上节课我给大家粗略介绍了一下剥夺说 Last time I sketched the deprivation account.
这是一种说法或是一个理论 That's a story or theory about
指出死亡为什么是坏事 what it is about death that makes it bad.
死亡是坏事是因为 What's bad about death is the fact that,
当你死去 当你不再存在 because you're dead, because you don't exist,
生活中的美好事物都离你而去 you're deprived of the good things in life.
从本质上来说 死亡并不坏 Being dead isn't intrinsically bad.
它不像是一段不愉快的经历 It's not like it's an unpleasant experience.
但相比较而言 它就是坏事 But it's comparatively bad.
之所以这么说是因为 You're worse off by virtue of the fact
你得不到你活着时能得到的东西 that you're not getting the things that you would get, were you still alive.
如果我死了 我就不能和爱人在一起 If I'm dead I can't spend time with my loved ones.
不能看日落 不能听音乐 I can't look at sunsets. I can't listen to music.
不能讨论哲学 I can't discuss philosophy.
剥夺说认为 The deprivation account says,
死亡是坏事是因为 what's bad about death is the fact
你失去了生活中美好的事物 that you're deprived of the good things in life.
乍看起来很有道理 Now, that seems pretty plausible, as a basic story goes.
但就像我们上节课看到的 But as we also saw last time,
在哲学上 这里面有些疑问 there are some philosophical puzzles about how it could be.
比如在什么时候 死亡对你来说是坏事 The question of when is death bad for you,
更重要更根本的是 and even more importantly and more essentially,
我们很难确定 there's the difficulty of asking ourselves,
我们是否真相信 do we really believe it's possible for
当你不存在了 还会有事情对你是坏事 something to be bad for you, when you don't even exist?
我们面临一系列困难的选择 We saw a series of difficult choices.
如果我们不引入"存在前提" If we don't throw in an existence requirement,
如果我们不说 我还是用肯定语气吧 if we don't say--to put it more positively,
如果我们说 即使你完全不存在 if we say things can be bad for you
还会有事情对你是坏事 even if you don't exist at all,
那我们就必须承认 then we're forced to say
对拉里来说有些事是坏事 that things are bad for Larry.
拉里是我们给潜在的人起的名字 You'll recall that larry was our name for a potential person,
他们可能存在 somebody who could have come into existence
但从来没有也从来不会存在 but never actually does or will come into existence.
说到失去生活中美好事物的人们 Well, talk about people who are deprived of the good things in life,
拉里就完全失去了这一切 Larry's completely deprived of the good things in life.
如果我们认为你是否存在 If we think it doesn't matter whether or not you exist,
不影响是否有事情对你是坏事 for things to be bad for you,
那我们就会说 then we have to say,
"这事儿对拉里来讲太糟糕了" "Oh, things are bad for Larry."
不仅对拉里如此 And not just Larry,
对十五亿亿亿亿 but all of the 1.5 million, billion, billion, billion
从未出生的人都是如此 never-to-be-born people.
这一类人的数目大得惊人 The number of potential people is just staggering.
倘若我们摒弃"存在前提" And if we throw away an existence requirement,
我们就必须承认这是道义上的悲剧 we have to say it's a moral tragedy of
对无数从没来到人世 unspeakable proportions that these people are never born,
从没存在过的人的悲剧 that they never come into existence.
如今 有些哲学家就准备接受这种说法 Now, there are philosophers who are prepared to say that.
但如果你不打算这样做的话 But if you're not prepared to say that,
那你恐怕就得接受 it looks as though you've got to accept
某一种形式的"存在前提" some kind of existence requirement.
为什么我们对拉里以及 Why don't we feel sorry for Larry
他数以万亿计从没出生的同胞不感到难过 and his billions upon billions of never-to-be-born compatriots?
这是因为 事实上他们并不存在 Because, indeed, they don't exist.
他们只不过是一种可能性 They're merely possible.
我们可能会说 And we might say,
你必须存在才会有事情对你是坏事 you've got to exist in order for something to be bad for you.
但当我们说这话的时候 But once we say that,
我们好像就近似于承认 it seems we're running towards the position that,
死亡对我来讲不会是坏事 因为很明显 in that case, death can't be bad for me, because of course,
当我死了 我就不存在了 when I'm dead, I don't exist.
怎么会有事情对我是坏事呢 So how can anything be bad for me?
上节课最后 我提出 I proposed at the end of class last time
我们可以 that we could try to solve this problem
通过区分 by distinguishing between
两种不同的"存在前提"来解决这个问题 two versions of the existence requirement--
宽泛前提和严格前提 a more modest version and the bolder version.
严格前提说的是 The bolder version says,
"有事情对你是坏事 "In order for something to be bad for you,
当且仅当它发生时你存在" you've got to exist at the very time that it's happening."
如果我们这样说 那么我们确实可以说 If we say that, then indeed, we can say,
"拉里从没来到人世不是坏事 "It's not bad that Larry doesn't exist,
因为他现在不存在" because he doesn't exist now."
那么没有任何事情 So there's nothing--
即使我们想到 even if we wanted to think
他可能会拥有一些美好的东西 that there are good things he could be having,
但没有这些对他也不是坏事 that's not bad for him to not have them.
因为他现在不存在 He doesn't exist now.
但同样 But it also,
如果我们坚持存在的严格前提 if we go all the way to the bold existence requirement,
我们就得承认 we have to say,
"当我死了 死亡对我就不是坏事 "Look, when I'm dead that won't be bad for me,
因为我那时已经不存在了" because, well, I won't exist then."
除了接受存在的严格前提 But instead of accepting the bold existence requirement,
我们也可以选择要求少点的前提 we might settle for something a little bit less demanding,
我叫它"宽泛前提" the thing I dub "The modest existence requirement."
有事情对你是坏事 In order for something to be bad for you,
当且仅当你在一段时间内存在过 there has to have been a time, some time or the other, when you exist.
你需要 You've got to, as it were,
至少存在一段时间 进入圈子中 exist at least briefly in order to get into the club,
我们把我们关心的人 as we might put it, of those creatures,
生活过 牵动我们心绪的人 those possible creatures
放在这个圈子里 that we care about and are concerned about morally.
你必须至少存在过一段时间 You have to have gotten in the club
才能进入这个圈子 by at least having existed for some period of time.
但你一旦进入这个圈子 But once you're in the club,
有些事情对你就会是坏事了 things can be bad for you,
即使你在它发生的那一刻并不存在 even if you don't happen to exist at that particular moment.
如果我们接受宽泛前提 If we accept the modest existence requirement,
那我们就可以说 then we can say,
拉里没生下来不是件坏事 it's not bad that Larry doesn't exist,
因为 拉里没进入这个圈子 because, well, Larry doesn't get into the club.
要想进入我们会为你难过的圈子 In order to get into the club of things that we feel sorry for,
你必须存在过一段时间 you have to have existed at least some moment or the other.
拉里和其他 Larry and the billions upon
数以万亿亿亿计的潜在的人 billions upon billions of potential people
那些从没存在过的人 who never actually come into existence,
他们没有满足存在过一段时间这一条件 they don't satisfy the requirement of having existed at some time or the other.
所以我们不为他们感到难过 So we don't have to feel sorry for them.
但我们会对 But we can feel sorry for somebody
上周去世的10岁的孩子感到难过 who died last week at the age of 10 because we can say,
他们存在过 哪怕时间很短 well, they existed, albeit very briefly.
所以他在我们为之难过的圈子里 And so they're in the club of beings that we can feel sorry for and say,
他们没能继续活下去对他们是件坏事 look, it's bad for them that they're not still alive.
想想生活中美好的事情 Think of all the good things in life
如果他们还活着他们还会享受到的 they would be getting if they were still alive.
所以宽泛前提 So the modest existence requirement
使我们避免了非左即右的困境 allows us to avoid both extremes.
或许这就是我们应该采取的立场 Maybe then that's the position that we should accept.
总的来说 它可能是最好的立场了 It may be, on balance, the best possible view here.
但我也想强调 But I just want to emphasize
即使是宽泛前提 that even the modest existence requirement
也有它有悖常理的一面 is not without its counterintuitive implications.
比如一个人的一生 Consider somebody's life.
假设一个人愉快地生活了很长时间 Suppose that somebody's got a nice long life.
从出生 一直活到 Comes into existence, leads--
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90岁 lives 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 years.
美好的一生 Nice life.
现在 设想若我们不让 Now, imagine that we bring
他们活到90岁 it about that instead of living 90 years,
让他们活得稍微短一点 they have a somewhat shorter life--
10 20 30 40 50岁 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 years.
我们让他们50岁就死了 We've caused them to die after 50 years as opposed
不让他们像以前那样活到90岁 to the 90 years they might have otherwise had.
那么 我们可以说 Well, we can say, look,
对他们来讲 that's worse for them--
仅仅活了50岁而不是90岁是一件坏事 to live merely 50 years instead of the full 90 or 100 years.
如果我们接受宽泛前提 And if we accept the modest existence requirement,
我们可以说 不管如何 we can say that, because after all,
不管你活了50岁还是90岁 whether you live 50 years or 90 years,
你确实活过一段时间 you did exist at some time or the other.
所以你失去了 So the fact that you lost
本来应该有的40年岁月 the 40 years you otherwise would have gotten,
这对你来讲是件坏事 well, that's bad for you.
还蛮有道理的 There. Fair enough.
这就是我们想要的答案 That gives us the answer we want.
这种说法符合常理 That's not counterintuitive.
现在 设想他没活到50岁 Now, imagine that instead of living 50 years,
他只活到10岁 20岁就死了 the person lives only 10, 20 years and then dies.
这就更糟了 Well, that's worse still.
想象一下如果他们没死 Think of all the extra goods
会得到多少美好的东西 they would have gotten if only they hadn't died then.
如果我让他们 And if I caused them to
活了20岁而不是50岁或90岁就死了 die after 20 years instead of 50 or 90 years,
我就把事情弄得更坏了 I've made things worse and worse.
想象我让他们活了一岁就死了 Imagine that I caused them to die after one year.
事情更坏 这一切都符合常理 Worse still. All this is perfectly intuitive.
他们活得越短 事情就越坏 The shorter their life, the worse it is for them,
他们失去生活中美好的事物就越多 the more they're deprived of the good things in life.
所以 90岁的一生 还不坏 So 90-year life, not bad.
50岁的一生 坏事 50-year life, worse.
10岁的一生 更坏 10-year life, worse still.
一岁的一生 更坏 One-year life, worse still.
一个月的一生 更坏 One-month life, worse still.
一天的一生 更坏 One day life, worse still.
一分钟的一生 更坏 One-minute life, worse still.
一秒钟的一生 更坏 One-second life, worse still.
现在 如果我让他 Now, imagine that I bring it about
从来没存在过 that the person never comes into existence at all.
哦 那就不是坏事了 Oh, that's fine.
看到没 这就是宽泛前提 See? That's the implication
有悖常理的一面 of accepting the modest existence requirement.
如果我们缩短他们的生命 直到 If I shortened the life they would have had so completely
他们从没出生过 that they never get born at all,
或者他们从没存在过 or they never come into existence at all,
那他们就无法满足 then they don't satisfy the requirement of
至少存在过一段时间这一条件 having existed at some time or the other.
所以尽管我们通过缩短他们的生命 So although we were making things worse
使得事情变得越来越糟糕 and worse and worse and worse and worse as we shortened the life,
但当我们缩短到最后一秒钟的最后一刻 when we finally snip out that last little fraction of a second,
突然间我们就没有使事情变得更坏 it turns out we didn't make things worse at all.
我们就从没做过任何对人有害的事情了 Now we haven't done anything objectionable.
如果你接受存在的宽泛前提 That's, it seems, what you've got to say
你似乎就得这么说 if you accept the modest existence requirement.
当然 如果你从来不接受"存在前提" Of course, if we didn't have an existence requirement at all,
你就可以说 "看吧 we could say, "Well look,
从没出生过是最坏的事情" worst of all, never to have been born at all."
说得没错 Fair enough.
但如果你这样说 But if you say that,
你就一定会对拉里感到难过 then you've got to feel sorry for Larry.
你就会对十五亿亿亿亿 You've got to feel sorry for the 1.5
(潜在的人)感到难过 million billion, billion, billions.
所以总的来说 So which view is it that on balance is the--
我不想说"最有道理的" I don't want to say "Most plausible."
当我们开始思考这些迷题时 I think when we start thinking about these puzzles,
各种选择都很牵强 every alternative seems unattractive in its own way.
所以我们只能期待 Maybe the most we could hope for is,
找到"最不无道理的"说法 which is the least implausible thing to say here?
我也不是很有把握 I'm not altogether certain.
让我们再来谈一个有关剥夺说的 Let me turn to one more trouble or problem
问题或者疑难 or puzzle for the deprivation account.
这个问题和我们是否 And this particular puzzle arises whether or not
接受"存在前提" we accept an existence requirement,
是否接受严格前提 whether or not we accept a bold existence requirement,
还是宽泛前提 a modest existence requirement,
还是不接受"存在前提"都无关 or no existence requirement,
因为这里讨论的 because we're going to deal with somebody
是存在过一段时间的人 who actually does exist at some time or the other,
比如你 或者我 namely you or me.
其实有些同学在作业里 This is actually a puzzle
已经写到了这个问题 that some of you may have written your paper on,
卢克莱修 古罗马哲学家及诗人 because it's the puzzle about Lucretius,
它是卢克莱修的问题 the puzzle that Lucretius gives us.
卢克莱修提出的问题 It's not a direct quote,
这段话不是原话 but Lucretius basically says,
但他主要意思是这样的 look, most of us are upset and anxious
看 大部分人对我们将要死去 at the fact that we're going to die.
都感到不安和焦虑 We think death is bad for us.
我们认为死亡是坏事 There'll be this period after my death in which I won't exist.
我死后会有一段时间我不存在 And the deprivation account helps say why that's bad,
剥夺说告诉我们为什么它是坏事 because during this period of nonexistence,
因为在我不存在的这段时间里 you're not enjoying the good things in life.
我享受不到生活中美好的事物 Fair enough, says Lucretius,
说得有道理 卢克莱修说 but wait a minute.
但是等一下 The period after you die isn't the only period during
你死后的这段时间不是你不存在的 which you don't exist.
唯一的时间 It's not the only period in which
它不是唯一的一段时间 if only you were still alive,
只要你还活着 you could still be enjoying the good things in life.
你就可以享受到生活中美好的事物 There's another period of nonexistence.
还有一段你不存在的时间 It's the period before my birth.
就是你出生前的时间 I think I've just switched the timeline here, but all right.
我想我弄反了时间轴 不过没关系 Imagine this is the period before my birth.
想象一下这是你出生前的时间 Just like there'll be an infinite period
就如同我死后会有 after my death in which I won't exist,
一段无穷无尽的时间我不存在一样 and realizing that fills us with dismay,
它给我带来惊恐和绝望 there was, of course,
在我出生前 an infinite period before I came into existence.
也会有一段无穷无尽的时间我不存在 Well, if nonexistence is so bad
如果不存在是如此可怕 and by the deprivation account it seems
根据剥夺说 that we want to say that it is,
我们会说它很可怕 shouldn't I be upset at the fact
那么我是不是也应该对 that there was this eternity before I was born?
我出生前的漫长时间感到害怕 But, says Lucretius,
但卢克莱修说 that's silly, right?
这很愚蠢 不是吗 Nobody's upset about the fact
没有人会为 that there was an eternity before they were born.
他们出生前的漫长时间感到害怕 In which case, it doesn't make any sense
这样的话 那对死后不存在的 to be upset about the eternity after you die of nonexistence.
漫长时间感到害怕也是毫无道理的 Well, Lucretius doesn't offer this as a puzzle.
卢克莱修没把这一说法当问题 Lucretius offers this as an argument
他提出这点是作为论据 that we should not be concerned about the fact that we're going to die.
论证我们不应对我们将会死去感到担忧 Most philosophers aren't willing to go with
大多数哲学家不完全接受 Lucretius all the way to the end of the bus, bus route.
卢克莱修的论证 Most philosophers want to say
大多数哲学家想说 there's got to be something wrong with that argument someplace.
这个论证里肯定有些地方有问题 There's got to be some--
肯定会有些问题 Well, what are the possibilities here?
这里都有什么可能性 One possibility is indeed to just agree with him, right?
一种可能当然就是同意他的论证 Nothing bad about the eternity before I was born.
我出生前的漫长时间并不可怕 So, nothing bad--of the eternity of nonexistence.
所以这段我不存在的漫长时间并不可怕 So nothing bad about the eternity of nonexistence after I die.
所以我死后不存在的漫长时间也不可怕 That's one possibility, to agree with Lucretius.
这是一种可能 即同意卢克莱修的说法 Second possibility is to say,
第二种可能性是说 look, Lucretius, you're right.
卢克莱修 你是对的 We really do need to treat these
我们确实需要同样对待 two eternities of nonexistence on a par.
这两种我不存在的漫长时间 But we could turn it around.
但我们可以换一种说法 Instead of saying with Lucretius,
不采用卢克莱修的说法 nothing bad about this one,
即 这种不是坏事 so nothing bad about this one,
所以这种也不是坏事 maybe we should say instead,
我们换一种说法 something bad about the one after we die,
我们死后的这段时间是坏事 and so something bad about the one before we were born.
所以我们出生前的这段时间也是坏事 Maybe we should just stick to the deprivation account
或许我们应该坚持剥夺说 and not lose faith in it.
不要对它失去信心 The deprivation account says
剥夺说告诉我们 it's bad that there's this period after we die,
死后的这段时间是坏事 because if only we weren't dead then,
因为如果我们不死 we would still be able to enjoy the good things in life.
我们就可以继续享受生活中美好的事物 Maybe we should say, look, similarly then,
或许你可以说 类似地 when the deprivation account tells us
剥夺说告诉我们 it's bad that there's this period
我们出生前的这段时间 before we come into existence, when we don't exist.
当我们不存在时 也是坏事 Because if only we had existed then,
因为只要我们存在 we'd be able to enjoy the good things in life.
我们就能享受生活中美好的事物 Maybe Lucretius was right,
或许卢克莱修是对的 we have to treat both periods the same.
我们要同样看待这两段时间 But he's wrong in thinking
但他错在认为我们不该把 we shouldn't think either period is bad.
这两段时间都想成坏事 Maybe we should think both periods are bad.
也许我们应该把这两段时间都想成坏事 Well, that's a possibility.
这也是一种可能性 What other possibilities are there?
还有什么其它可能性呢 Another possibility is to say,
有种可能性是说 Lucretius, you're right,
卢克莱修 你是对的 there are two periods of nonexistence,
确实有两种我不存在的漫长时期 but there's a justification for treating them differently.
但是有理由区别对待它们 They're asymmetrical in a way that makes sense
从我们关心的事情上来讲 from the point of view of what we should care about.
它们的意义不同 Well, it's easy to say that.
这么说说很容易 The puzzle--most philosophers want to take that last way out.
很多哲学家想借此一劳永逸解决这个问题 They want to say there's something that explains
他们想要指出 why it makes sense, why it's reasonable
为什么这样做是有意义的 有道理的 to care about the eternity of nonexistence after my death,
为什么要关心死后无穷无尽的时间 but where that doesn't apply to the eternity of nonexistence before my birth.
而不是关心出生前无穷无尽的时间 And then the puzzle is to
现在 解决这个问题就变成 point to a difference that would justify
要找出区别对待这两类时间 that kind of rationally asymmetrical treatment of the two periods.
的理由或是证明 It's easy to say it's okay,
简单说这么做是对的 it's reasonable to treat them differently.
或者说它有道理都很容易 The philosophical challenge is to point to something
但哲学家面临的问题是要找出 that explains or justifies that.
对此的解释或者证明 Now, a very common response is to say something like this.
一种常见的回答是说 Look, consider the period after my death.
我死后的这段时间 I'm no longer alive. I have lost my life.
我不再活着 我失去了生命 In contrast,
与此相反 the period before my birth,
我出生前的这段时间 although I'm not alive,
尽管我也没活着 I have not lost my life.
但我没有失去生命 I have never yet been alive.
我还从来没有过生命 And so, of course,
所以 显然 you can't lose something you've never yet had.
你不可能失去你从没有过的东西 So what's worse, this answer suggests, about the period after death
为什么死后这段时间是坏事呢 is the fact that death involves loss,
这个回答说 因为死亡包含损失 whereas prenatal nonexistence does not involve loss.
而出生前不存在的时间不包含损失 And so, the conclusion comes,
所以 结论出来了 and now we see why it's okay to care more about that one
我们为什么要更关注这段时间 than this one,
而不是这段时间 the one after death and the one before birth.
更关注死后的时间而不是出生前的时间 Because the one after death involves loss,
因为死后的时间包含损失 and the one before birth does not.
出生前的时间不包含损失 Very, very common response,
非常常见的回答 but I'm inclined to think that can't be an adequate answer.
但我个人认为这不是令人满意的回答 It's true, of course, that this period involves loss,
说这一时期包含损失当然是对的 because the very definition of "Loss" Is,
因为"损失"的定义就是 you don't have something that at an earlier time you did have.
你失去了你以前拥有的东西 So this period involves loss.
所以这一时期包含损失 But the period before birth does not involve loss,
但是出生前的时间不包含损失 because although I don't have life,
因为尽管我没有生命 I haven't, previous to the period, had life,
但在这一时期之前我也没有生命 so I haven't lost anything.
所以我没有失去任何东西 Of course, there's another thing
但是还有一件事 that's true about this prenatal period, to wit,
在出生前的时期也是成立的 I don't have life and I'm going to get it.
我没有生命但我即将拥有生命 So I don't yet have something that's going to come in the future.
我没有一些我即将拥有的东西 That's not true about the post-life period.
这一点在死亡后的时期不成立 I've lost life.
我已经失去生命了 But it's not true of this period that I don't have life
在这一时间期我不是没有生命 and I'm going to get it in the future.
然后得到生命 So this period involves loss.
所以这一时期包含损失 Interesting. In fact,
很有意思的是 we don't have a name for this other state,
在这种状态下 我们没有一个词来描绘 where you don't yet have something that you'll get later,
你现在没有 虽然你将来要有 but you don't yet have it.
但是你现在还没有 Let's call that, not loss,
我们叫它 不叫损失 let's call it "Schmoss," Okay?
叫"尚无"好吗 So during this period, there's a loss of life,
所以在这一时期 你失去了生命 but no schmoss of life.
但你并不是"尚无"生命 And in this period,
在这一时期 there's no loss of life,
你没有失去生命 but there's a schmoss of life.
但你"尚无"生命 And now we need to ask, as philosophers,
作为哲学家 我们需要问一下 why do we care more about loss of life
我们为什么更关心失去生命 than schmoss of life?
而不是"尚无"生命 What is it about the fact
为什么 that we don't have something that we used to,
我们失去我们已有的东西 that makes it worse than not having something that we're going to?
比我们没得到本该得到的东西更坏 It's easy to overlook the symmetry here,
我们很容易忽略这种类比 because we've got this nice word "Loss,"
因为我们有"损失"这个词 and we don't have this word "Schmoss."
但没有"尚无"这个词 But that's not really explaining anything,
不过它没有解释任何事 it's just pointing to the thing that needs explaining.
它只是指出了应该解释的事情 Why do we care more about not having
为什么我们更关心失去 what once upon a time we did,
以前拥有的东西 than we care about not having what once upon a time we will?
而不关心没有得到本来将要得到的东西 Well, there's some other proposals that we might make.
还有一些其它说法我们也要讨论 A couple of them have actually been
有些是在 sketched in some of your reading.
你们的阅读材料里 So for example, Tom Nagel ,
比如 汤姆·内格尔 in his essay on death says,
汤姆·内格尔 美国哲学家 目前任教于纽约大学 look, here's the difference.
在他关于死亡的文章里说 It's easy enough to imagine--
看 这就是区别 and indeed for there to actually be a possibility of--
很简单 只要想象 my living longer.
当然也确实有这个可能 Suppose I die at the age of 80 and if I didn't die,
我活得更长 then I'd continue living 90, 100, what have you.
假设我80岁死了 如果我没死 There it is. It's still me.
我会接着活到90 100岁 When you imagine me with an earlier--
这人始终是我 rather with living longer,
当你想象我 you're imagining me living longer.
比如说活得更长 To use the vocabulary that we introduced
你是在想象我活得更长 in thinking about some of Plato's arguments,
用我们讨论 we might say although --
柏拉图时的术语就是 suppose I die at age 80--that's a fact about me,
你可以说 尽管 it's a contingent fact about me.
假设我80岁死了 对我来讲是个事实 It's not a necessary fact about me that I died at 80.
但这是个偶然的事实 Suppose at 80 I get hit by a car.
我80岁死掉不是必然的事实 It's not a necessary truth about me that I got hit by a car.
假设我80岁时被车撞了 I could have not gotten hit by a car,
但是我被车撞不是一个必然发生的事 and lived to the ripe old age of 90 or 100.
我也可能没被车撞 When you die is not an essential feature of you,
活到了90或者100岁 so it's easy for us to think about the possibility
你何时死亡并不是你的基本特征 in which I live longer.
所以我们可以很容易想象 But, says Nagel,
我能活得更长 when I try to imagine what would the alternative be,
但是 内格尔说 if I'm going to be upset about the prenatal nonexistence,
当我想象另一个情形时 we have to imagine my being born earlier.
如果我对我出生前的时间感到不安 I was born in 1954.
我们可以想象一下让我早点出生 Should I be upset about the fact
我出生在1954年 that I was born in 1954 instead of 1944?
我是否该对我出生在1954年 That's the analog of being upset about the fact
而不是1944年感到不安 that I die in whatever it is,
这和我对于 2044 instead of living to 2054.
我是在2044年死 Nagel says, but look, when you try to think about the possibility
还是在2054年死感到不安是类似的 in which instead of being born in 1954,
内格尔说 但是 当你想象自己 I was born in 1944--and for the rest of you,
不是在1954年出生 you've got to plug in your own birthdates--
而是在1944年出生 你们 Nagel says you can't do it.
可以填进自己的生日 The date of my death is a contingent fact about me.
内格尔说你无法这样想象 But the date of my birth is not a contingent fact about me.
我死亡的日期对我来讲是偶然事件 And by birth we don't really mean
但我出生日期对我来讲不是偶然事件 when I came out of the womb.
我们提到出生不是指 That could be changed,
我从子宫出来的那一刻 perhaps by having been delivered prematurely,
这个时刻可以变化 or through caesarean, or what have you.
比如早产 We really mean the time at which I come into existence.
或者剖腹产 等等 Let's suppose it's the time when the egg and the sperm join.
我们是指我真正存在的那一刻 That's not a contingent moment in my story.
我们假设这是精子卵子结合的那一刻 That's an essential moment in my life story.
对我来讲这不是一个偶然时刻 How could that be?
在我生命里这是一个必然时刻 We say, couldn't my parents have had sex earlier,
为什么这么说 10 years earlier? Sure they could have.
难道我父母不能早点做爱吗 But remember, if they had had sex 10 years earlier,
比如10年前 他们当然可能 it would have been a different egg
但是记住 如果他们在10年前做爱 and a different sperm coming together,
那就会是另一个卵子 so it wouldn't be me.
和另一个精子结合 It would be some sibling of mine that,
所以那就不是我了 as it happens, never got born.
会是我的哥哥或者姐姐 But if, had they had sex 10 years earlier,
确实这样 他们从没出生 some sibling would have been born.
但是如果 他们在10年前做爱 That's not me being born earlier.
我的哥哥或姐姐出生了 Different sperm, different egg makes for a different person.
那也不是我提前出生了 So you can't--you can say the words,
不同的精子 不同的卵子 不同的人 "If only I'd been born earlier,"
所以你不能 你可以看这句话 but it's not actually metaphysically possible.
"如果我能早点出生的话"[虚拟语气] Well, it's an intriguing suggestion,
但在形而上学上没有这种可能性 but I think it can't quite be right,
这是一个有趣的提法 or at the very least,
但我觉得它不完全正确 it cannot be the complete story
或者至少 about how to answer Lucretius' puzzle.
它不是关于 Suppose we've got a fertility clinic
卢克莱修问题的彻底回答 that has some sperm on hold,
想象我们有一个生育医疗中心 and has some eggs on hold,
保存了一些精子 in the sperm bank, in the egg bank, what have you.
和一些卵子 And they keep them here frozen
在精子库或者卵子库里 until they're ready to use them.
它们被冷冻起来 And they thaw them out in whatever it is, 2020.
直到使用的时候 And then the person's born.
他们把它 比如说在2020年融化开 Of course, he could go back.
然后这个人出生了 He could look back and say,
他当然可以回顾 if only they had put my sperm and egg together 10 years earlier.
他回顾一下然后说 That would still be me.
如果他们提前10年把精子和卵子结合 After all, very same sperm, very same egg,
那个人依然是我 makes for the very same person.
毕竟 同一个精子 同一个卵子 So if only they had combined my sperm
同一个人 and egg 10 years earlier,
所以只要他们把精子和卵子 I would have been born 10 years earlier.
提前10年结合 Well, so Nagel's wrong in saying it's not possible
我就能早出生10年了 to imagine being born earlier.
所以内格尔说提前出生是不可能的 In at least some cases, it is.
他说错了 Yet, if we imagine somebody like this,
至少在某些情况下 是可能的 somebody who's an offspring of this kind of fertility clinic,
如果我们想象有个人 and we ask, would they be upset
在这个生殖医疗中心出生 that they weren't born earlier?
如果我们问他 again, it still seems as though most people would say,
没早点出生他感到不安吗 "No, of course not."
同样 大多数人可能都会回答 So the Nagel answer doesn't seem
"不 当然不了" to me to be an adequate one.
所以内格尔的回答 Well, there's another possible answer.
在我看来 并不充分 This is Fred Feldman's answer,
还有一种可能的回答 also in the one of the papers that you've read.
来自弗雷德·费尔德曼 Fred Feldman says--
弗雷德·费尔德曼 当代美国哲学家 现执教于马萨诸塞大学阿姆赫斯特分校 Nagel's a contemporary philosopher,
同样在你们的阅读材料里 Fred Feldman's a contemporary philosopher.
弗雷德·费尔德曼说 Feldman says, when I imagine...
内格尔是当代的哲学家 Suppose I get killed by the bus in 2044,
弗雷德·费尔德曼也是当代的哲学家 and if I imagine if only I hadn't died then,
费尔德曼说 当我想象 what is it that we imagine?
假设2044年我被一辆公共汽车撞死了 We imagine instead of living 80 years,
如果我想象我那时没死 living 90 or 95 or more.
我们到底在想象什么 We imagine a longer life.
我们在想象我们不是活了80岁 But what is it that happens when I say,
而是活了90或者95岁或者更多 if only I'd been born earlier?
我们想象的是更长的生命 Well, says Feldman,
但当我说我希望早些出生时 you don't actually imagine a longer life,
到底发生了什么 you just shift the entire life and start it earlier.
费尔德曼说 After all, suppose we just said--especially
你实际上不是在想象一个更长的生命 if I had asked you this question
你只是平移了生命让它早开始一些 before setting all of this up--
所以想一想 but if only you'd been born in 1800.
特别是在听到这些东西之前 Nobody thinks, "Oh, if only I'd been born in 1800,
如果我问你 I'd still be alive.
你要是生在1800年会如何 I'd be 200 years old."
没有人会想 "如果我1800年出生 You think, "Oh, if I'd been born in 1800,
我现在肯定还活着 I would have died in 1860, 1870,
我现在都200岁了" 1880," Whatever it is.
你会想 "如果我1800年出生 When we imagine being born earlier,
我会在1860 1870 we don't imagine a longer life.
或是1880年死去" Nothing better about having a life earlier,
当我们想象早些出生的时候 according to the deprivation account.
我们不是在想象一个更长的生命 But when we imagine not dying when we actually die,
生得早一点没有任何好处 we say, "If only I died in 2050
剥夺说会得出这样的结论 instead of 2040,"
但当我们死后却想象自己没死的时候 it's not that we imagine having been born later.
我们说 "如果我不是2040年 We don't shift the life forward.
而是2050年才死" We imagine a longer life.
这和我们想象早些出生不同 So, Feldman says, no wonder, no surprise
我们没有把生命向前平移 that you care about the nonexistence after death.
我们想象的是一个更长的生命 Because when you imagine that being different,
所以 费尔德曼说 毫无疑问 you imagine a longer life.
你关心死后不存在的日子 But when you start thinking about
因为当你想象能有什么不同时 the nonexistence before birth and you imagine that being different,
你在想象更长的生命 you don't imagine more goods in life,
但当你开始思考 you just imagine them taking place at a different time.
出生前不存在的日子能有什么不同时 Well, that's an interesting possibility, I suppose.
你并没有想象生活中更好的事情 It doesn't seem to me--again,
你只是想象它们发生在不同的时间 that it's got to be--maybe it's part of the story,
我觉得这是个很有意思的解释 but it doesn't seem like it's going to be the complete story.
但是同样 Because we could imagine cases where the person just thinks,
或许它只是部分的回答 look, if only I'd been born earlier,
但看起来不像是彻底的回答 I would have had a longer life.
因为我们可以想象出来人们会这样想 Let's suppose that next week
如果我能早生出来 astronomers discover the horrible fact that there's an asteroid
我就能拥有一个更长的生命 that's about to land on the Earth and wipe out all life.
假设下周 So here it is, it's going to come on January 1, 2008.
天文学家发现一颗可怕的小行星 And there you are, at whatever your age is,
就要撞击地球消灭一切生物 20 years old, 21 years old,
比如说 2008年1月1日就要撞击 on January-on December 31, 2008 thinking,
那个时候 不管你多少岁 I've only had 20 years of life.
20岁 21岁 If only I'd been born earlier.
在2007年12月31日都会想 If only, instead of being born, whenever it was,
我只活了20岁 I'd been born 10 years earlier,
如果我能早点生出来 I would have had 30 years of life instead of 20 years of life.
如果我能 比如说 That seems perfectly intelligible.
早生出来10年 So it does seem as though, if we put our head into it,
我现在就不是活了20岁而是30岁了 we can get ourselves into thought experiments where we say,
这点非常清楚 yeah, don't just shift the life, make it longer.
所以看来 如果我们深入研究 But instead of making it longer in the post-death direction,
我们可以进行这个思想实验 make it longer in the pre-birth direction.
提出不仅是平移时间 而且是延长时间 Again, you can imagine somebody saying,
只不过不向死后延长 "Yeah, and when we do that, we should feel the same."
而是向出生前延长 It doesn't really matter which direction it goes.
同样 你可以想象有人会说 So symmetry is the right answer after all.
"当我们这样做的时候 感觉是一样的" When I think about the asteroid example,
向哪个方向延长不重要 I find myself thinking, huh,
所以正确答案是同等对待这两类时间 maybe symmetry is the right way to go here.
当我想到小行星的例子时 Maybe Feldman's right,
我发现自己在想 that normally we just shift instead of extending.
或许同等对待是正确的 But if I'm careful to extend,
或许费尔德曼是对的 maybe that really is bad that
我们通常只想着平移而非延长时间 I didn't get started sooner
但如果我注意到延长生命 and have a longer life in that direction.
或许没早点生出来 Well, here's one other answer that's been proposed.
没向那个方向延长生命 This is by yet another contemporary philosopher, Derek Parfit.
还真是件坏事 Parfit says, it's true that
好了 下面是另一种解释来自 when I think about the nonexistence after I die,
另一位当代哲学家 德里克·帕菲特 that's loss,
帕菲特说 确实 whereas the nonexistence before I'm born,
当我想到死后不存在的时间 that's not loss, that's mere schmoss.
我想到的是损失 And it's true that we need an explanation
当我想到出生前不存在的时间 about why loss is worse than schmoss.
我想到的不是损失而是尚无 But we can see that this
所以我们确实需要说明 is not an arbitrary preference on our part,
为什么损失比尚无更坏 because in fact, it's part of a quite general pattern
但我们可以看到 we have of caring about the future
这不是我们凭空想象出的不同 in a way that we don't care about the past.
事实上 这是很普遍的想法 This is a very deep fact about human caring.
我们更关心未来 We are oriented towards the future
而不关心过去 and concerned about what happens in it,
这是人类关注事物的本性 in a way that we're not oriented
我们面向未来 and concerned about what happened in the past.
关心未来会发生什么 Parfit's got a very nice example to bring the point home.
而不是面向过去 He says, imagine that you've got some condition,
关心过去发生过什么 some medical condition that will kill you
帕菲特举了个很好的例子说明这一点 unless you have an operation.
他说 假如你生病了 So fair enough, you're going to have the operation.
这病会要你的命 This will allow you to live your life.
除非动手术才能治好 Unfortunately, in order to perform the operation,
所以很明显 你要动手术 they can't have you anesthetized.
手术能让你活下去 You have to be awake,
遗憾的是 做这个手术时 perhaps in order to tell the surgeon
你不能麻醉 "Yeah, that's where it hurts," Whatever it is.
你要一直保持清醒 Sort of like when the dentist pokes and says,
也许是为了告诉医生 "Does this hurt? Does that hurt?"
"对 就是这里疼" 如此这般 So you've got to be awake during the operation
就像牙医边戳边问 and it's a very painful operation.
"这里疼吗 那里疼吗" We can't give you pain killer,
所以你在手术中要保持清醒 because then you won't be able to point out,
不过这是个非常痛苦的手术 does this hurt, does that hurt, and so forth and so on.
我们无法为你减轻疼痛 Since we can't give you pain killer,
因为如果那样 你就无法指出病灶 all we can do is this.
这里疼还是那里疼 诸如此类 So, you'll be awake during this,
由于我们无法为你减轻疼痛 basically being tortured.
我们只有这样做 You'll be awake being tortured.
所以 手术中你会保持清醒 It's still worth doing it,
基本上就是在受折磨 because this will cure the condition,
在折磨中你会一直清醒 so then you'll have a nice long life.
但这是值得的 Since we can't give you pain killers
因为这能治好你的病 and we can't put you out,
你将会有一个美好悠长的人生 all we're going to do is,
由于我们无法为你减轻疼痛 what we will do is this:
也不能给你麻醉 After the operation is over,
我们要做的是 we'll give you this very powerful medication,
我们将要做的是 which will give you short-term,
手术结束后 sort of very localized, amnesia.
给你吃一种很高效的药物 You won't remember anything about the operation itself.
会使你忘记短期的 So you won't have to at least to dwell
特定时间内发生的事情 upon these horrible memories of having been tortured.
你将不记得任何有关手术的事情 Those will be completely wiped out.
所以你至少不会记得 Okay, so painful operation.
遭受过可怕的折磨 You're awake during it.
这些记忆会全部抹去 After the operation,
所以在这段痛苦的手术中 you're given this thing that makes you forget
你一直保持清醒 whether you've had the operation,
手术后 anything about the operation at all.
你吃了药 然后你忘了 And that the preceding 24 hours will be completely wiped out.
自己曾经做过手术 So you're in the hospital
有关手术的一切都忘了 and you wake up and you ask yourself,
24小时之内的记忆都被抹去 "Huh, have I had the operation yet or not?"
所以你在医院里 Don't know, right? Because of course,
你醒来后问自己 if I haven't had it, no wonder I don't remember it,
"我做过手术了吗" but if I have had it,
你不可能知道 对吧 因为 I would have been given that temporary sort of localized amnesia.
如果我还没做 我当然没印象 So of course I wouldn't know whether or not I've had it.
但如果我做了 So you ask the nurse,
我就已经吃了那种短期定时失忆的药物 "Have I had the operation yet or not?" She says,
所以我同样没印象 "I don't know, we have a couple on the hall today who are,
于是你问护士 some of whom have had it
"我做过手术了吗" 她说 and some of whom are scheduled to have it later today.
"我不知道 今天有些人要做手术 I don't remember which one you are.
一些已经做了 Let me go look at your file.
一些要在今天晚些时候才做 I'll come back and I'll tell you."
我不知道你做没做 So she wanders off.
我去查一下你的病例 She's going to come back in a minute or two.
我等会儿回来告诉你" And as you're waiting for her to come back,
然后她离开了 you ask yourself,
她几分钟后会回来 what do you want the answer to be?
当你等着她回来的时候 Are you indifferent,
你问自己 or do you care whether you're one of the people who's already had it,
你希望的答案是什么呢 or somebody who hasn't yet had it?
你是否介意 Now, if you're like Parfit,
你是已经做完手术的呢 and for that matter, like me,
还是没做手术的 then you're going to say, of course I care.
如果你和帕菲特一样 I want it to be the case that
或者和我面对这件事时一样 I'm one of the people who's already had the operation.
那么你会说 我当然介意 I don't want to be one of the people who hasn't yet had the operation.
我希望 You might say, how can that make any sense?
我已经做完了手术 Your life's going to have the operation sooner or later.
我不希望我还没做手术 At some point in your life history,
你可能会说 这有什么区别 that operation is going to have occurred.
你迟早都是要做这个手术的 And so there's the same amount of pain and torture, regardless of
在你的生命长河里 whether you're one of the people that had it yesterday
终究是会发生这个手术的 or one of the people that's going to have it tomorrow.
所以不论你是今天还是明天 But for all that, says Parfit,
做了这个手术 the fact of the matter is perfectly plain,
你都要忍受同样分量的痛苦和折磨 that we do care.
但是尽管如此 帕菲特指出 We want the pain to be in the past.
事实非常清楚 We don't want the pain to be in the future.
我们确实介意 We care more about what's happening in the future
我们希望痛苦在以前发生 than we care about what's happening in the past.
我们不希望痛苦在将来发生 That being the case, no surprise
我们更关心未来会发生什么 we care about the nonexistence in the future in a way
而不是以前发生过什么 we don't care about the nonexistence in the past.
既然这样 那我们关心死后不存在的时间 Well, that may be right as far as explanation goes,
而非出生前不存在的时间 but we might still wonder whether or
也就一点也不奇怪了 not it's any kind of justification.
到目前为止 这种解释似乎是对的 The fact that we've got this deep-seated asymmetrical
但我们仍然会质疑 attitude towards time doesn't in any way,
这是否算是一种证明呢 as far as I can see,
我们根深蒂固地区别对待 yet tell us whether or not that's a justified attitude.
这两类时间的做法 Maybe evolution built us to care about the future
至少我目前看来 in a way that we don't care about the past
并没有证明任何事情 and this shows up in lots of places,
或许我们会进化成更关心未来 including Parfit's hospital case,
而不是关心过去 including our attitude towards loss versus schmoss, so forth and so on
这点体现在很多事情里 But the fact that we've got this attitude
包括帕菲特医院的例子 doesn't yet show that it's a rational attitude.
包括我们对损失和尚无不同的态度等等 How could we show that it's a rational attitude?
但我们抱这种态度 Well, maybe we'd have to
并不说明它就是理性的态度 start doing some heavy-duty metaphysics,
我们如何证明这是一种理性的态度 if what we've been doing so far
也许我们应该 isn't yet heavy-duty enough.
进行一些繁琐的形而上学研究 Maybe we need to talk about the difference between--
如果我们到目前为止 the metaphysical difference between the past and the future.
做的还不够的话 The past is fixed, the future is open,
也许我们需要分辨 the direction of time.
形而上学中过去和未来的区别 Maybe somehow we could bring all these things in
过去已经确定 未来充满变数 and explain why our attitudes towards time make sense.
时间方向不同 I'm not going to go there.
或许我们可以引入这些讨论 All I want to say is it's not altogether obvious
来解释为什么我们对待时间的态度有道理 what the best answer to Lucretius' puzzle is.
但我不会继续深入下去 So when I say, as I have said--
我想说的是 人们依然不清楚 and I'm going to say it many times
对卢克莱修疑问最好的解答是什么 over the course of the remaining weeks--
所以当我说 我以前说过 that the central thing that's bad about death
以后也会说很多遍 is the fact that you're deprived of the good things in life,
直到几周后课程结束 when I make use of the deprivation account,
死亡最主要的坏处 I don't mean to suggest everything is
是你失去了生活中美好的事物 sweetness and light with regard to the deprivation account.
这是剥夺说的结论 I think there are some residual puzzles
我并不认为这一说法暗示了 about how it could be that death is bad.
生活中所有的事物都是甜蜜光明的 And in particular,
我想关于死亡为什么是坏事 how it could be that the deprivation account
还有些其它疑难 puts its finger on what's bad about death.
特别是 But for all that, it seems to me the right way to go.
为什么剥夺说能够 It seems to me that the deprivation account
明确指出死亡的坏处 does put its finger on the central bad thing about death.
但是不管怎么说 我觉得它是正确的 Most centrally, what's bad about death is that when you're dead,
我认为剥夺说 you're not experiencing the good things in life.
确实准确指出了死亡最主要的坏处 Death is bad for you
最主要的坏处就是 当你死去 because you don't have what life would bring you,
你就不能再享受生活中的美好事物了 if only you hadn't died. All right.
死亡对你是件坏事 If that's right, should we conclude,
是因为如果你没死 你就能得到 in fact, do we have to conclude--
生活带给你的东西 if death is bad because of it's a deprivation,
如果这是对的 我们能否下结论 then if I wasn't dead,
我们是不是只能说 I wouldn't be deprived--
因为有所损失 所以死亡是坏事 so doesn't it follow then that the best thing
如果我没死 of all is never to die at all,
我就不会损失任何东西 to wit, immortality?
所以 能否接下去说 最好的事情 If it's bad...
就是永远不死 Suppose I get hit by a truck next week,
即 永生 that's bad, because if only I hadn't gotten hit by a truck,
如果这是件坏事 I might have lived another 20, 30 years, whatever.
假设我下周被卡车撞了 I would have gotten the good things in life
太糟糕了 如果我没被车撞 that would have been better for me.
我还可以接着活上20 30年 Ah, but when I die of whatever it is,
我可以享受生活中美好的事物 some heart disease at age 80,
我会过得越来越好 that's bad maybe because
但是不管什么原因 当我死了 if only I didn't have heart disease,
80岁时死于心脏病 I could have lived another 10, 15, 20 years,
也会很糟糕 因为 gotten more good things in life.
如果我没得心脏病 If only I hadn't died at 100,
我还可以接着活10 15 20年 I would have gotten more good things in life.
得到更多生活中的好东西 If only I hadn't died at 500,
如果我100岁还没死 I would have gotten more good things in life.
我还能得到更多生活中的好东西 Whenever it is I die, won't it always be true,
如果我500岁还没死 if we accept the deprivation account,
我还能得到更多生活中的好东西 that if only I hadn't died then,
不管我什么时候死 全都如此吗 I would have gotten more good things in life?
如果我们相信剥夺说 And so whenever it is you die,
只要我没死 death is bad for you.
我就能得到更多生活中的好东西吗 So the best thing for you would be never to die,
所以不管你什么时候死 immortality.
死亡对你来说都是坏事 Two questions really that we need to ask.
所以对你来说最好的事情是永远不死 One is...
永生 Does consistency, does logic,
我们实际上需要问两个问题 require somebody who accepts the deprivation account--
第一个问题 does consistency require that
是否逻辑一致性要求 if you accept the deprivation account,
相信剥夺说的人 you believe immortality's a good thing?
是否必须... Second question: Even if logic doesn't require that,
如果你接受剥夺说 is it true that immortality's a good thing?
就一定要相信永生是好事 Let me start with the first one,
第二个问题 即使逻辑上不必如此 because I think that's the easier one.
那么永生到底是不是件好事 Logic alone, logic plus the consistency requirement--
我们从第一个问题开始 rather and the deprivation account--
因为我认为这个比较简单 logic alone doesn't require us
单从逻辑上讲 或者说是 to say immortality's a good thing. Why?
剥夺说从逻辑上 Because strictly speaking,
单纯从逻辑上来讲 我们并不一定 what the deprivation account says is,
要认为永生是件好事 为什么呢 death is bad insofar as you're deprived of the good things
因为严格来讲 in life by virtue of not existing.
剥夺说讲的是 If only you hadn't gotten hit by that truck,
死亡是坏事当且仅当你的不存在 you would have gone on to an exciting life
使你失去了生活中的美好事物 in your career as a professional dancer.
如果你没被车撞 You would have had a family,
你就会接着享受你的激情人生 or what have you. Whatever it is.
比如做个舞蹈演员 You would have traveled around the world.
你可能会成家立业 Life would have given you a lot of great things
如此这样 and you get deprived of those great things,
你可能会环球旅行 that's why it's bad that you got hit by the truck.
生活可能给你带来很多美好的事情 That is to say, death is bad,
但是你失去了它们 when it's bad, by virtue of the fact
这就是为什么你被车撞是件坏事 that it deprives you of the good things in life.
也就是说 死亡是坏事 But suppose--we don't yet know
死亡是坏事是因为 whether this could actually happen,
你失去了生活中美好的事物 but here we're just talking about logical possibilities--
但是假设 我们不知道 suppose that there's no more good things
这一切是否真的会发生 for life to give you.
这里我们只谈逻辑上的可能性 Then when you're deprived of life by death,
假设对你来讲 生活中已经 you're not being deprived of any good things,
没任何好事情了 and so it's not bad for you
那么当你被死亡夺去生命的时候 to be dead at that point.
你不会失去任何美好的事情 Death is only bad,
所以在这时死去 according to the deprivation account,
对你来说不是坏事 when there are good things that would have come your way.
死亡是坏事 When, as we might put it, on balance,
根据剥夺说 the life you would have had would have continued
只在你失去将会得到的好东西时才成立 to be good for you.
我们可以说 总的说来 When that happens, then to lose that good bit of life,
你接下去的生活 that's bad for you.
会对你有好处 But if it should turn out that
这种情况下 失去美好生活 what life would have had hereafter,
对你是坏事 instead of being good, would have been hellish,
但是如果你发现 it's not bad for you to avoid that.
生活从此以后 It might actually be good for you to avoid it.
不会再有好事 都是地狱般的煎熬 So, even if we accept the deprivation account,
那么避免它并非是件坏事 we're not committed to the claim that death is always bad.
实际上你能避免它是件好事 We have to look and see,
所以 即使我们接受剥夺说 what would life actually hold out for us?
我们也不必非要承认死亡永远是坏事 Logic alone, plus the deprivation account,
我们需要了解 doesn't force us to say immortality would be a good thing.
生活还为我们准备了什么 After all--this is really a crucial point to understand--
剥夺说在逻辑上 things that are good for you in limited quantities
并不强迫我们认为永生是好事 can become bad for you if you get more and more and more and more of them.
不管怎么说 这一点很关键 Well, I love chocolate.
数量有限时的好东西 So suppose somebody comes up
会随着你得到的越来越多变成坏东西 to me with a box of Godiva chocolate,
比如说 我喜欢吃巧克力 offers me a couple of chocolates.
假设有个人带来 I say, "Wonderful! I love Godiva chocolate."
一盒高迪瓦巧克力 And then they give me some more and some more.
给了我几块 Twenty pieces of chocolate.
我说"太好吃了 我爱高迪瓦巧克力" Well, you know,
然后他们不停地给我 by the time I got 20 pieces of chocolate,
20块巧克力 I'm not sure right now if I really want the 21st piece.
你知道 But you keep giving me some more.
当我得到第20块巧克力时 Thirty pieces of chocolate,
我不确定我是不是还想要第21块 40 pieces of chocolate,
但是你不停地给我 100 pieces of chocolate.
30块巧克力 At some point--I've never actually had his much chocolate;
40块巧克力 I don't know what the point is,
100块巧克力 but at some point--
在某一点上 我从没得到过这么多巧克力 I'm going to say, you know,
我也不知道是哪一点 although the first 10, 20, 30 pieces of chocolate,
但是在某一点上 those were good, but giving me the 21st piece of chocolate
我会说 你知道 or the 50th piece of chocolate,
尽管开始的10 20 30块巧克力 no longer good.
都很好吃 但第21块巧克力 Logically, at least, it could happen.
或者第50块巧克力 Logically, it could happen that although in quantities,
就不再好吃了 small quantities, 50 years, 60 years, 100 years,
至少在逻辑上 这是可能的 life is good, at some point,
在逻辑上 一定数量的 maybe life would turn bad for us.
较小数量 50岁 60岁 100岁 Just like being force-fed more and more chocolate.
生活是美好的 但到了某一点 And if it did turn bad for us,
或许生活就不美好了 the deprivation account would allow us to say,
就跟不断被逼着吃巧克力一样 oh, at that point, dying's not bad for you.
如果这对我们来说变成了坏事 Well, that's all that logic tells us.
那么剥夺说会说 Logic simply tells us we don't have
在那一点上 死亡对你就不是坏事了 to believe immortality's a good thing.
所以 这就是逻辑上的结论 But for all that, it could still be a good thing.
逻辑上 我们不必 So that's question number two.
非要相信永生是好事 Let's ask, what should we think about the prospect of living forever?
但即便如此 永生仍然可能是好事 Would it, in fact, be better and better and better?
这就是第二个问题 Somebody dies at age 10 by some horrible disease,
我们想象中的永生应该是怎样的画面 better if they'd made it up to 40.
它确实会越来越美好吗 Somebody dies at age 40,
10岁时死于可怕疾病的人 better if they'd made it up to 80.
如果能活到40岁该有多好 Somebody dies at age 80,
40岁死的人 better if they'd made it to 100, 120.
如果能活到80该有多好 Is it true that life would get better
80岁死的人 and better and better, the longer it is?
如果能活到100 120该有多好 Now, in asking this question,
随着生命不断延长 we have to be careful to be clear about
生活真的会越来越好吗 what exactly we're imagining.
我们这么问的时候 Here's one way to try to imagine that story.
我们要仔细想清楚 Imagine that life is sort of the way it works now,
我们究竟在想象什么 with the kinds of changes that bodies
下面是一种对永生的想象 undergo as they get older.
想象生命就如同现在这样发展 But instead of those changes basically killing you
身体不断变化 at 80, 90, or 100, they don't.
逐渐老化 You get more and more of those changes,
通常衰老会使你在 but they never actually kill you.
80 90 100岁的时候死去 但你没有 This is the sort of thought experiment
你不断地变老 that Jonathan Swift undertakes in the passage
但衰老始终没让你死去 from Gulliver's Travels that I've had you look at.
类似这样的思想试验 He imagines Gulliver coming to a country
在我推荐你们阅读的乔纳森·斯威夫特 where a subset of the people live forever, immortals.
写的《格列佛游记》里也有描述 And at first, Gulliver says, "Oh, isn't this wonderful?"
他想象格列佛来到一个国家 But he forgot to think about the fact
那里有些人永远不死 永生 that if the kinds of changes that we undergo continue to accumulate,
起初 格列佛说 哦 这太好了 then you're getting older.
但他忘记了 Not just older, but weaker,
由于身体上的变化不断积累 in more and more discomfort,
人们不断变老 senility sets in with a vengeance,
不仅变老 而且越来越虚弱 until eventually you've got these creatures that live forever,
身体越来越不舒服 but their mind is gone,
衰老开始了它的报复 and they're sort of in pain
最后这些永远不死的人 and they can't do anything because their body's utterly
大脑空空如也 infirm and diseased and sick.
痛苦不堪 That's not a wonderful thing to have.
他们疾病缠身 弱不禁风 If immortality was like that, says Swift,
什么事都做不了 that would be horrible.
这不是好事情 For an immortality like that,
如果永生是这样的话 斯威夫特说 death would be a blessing.
那么它太可怕了 And Montaigne, in the essay that I've had you look at,
如果永生是这样的话 says indeed, death is a blessing,
死亡就是祝福 because it puts an end to the pain
蒙田说 在我让你们读的另一篇文章里 and suffering and misery that afflict us in our old age.
蒙田 法国文艺复兴后期 十六世纪人文主义思想家 Well, all of that seems right,
他说 事实上死亡就是祝福 but I suppose we'd be forgiven for thinking,
因为它结束了我们年老时 look, when we wanted to be immortal,
折磨我们的痛苦和悲伤 we didn't want this kind of life going on
这些说法看上去很正确 and on and on with the same trajectory, the same downward trajectory.
但我认为我们忽视了 We sort of wanted to live forever,
看 当我们想到永生时 hail and hearty and healthy.
我们想到的并不是这样普通的生活 So even if the real world wouldn't allow us that,
沿着相同的轨迹 不断向下延伸 let's just ask science fictiony whether
我们想一直过一种 or not in fact living forever would be good.
丰富多彩 健康有益的生活 Isn't it at least true that in principle,
所以即使真实世界不允许我们这样 living forever could be good?
那么求助科学幻想 You've got to imagine changing some of the facts
能否说明永生是件好事呢 about what it would be like to live forever.
至少在原则上 So instead of asking the question,
永远不死可能是好事吗 the question I started with,
我们必须想象有些事情 would it be good to live forever? --
在永生中发生了改变 If you're not careful,
所以不要 this is going to be like one of those horror stories, right?
像我一开始那样问 Where you've got a couple of wishes
永远不死好不好 and you aren't careful about how exactly you state the wish.
你要是不注意 And so you get what you want,
得到的答案就会是那些悲惨景象 but it ends up being a nightmare, right?
如同你可以许几个愿 If you just tell the fairy who gives you three wishes,
你要是不小心 许得不精确 "I want to live forever,"
那么愿望会实现 and you forgot to say "And be sure to keep me healthy,"
但却是个噩梦 well, that's going to be a nightmare.
你要是告诉帮你实现三个愿望的精灵 That's what Swift told us.
"我想永生" So let's be careful.
忘了加上 让我保持健康 Let's throw in health and
那么 你会得到一场噩梦 anything else you want.
这是斯威夫特告诉我们的 Throw in enough money to make sure
所以我们要小心 you're not poor for eternity.
让我们加入健康以及 Wouldn't that be horrible, to be healthy but impoverished forever?
所有你想加入的元素 Throw in whatever you want.
加入足够的钱财 保证 All we need to ask at that this point is,
你永远不会穷困 is there any way at all to imagine immortality,
健康的活着但是没钱了不也很惨吗 where immortality of that sort would be a good thing?
加入一切你想要的 Is there any way to imagine existing forever
我们这时需要问的是 where that would be good for you, forever?
有没有可能想象永生 Now, it's very tempting at this point to say, look, of course.
这种样子的永生是件好事呢 Nothing could be easier.
能不能想象永远存在 Just imagine being in heaven forever, right?
对你永远都是好事 You're done, right? You've got heavenly bliss.
现在 我们很容易说 当然是这样了 Isn't this incredible?
再简单不过了 Wouldn't we all love to be in heaven forever?
如同想象永远生活在天堂 The trouble is, we were a little bit vague about
你成功了 不是吗 你受到上天眷顾 what exactly life is like in heaven.
真是难以置信 It's a striking fact that even those religions
难道我们不都想在天堂永生吗 that promise us an eternity in heaven
问题是 我们对 are rather shy on the details. Why?
天堂的生活究竟是什么样子有点模糊 Because, one might worry,
引人注目的是 即使那些宗教 if you actually tried to fill in the details,
许诺我们在天堂获得永生 this wonderful, eternal existence ends up
也没有清楚地描绘过它 为什么 not seeming so wonderful after all.
因为 人们会担心 So imagine that what's going to happen is that we all become angels
如果你真得描绘了细节 and we're going to spend eternity singing psalms.
这个美妙永恒的生活就终结了 Now, I like psalms and I actually enjoy
看上去再也不美丽动人了 rather singing psalms at services.
想象我们都成了天使 On Saturday mornings,
我们将永远咏唱赞美诗 I sing psalms in Hebrew and I rather enjoy it.
我喜欢赞美诗 而且实际上 But if you ask me:
我喜欢在礼拜的时候唱赞美诗 What about the possibility of an eternity of doing that?
周六早上 That doesn't really seem so desirable.
我会用希伯来语唱赞美诗 我相当喜欢 Bedazzled, not the remake.
但如果你问我 I haven't seen the remake, but the original.
要是让你永远唱下去如何 In the original, there's a human character
这听起来一点不吸引人 who hooks up with the devil.
《神鬼愿望》 不是后来重拍的 He meets the devil and he asks the devil,
我没看过重拍的 最初的那个电影 "So why did you rebel against God?"
最初的那个电影里 有个人 The devil says, "Well, I'll show you.
被魔鬼抓住了 You sit here on the--" Whatever it was,
他见到魔鬼 他问 the mailbox, I think it was.
"你为什么反对上帝" "I'll sit up here on the mailbox," The devil says.
魔鬼说 "好吧 我做给你看 "And you dance around me and say,
你坐在那里" oh, praise the lord,
坐在邮筒上 我想那是个邮筒 aren't you wonderful? You're so magnificent.
"我会坐在邮筒上" 魔鬼说 You're so glorious.'" And
"你在我边上跳舞 边跳边说 the human does this for a while and he says,
喔 赞美上帝 "This has gotten really boring.
你如此伟大 你如此壮丽 Can't we switch?" And the devil says,
你如此辉煌" "That's exactly what I said."
那个人跳了一会儿 说 Now, when you try to imagine heaven singing psalms for eternity,
"这实在太没劲了 that doesn't seem so attractive.
我们能换一下吗" 魔鬼说 All right, so don't imagine heaven singing psalms for eternity.
"我就是这么说的" Just imagine something else.
当你想到永远在天堂唱赞美诗时 But what? Imagine what? This is the thought experiment
并不那么吸引人 that I invite you to participate in.
好了 不去想永远在天堂唱赞美诗了 What kind of life can you imagine,
想些别的 such that having that life forever would be good?
但想什么呢 我请你们 Not just for another 10 years,
一起加入这个思想实验 not just for another 100 years,
你们能想象出永远过什么样的生活 not just for another 1,000 years,
是一件好事情 or million years, or a billion years.
不是说接着过10年 Remember, eternity is a very, very long time.
也不是说接着过100年 Forever goes on forever.
也不是说接着过1000年 Can you describe an existence
或者一百万年 十亿年 that you would want to be stuck with forever?
记住 永远是一个很长很长的时间 Now, it's precisely at this point that Bernard Williams,
永远是永远持续下去 in another one of the papers I had you take a look at--
你能描述出一种生活 Bernard Williams says no.
你希望永远过下去吗 No kind of life would be one that would be desirable
伯纳德·威廉姆斯此时提出 and attractive forever.
伯纳德·威廉姆斯 英国著名道德哲学家 No kind of life at all.
在我推荐你们读的另一篇文章里 In short, says Williams,
伯纳德·威廉姆斯给出了否定的回答 every life would eventually become tedious and worse,
没有任何生活会 excruciatingly painful.
永远有吸引力 Every kind of life is a life
根本没有这样的生活 you would eventually want to be rid of.
简单来讲 威廉姆斯说 Immortality, far from being a wonderful thing,
每种生活最终都会变的单调乏味 would be a horrible thing.
极度痛苦 Suppose, for the moment,
每种生活都是 that we were to agree with Williams.
你们最终想要摆脱的生活 What then should we say? We might say--look,
永生 远不是件美好的事情 at least when we're being careful,
它是件可怕的事情 if we agree that immortality would be bad,
假设 我们现在 we can't say then that death, per se, is bad.
赞同威廉姆斯的观点 The very fact that I am going to die
我们能得出什么结论 我们会说 turns out not to be a bad thing,
至少 要是我们注意一些 because after all, the only alternative to dying is immortality.
当我们承认永生是件坏事时 And if immortality would be a bad thing,
我们就不能说死亡 就其本身来讲是坏事 then death is not a bad thing.
我将会死去这个不变的事实 Death is a good thing. We might say,
看上去不是件坏事 if we accept Williams' thought,
因为毕竟 和死亡对立的只有永生 the fact of our mortality is good rather than bad,
如果永生是坏事 if immortality would eventually be bad.
那么死亡就不是坏事了 Now of course, crucial to notice that even if we say this,
我们可以说死亡是好事 that doesn't mean that when you get hit by a car tomorrow,
如果我们接受威廉姆斯的观点 that that's good. You don't have to say that.
我们必有一死就是好事而不是坏事 You can still say it's a bad thing that I got hit by a car tomorrow,
如果永生是坏事的话 because after all, if I hadn't gotten hit by a car tomorrow,
当然 关键要清楚即使我们这样说 it's not as though I would have been condemned to immortality,
也不意味着明天你被车撞了 I just would have lived another 10 or 20 or 30 years.
就是好事 你不必这样说 And those years would have been good ones for me.
你仍然可以说我明天被车撞了是件坏事 And maybe even when I die--
因为不管怎么说 如果我明天没被车撞 let's suppose I live to the ripe old age of 100--
也不意味着我被判处永生之刑 when I die at 100, I could perhaps still say,
我可以再接着活10年 20年或者30年 it's a bad thing for me that I die at the age of 100.
那些岁月对我来讲都是美好的 Because if I hadn't died now,
或许即使我 I might have lived another 10, 20, 30 years
假设我活了100岁 and still enjoyed things in life,
我100岁死了的时候 我依然可以说 enjoyed playing with my great grandchildren, whatever it is.
100岁死了对我来讲仍然是坏事 To say that immortality is bad is not to say
因为如果我不死 it's a good thing that we die when we do.
我还能多活10 20 30年 You can still believe consistency--consistently--
继续享受人生 that we die too soon.
享尽天伦之乐 Even if in principle, eventually, sooner or later,
说永生是坏事并不是在说 death would no longer be bad,
不管我们什么时候死都是好事 it could be that it comes too soon for all of us.
你仍然可以认为 Still, the question we want to ask is,
我们死得太早了 is there any way even to imagine an immortal life
即使在原则上 最终 早晚 that would be worth having?
死亡将不再是坏事 In principle, could immortality be a good thing?
但它来得太早依然是坏事 Or, is Williams right, that no, even in principle,
我们要问的问题仍然是 go as fantastic and science fictiony as you want,
有没有可能 想象一种生活 in principle an immortal life could not be desirable?
值得永远过下去 So until next time,
原则上 永生可以是好事吗 I invite you to think that question through.
或者像威廉姆斯所说 即使在原则上 If you're trapped into the prospect of immortality,
不论你多么天马行空地想象 what would the best kind of immortal life be like?
在原则上永生也不会令人向往
所以在下节课前
我请你们彻底地思考一下这个问题
如果你陷入永生的怪圈
你希望永远过一种什么样的生活