我们先回顾一下 Let me start by reviewing the problem
上周讨论的问题 that we were considering last week.
我们提出了 We were raising a difficulty
人格同一性的人格理论的一个难题 for the personality theory of personal identity
根据人格理论 成为同一个人的关键 according to which the key to being the same person
在于拥有同一个持续不断发展的人格 is having the very same ongoing, evolving personality.
而从根本上来说 And the difficulty was basically
这一难题其实就是有关复制的问题 the problem of duplication.
也就是说 我们 或者说一个人 That it seemed as though we could have more than one--
似乎可以拥有不止一具肉体 call it an individual--more than one body,
它们皆拥有同样的 that had the very same set of
记忆 信仰等等 memories, beliefs and so forth.
我们得问问自己 And that we have to ask ourselves,
"人格理论该对此 "Well, what should the personality theory
做出怎样的解释呢" say about a case like that?"
想象一下 周末时 So imagine that over the weekend,
那个疯子科学家拷贝了我的 the mad scientist copied my
记忆 信仰 愿望 恐惧 memories, beliefs, desires, fears,
抱负 目标 意图 ambitions, goals, intentions
然后将这些移植到另一个人的大脑里 and imprinted that on somebody else's brain.
一切皆于昨晚午夜完成 They did it last night at midnight.
早晨我们一觉醒来 This morning, we woke up.
问自己 And we have to ask ourselves,
"谁是雪莱·卡根 "Who's Shelly Kagan?
谁是上周给你们讲课的那个人" Who's the person that was lecturing to you last week?"
我们似乎无法 Well, it doesn't seem plausible
依照人格理论确定 in terms of the personality theory to say
那个人就是雪莱·卡根 that he's Shelly Kagan,
就是你们面前的这个人 and the one here today.
假设另有个人在密歇根 Suppose the other one's in Michigan.
如果在密歇根的人才是雪莱·卡根 If the one in Michigan's Shelly Kagan
而眼前的这个不是 but this one's not.
尽管他确实拥有雪莱·卡根的记忆 After all, although it's true that he's got Shelly Kagan's memories,
且醒来后觉得自己正是雪莱·卡根 he woke up thinking he was Shelly Kagan,
就像我醒来觉得自己是雪莱·卡根一样 just like I woke up thinking I was Shelly Kagan.
他起床以后思索 He woke up thinking about
今天课上要讲些什么 what he was going to lecture on in class today,
就如同我起床以后就会考虑 just like I woke up thinking about
今天上课该讲什么一样 what I was going to lecture in class today.
他记得上周上课的内容 He remembered last week's lecture
就如同我记得上周上课的内容一样 just like I remembered last week's lecture.
但是 人格理论 Well, no clear reason to say
并没有明确的理由确认 for the personality theory to say
他是雪莱·卡根 而我不是 that he's Shelly Kagan and I'm not.
毕竟 我与他拥有相同的 After all, I've got the very same set of
记忆 信仰和愿望 memories, beliefs, desires that he has.
同样 更出乎意料的是 But equally true, and more surprisingly,
人格理论也毫无理由说明 from the personality theory point of view, there's no reason to say that
我是雪莱·卡根 而他不是 I'm Shelly Kagan and he's not.
毕竟 他也和我拥有相同的 After all, he's got all the same
记忆 信仰和愿望 memories, beliefs and desires that I do.
此外 我们俩都是 It doesn't seem plausible to say we're both
雪莱·卡根的说法也不成立 Shelly Kagan,
因为这样一来就意味着 because now we'd have to then say
雪莱·卡根同时置身两处 Shelly Kagan's in two places at the same time.
所以答案只可能为 So the only alternative seems to be
我们俩都不是雪莱·卡根 to say that neither of us is Shelly Kagan.
但如果我们俩都不是雪莱·卡根 But if neither of us is Shelly Kagan,
那么最初说的那个人格理论就是错误的 then the simple original personality theory was false.
因为该理论表明 Because according to that theory,
成为雪莱·卡根的关键就是具有他的人格 having the personality is what it took to be Shelly Kagan.
我们俩都具有他的人格 We both have it,
但我俩都不是雪莱·卡根 yet neither of us is Shelly Kagan.
如此以来 人格理论必定是错的 The personality theory must be false.
所以我们将人格理论稍事修正 So we revise the personality theory to say,
判断人格同一性的关键是 the secret to personal identity is
在不存在其他分支的前提下 having the same personality
具有同样的人格 provided that there's no branching.
假设没有分裂 Provided there's no splitting.
只存在唯一的最佳竞争者 Provided there's only one best competitor,
而非两位势均力敌的候选人 not two equally good candidates.
根据无分支原则 Given the no branching view, the no branching rule,
我们可以说 在一般情况下 we can say, in the ordinary case,
其实并没有人 look, there really wasn't anybody
将我的记忆和愿望移植至密歇根 imprinted with my memories and desires in Michigan.
世上只有我一人 I'm the only one around in the earth right now
拥有雪莱·卡根的记忆和愿望 with Shelly Kagan's memories and desires.
因为没有其他竞争者存在 Since there's no competitor,
我独占他的人格 and I've got the personality,
所以我是雪莱·卡根 I'm Shelly Kagan.
我就是 I'm the very same person
上周给你们上课的那个人 that was here lecturing to you last week.
这就是我们在一般情况下 That's what the personality theory it gives us the answer we're looking for
从人格理论得出的答案 in the ordinary case.
但是在科幻故事里 But in the science fiction story
如果出现人格复制 where there's a duplicate,
也就是说 人格出现分支 it says, uh, if there's branching,
那么无分支原则就会说明 the no branching rule comes in.
两者其实都不是雪莱·卡根 Neither of them is Shelly Kagan.
所以 为解决这一难题 All right, so that's the best way for the personality theory
我们必须修正人格理论 to get revised to deal with this problem.
然而困难在于 无分支原则 The trouble was, it seems the no branching rule
似乎和直觉背道而驰 seems very counter-intuitive.
你想想 So think about it.
现在我站在你们面前 Here, right now I'm standing in front of you
说我自己是雪莱·卡根 saying I'm Shelly Kagan,
即上周给你们上课的那个人 the guy who was lecturing to you last week.
我相信我是雪莱·卡根 I believe I'm Shelly Kagan,
我上周给你们上过课 the guy who was lecturing to you last week.
那么我是不是雪莱·卡根呢 Am I Shelly Kagan?
我拥有雪莱·卡根的人格 Well, I've got Shelly Kagan's personality.
到现在为止没什么问题 So far so good.
我们现在要确定的是 Now all we have to decide is,
是否具备无分支原则成立的条件 was the branching rule satisfied or violated?
所以我们必须知道 So all we have to know is,
全宇宙里有没有一个人 is there somebody else somewhere in the universe
拥有我全部的记忆 信仰以及愿望 who's got all my memories and beliefs and desires?
那怎么才能知道呢 Well, how in the world could I know that?
这个在你们面前讲课的我 Whether I, this person talking to you right now,
是不是雪莱·卡根 is Shelly Kagan
取决于密歇根是否存在一个 depends on whether there's some duplicate
拥有我所有记忆的复制品 with all my memories in Michigan or not?
这听上去太有悖直觉了 It seems very counter-intuitive.
所以 尽管附带无分支原则的 So although the personality with no branching rule
人格理论避免了复制这一问题 avoids the problem of what to say about duplicates,
表示如果出现分支 by saying when there's branching,
那么他们就都不是雪莱·卡根 neither of them is Shelly Kagan,
但分支原则本身却是极其有悖直觉的 the branching rule itself seems very counter-intuitive.
人们判断一个人是不是我 We feel as though whether somebody is me or not
应该依据 should depend upon internal facts
我在不同阶段的内部事实来判断 about me in the earlier stages or this stage and that stage,
而不应根据别处 比如说外部 not about what's happening elsewhere, outside,
发生的事情来判断 extrinsic to these things.
所以 如果你不愿接受无分支原则 So, if you're not willing to accept the no branching rule,
如果你觉得它像是一条 if it strikes you as a bizarre thing
强加在人格同一性上的怪诞原则 to throw in to personal identity,
也许你就得放弃人格理论了 maybe you need to reject the personality theory.
在此过程中 Now during all of this,
肉体理论的拥趸则绽放出会意的笑容 the fans of the body view typically are laughing.
他们认为这足以显现 They say this just goes to show
人格理论之愚拙 what a dumb theory the personality theory is.
人格理论的整个问题在于 The whole problem with the personality theory is that
人格就好比软件 personality is a bit like a software.
类似于程序 It's like programs.
在你这台计算机上可以运行各种程序 It's the various programs you run on your computer
可以在硬盘上 along with the various data files
存储各式数据 如此这般 that you have saved on your hard drive, and so forth.
这些皆可以被复制 And those can be duplicated.
你可以不断拷贝下去 You have copy after copy after copy.
你可以拷贝两份我的人格 You can have two copies of my personality.
也可以拷贝成百上千份 You could have 100 or 1,000.
之所以能够向人格理论 The problem with--what drove the personality theory
引入难以置信的无分支原则 into the no branching rule, implausible as it may be,
其原因在于人格像软件一样能够被复制 was the fact that your personality is like software, and it can be copied.
所以他们就说 That's why, they say,
我们应该相信肉体理论 we should believe in the body view.
如果我们接受肉体理论 If we accept the body view,
我们就避免了复制这一问题 we avoid the duplication problem.
因为肉体不同于软件 Because, unlike software,
软件可以随心所欲地拷贝复制多次 which can be literally copied, as many as you want identical,
然而肉体却无法分裂 the body can't split.
人类的肉体无法分裂 也不能产生分支 Human bodies can't divide or branch.
肉体绝不可能 There's no way that there's another body,
在某个周四一分为二 that the body on Thursday became two bodies.
周四的肉体 The body that was here on Thursday
没有也不可能分裂为两个肉体 didn't, couldn't become two bodies.
如此一来 我们便避免了这整个问题 So we avoid all the problem.
以上即为肉体理论的拥趸 That's at least the kind of claim that
面对人格理论难题时 fans of the body view often make
采用的一惯说法 in the face of this difficulty for the personality theory.
现在我们要问 确实是这样吗 Well, now we need to ask, is it really true?
肉体理论真的不存在复制问题吗 Is it really true that bodies don't face a duplication problem?
人类肉体真的不会也不能分裂吗 Is it really true that human bodies don't and couldn't split?
注意 这里的关键词是"不能" Look, the crucial word here is, of course, "Couldn't."
人格实际上也没有分裂 对吧 Personalities don't actually split either, right?
尽管在我列举的科幻小说一例中 Although I've been giving science fiction examples
那个疯子科学家复制了我的 in which the mad scientist duplicates my
记忆 信仰和愿望 memories and beliefs and desires,
但那都仅仅是科幻小说里的情节 they've all been science fiction examples.
如果我可以利用科幻小说 If I can use science fiction
探讨人格分裂的可能性 to talk about the possibility of splitting,
并对人格理论进行反驳 and use that against the personality theory,
那么我也可以假借科幻小说的例子 I'm entitled to use science fiction examples
来谈论肉体分裂的可能性 to talk about the possibility of bodies splitting,
然后问 这会给肉体理论 and ask, what kind of problem
带来什么问题 that would raise for the body theory?
现在大家都已经知道 Now, we are familiar with some
低等生物的肉体会分裂 low-level examples of bodies splitting.
比如变形虫分裂生殖 对吗 Amoebas split, right?
这里有一个变形虫 You've got a single amoeba.
它不断分裂 在某一点上 It's going along. At a certain point.
我们来画一个变形虫分裂的图 Let's draw our amoeba splitting, right?
变形虫在分裂 不断地分裂 You've got an amoeba split, going along.
在某一点上 开始变成这样 At a certain point, it starts to look like that.
然后变成这样 然后砰的一下 Then it looks like that. And then boom!
它就这样分裂了 You've got, well, it splits.
从生物学本身来讲 There's nothing in biology per se
没有事物会阻止细胞分裂 that rules out cell division.
反而言之 细胞可以分裂 Indeed, on the contrary, right? We know cells can split.
而人类肉体有别于变形虫 其不能分裂 Now, human bodies, unlike amoebas, don't do that.
但也许在生物学上 But maybe there's nothing in biology
并没有东西阻止这种可能性 that rules out the possibility.
假设我们明天打开《耶鲁日报》 Suppose we open up the Yale Daily tomorrow
看到耶鲁变形虫研究中心 and we see that the Yale Center for Amoebic Studies
取得了突破性进展 has made this tremendous breakthrough
发现通过 and has discovered how to,
某种注射或是什么其他方法 through the right kind of injection or whatever,
可以让人类肉体 cause a human body to
以类似变形虫的方式分裂和复制 replicate and split in an amoeba-like fashion.
那时我们就不得不面对 Well, then we have to face the problem of
肉体分裂这一问题了 what to say in this case of bodily branching.
与其深究此例 Well, instead of pursuing that example,
不如让我再举个稍稍不同的例子 let me give you a slightly different example
该例曾在哲学文献上 that's been discussed a fair bit
受到热烈的讨论 in the philosophical literature.
它其实 This is actually a case that
曾被某同学当堂提问过 one of the students in the class asked about,
如果不是更早 我记得也许就是上周吧 I think it was last week, if it wasn't even earlier.
我当时说 好问题 我们会讲到它 And I said, "Great question. Let's come back to it."
现在 终于到我 So here, at long last,
兑现承诺的时候了 I'm making good on my promissory note.
我打算从以前曾提到的例子讲起 I'm going to come back to the example that was raised before.
回想一下 当我们讲肉体理论时 You'll recall that when we talked about the body view,
我说过肉体理论的最佳版本 I said the best version of the body view
并非需要整个肉体 doesn't require the entire body,
而只是将大脑作为判断同一个人的标准 to be the same body, but the brain.
以大脑为衡量尺度 Follow the brain.
而且实际上 And indeed, it doesn't seem as though
我们也无须整个大脑 we have to require the entire brain,
只要部分即可 just enough of the brain, however much that turns out,
足够安置人格 记忆等就行 to house personality, memories and so forth.
然后我说 假定 And then, I said, suppose it was possible
一边的大脑半球就能满足要求 that one hemisphere of your brain is enough.
如果大脑有足够的冗余 If there's enough redundancy in the brain
即使你大脑右半球遭到破坏 so that even if your right hemisphere got destroyed,
你大脑的左半球 your left hemisphere,
也依然保存了你全部的记忆 you still have all the same memories,
愿望和信仰 desires, beliefs.
这就够了 Good enough.
我们来关注以下问题 So now we worry about the following case.
我曾给你们举过很多例子 So I gave you a bunch of examples, right,
比如大脑移植 where there are brains being transplanted
到其他人的躯体上 into torsos of others.
假设 非常糟糕 So suppose, gruesome as it was,
这个周末我遇到一场可怕的事故 this weekend I'm in some horrible accident
我的躯体毁掉了 and my torso gets destroyed
他们把我大脑放进生命维持系统 and they keep my brain on life support,
不断供氧 oxygenating it just long enough
随即完成了一次彻底的外科手术 to do some radical surgery
把它移植到了一具备用躯体上 into some spare torsos.
备用躯体从哪儿来 Where'd the torsos come from?
有人 Well, you had some living people,
得了极其罕见的脑部疾病 but they had very rare brain diseases
他们的大脑突然之间溶解了 and their brain suddenly liquefied.
于是我们就有了备用躯体 So now we've got some spare torsos.
好了 现在这里是雪莱·卡根 All right, so here we've got Shelly Kagan.
他的躯体毁灭了 His body gets destroyed.
这是我的大脑 And here's my brain.
这边这个是琼斯的躯体 Over here we've got Jones' torso.
这个是史密斯的躯体 And over here we've got Smith's torso.
假定我们把 Suppose we take,
这部分叫左半球 call this one the left hemisphere,
我们把它放在这里 and we stick it in here,
放在乔恩的躯体里 into Jones' torso.
我们把另一个半球 右半球 We take this other hemisphere, the right half of my brain
放在史密斯的躯体里 and we stick it into Smith's torso.
我们连好了各种血管 神经 We connect all the wires, all the neurons.
手术非常成功 两个人都醒来了 The operation's a smashing success. Both things wake up.
这里是琼斯的躯体 So here's Jones' torso
加上雪莱·卡根的左脑 with the left half of SK's brain.
史密斯的躯体加上雪莱·卡根的右脑 Smith's torso with the right half of SK's brain.
他们醒来了 They wake up.
我们得给他们起个名字 We need some way to refer to these people,
以方便我们区分二者 so we can start talking about who they are.
我们叫上面这个人 Let me just call this top one
琼斯的躯体加上雪莱·卡根左脑 Jones' torso with the left half of Shelly Kagan's brain
我们叫他阿左 let's call him Lefty.
史密斯的躯体加上雪莱·卡根右脑 Smith's torso with the right half of Shelly Kagan's brain,
我们叫他阿右 let's call him Righty.
好了 手术很成功 Okay, operation's a success.
阿左阿右都醒来了 Lefty and Righty both wake up.
他们都认为自己是雪莱·卡根 They both think they're Shelly Kagan,
如此这般 and so forth and so on.
然后我们问自己 根据肉体理论 And we ask ourselves, according to the body view,
到底哪个人才是雪莱·卡根 which one is Shelly Kagan?
都有哪些可能性呢 What are the possibilities?
我们可以说阿左是雪莱·卡根 We could say Lefty is Shelly Kagan
而阿右不是 and Righty is not.
阿右是假冒的 Righty's an imposter.
但是肉体理论 But there's nothing in the body view
并没有让我们做这样的选择 to give us a reason to make that choice.
阿左确实有一半雪莱·卡根的大脑 It's true that Lefty's got half of Shelly Kagan's brain
而且挺够用 and that's good enough.
然而同样 But it's also true that
阿右也有一半雪莱·卡根的大脑 Righty's got half of Shelly Kagan's brain
看上去也够用了 and that seems good enough.
所以没有理由说 So there's no reason to say that
阿左是雪莱·卡根 而阿右不是 Lefty is Shelly Kagan and Righty isn't.
类似地 And similarly, of course,
肉体理论也不是说 there's nothing in the body view to make us say that
阿右是雪莱·卡根 而阿左不是 Righty is Shelly Kagan and Lefty isn't.
这也不是那也不是 Well, if it's not one, and not the other,
还有哪几种可能呢 what are the remaining possibilities?
我猜大家会说他们都是雪莱·卡根 We could, I suppose, try to say they're both Shelly Kagan.
这样雪莱·卡根活下来了 And so Shelly Kagan continues,
也就是说他的肉体活下来了 that is to say his body continues,
即 他的大脑活下来了 that is to say his brain continues,
也就是说 that is to say
他大脑足够安置人格的那部分活下来了 enough of his brain continues,
快乐地存活下来 merrily on its way,
只不过它现在在两个地方存活着 except now in two places.
所以从现在开始 And so from now on,
雪莱·卡根这个人 Shelly Kagan, that single person,
同时处于两个地方 is in two different places at the same time.
阿左去了加利福尼亚 Lefty goes to California.
阿右去了佛蒙特 Righty moves to Vermont.
于是 雪莱·卡根同时生活在东西海岸 From now on, Shelly Kagan's bicoastal.
这听起来不太对 It doesn't seem right.
那么肉体理论还有什么其它说法呢 So what else can the body theory say?
肉体理论可以说 Well, the body theory could say
他们俩都不是雪莱·卡根 neither of them are Shelly Kagan.
雪莱·卡根已经在那场可怕的事故中死了 Shelly Kagan died in that gruesome, horrible accident.
虽然我们现在 Although it's true that we now
有了两个人 阿左和阿右 have two people, Lefty and Righty,
他们各有雪莱·卡根的半个大脑 each of whom has half of Shelly Kagan's brain,
以及雪莱·卡根的全部记忆 and all of Shelly Kagan's memories,
无论该记忆多么有纪念意义 for whatever that's worth,
他们都不是雪莱·卡根 neither of them is Shelly Kagan.
我们可以这么说 We could say that as well.
但我们要是这么说 But if we--and that seems
这种说法似乎最讨巧 the least unpalatable of the alternatives.
但我们要是这么说的话 But if we say that,
那我们就得放弃肉体理论了 then we've given up on the body view.
因为肉体理论认为 Because the body view, after all,
要成为雪莱·卡根 said to be Shelly Kagan is to have
就得拥有足够的雪莱·卡根的大脑 enough of Shelly Kagan's brain.
在这个例子中 阿左和阿右看起来 And in this case, both of Lefty and Righty seem to have
同时具有雪莱·卡根大脑的足够部分 enough of Shelly Kagan's brain.
那肉体理论者如何解释呢 What's the body theorist to do?
在我看来 不出意外 肉体理论者 As far as I can see, the best option for the body theorist
对这个问题的最佳处理方式 at this point is to add--no surprises here
便是加上一条无分支原则 a no branching rule.
肉体理论者会说 The body theorist should say,
"判断是否是同一个人的关键在于 "The key to personal identity is
是否拥有同一个肉体 即 having the same body, to wit,
拥有同一个大脑 即 the same brain, to wit,
拥有足够保存人格的大脑部分 enough of the brain to keep the personality going
并且不存在分支 也没有分裂 provided that there's no branching, no splitting,
没有竞争者 只有一个人" no perfect competitors, only one."
如果肉体理论结合了无分支原则 If the body view adds the no branching principle,
那么我们可以说 then we can say,
在这种类型的分裂中 look, in the case of this sort of splitting
此例 this example is known
在哲学文献中被称为裂变 in theto philosophical literature as fission,
好比核裂变时一个大原子分裂成俩 like nuclear fission when a big atom splits into two.
所以 在这个裂变例子中 So, in the fission case,
肉体理论者的观点是 the body says, the body theorist says,
在裂变情况下 发生分裂 出现分支 in the fission case, there's splitting, there's branching.
所以他们最终都不是雪莱·卡根 So neither of them is going to end up being Shelly Kagan.
但在一般情况下 这里有我的肉体 But in the ordinary humdrum case, here I am, my body.
为什么我是雪莱·卡根 Why am I Shelly Kagan?
因为在你们面前的大脑 你们看不见它 Because the brain in front of you--you can't see it,
但是确实在你们面前 but it's in front of you--the brain in front of you
和上周四在你们面前的大脑 is the very same brain as the brain
是同一个大脑 that you had in front of you on Thursday.
肉体同一 大脑同一 人才能同一 Follow the body, in particular follow the brain.
所以在一般情况下 So in the ordinary case,
不存在分裂 仅需以大脑作为判断标准 no splitting, follow the brain.
而在发生分裂的特殊情形下 In the special case where there's splitting,
即使根据大脑判断 也得不出结论 even if you follow the brain, not good enough.
所以 肉体理论者 So the body theorist
要想回避裂变问题 can avoid the problem of fission,
回避复制问题 avoid the problem of duplication
就需要加入无分支原则 by adding the no branching rule.
不过无分支原则看上去的确不合直觉 But of course, the no branching rule didn't seem very intuitive.
判断我是不是雪莱·卡根 Whether or not I'm Shelly Kagan,
是不是那个上周四给你们上课的人 the guy that was lecturing to you on Thursday,
取决于 反正我想象不出 depends on whether, unbeknownst to me,
周末时 over the weekend,
是否有人移除我一半的大脑 somebody removed half of my brain,
并随即把它塞到另一个人的躯体上 stuck it in some other torso,
再把我缝好 sealed me all back up.
这跟判断我的同一性有什么关系 How could that matter?
如果认为无分支原则毫无道理 Well, if you don't find the no branching rule plausible,
作为肉体理论者的你可就遇到麻烦了 you're in trouble as a body theorist.
事实上 我们发现 In fact, so what we see is,
肉体理论也碰到了同样的问题 the body theory is in exactly the same problem,
和人格理论处于同样的困境中 exactly the same situation, as the personality theory.
其实 裂变是人格理论里 Indeed, the fission example is a very nice case of
用来说明人格如何分裂的好例子 how you could have splitting for the personality theory.
事故发生前 Here, before the accident,
这人是雪莱·卡根 他拥有我的 was Shelly Kagan, somebody who had my
信仰 愿望 记忆 目标等等 beliefs, desires, memories, goals, and so forth.
事故之后 After the accident,
变成了两个人 即阿左和阿右 we've got two people, Lefty and Righty,
或者说变成两个实体 即阿左和阿右 or two entities, Lefty and Righty,
他们都具有雪莱·卡根的 both of whom have Shelly Kagan's
记忆 信仰 愿望 目标等等 memories, beliefs, desires, goals, and so forth.
大脑的分裂表明了 Splitting the brain shows how you could,
你将如何分裂人格 in fact, have splitting of personality.
所以同一个例子在肉体理论和 So the very same case raises the very same problem
人格理论里引发了同样的问题 for both the body view and the personality view.
我唯一能想到的解决办法 And the only solution that I can see,
至少在我看来是最佳解决办法 at least the best solution that I can see,
便是接受无分支原则 is to accept the no branching rule.
如果你不愿接受无分支原则 If you don't like the no branching rule,
那么你的选择就不明了 it's not clear what your alternatives are.
或者说 你的选择是很明了 Or at least, it is clear what your alternatives are;
但却无法比较出孰优孰劣 it's not clear which alternative would be any better.
在此过程中 Now during all of this
人格理论的问题 problems for the personality theory,
肉体理论的问题 在整个过程中 problems for the body view--during all of this,
灵魂理论者有了一施拳脚的机会 the soul theorist is having a field day.
灵魂理论者说 The soul theorist is saying,
"看啊 你们这些人走进 "Look you guys, you got into all this trouble
分裂的麻烦中 如何如何 with splitting and so forth and so on,
还需要引入一个愚蠢至极 and needing to add the no branching rule,
且异常牵强的无分支原则 silly and implausible as that seems,
你们陷入这一困境 you got into all that trouble
皆因分裂问题 because of the problem of splitting
因为人格可以分裂 肉体可以分裂 because personalities can be split, bodies can be split.
如果你能感受到人格同一性的 If only you had seen the light
灵魂理论的光芒并对它深信不疑 and stuck to the soul theory of personal identity,
那一切就都解决了" all these problems could be avoided."
可是 如你们所知 我并不相信灵魂 Now, as you know, I don't believe in souls.
但我们可以暂时先忽略这点 But forget that issue for the moment.
先来问个问题 Let's just ask the question,
"如果灵魂存在的话 "Is it true that the soul theory
灵魂理论 if only there were soul
在这些问题上 is it true that the soul theory would at least
真能更有优势吗 have the following advantage?
它能避免复制问题和裂变问题吗" It avoids these problems of duplication and fission."
我们先问一下 Well let's ask.
灵魂理论者会如何 What should a soul theorist say
解释裂变的例子 about the fission case?
现在发生了可怕的事故 So here's the gruesome accident.
我的大脑分裂开来 My brain gets split apart.
一部分放在了琼斯的躯体里 One part gets put into Jones' torso.
一部分放在了史密斯的躯体里 One part gets put into Smith's torso.
手术后 After the operation,
阿左醒来以为自己是雪莱·卡根 Lefty wakes up thinking he's Shelly Kagan.
史密斯醒来也以为自己是雪莱·卡根 Smith wakes up thinking he's Shelly Kagan.
阿左拥有雪莱·卡根的一部分大脑 Lefty's got part of Shelly Kagan's brain.
阿右也拥有雪莱·卡根的一部分大脑 Smith's, or rather Righty's got part of Shelly Kagan's brain.
灵魂理论者会如何 What should the soul theorist say
解释裂变的例子 about the case of fission?
回忆一下 灵魂理论说 Well, again, remember, the soul theory says
成为同一个人的关键在于拥有同一个灵魂 the key to being the same person is having the soul.
为什么我是 Why am I the person
上周四给你们讲课的人 that was lecturing to you on Thursday?
因为支配这个肉体的灵魂同一 Because it's the very same soul animating my body, or what have you.
那么 灵魂论者会如何 So, what does the soul theorist say
解释裂变的例子呢 about the fission case?
我也不是很清楚 I'm not quite sure,
因为我们会遇到一个形而上学的问题 because we have to turn to a metaphysical question
我们以前也遇到过它 that we've touched upon before,
那就是 灵魂可以分裂吗 namely, can souls split?
毕竟 人格理论 After all, the problem that fission raises
需要探讨的裂变问题 for the personality theory,
一言以蔽之 即在于人格可以分裂 in a nutshell, is that personalities can split,
它可以产生分支 they can branch.
而裂变问题给肉体理论造成的麻烦 The problem for the body view that fission raises,
简单来说 也就是肉体能分裂 in a nutshell, is that bodies can split.
能产生分支 They can branch.
我们需要从形而上学的角度来讨论 We need to ask about the metaphysics of the soul,
灵魂到底能不能分裂 can souls split?
当然了 我并不知道答案 And I don't know the answer to that, of course.
所以我们先全面考虑存在的两种可能情形 So let's consider both possibilities.
第一种可能 Possibility number one.
灵魂和肉体还有人格一样是可以分裂的 Souls, just like bodies, just like personalities, can split.
假设 Suppose that's what happened.
这里有一个灵魂 雪莱·卡根的灵魂 So, there was a single soul here, Shelly Kagan's soul,
但是在这个可怕的手术中 but in the middle of this gruesome operation,
可怕事故发生之后的 gruesome accident and followed
可怕手术中 by this amazing operation,
雪莱·卡根的灵魂分裂了 Shelly Kagan's soul split.
所以这里有了一个雪莱·卡根的灵魂 So there's one of the SK souls over here
这里也有了一个雪莱·卡根的灵魂 and there's one of the SK souls in the other case as well.
阿左和阿右 Each one of Lefty and Righty
各有了一部分 has one of the pieces
雪莱·卡根分裂的灵魂 of the split Shelly Kagan soul.
好了 现在我们问自己 All right, so now we ask ourselves,
"根据灵魂理论 哪个是雪莱·卡根" "According to the soul theory, which one is Shelly Kagan?"
现在你自己 Well, you--by this point,
你自己就可以分析各种可能性了 you can run through all the possibilities yourself, right?
我们可以说 阿左是而阿右不是 We could say, well, it's Lefty and not Righty.
但灵魂理论并没有 But there's nothing in the soul theory
支持这种说法 that supports that claim.
他们两个都具有同样完整的 They each have an equally good
不管完整到何种程度 however good it may be
他们都具有同样完整的 they've got an equally good piece
雪莱·卡根原始灵魂的一部分 of the original Shelly Kagan soul.
所以没有理由说 So there's no reason to say that
阿左是雪莱·卡根 而阿右不是 Lefty is Shelly Kagan and Righty isn't.
也没有理由说 There's no good reason to say
阿右是雪莱·卡根 而阿左不是 Righty is Shelly Kagan and Lefty isn't.
那说他俩都是雪莱·卡根如何 Well, would it be better to say they're both Shelly Kagan,
只要你拥有了一部分雪莱·卡根的灵魂 as long as you've got a piece of Shelly Kagan's soul,
一部分原始灵魂 你就是雪莱·卡根了 of the original soul, then you just are Shelly Kagan?
这种情况下 In which case,
阿左和阿右都是雪莱·卡根 Lefty and Righty are both Shelly Kagan,
而且雪莱·卡根同时在东西海岸 and Shelly Kagan is now bicoastal,
一个在加利福尼亚 一个在佛蒙特 one in California, one in Vermont,
都作为他的一部分 one part of him?
这种说法似乎不足以令人信服 That doesn't seem very satisfying.
还有什么其他的选择呢 What's the alternative?
对于灵魂理论者来讲 似乎便是 The alternative, it seems, for the soul theorist, is to say,
他俩都不是雪莱·卡根 neither of them is Shelly Kagan.
他俩都不是雪莱·卡根 Neither of them is Shelly Kagan,
那雪莱·卡根就死了 then Shelly Kagan died.
但如果我们接受灵魂理论 But how can we say that
我们又怎能得出此种结论呢 if we accept the soul theory?
他们都拥有一部分雪莱·卡根的灵魂 They both have pieces of Shelly Kagan's soul.
灵魂分裂了 The soul split.
看来灵魂理论者需要 Well, maybe what the soul theorist would have to do
在这一点上接受无分支原则了 at this point is accept the--da-ta-da--the no branching rule.
灵魂论者会说 "Ah," Says the soul theorist,
"灵魂是关键 除非灵魂分裂 "Follow the soul--unless the soul splits,
只有这种情形下他们才都不是雪莱·卡根" in which case neither of them is Shelly Kagan."
问题在于 Well, the trouble is,
我们发现无分支原则并没什么说服力 we didn't find the no branching rule very plausible.
它看上去似乎与直觉背道而驰 It seemed counterintuitive.
但现在 你就会开始想 But at this point, you begin to wonder,
也许我们必须接受它 maybe we just need to learn to live with it.
如果人格理论需要无分支原则 If the personality theory needs the no branching rule,
肉体理论需要无分支原则 and the body theory needs the no branching rule,
灵魂理论也需要无分支原则 and the soul theory needs the no branching rule,
似乎我们被无分支原则缠住了 maybe we're just stuck with the no branching rule,
不管我们愿不愿意接受 whether or not we like it.
一旦我们肯定其成立 And if we're stuck with it,
它当然就不会妨碍 then of course it's not an objection against
任何一个包含它的理论了 any one of the theories that uses it.
这就是我们站在灵魂理论者的角度 Well, this is all what we would say as soul theorists
从灵魂可以分裂的前提下得出的结论 if we think souls can split.
但是我们也要考虑 But we need to consider the possibility
灵魂不能分裂的情形 that souls can't split.
可能灵魂理论者还有其他的选择 Maybe the soul theorist has an alternative available to it that
当其他理论行不通时的专门选择 available to him that the other theories don't have.
假设雪莱·卡根的灵魂 Suppose Shelly Kagan's soul
不能分裂 cannot split.
这说明什么呢 What does that mean?
说明当我的大脑分裂时 It means, when my brain gets split,
我的灵魂会完全转移到 my soul is going to end up
阿左或者阿右体内 in Lefty or in Righty,
但不是同时一转多 but not in both.
如果灵魂不能分裂 If a soul can't split,
最后不可能出现 you can't end up with
一人有部分灵魂而另一个则坐拥残存部分 pieces of the soul or the remnants of the soul in both.
灵魂是一个统一的单一物 The soul is a unified simple thing.
我无法确定 Now, I don't actually know
单一的事物是否就不能分裂 whether it's true that simple things can't split.
从形而上学的角度 我不确定 Metaphysically, I'm not sure
是否存有这种可能性 whether that's a possibility or not.
但让我们想象一下 But let's just suppose
柏拉图曾经论证过灵魂是单一的 look, Plato argued the soul was simple.
他其实并没能彻底说服我 He didn't actually convince me of that,
但还是让我们假定灵魂是单一的 but suppose we thought souls are simple,
并且单一的东西不能分裂 and we think simple things can't split.
那么 It would follow,
不能分裂的灵魂则成为同一性的判断标准 then, that souls can't split.
假定我们接受所有这些形而上学的结论 Suppose we accept all that metaphysics.
那么问题最终转化为"谁是雪莱·卡根" Then the question is just, "Which one is Shelly Kagan?"
这取决于最后究竟是谁 Well, it depends which one ended up
拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 with Shelly Kagan's soul.
我们不能说 他们都拥有部分灵魂 We can't say, they both have a piece.
其中一个有 另一个则没有 One of them will have it, the other one won't.
想知道哪个人是雪莱·卡根吗 And you want to know which one's Shelly Kagan?
谁是雪莱·卡根灵魂的最终拥有者 The one that actually ends up with Shelly Kagan's soul.
如果阿左最终拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 If Lefty ends up with Shelly Kagan's soul,
那么阿左是雪莱·卡根 而阿右不是 then Lefty is Shelly Kagan and Righty is an imposter.
阿右以为自己是雪莱·卡根 其实不然 He thinks he's Shelly Kagan, but he's not,
因为他没有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 because he doesn't have Shelly Kagan's soul.
而阿左有 Lefty has it.
如果阿右具有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 If Righty's got Shelly Kagan's soul,
那么阿右是雪莱·卡根 而阿左不是 then Righty is Shelly Kagan and Lefty is the imposter.
现在 从外部看来 Now, looking at the situation from the outside,
我们无法断定 we might be unable to tell
谁是真正的雪莱·卡根 which one is really Shelly Kagan.
因为我们无法 Because we won't be able to tell,
从外部的角度辨别 looking at it from the outside,
谁真正拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 which one really has Shelly Kagan's soul.
尽管谁是雪莱·卡根 Although it will be true, whichever one really does have
取决于谁有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 Shelly Kagan's soul is Shelly Kagan.
但我们不知道谁是灵魂的拥有者 But we don't know which one that is.
叫人哑然失笑的是 Interestingly, and somewhat more surprisingly,
从内部观察 looking at it from the inside,
我们也同样无法分辨 we won't be able to tell either.
阿左会说 Lefty will say,
"省省吧 我当然是雪莱·卡根了 "Give me a break. Of course I'm Shelly Kagan.
我当然拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂了 Of course I've got Shelly Kagan's soul.
我当然就是他了" Of course I'm the one."
但阿右同样会说 But Righty will also say,
"得了吧 我才是雪莱·卡根 "Give me a break. Of course I'm Shelly Kagan.
肯定是我拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂了 Of course I've got Shelly Kagan's soul.
我才是他" Of course I'm the one."
如果灵魂不能分裂 If souls can't split,
他们中肯定有一人错了 one of them is mistaken.
但是他们没有办法辨明 But there's no way for them to know
到底谁是假冒的 which one is the one that's deceived.
不过 这个问题也许 Now, that may not be a problem
能为你们所接受 that you're unwilling to swallow.
如我们所见 所有理论 As we've seen, all the views here
都有对应的难题 have their difficulties.
也许你们已经准备好接受这个难题了 Maybe that's the difficulty you're prepared to accept.
裂变发生时如何判断 What's the right answer in fission?
答案是 看谁拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 It depends on who's got Shelly Kagan's soul.
这没法确定 No way to tell.
但它依然是 But still, that's the answer
那个形而上学问题的答案 请问 to the metaphysical question. Question?
刚才的问题是 The question was,
"如果这两个人都没有 "What if neither of these
雪莱·卡根的灵魂又会如何" have Shelly Kagan's soul?"
那么他们都是冒充的 Then they're both imposters.
这有点像我们先前开始谈论灵魂理论时 That's a little bit like the case we worried about
研究的一个问题 对吗 when we started thinking about the soul view, right?
"如果上帝昨晚毁掉我的灵魂 "What if last night God destroyed my soul
然后植入一个新灵魂会如何" and put in a new soul?"
雪莱·卡根就死了 Then Shelly Kagan died.
如果雪莱·卡根的灵魂 If Shelly Kagan's soul
没有转移到阿左或者阿右那里 does not migrate to Lefty or Righty,
那么他们就都不是雪莱·卡根 neither of them is Shelly Kagan,
这就是灵魂理论的结论 according to the soul theory.
但是雪莱·卡根到底怎么样了 What happened to Shelly Kagan?
如果他的灵魂毁灭了 Well, if the soul got destroyed,
那雪莱·卡根就死了 Shelly Kagan died.
如果他的灵魂没毁灭 If the soul didn't get destroyed,
那么可能在我们视线之外的一个人 maybe somebody else that we weren't even looking at
便是雪莱·卡根 is Shelly Kagan.
就像我说的 灵魂理论至少 So as I say, the soul theory can at least
可以让我们 give us an answer
在回避无分支原则的情况下得到一个结论 that avoids the no branching rule.
如果灵魂是单一的 If souls are simples
并且单一的东西不能分裂 and simples can't split,
那么就不可能 there's no possibility
有两个人同时拥有一个相关联的灵魂 of having two things with a relevant soul.
这样我们就不用特地附上 So we don't need to add,
这个无分支原则了 in this ad hoc fashion, the no branching rule.
这便是灵魂理论的优势 That's an advantage for the soul theory,
我们只要相信灵魂存在即可 if only we believed in souls.
这是它的优势所在 It is an advantage.
但我要指出 But I need to point out that
裂变问题对灵魂理论 there's another disadvantage that the fission case raises
也有妨碍之处 for the soul theory.
我们形而上学地假设一下 So let's just suppose that
上帝告诉我们 metaphysically God tells us
阿左拥有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 that it's Lefty that has Shelly Kagan's soul.
那么阿左当然就是雪莱·卡根了 Then of course it's Lefty that is Shelly Kagan.
阿右是假冒的 Righty is an imposter.
阿右相信他自己是雪莱·卡根 Righty believes he's Shelly Kagan,
他有雪莱·卡根全部的记忆 he has all the memories of Shelly Kagan,
雪莱·卡根所有的愿望 all the desires of Shelly Kagan,
但他并不是雪莱·卡根 but he's not Shelly Kagan
因为他没有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 because he doesn't have Shelly Kagan's soul.
而阿左却拥有这个灵魂 Lefty happens to have it.
这就是对裂变问题的巧妙回答 That's a nice answer to the problem of fission,
但要注意这也引出了我们最先论证 but notice the problem it raises for the argument
是否相信灵魂存在所提出的那个问题 for believing in a soul in the first place.
回想一下 学期伊始我们曾提出 Way back at the start of the semester when we asked,
"为什么要相信灵魂存在" "Why believe in souls?"
一个重要论点是 One important argument was,
或者说一系列论点是 or really family of arguments was,
我们必须相信灵魂 you need to believe in souls
由此我们才能解释肉体为什么活力四溢 in order to explain why bodies are animated,
人为什么有理性 why people are rational,
人为何具有人格 how they can have personalities,
人为什么有创造力 等等 how they can be creative, and so forth.
为了解释意识以及自我意识 In order to explain consciousness and self-awareness.
随便是什么 就像做填空题一样 Whatever it was, fill in your favorite blank,
按照你的喜好填上就行 fill in the blank in your favorite way.
即是说 为了便于解释 The claim was, you needed to believe in souls
我们需要相信灵魂 in order to explain all that.
如果这一说法正确 But if that's right,
那么阿右这边发生了什么事呢 what's going on in Righty's case?
阿右有自我意识 他有意识 Righty is aware. Righty is conscious.
阿右有创造力 阿右有自由意志 Righty is creative. Righty has free will.
阿右制定计划 阿右拥有人格 Righty makes plans. Righty's got personality.
阿右有理性 阿右的肉体充满活力 Righty is rational. Righty's body is animated.
根据灵魂理论对灵魂的论证 According to the soul-theory argument for soul,
更准确地说是根据对灵魂的论证 rather, according to the argument for souls,
你需要相信灵魂 you needed to believe in souls
以此才能解释为什么会存在这么一个人 in order to explain how you could have a person.
但现在阿右是个没有灵魂的人 But now Righty's a person without a soul,
因为我们刚刚假设 because we just hypothesized,
雪莱·卡根的灵魂在上边这儿 oh, Shelly Kagan's soul's up there.
所以 一方面 So at the very same moment
关于灵魂不能分裂的假定 that positing the nonsplitting of souls
似乎解决了裂变造成的复制问题 seems to solve the fission problem of duplication,
但却它拽走了灵魂理论者脚下的地毯 it yanks the rug out from underneath the soul theorist
它对我们最初这种 by undermining one of the types of arguments
相信灵魂的论证形成了妨碍 for believing in the soul in the first place.
就是说 如果阿右是一个人的话 After all, if Righty can be a person,
显然肯定不是雪莱·卡根 admittedly not Shelly Kagan,
但他是一个有意识 有创造力 but a person--conscious, creative,
有理性 有自我意识的人 rational, so forth, aware--
只是没有灵魂 without a soul,
这种情形也可能在我们身上发生 then maybe the same thing is true for us,
这正是物理主义者的观点 which is of course what the physicalist says.
我想再提出另一种可能 Let me mention one other possibility,
因为它非常有意思 because it's quite intriguing.
假定灵魂论者如此 Suppose the soul theorist answers
反驳刚才的诘问 that last objection by saying,
"这一切都不会发生" "Ain't ever going to happen."
如果阿右醒来却没有灵魂 Yeah, it would be a problem for believing in souls
那么相信灵魂存在就会出问题 if Righty could wake up without one.
我们已经确定 But since we stipulated that
雪莱·卡根的灵魂会转移给阿左 Shelly Kagan's soul is going to end up in Lefty,
那么阿右就不会醒来 Righty is not going to wake up.
或者是 阿右醒来 Alternatively, it might have been that Righty woke up,
而阿左没有醒来 but Lefty doesn't wake up,
手术后没能活下来 doesn't survive the operation.
假设我们一直在做这种大脑移植手术 Suppose we did these sort of brain transfers all the time
那么事态就会如此发展 and the following thing always happened.
移植整个大脑后 病人醒来 Transfer the entire brain, the patient wakes up.
移植一个大脑半球后 病人醒来 Transfer one hemisphere, the patient wakes up.
移植两个半球后 Transfer both hemispheres,
这个或那个病人醒来 one patient or the other wakes up,
但从来不会两个都醒过来 but never both.
如果真是这样 If that happened,
我们就有了一个伟大的新论据 we'd have a great new argument
来证明灵魂存在 for the existence of a soul.
如何解释 What could possibly explain
只要我们不同时移植两个大脑半球 why either hemisphere of the brain
一般情况下 would normally be enough,
大脑任何一个半球就够用了呢 as long as we don't transfer both?
当我们同时移植它们 When we transfer both,
一个半球有时可能工作 one hemisphere might work sometimes,
另一个半球也有时可能工作 sometimes the other hemisphere,
但两个半球从来不同时工作 but never both.
如何解释这一点呢 What could possibly explain that?
灵魂能解释这一点 Souls could explain that.
如果灵魂不能分裂 If souls can't split,
它只能跟随一半的大脑 it can only follow one half of the brain,
这就是为什么有时这个人醒来 and that's why we'll get somebody that's got one half,
有时那个人醒来 但他们从不同时醒来 sometimes the other half, but never both halves.
这是一种 So there's a kind of
灵魂存在的 empirical argument
经验主义论证 for the existence of the soul
如果我们真的发现了这种结果的话 if we found those kinds of results.
当然 这里要划一个很大的问号 Of course, that's a big "If."
千万别以为我刚才说的 Please don't go away thinking that what I just said is,
是一个灵魂存在的新论据 here's a new argument for the soul.
我们不做大脑移植手术 We don't do brain transfers,
更不用说半个大脑移植手术了 let alone have a half-a-brain transfers.
我们没做过任何试验 We don't have any experiments
能够表明一半人会醒来 that suggest one half wakes up,
一半人醒不过来 but not the other half.
我说的是如果有一天我们真发现了这种事 All I'm saying is that if someday we found that,
那么 at that point,
就会出现一个灵魂存在的新论据 we'd have an argument for the soul.
好了 让我们暂且把灵魂理论放在一边 Well again, let me put away the soul theory again.
我探讨它是因为 I was exploring it because it's interesting
思考它背后的含义很有意思 to think about its implication.
但是因为我不相信灵魂存在 But since I don't believe in souls,
我希望在 I want to choose between
肉体理论和人格理论中做出选择 the body view and the personality view.
我们已经看到 Both of them,
这两个理论在面对裂变问题时 as we saw in the face of fission,
都需要引入无分支原则 needs to accept a no branching rule.
如果这两个理论 If they're going to survive
要参与对这个问题的探讨 thinking about this case at all,
它们就必须加入无分支原则 we need to throw in a no branching rule.
不管你是否相信 Whether or not you find the no branching rule
无分支原则 hard to believe,
如果两种理论都非它不可 if both views are stuck with it,
那么我们就缺不了它 well, then we're stuck with it.
先来选择是相信 So let's try to choose
带有无分支原则的人格理论 between the personality theory with the no branching rule
还是带有无分支原则的肉体理论 and the body theory with the no branching rule.
我们应该接受哪个 Which of these should we accept?
哪个是比较好的人格同一性理论呢 Which of these is the better theory of personal identity?
答案是"我也不确定" Answer, "I'm not sure."
在我的哲学生涯中 Over the course of my philosophical career,
我曾于两者之间徘徊 I have moved back and forth between them.
确实有很长一段时间 There was certainly a long period of time
我发现人格理论 in which I found the personality theory,
即 带有无分支原则的人格理论 that is, the personality theory with a no branching rule,
更优也更有说服力 to be the better and more plausible theory.
在当代哲学界它也确实 And it certainly has any number of advocates
有不少拥趸 on the contemporary philosophical scene.
但在我哲学生涯的另一个时期 But at other times in my philosophical career,
我发现肉体理论 即 I have found the body theory, that is to say,
带有无分支原则的肉体理论 the body theory with the no branching rule,
更合理 to be the more plausible theory.
同样 And it is certainly the case that
肉体理论在当代哲学家中 the body theory has its advocates
也有很多拥趸 among contemporary philosophers.
从价值上来讲 我其实不认为 For what it's worth--and I don't actually think that
我下面的话有多大意义 what I'm about to say is worth all that much.
我只想告诉你们我自己的小信仰 I'm going to share with you my own pet belief.
目前我倾向相信肉体理论 These days I'm inclined to go with the body theory.
我倾向于认为 I'm inclined to think that
人格同一性的关键是拥有同一肉体 the key to personal identity is having the same body,
只要没有出现分支 as long as there's no branching,
只要没有分裂 as long as there's no splitting.
但是当然 你们要做出你们自己的选择 But it's certainly open to you to decide that you think
"不不 人格理论更好" "No, no, the personality theory is the stronger view."
我解决不了这个问题 I can't settle the question.
我所有的哲学论证都告诉你们了 I don't have any more philosophical arguments
再没藏着掖着了 up my sleeve on this issue.
但我的确还有另一个观点 But I do have another point
值得拿出来讨论一下 that's worth considering.
尽管我倾向于认为 Although I'm inclined to think that
肉体理论也许是探寻 the body theory may be the best view about
人格同一性的关键的最佳理论 what's the key to personal identity,
但我同时也认为 I'm also inclined to think
它其实无关紧要 it doesn't really matter.
我们曾经一直问这样的问题 We've been posing the following question.
我们一直问 We've been asking,
"我怎样才能真正活下来" "What does it take for it to be true that I survive?"
也许我们的结论应该是 And it may be that what we should conclude is,
不管对应的最佳答案是什么 whatever the best answer to that question is,
它都不是 it's not the question
我们本应该认真思考的问题 we should really have been thinking about.
我们那时还没达到思考这个问题的高度 We weren't going to be in a position to see that
经过我们 until we went through all the stuff
这几周的讨论 we've been going over for the last couple of weeks.
我们现在可以思考了 But now that we're here,
我们现在也许会问 we're in a position perhaps to raise the question,
我们是否应该问 怎样才能存活下来 should we be asking what it takes to survive?
抑或问 Or should we be asking about
活下来的意义是什么 what matters in survival?
提出这个问题时 Now, in posing this question,
我已经假设 I'm obviously presupposing that
我们能够清楚区分这两个问题了 we can draw a distinction between the question,
"我是否存活下来 "Do I survive?
未来是否存在某个人 他是我" Is somebody that exists in the future, whatever, me?"
以及 and the question,
"我活下来的目的究竟是什么 "What was it that I wanted, when I wanted to survive?
一般而言 存活的意义在哪里" What was it that mattered in ordinary survival?"
这些问题也许确有不同 And it might be that these things can actually come apart.
为了看清这点 我们先来 To see this, suppose we start
讨论一下灵魂理论 by thinking again about the soul view.
假设有灵魂存在 Suppose there are souls.
我不相信灵魂 但可以想象一下 I don't believe in them, but let's imagine.
假设有灵魂存在 Suppose there are souls.
假设灵魂是判断人格同一性的关键 And suppose that souls are the key to personal identity.
所以如果某人有我的灵魂 那他就是我 So somebody is me if they've got my soul.
或者说得更直接些 Or, to put it more straightforwardly,
下周来上课的那个我 next week the person that's me
是个拥有我灵魂的人 is the person with my soul.
只要有人拥有我的灵魂 我就始终活着 I survive as long as there's somebody around with my soul.
一百年后 我还活着吗 A hundred years from now, am I still around?
如果我灵魂的还活着 那我就还活着 Well, if my soul's still around, that's me.
这就是灵魂理论的说法 That's what the soul theory says.
假设它正确 And suppose it's the truth.
现在来考虑一下这种可能性 Now, consider the following possibility.
假设人可以投胎重生 Suppose that people can be reincarnated.
也就是说 当他们肉体死亡时 That is to say, at the death of their body,
他们的灵魂承袭了 激活了 their soul takes over, animates,
迁徙了 连接到 inhabits, gets connected
一具新生的肉体 to a new body that's being born.
和一些传统文化 But, unlike the kind of reincarnation cases
以及宗教中的 that get talked about in popular culture
转世重生的故事不同 and various religions where,
最起码在那些情形下 at least under the right circumstances,
你可以记得你的前生 you can remember your prior lives,
而在这里我们只设想灵魂重生时 let's imagine that when the soul is reincarnated,
被擦除得非常干净 it's scrubbed completely clean,
没有任何前生的痕迹 no traces whatsoever of the earlier life.
无迹可寻 No way to retrieve it.
没有人格因缘轮回这类事情 No karmic similarities of personality or anything,
就是一块空白的黑板 just starts over like a blank slate.
一块彻底被擦干净了的黑板 Like a blackboard that's been completely erased,
我们现在有一块同样的黑板 we now have the very same blackboard,
然后开始往上写东西 and now we start writing new things on it.
想象中的重生便是此意 Imagine that that's the way reincarnation worked.
如果有人问你 So somebody asks you,
"一千年以后你还活着吗" "Will you still be around in 1,000 years?"
回答会是 "是的 The answer's going to be, "Yes,
因为我的灵魂将会重生 because my soul will be reincarnated.
一千年以后 会有一个人 In 1,000 years there'll be somebody
用我的灵魂 that has the very same soul
激活现在这个肉体" that's animating my body right now."
当然了 Of course,
这个灵魂不会记得自己曾是雪莱·卡根 that soul won't remember being Shelly Kagan.
它对前生没有任何记忆 It won't have any memories of its prior life.
且在任何方面都不与雪莱·卡根相像 It won't be like Shelly Kagan in any way
没有雪莱·卡根的愿望 in terms of Shelly Kagan's desires
抱负 目标或者恐惧 or ambitions or goals or fears.
不会出现 It won't be that
人格通过 we can see why that personality emerges
因果报应显现 through karmic cause
我前生的生活方式 and effect in any way that are a function of
从而影响今生的生活 what I was like in my life.
但他就是雪莱·卡根 It'll be Shelly Kagan,
因为他有雪莱·卡根的灵魂 because it's Shelly Kagan's soul,
只是和前生没有任何交集 but with no overlap of
人格 记忆都不重叠 personality, memories, anything.
那我就想说了 "谁在乎呢" Then I want to say, "Who cares?"
在这些情形中活下来 The fact that I will survive under those circumstances
对我而言没有任何意义 doesn't give me anything that matters to me.
被告知自己能存活下来 It's no comfort to me
并不会给我带来任何慰藉 to be told I will survive,
总之 灵魂是人格同一性的关键 because after all, the soul is the key to personal identity,
但如果没有相同的人格 没有记忆 if there's no similar personality, no memories,
没有信仰 没有以前生活的回忆 no beliefs, no retrievable memories of past lives.
那么谁在乎他是不是我呢 Then who cares that it's me?
如果你能把握这个观点的要点 If you can feel the force of that thought,
你就能看到 "我能否活下去" then you're seeing how the question "Will I survive?"
和"我活下去有什么意义"其实有区别 can be separated out from the question "What matters?"
我们关心的是什么 What do we care about?
仅仅是灵魂的存活吗 Bare survival of my soul,
即使它是 even though that is the key
人格同一性的关键 就算它是吧 to personal identity--if it is--
单灵魂之存活 bare survival of my soul
并非我所求 doesn't give me what I want.
这种说法同下面的说法一样不能让人满意 It's no more comforting or satisfying
如果你说 than if you said,
"看到这块关节骨了吗 "You know this knucklebone?
你死后 我们会做个关节手术 After you die, we're going to do knucklebone surgery
把这个关节骨移植到另一个人的身体里 and implant that knucklebone in somebody else's body.
这块骨头会活下去" And that knucklebone is going to survive."
我会说 "太有意思了 And I say, "Oh, that's very interesting that
这块关节骨 that knucklebone will be
从现在起会活上100或1000年 around 100 or 1,000 years from now.
但是谁在乎呢" But who cares?"
如果有人提出人格同一性的 And if the knucklebone theory
关节理论 of personal identity gets proposed
有人对你说 "是的 但是你看 and somebody said, "Oh, yes, but you see,
那个有你关节骨的人是你 that person now with that knucklebone will be you,
因为人格同一性的关键 because the key to personal identity
是拥有同一块关节骨" is having the very same knucklebone."
那我会说 "好吧 他就是我 I say, "All right, so it's me.
但谁在乎呢" Who cares?"
仅仅是关节骨活下来 Bare knucklebone survival
并没有给我带来任何意义 does not give me what matters.
人格同一性的关节理论 Now, the knucklebone theory of personal identity
简直愚蠢至极 is a very stupid theory.
相比之下 人格同一性的灵魂理论 In contrast, the soul theory of personal survival
却并不愚蠢 is not a stupid theory.
但不管怎么说 But for all that,
它也没能如我所愿 it doesn't give me what I want.
当你想到 活下来意味着 When you think about the possibility of bare survival
仅仅只是擦除干净的灵魂活下来 of the scrubbed, clean, erased soul,
你就会发现存活并不是你真正想要的 you see that survival wasn't really everything you wanted.
你想要的 至少我想要的 What you wanted--at least what I want,
请你们问一下自己 I invite you to ask yourself
你们是否也想要同样的东西 whether you want the same thing
我想要的不仅仅是活下去 what I want is not just survival,
而是带着相同的人格活下去 but survival with the same personality.
所以即使灵魂理论 So even if the soul theory
是人格同一性的正确理论 is the correct theory of personality,
它也不足以给我活下去的意义 it's not enough to give me what matters.
重要的不是活下去 What matters isn't just survival.
而是带着相同的人格活下去 It's survival with the same personality.
让我们看一下肉体理论 Let's consider the body view.
假设人格同一性的 Suppose that the body theory
肉体理论是正确的 of personal identity is correct.
要想成为我 就得有个人 And to be me, there's got to be somebody there
拥有我的肉体 that's got my body.
假定大脑版本是 Let's suppose the brain version of the theory
肉体理论的最佳版本 is the best version.
那么明年 And so next year,
会有一个人 there's going to be somebody
拥有我的大脑 that's got my brain.
但设想一下 倘若我被洗脑了 But let's imagine that the brain has been scrubbed clean.
所有记忆被完全清除 All memory traces have been completely erased.
我们说的是彻底的 We're talking complete
不可逆转的失忆 irreversible amnesia,
彻底删除 complete erasure of
大脑硬盘里的数据 the brain's hard drive.
没有愿望 记忆 No traces of desires and memories
意图 信仰的一丝遗迹 and intentions and beliefs
全部格式化 to eventually be recovered
只要手术成功 if only we have the right surgery,
或者叫过程 心理疗法 or procedure, or psychotherapy,
或者随便什么叫法 or what have you.
一切都消失了 It's gone.
现在 那个人 Now, that thing that wakes up
历经这次彻底的不可逆转的失忆后醒来 after this complete irreversible amnesia
肯定会重建人格 will no doubt eventually develop a personality,
一系列的信仰 记忆 a set of beliefs, memories.
没人知道他是谁 所以大家叫他 Nobody knows who it is, so they call it...
他们看到他在街上游荡 You know, they find it wandering on the streets.
于是叫他无名氏 They call it John Doe.
无名氏最终会有一系列的信仰 John Doe will eventually have a bunch of beliefs
关于世界如何运作 制定一些计划 about how the world works, make some plans,
具有一些记忆 get some memories.
根据肉体理论 那个人就是我 According to the body theory, that's me.
如果肉体理论正确 天哪 他就是我 And if the body theory is correct, well by golly, it is me.
我只能这么说 他就是我 And all I can say in response to that is, it's me.
但谁在乎呢 那又怎样呢 But who cares? So what?
想到自己五十年后依然活着 I'm not comforted by the thought that
我却并不因此而倍感宽慰 I will still be around 50 years from now,
这个人是我 但却没有我的人格 if the thing that's me doesn't have my personality.
仅仅是肉体的存活 这还不足以 Mere bodily survival isn't enough
给我我想要的 to give me what I want.
我想要的不仅仅是肉体活下来 I want more than mere bodily survival.
我希望带着同样的人格活下来 I want to survive with the same personality.
所以即使人格同一性的肉体理论成立 So even if the body theory of personal identity is the right theory,
我的回答仍然是 "那又怎样呢" what I want to say in response to that is, "So what?"
如果真正关键的问题不是 If the really crucial question is not
"我能否活下去" "Do I survive,"
而是"当我活下去的时候 but "Do I have what I wanted
我能得以如愿以偿吗" when I wanted to survive?"
那么答案就是 肉体理论没法满足你 the answer is the body theory doesn't give it.
我不仅仅想活下去 I don't just want to survive.
我还想带着同样的人格活下去 I want to survive with the same personality.
这样的话 我们能不能下结论说 Should we conclude, therefore,
这个重要问题的关键在于 that the key to the important question
即 "什么活下来才有意义" namely, "What matters?"
这一问题的答案 the answer to that question,
我们能不能下结论说 是同样的人格呢 should we conclude, is, same personality?
下节课再讨论这个问题 That's a question we'll have to take up next time.