之前我们已对人格同一性的关键 We've distinguished three different views
将三种不同观点做了区分 as to the secret or key to personal identity across time.
分别是灵魂观点 肉体观点 There's the soul view, the body view,
以及人格观点 and the personality view.
我们暂不展开灵魂理论 Putting aside, for the most part, the soul view,
因为我已论证过世界上没有灵魂 because I've argued that there are no souls--
虽然有时候为了比较 although occasionally I bring it out
或者对比方便 我会提到它 just for the sake of comparison and contrast--
我们主要需要问自己 the main question we want to ask ourselves
到底选择肉体理论 is how to choose between the body view
还是人格理论 and the personality view.
肉体理论认为应该以肉体为标准 The body view says follow the body.
将来若有人占据我的肉体 那他就是我 If somebody around in the future's got my body, that's me.
人格理论的评判标准则是人格 The personality view says follow the personality,
即 由信仰 欲望 记忆 that is, the set of beliefs, desires, memories,
目标 野心等组成的整体 goals, ambitions, and so forth.
如果将来某个人 Somebody around in the future
拥有我的记忆 that's got my memories,
我的信仰 我的欲望 那他就是我 my beliefs, my desires, that's me.
这两个观点我们该如何抉择呢 How should we choose between these two views?
上节课结尾我曾提到 As I mentioned at the end of last lecture,
我想给大家做一套思考实验 what I want to do is offer us a set of thought experiments.
我们只能通过思考实验的形式 They've got to be thought experiments,
因为在现实生活中 because in real life,
肉体和人格总是并存的 bodies and personalities go hand in hand.
但通过做一些科幻实验 But by doing some science fiction experiments,
我们可以将二者分开 并且扪心自问 we can take them apart and ask ourselves,
"究竟在我心目中哪一个才是我 "Which one do I think is me?
当我的肉体 When my body goes one way
和我的人格背道而驰 and my personality goes another way,
我又该何去何从" where do I go?"
再次提醒大家 Again, just to remind you,
为了让你们更直观地感受 in order to get the intuitions actually flowing,
一旦我把肉体和人格分离开来 what I'm going to do once I've separated
我将从二者中选其一 the body and the personality this way,
对其进行折磨 is torture one of the end products.
所以我要请大家 So I'm going to be asking you
将自己置身其中 to put yourself in the first person.
想象这正发生在你自己身上 Imagine this is happening to you.
问问你自己 And ask yourself,
"我希望哪个受折磨 "Which one do I want to be tortured?
或者我希望哪个不被折磨" Or which one do I want to not be tortured?"
因为那会帮你们发现 Because that will give you some kind of evidence
那个才是你内心真正所选 as to which one you take to be you.
大家用这种自省方式 And think about this in that special first person
来自然地思考下这个问题 ego-concerned way that comes naturally to us.
先不考虑 Just bracket any moral concerns
你可能会折磨他人 you may have about torturing other people
或同意他人被折磨的道德问题 or agreeing that somebody else should be tortured.
就我们的目的而言 此时此刻 For our purposes, right now,
如果我从课堂上拉出一个志愿者 if I brought up a volunteer from the class-
然后问他 你在这里 and I'm asking you--here's you,
那边还有另一个志愿者 there's the other volunteer--
你想让我折磨你俩中的哪一个呢 which one do you want to be tortured?
回答肯定是"折磨他吧 It's, "Let that one be tortured.
我就免了" Don't let it happen to me."
这样我们就可以发现自己内心的真实所想 That's how we know this is me speaking.
好了 这就是我要问你们的问题 All right, so that's the question I'm going to ask you.
我可能会逐步深入这个实验 I'll probably slip into talking about this experiment
就像发生在我身上一样 as though it's being done to me.
但为了更形象 你们也应该 But to get it vivid, you should think of it
将自己摆在实验者的角度去思考 as though it's being done to you.
介绍完 I'll mention, just in passing,
这几个思维实验以后 that these thought experiments that I'm about to give,
我还会演示英国哲学家 I'm going to give a pair of them,
伯纳德·威廉姆斯的 come from Bernard Williams,
伯纳德·威廉姆斯 当代英国最杰出的道德哲学家 他认为道德反省最初的基础必须是个人的观点 即行为的内在理由 who's a British philosopher.
两个实验 All right, so case number one. Here you are.
好了 现在做第一个实验 The mad scientist has kidnapped you and he says:
有个疯狂的科学家绑架了你 并对你说 "I've been working on mind transfer machines.
"我在造思想调换器 And what I'm going to do is I've got you
除了你 and I've also kidnapped somebody else over here, Linda.
我还绑架了琳达 And I'm going to hook you up to my machines
我要把你俩联接到我的机器上 and swap your minds.
然后调换你们的思想 And what that means is, I'm going to read off the memories
也就是说 我会从你的脑子里 and the beliefs and the desires from your brain
读取你的记忆 信仰 欲望 and read off the memories
并从琳达的脑子里 and desires and beliefs from Linda's brain.
读取她的记忆 信仰 欲望 And then I'm going to electronically transfer
然后将琳达的记忆信仰等 Linda's memories and beliefs and so forth over here
用电子方式输送到这里 and implant them onto this brain.
植入你的大脑 And take your memories and beliefs and so forth
再将你的记忆信仰等 and implant them onto Linda's brain.
植入琳达的大脑 First, we'll put you to sleep when we do all this procedure.
整个过程中我们会先将你催眠 Then when you wake up,
然后当你醒来时 you will wake up in Linda's body."
你将处于琳达的肉体里" There'll be something here that,
接下来 you'll wake up and you'll say,
你醒后就会说 "What am I doing in this new body?
"我怎么会在这个新的肉体里 What happened to my beard?
我的胡子上哪去了 How come I'm speaking in this high female voice?"
我怎么在用这种女高音说话" Whatever it is, but you'll think to yourself,
但不论如何 你心里知道 "Well, here I am, Shelly Kagan.
"我是雪莱·卡根 I seem to be inhabiting Linda's body.
貌似我困在了琳达的肉体里 Don't know how that happened.
我也不知道是怎么一回事 Oh yes, the mad scientist kidnapped me
哦 对了 有个疯子科学家绑架了我 and he transferred us, he swapped us.
把我俩对调了 He swapped our bodies, swapped our minds.
他把我俩的肉体和思想对调了 I guess the whole thing works."
我猜大概就是这样吧" So the mad scientist explains all of this to you,
于是他对你做出如此一番解释 but in order to give it a little kicker,
不过更可恶的是 because he's also an evil mad scientist--
他还是个邪恶的疯子科学家 that may be evil already,
疯子科学家本身就够邪恶的了 but because he's an evil mad scientist--
但他还是个邪恶的疯子科学家 he says, "and then when I'm done--"
他说"当我完成后" So over here we've got Shelly's body but Linda's personality.
这儿还有个装着琳达人格的雪莱肉体 So Linda thinking "What am I doing?"
琳达会想"我在干吗" and "What am I doing in Shelly's body?
"我怎么会在雪莱的肉体里 How did I get a beard?"
我怎么长胡子了" So over here, Linda, in Shelly's body.
于是这边是装着琳达人格的雪莱肉体 Over here, Shelly, in Linda's body.
这边是装有雪莱人格的琳达肉体 "I'm going to torture one of these.
"我要折磨其中一个 But because I'm a generous evil mad scientist,
但由于我是个仁慈的邪恶的疯子科学家 I want to ask you which one should I torture?"
我想先问问你 我该折磨哪一个" Now, when I think about this, and again,
对于这个问题 I'm inviting you to think about this in the first person,
我再次请你们置身其中来思考 so this is happening to you.
假设这事发生在你们身上 When I think about this, I say
就我自己考虑的结果 我会说 "Torture the one over here."
"折磨这边这位吧" I'm going to be over here in Linda's body,
我会在这边琳达的肉体里 horrified at what's been going on,
震惊于我所经历的一切 horrified that she's being tortured,
惊恐地看着她遭受折磨 but at least it's not happening to me.
但起码我自己逃过一劫 That's the intuition I've got when I think about this case.
这就是我思考这个例子时的第一反应 When the mad scientist asks me,
当这个疯子科学家问我 "Which one of these two should I torture?"
"我应该折磨哪一个" I say, "Torture this one."
我会说"折磨这个吧" Because if I were to say "Torture this one"
因为如果我说"折磨这个" and then he does it, think about what's going to happen.
而他也这么做了 想想接下来会怎样 I'll be thinking "I'm Shelly Kagan.
我会想"我是雪莱·卡根 Oh, this is what a horrible situation.
这太恐怖了 Oh, the pain, the pain! Stop the pain!
疼 疼 快住手 Make it go away!"
快住手" I don't want that to happen to me.
我可不想遭这份罪 If this one's being tortured, nobody's thinking to himself,
如果这家伙被折磨的话 没人会觉得 "Oh, I'm Shelly Kagan in horrible pain."
"我是极度痛苦的雪莱·卡根" So I want this one to be tortured.
所以我希望这家伙被折磨 All right, that's the intuition I've got about the case.
这就是我在思考这个例子时的直觉反应 Now, if you've got that same intuition,
如果你也这么认为的话 think about the implications of that intuition.
就想想看这个答案的含意 You're saying that
你是想说 I, Shelly Kagan, ended up over here.
我 雪莱·卡根 最终还是这边这个 But that's not my body.
但那个肉体不是我的 This is Linda's body.
而是琳达的 Shelly Kagan's old body is over here.
雪莱·卡根的身体在这里 But this is the one that's me,
但这个才是我 because this is the one that I don't want to have tortured.
因为我不希望它受折磨 So the body isn't the key to personal identity.
所以肉体不是人格同一性的关键 Personality is the key to personal identity.
人格才是 This has got my personality,
这边这个有我的人格 my memories of growing up in Chicago,
我在芝加哥长大的记忆 becoming a philosopher,
成为一名哲学家的记忆 my thoughts about what I want to have happen to my children,
我对我孩子寄予的希望 my fears about how I'm going to explain what's going on to my wife.
以及我对如何向妻子解释这一切的担忧 Whatever it is,
不论如何 this is the Shelly Kagan personality over here.
这边这个有雪莱·卡根的人格 This is me.
这才是我 That follows then that this intuition suggests
这个直觉说明 that what I find intuitively plausible
我凭直觉发现在人格同一性理论中 is the personality theory of personal identity.
人格理论更可靠 Now, let's tell a different story.
现在来讲另一个故事 Both of these stories, as I say,
如我说过 这两个故事 come from Bernard Williams.
都是源自伯纳德·威廉姆斯 Bernard Williams says here's another example we can think about.
伯纳德·威廉姆斯说还有另外一个例子 Mad scientist, again, kidnaps you, kidnaps Linda.
还是那个疯子科学家绑架了你和琳达 And he says, "Shelly, I've got some news for you."
然后他说"雪莱 我给你说个事" I'm switching between you and me.
这里我置换了第一人称和第二人称 He says, "Shelly, I've got some news for you.
他说"雪莱 我给你说个事 I'm going to torture you.
我要折磨你" I say, "No, no! Please don't do it to me!
我说"不要 请别这样对我 Please, please, don't torture me!"
求你了 请别折磨我" He says, "Well, you know, I'm in the mad scientist business.
他说"你也知道 我是个疯子科学家 This is what I do. I'm going to torture you."
这是我的工作 我要折磨你 He says, "But because I'm a generous mad scientist,
但由于我是仁慈的疯子科学家 before I torture you,
所以在折磨你之前 what I'm going to do is give you amnesia.
我会先让你失忆 I'm going to completely
我要彻底 scrub clean your brain
清除你的大脑记忆 so that you won't remember that you're Shelly Kagan.
这样你就不记得你是雪莱·卡根了 You won't have any memories of growing up in Chicago.
不记得你在芝加哥长大的事 You won't have any memories
不记得 of deciding to become a philosopher.
你决心要做一个哲学家的事 You won't remember getting married or having children.
你也不记得自己结了婚有了孩子 You won't remember the--all,you won't have any desire.
你什么都不记得 你无欲无求 The whole thing wiped clean,
在我折磨你之前 一切都会被清除掉 complete perfect amnesia before I torture you.
让你完完全全地失忆 Don't you feel better?"
这样行了吧" No, I don't feel better.
我可不觉得 I'm still going to be tortured
我还是要受折磨 and now we've added insult to injury.
而且酷刑还愈发加重了 I've got amnesia as well as being tortured.
既要失忆 又要受折磨 No comfort there.
一点也不好受 "Well," He says, "Look, I'll make the deal sweeter for you.
"好吧" 他说 "为了让你好过点 After I give you amnesia, before I torture you,
在你失忆以后 受到折磨之前 I will drive you insane
我会先把你弄疯 and make you believe that you're Linda.
让你确信自己就是琳达 I've been studying Linda. There she is.
我一直在研究琳达 她就在那儿 I've been reading her psychology
我一直在观察她的脑电波等 by looking at her brain waves and so forth and so on.
来研究她的心理 And so I'm going to delude you
所以我要混淆你的意识 into thinking that you're Linda.
让你觉得自己就是琳达 I'm going to make you think 'oh, I'm Linda.'
我要让你以为'我是琳达' You won't talk like that. 'Oh, I'm Linda.'
当然你不会那么说 你会说'我是琳达' And you'll have the memories of Linda
你会获得关于琳达 growing up in Pennsylvania
在宾夕法尼亚长大的那些记忆 and you'll remember Linda's family and,
你会知晓琳达的家庭情况 like Linda, you'll want to be an author,
并且像琳达一样 你会想当一名作家 or whatever it is that Linda wants to be.
或是任何她想做的职业 And then I'll torture you. Are you happy now?"
然后我再来折磨你 你现在满意了吗" No, I'm not happy now.
不 我还是不乐意 First of all, I'm being tortured. I was given amnesia.
首先 我要被折磨 我会失忆 And now you've driven me crazy and make me--
现在你还要把我逼疯 deluded me into thinking that I'm Linda.
再蛊惑我的内心 让我觉得我是琳达 No comfort there.
简直糟透了 He says, "Okay, last attempt to make--
他说"好吧 最后一次让步 you're not being very reasonable," he says.
你太不讲道理了" "Last attempt, I'm going to, after I drive you crazy
"我的最后一次让步 在把你弄疯 and make you think you're Linda,
让你以为你是琳达以后 I'm going to do the corresponding thing for Linda.
我要对琳达做一样的事情 I'm going to give her amnesia
让她失忆 and then I'm going to drive her crazy
把她弄疯 and make her think that she's Shelly.
让她觉得她就是雪莱 Give her all of your memories and beliefs and desires.
把你的一切记忆信仰欲望都给她 Now is it okay that I'm going to torture you?"
这样的话 再折磨你总没问题了吧" No. It hardly makes it--
才不呢 问题大了去了 it was bad enough I was being tortured
我受折磨 失忆 发疯 and given amnesia and driven insane.
就已经够糟糕了 It doesn't really make it any better that you're also
你让不让别人失忆发疯 going to give amnesia and drive insane somebody else.
又不能改善我的处境 Don't torture me!
不要折磨我 If you've got to torture somebody,
如果你一定要折磨谁 I say in my nonethical mood,
我不道德地说一句 if you've got to torture somebody,
如果你一定要折磨谁 do it to her. Don't do it to me.
就折磨她好了 别折磨我 When I think about this second case,
我思考这个例子的时候 that's my intuition.
就是这么个直觉 Now, think about the implications of this second case
现在想想第二个例子 for the theory of personal identity.
对人格同一性理论有什么含意 If I don't want this thing over here to be tortured,
如果我不希望这边这位受折磨 that must be because I think it's me.
那一定是因为我觉得这就是我 But if it's me,
但如果这是我的话 what's the key to personal identity?
人格同一性的关键又是什么 Well, not personality,
看来不是人格 because after all, this doesn't end up with
因为在受折磨之前 Shelly Kagan's personality before the torture.
这并不是雪莱·卡根的人格 Shelly Kagan's personality is over there.
雪莱·卡根的人格在那里 This is Shelly Kagan's body
这只是雪莱·卡根的肉体 and that suggests if I don't want this to be tortured,
这就表明如果我不希望他受折磨 it's because I believe in the body theory of personal identity.
是因为我相信人格同一性的肉体理论 Follow the body, not follow the personality.
根据肉体而非人格判断身份同一性 Even though he swapped our personalities,
即便他调换了我们的人格 it's still me he's torturing.
他折磨的人依然是我 That's the intuition I've got
这就是我思考伯纳德·威廉姆斯描述的 when I think about Bernard Williams' second case.
第二个例子时的直觉 Now, we're in a bit of a pickle here,
从哲学角度来看 from the philosophical point of view.
我们现在陷入了困境 Because when we've thought about the first case,
因为当我们考虑第一个例子时 the intuition seemed to be, ah,
我们的直觉好像在说 personality's the key to personal identity.
人格是身份同一性的关键 But when we thought about the second case,
但当我们考虑第二个例子时 the intuition seems to be, huh,
我们的直觉却又好像在说 body is the key to personal identity.
肉体才是身份同一性的关键 That's bad, right?
这就出问题了 对吧 Two different cases give us two different,
两个例子居然使我们对同一问题 diametrically opposed, answers on the very same question.
得出了两种截然不同的答案 One sec.
稍等一下 And it's worse still--
但更大的问题在于 Of course, if you don't share the intuitions
当然了 如果你的直觉和我不一样 that I just--I was being honest with you.
我只是跟你们实话实说 Those really are my intuitions when I think about these cases.
那些确实是我思考这些情况时的直觉 If you're with me,
如果你和我一样 you're in a philosophical problem.
你也会陷入这个哲学困境 If you're not with me,
如果你和我不一样 if you didn't have the same intuitions,
如果你没有同样的感觉 then maybe you don't have a problem.
那么你大概就没有这个问题 But I've got a problem.
但我确实碰到这个问题了 And it's worse still because it's not really,
问题实际上更大 因为它们不是 if we're careful and think about it,
如果你仔细推敲一下 it's not really as though we have two different cases
其实并不是这两种不同情况 and intuitively we want to give different answers
使我们直觉上有了 to those two different cases.
两种不同的答案 Really, all we've got there is just one case.
它们其实是同一种情况 It's the very same case, the very same story,
同一种情形 同一个故事 that I told two different times.
只不过我讲了两遍而已 In both cases,
在这两个例子中 before the torturing ends, goes in,
折磨开始前 there's Shelly Kagan's body over here
这边都是雪莱·卡根的肉体 with Linda's personality
和琳达的人格 and there's Linda's body over here
那边是琳达的肉体 with Shelly Kagan's personality.
加上雪莱·卡根的人格 And we're asking, "Which one do you want to be tortured?"
然后我们问"你想折磨哪个呢" It's the very same setup.
背景是一样的 I just emphasized different elements in a way
我只不过通过强调不同的侧重点 to manipulate your intuitions.
来诱导你们作出不同的选择 But it's the very same case.
但它们其实是同一种情况 It can't be that in one of them,
不可能在一种情况下 follow the body and the other one, follow personality.
肉体是关键而另一种情况下人格是关键 So it's very hard to know what moral should we draw.
所以我们很难从中得出什么结论 The appeal to intuition, thinking about these cases
通过直觉来思考这些例子的办法 doesn't seem to take us very far.
看来也没什么帮助 There's a question back there. Yeah?
刚才有人提问 请说 Nice suggestion. So the suggestion was this.
好问题 问题是这样的 When the mad scientist put my personality,
当那个疯子科学家把我的人格 Shelly Kagan personality, onto Linda's body,
雪莱·卡根的人格转移到琳达的肉体上时 he had to modify Linda's brain.
他需要改变琳达的大脑 And in modifying Linda's brain--
而改变琳达的大脑 this was the question that was just raised--
这就是刚才说的那个问题 hasn't he actually made that brain
是不是就是说他把那个大脑改造得 more like Shelly Kagan's brain than Linda's brain?
更像雪莱·卡根而非琳达的大脑 And if that's right, shouldn't we say--remember,
如果是的 我们能不能说 the best form of the body view, I argued previously,
还记得我以前讲的肉体理论的最佳说法吗 was the brain version.
即大脑是人格同一性的关键 So if this is really Shelly Kagan's brain over here,
所以如果这个真是雪莱·卡根的大脑 then this isn't a problem for the body view.
那肉体理论就没问题了 We were deceived when we said the body view
我们前面错误地认为肉体理论会指出 said this is Shelly Kagan.
这里的这个是雪莱·卡根 Really, the body view, to wit,
其实肉体理论 特别是 the best version of the body view,
它的最佳版本 that is the brain version, now has to say,
大脑理论会说 "Oh, we moved Shelly's brain and put it here."
"我们把雪莱的大脑搬到这儿了" Well, if you're prepared to say that,
如果你准备这么说的话 then indeed you will be able to say,
当然你也确实可以这么说 yeah, it's the body view.
肉体理论是对的 The body view says,
肉体理论不会像前面那样说 "Do it to this one." Rather, "
"折磨这个家伙吧" 而会说 Don't do it to this one, because this is Shelly Kagan."
"别折磨这家伙 因为他是雪莱·卡根" I don't actually find myself though inclined to agree with you
我觉得自己不会同意你的观点 that this has become Shelly Kagan's brain.
说这个大脑变成了雪莱·卡根的大脑 If you ask me, "Where's Shelly Kagan's legs?"
如果你问我"雪莱·卡根的腿在哪里" They're still here.
它们还在这里 "Where's Shelly Kagan's heart?"
"雪莱·卡根的心脏在哪里" It's still here.
它还在这里 "Where's Shelly Kagan's brain?"
"雪莱·卡根的大脑在哪里" It's still here.
它同样还在这里 It's not as though what the scientist did was open up my skull,
那个疯子科学家似乎并没打开我脑壳 take the brain out.
取出我的大脑 At least, if that's the way we're imagining it,
至少 如果你是这么想像的话 don't imagine that!
千万别这样想 This is all electronic transfer.
所有的调换都是电子调换 It's not as though he took the brain out
并不是他取出大脑 and literally moved that hunk of tissue over here.
然后真的把这么一堆东西搬到那边去 All he's done is
他只是 reprogram Linda's brain.
重新给琳达的大脑编程 Analogy here that might be helpful.
打个比方可能更便于你们理解 Think of the difference between
想象一下计算机和 the computer and the programs and files
存储在其里面的程序及文件 saved on the computer.
之间的不同 Personality is a little bit like a program
人格就像计算机上 that's running on the computer.
运行的程序 Though we have to have not just the generic program,
我们不仅要有一般的程序 but the specific data files
还要有特定的数据文件 and databases and so forth.
及数据库一类的东西 What the mad scientist did, in effect, was
那个疯子科学家实际要做的 wipe out the hard drive,
就是彻底删净硬盘 put in the other programs from the Shelly Kagan computer,
把雪莱·卡根计算机里的程序放进去 but it's still the very same computer.
计算机还是那台计算机 It's still the same central processing unit,
还是同样的中央处理器 or so it seems to me.
起码我是这样想这个问题的 Of course, it's true that now, in a certain way,
当然 从某一角度说 Linda's brain will be similar to the way
琳达的大脑在某种程度上 that Shelly Kagan's brain had been before.
和雪莱·卡根以前的大脑是有些相似 In terms of how, as it were,
比如说 the floppy drives are set up.
就像两台计算机上都有软驱一样 But still where's, literally speaking,
但是 雪莱·卡根的大脑 Shelly Kagan's brain?
究竟在哪里呢 I want to say it's over there, not over here.
我觉得它在那里 不在这里 There was another question or comment. Yeah.
又有人提问 请说 I'm not quite sure what the question is.
我没太听懂这个问题 So the thought is, look,
你就这么想 over here we've got Shelly Kagan's body
这边是雪莱·卡根的肉体 with Linda's personality.
加上琳达的人格 If we torture this one, this thing,
如果我们折磨这个人 whoever it is, is going to think to itself,
别管是谁 这个人会想 "I'm Linda. I'm in horrible pain.
"我是琳达 我很疼 I wish it would stop.
我真希望他能住手 I wonder whether I'll ever see Linda's husband again."
我不知能否再见到琳达的丈夫" Over here we've got Linda's body,
而这边是琳达的肉体 Shelly Kagan's personality.
加上雪莱·卡根的人格 If we torture this one--
如果我们折磨这个人 of course to torture, you cause pain to bodies,
折磨必定会使肉体疼痛 but the pain gets felt in the mind.
但是 是意识感觉到疼痛 So over here, we've got
所以在这里 something that's going to think to itself,
这个人会想 "I'm Shelly Kagan. I'm in horrible pain.
"我是雪莱·卡根 我很疼 I wonder whether I'll ever see Shelly Kagan's wife again."
我不知能否再见到雪莱·卡根的妻子" Yes, of course, we're torturing bodies.
当然 我们折磨的是肉体 By torturing the bodies we cause pain to the minds,
折磨肉体导致意识感受到疼痛 the personalities,
从而人格感受到疼痛 who have beliefs about who's hurting.
它知道是谁在经受折磨 What I'm inviting you to think about is which one,
我希望你们思考的是 if you had to choose between these two gruesome scenarios,
倘若非在这两种可怕的情景中选其一的话 which one would you rather save?
你会救哪一个人 Which one would you rather protect?
你会保护哪一个人 Which do you care more about?
你更在乎哪一个人 Making sure that your lump of flesh
是保你自己 doesn't have its neurons hurt?
毫发无损 Or making sure that the person
还是保那个 who's thinking to yourself,
心里正想着 "I'm Shelly Kagan"
"我是雪莱·卡根"的那个 Or whatever your name is,
还是 随便你取什么名 that "I'm in pain."
但都感到"我很疼"的那个 You don't want to be thinking,
你肯定不希望自己叫着 "I, Shelly Kagan, am in pain."
"我是雪莱·卡根 我很疼" Or if your name is Mary,
亦或是你叫玛丽 "I'm Mary. I'm in pain."
喊着"我是玛丽 我很疼" That's what we're trying to get straight on here.
这就是我们要寻找的答案 The trouble though is that
问题是 you tell the very same story, two different times
同一个故事讲了两遍 and I find myself sometimes being pulled this way,
我发现我一会儿倾向这边 sometimes being pulled that way.
一会儿又倾向那边 So I can't use thinking about the Williams cases
所以我觉得思考威廉姆斯的例子 as a method of deciding what do I really believe,
无益于帮我决定要相信哪个理论 the body view or the personality view?
肉体理论亦或是人格理论 I find, myself, you spin the story one way
我发现当你用这种方式讲这故事时 and I follow the body.
我就认可肉体理论 You spin the story another way,
你用那种方式讲这故事时 and I follow the personality.
我就认可人格理论 If we're going to have a way to decide
如果我们需要 between these two theories,
在两种理论中做出选择的话 it seems as though we need some other kind of arguments.
我们还必须寻求一些其它的论证方法 At least, I need some other kind of arguments,
至少我认为需要诉诸其它一些论证方法 because of the intuitions
因为我对这例子的直觉 I've got about the cases.
使我陷入了哲学困境 So let me turn to a different approach
所以让我们来看另一种论证方法 to solving the question, answering the question,
是如何解决这个问题的 which one should we believe?
从而告诉我们究竟该相信哪个理论 It starts by
它首先 raising a certain philosophical objection
提出一个人格理论的 to the personality theory.
哲学异议 It's going to say, look,
它会这样说 看 the personality theory of personal identity
人格同一性的人格理论 has an implication that we cannot possibly accept.
会产生一个我们无法接受的结果 So we have to reject the view.
所以我们要拒绝这种理论 And then become body theorists,
如果没有灵魂 if there are no souls.
那我们就该认可肉体理论 Here's the objection. It's a common enough objection.
这个异议是这样的 很常见的一种情况 It's probably occurred to some of you.
你们中有些人可能也会想到 According to the personality theory,
根据人格理论 whether somebody is me depends on
判断一个人是不是我 whether he's got my beliefs.
取决于他有没有我的信念 For example, the belief that I'm Shelly Kagan,
比如说 认为自己是雪莱·卡根 professor of philosophy at Yale University.
知道自己在耶鲁大学教授哲学 Well, I'm a not an especially interesting fellow.
拿我自己举例没什么意思 So let's make it more dramatic and think about Napoleon.
不如举举拿破仑的例子 更生动一些 You've probably read about this thing.
你们大概都听说过 Every now and then there are some crazy people
时不时的有些疯子 who think they're Napoleon.
觉得自己是拿破仑 So imagine that there's right now somebody
试想现在有个人 in an insane asylum in Michigan
在密歇根的精神病院里 who's got the thought,
他认为 "I am Napoleon."
"我就是拿破仑" Well, the objection says,
这个哲学异议指出 clearly this guy's just insane, right?
很明显他是疯子 对吧 He is not Napoleon.
他不是拿破仑 He's David Smith
他是戴维·史密斯 who grew up in Detroit or whatever.
在底特律或是别的什么地方长大 He just insanely believes he's Napoleon.
他精神错乱 认为自己就是拿破仑 Yet, the personality theory, the objection says,
但是这个异议指出 人格理论会说 would tell us that he is Napoleon
他就是拿破仑 because he's got the beliefs of Napoleon.
因为他有拿破仑的信念 He's got Napoleon's personality.
他有拿破仑的人格 Since that's obviously the wrong thing to say about the case,
既然这种说法明显是错误的 we should reject the personality view.
所以我们要抛弃人格理论 But not so quick.
不过先别这么快下结论 The personality view doesn't say
人格理论并没有说 anybody who has any elements at all
一旦某人有任何一点 of my personality is me.
我的人格 那么他就是我 One belief in common
共同的信念 is obviously not enough.
显然不足以证明他就是我 Look, we all believe the earth is round.
比如说 我们都相信地球是圆的 That's not enough to make somebody else me.
但这不足以证明别人就是我 Of course, the belief, "I am Napoleon"
当然 "我是拿破仑"这个信念 is a much rarer belief.
是个少有的信念 I presume that none of you have that belief.
我相信你们没有谁会有这个信念 I certainly don't have that belief.
我自己当然也没有这个信念 Napoleon had it
拿破仑有这个信念 and David Smith in Michigan's got it.
密歇根的戴维·史密斯也有这个信念 But so what?
但这又怎样呢 One belief, even one very unusual belief's
一个信念 哪怕是个极与众不同的信念 not enough to make somebody Napoleon,
根据人格理论 according to the personality theory.
也不足以证明这个人就是拿破仑 To be Napoleon,
要成为拿破仑 you've got to have the very same overall personality,
你就要拥有彻底相同的人格 which is a very big, complicated set of beliefs
它包罗一系列错综复杂的信念 and desires and ambitions and memories.
欲望 野心以及记忆 David Smith doesn't have that.
戴维·史密斯没有这些东西 David Smith in the insane asylum in Michigan
密歇根精神病院里的戴维·史密斯 does not remember conquering Europe.
可没有征服欧洲的记忆 He doesn't remember being crowned emperor.
也没有加冕称王的记忆 He doesn't remember being defeated by the British.
更没有被英国人打败的记忆 He doesn't have any of those memories.
这些记忆他一个都没有 He probably doesn't even speak French.
他甚至都不会说法语 Napoleon spoke French.
拿破仑说的是法语 He doesn't have Napoleon's personality.
他没有拿破仑的人格 So the David Smith case isn't really bothersome.
所以戴维·史密斯的例子不具说服力 It's not really a counterexample to the personality theory.
无法作为人格理论的一个反例 The personality theory says, to be Napoleon,
人格理论认为 要成为拿破仑 you've got to have Napoleon's personality.
你需要有拿破仑的人格 But David Smith doesn't.
但是戴维·史密斯没有 So, of course, we can all agree David Smith,
当然 我们可以相信戴维·史密斯 despite thinking he's Napoleon,
尽管他自以为是拿破仑 is not Napoleon.
但实际上并不是拿破仑 No problem here for the personality theory.
这个异议无法颠覆人格理论 But we could tweak the case.
但是我们可以将这个例子稍作调整 We could revise the case.
把它修改一下 Some foe of the personality theory could say,
有些人格理论的反对者会说 "Okay, imagine
"那好 试想 that this guy in Michigan
在密歇根的这个人 does have Napoleon's personality.
确实拥有拿破仑的人格 He's got the memories of
他记得自己 being crowned emperor and being defeated, conquering Europe.
加冕称王 遭遇滑铁卢以及征服欧洲 He's got all of those memories."
这些记忆他都拥有" And, remember
而且 还记得之前说的吗 we want him to have Napoleon's personality.
我们想让他拥有拿破仑的人格 He doesn't have any David Smith memories.
他没有戴维·史密斯的记忆 He doesn't have any memories of growing up in Detroit.
他没有任何在底特律长大的记忆 How could Napoleon have memories of growing up in Detroit?
拿破仑怎么可能有在底特律长大的记忆 Napoleon grew up in France.
拿破仑是在法国长大的 The objection then says
然后这个异议就会说 even if
即使 this guy had all of Napoleon's memories,
这个人拥有拿破仑所有的记忆 beliefs, desires, personality,
信念 欲望 个性 still wouldn't be Napoleon.
他仍然不是拿破仑 So the personality theory's got to go.
因此人格理论说不通 Well, when I think about this example,
当我思考这个例子时 I think, now we've got it right.
我认为 也许这才是对的 That is, that is what the personality theory
这就是人格理论 has to say about that case.
所作的恰当解释 But I'm not so confident anymore
而我并不认为 that it's the wrong thing to say.
人格理论完全是错的 So think of this, as it were,
让我们在某种程度上 from the point of view of Napoleon, right?
从拿破仑的角度思考 So there was Napoleon in the 1800s conquering Europe
拿破仑在18世纪征服欧洲 and being crowned emperor,
加冕为王 being defeated by the British,
之后被英国人击败 being sent to exile on, was it Elba, right?
被流放到厄尔巴岛 对吧 And I forget where Napoleon actually dies,
我不记得拿破仑死在哪的了 but he's got memories of getting sick and ill
但他记得自己病危之时 and the light begins to fade and he goes unconscious.
眼前越来越暗 直到失去知觉 And then--well, we'll at least try to
然后 我们发挥一下想象 describe it this way--he wakes up.
这样来说 他突然醒了过来 And he wakes up in Michigan.
在密歇根醒了过来 And he thinks to himself,
他心想 "Hallo. Je suis, Napoleon!
"哈 我拿破仑又回来了 What am I doing in Michigan?"
我在密歇根做什么" I don't speak French, so I'm going to drop that, right? "
我不懂法语 还是放弃算了 But the last thing I remember
但我最后记得的事是 I was going to bed
自己在厄尔巴岛病入膏肓 from my fatal illness on the Isle of Elba.
卧床不起 How did I get over here?
我怎么到这来了 I wonder if there's any chance of reassembling my army
我要找机会重组军队 and reconquering the world."
再次征服世界 If he had all of that,
如果他真有那些记忆的话 it's not so clear to me
我也不知道 that it would be the wrong thing to say that,
这样说是否正确 by golly, this is Napoleon.
天哪 他就是拿破仑 I mean, it would be totally bizarre.
我是说 这的确很怪诞 Things like this don't happen.
现实中肯定不会发生这样的事 But of course, we're doing science fiction stories here.
就当我们是在讲科幻故事 So we'd say to ourselves, wouldn't we,
那么我们能否说 somehow Napoleon has been reborn
拿破仑复活了 or reincarnated,
或者说转世了 taking over, by some sort of process of possession,
经过某种过程 the body of the former David Smith, but now it's Napoleon.
大卫·史密斯的肉体 现在成了拿破仑 I find myself thinking
我觉得 maybe that would be the right thing to say.
也许这么说也没错 Yeah?
请说 All right, so the thought was,
好的 你就这么想 look, this guy over here,
看 那家伙 David Smith's body with Napoleon's personality--
大卫·史密斯的肉体加上拿破仑的人格 And let's be clear about this.
大家搞清楚一点 There's no underlying David Smith personality still there,
大卫·史密斯的人格已经不存在了 to have the counterexample or the example that we're after.
作为一个反例或是我们想要的例子 It can't be that he's got mixed together
他是不可能拥有两种记忆的 memories of growing up in France
不可能既有在法国长大的记忆 and memories of growing up in Detroit.
又有在底特律长大的记忆 He never thinks to himself,
他自己也从不会想 "I'm David Smith.
"我是大卫·史密斯 How did I become Napoleon?"
怎么变成拿破仑了" If you got that junk,
如果你那么想的话 you don't have Napoleon's personality.
就说明你还没有拿破仑的人格 He's just got Napoleon's personality through and through.
他已经完完全全拥有拿破仑的人格 Well, the question was, maybe that's not so.
但接下来问题是 也许事情不是这样的 After all,
毕竟 he doesn't really have Napoleon's experiences, did he?
他其实并没有拿破仑的经历 不是吗 Napoleon had the experience of being crowned emperor.
拿破仑有做称帝的经历 But this guy didn't have the experience
这个家伙却没有 of being crowned emperor.
加冕称王的经历 Maybe what we should say is
也许我们应该说 he thinks he remembers the experience
这家伙自以为拥有 of being crowned emperor,
加冕称王的经历 but it's a fake memory.
但那记忆是虚幻的 It's an illusion, or a delusion,
那只是种幻觉或是妄想 but he didn't really have the genuine memory.
他自己其实从未真正经历过那些 To have the genuine memory,
要拥有真实的记忆 he has to have been crowned emperor.
他就必须真正当过皇帝 And he wasn't crowned emperor;
但他没当过 Napoleon was crowned emperor.
拿破仑才当过皇帝 Well, that's what we could say, but we can't say that
但直到我们确认他不是拿破仑之前 until we decide he's not Napoleon.
我们还不能那么肯定 After all, if the personality theory is right,
总之 如果人格理论是对的话 since he does have all of these memories,
那么既然他拥有所有的记忆 or semi-memories, or quasi-memories,
或者叫半记忆 或是准记忆 or whatever we should call them.
随便怎么叫吧 If that's the key, then it is Napoleon.
如果人格是关键的话 那他就是拿破仑 So he is remembering being crowned emperor.
于是他就记得自己曾做过皇帝 If you want to say, no, no, no,
如果你要说 不不不 those memories are illusions, it must be,
那些记忆都是幻想 绝对是 because you don't think he's really Napoleon.
因为你觉得他不是真的拿破仑 In which case, what you're discovering is
这种情况下 你发现自己其实 you don't really believe the personality theory.
并不相信人格理论 Why isn't he Napoleon? It's not his body.
他为什么不是拿破仑 因为肉体不同 The body of Napoleon is not this body
这个肉体不是拿破仑的 and to be Napoleon, you've got to have Napoleon's body.
要想成为拿破仑 你必须拥有他的肉体 It's a possible position.
这是一种可能的观点 That's the thought
这就是 that the body theorists are trying to elicit in you
肉体理论家提出拿破仑的反例时 when they offer these Napoleonesque counterexamples.
试图灌输给你的思想 You could match the personality as much as you want,
无论你拥有多少人格 but it's still not Napoleon.
你都不会成为拿破仑 Don't you agree? That's what they say.
你同意吗 那就是他们的观点 And if you do agree,
如果你同意 that shows you don't really accept the personality theory.
那就意味着你并不接受人格理论 I'm not going to try to settle this here.
我在此并不打算下一个结论 Who should we believe?
我们究竟该相信哪个 The personality theory or the body theory?
人格理论还是肉体理论 I'm trying to invite you to think about
我只是想让你们思考 the implications and the differences between these views
这些观点之间的异同之处 so as to get clearer in your own mind about
以便你们能够清楚地了解 which of these you accept.
自己到底接受哪一个观点 In many moods--at least,
要强调的是 when I think about not the simple,
当我思考 并非简单地思考 the ordinary David Smith case with a single belief or two,
大卫·史密斯到底有一个还是两个人格 but the full bodied--that's a bad term--
而是思考整个肉体 用词不当 the full blown Napoleon case
思考拿破仑的所有方面 with all the memories, all the beliefs.
所有记忆 所有信念 You know, suppose David Smith there thinks,
假如大卫·史密斯说 "I remember. I remember."
"我想起来了 我想起来了" I can't say it in a French accent.
我不会用法语说这个 "I remember playing as a lad in France
"我想起自己小时候在法国 burying my little toy saber."
挥舞着玩具刀玩耍" Some memory that Napoleon never wrote down in his diaries.
一些拿破仑从未写进日记的记忆 And we go and we dig up in France
然后我们去法国考证 and there is the saber, right?
并发现了那把玩具刀 This guy remembers things that Napoleon would remember.
这个人记得只有拿破仑才记得的事 I find myself thinking, well, maybe that's Napoleon.
那么我就会觉得 也许他真是拿破仑 Imagine a slightly different version of this case.
假设将这例子稍作变化 Napoleon dies on his death bed,
拿破仑死在自己的床上 wakes up in heaven saying
在天堂醒来后说 "Je suis Napoleon. I was emperor of Europe
"我拿破仑是欧洲之王 and now I have come to my due reward.
我终于死得其所 I am here in heaven."
来到天堂了" Well, it seems like what we would want to say is,
好像我们都会说 "Yeah, that's Napoleon."
"没错 那是拿破仑" It's Napoleon even if it doesn't have Napoleon's body.
即使他已经没有肉体 但他仍是拿破仑 Napoleon's corpse is rotted in France.
拿破仑的肉体已经在法国腐烂 God gives Napoleon some new angelic body.
上帝给了拿破仑一个新的天使肉体 It seems straightforward.
很容易理解 If it's got Napoleon's memories,
如果他有拿破仑的记忆 beliefs, desires, goals, and so forth and so on,
信念 欲望 目标 以及其它种种 wouldn't we say it's Napoleon?
我们还认为那不是拿破仑吗 Imagine that--
想象一下 back to this earth--
让我们从天堂回到人间 this Napoleon type of case happened all the time.
这种拿破仑式的事件其实经常发生 We might have a term for this sort of thing--
我们常把这类事情称为 possession.
着魔 Every now and then,
有时 people's bodies get possessed.
人们的肉体会着魔 They become this other person who's,
他们会突然变成另一个人 now, personality has taken over.
之前的人格消失了 If this happened frequently enough,
如果这种事情发生得足够频繁 instead of just a little science fiction story
不仅限于科幻小说那种 like with the David Smith case,
类似大卫·史密斯的例子 maybe we'd say, yeah,
也许我们应该 possession is one of these things that needs to be explained.
对着魔这件事做出解释 How is it the personality travels?
人格是如何传递的 maybe there'll be some sort of physical explanation for it.
也许物理学能够给出一些解释 Still, maybe we'd say, yeah,
也许我们该说 没错 the people have been taken over.
这些人被取代了 They've become somebody else.
他们变成了别的人 So speaking personally,
所以我个人认为 I don't find the Napoleon objection a telling one.
我不认为拿破仑是个有说服力的反例 It doesn't give me a reason to reject the personality theory.
它没有给我一个反对人格理论的理由 But we can now tweak the worry
但至少我们看到了 in a slightly different way.
另一种不同的思路 Okay, so here was Napoleon back in France
现在再看拿破仑在法国时 with his memories and his beliefs and so forth and so on.
拥有的记忆 信念等等 Death bed, goes to sleep,
最后死在床上 逐渐睡去 goes unconscious, whatever it is.
失去意识 等等 I told you a story in which he wakes up,
我刚才在故事里说他醒来 or his personality wakes up,
或者说他的人格醒来 however we should put it, in Michigan.
我们把场景设在了密歇根 But if it could happen in Michigan,
但如果能在密歇根发生 I suppose it could also happen in New York.
同样也就能在纽约发生 And if it could happen in New York
而如果能在纽约发生 and it could happen in Michigan,
同时也能在密歇根发生 I suppose it could happen in New York
我假设在这两个地方 and Michigan.
都能发生 So right now,
那么现在 let's imagine two people
想象一下两个人 with Napoleon's personalities,
都拥有拿破仑的人格 complete personalities,
完整的人格 one of them in Michigan, one of them in New York.
一个在密歇根 另一个在纽约 Whoa. What should we say now?
现在又该怎么说 What is the personality theory going to say about this case?
人格理论该怎样解释这种情况呢 So I don't know how to draw personalities
我不知道在黑板上 very well on the board,
该怎么画人格 so I'll draw little stick figures of bodies,
我会画一个有四肢的小人 but I mean these to be the personalities.
但其实我所指代的是人格 So here we've got the continuing,
我们有一个持续存在 evolving over time--
随时间进化 this is all taking place in France--
全部发生在法国的 the personality of Napoleon in France.
拿破仑的人格 There's the deathbed scene.
这是死亡的界线 Now, up here we had
在上面我们有 somebody with Napoleon's personality continuing.
一个拥有拿破仑人格的人 Of course, he's going to change. He's going to evolve.
当然 他会不断改变 不断进化 Just like the actual historical Napoleon
就像历史上真实的拿破仑一样 kept having new beliefs and new desires,
不断有新的信念 新的欲望 if this really was Napoleon in Michigan,
如果拿破仑真的是在密歇根的话 he'll start having some new desires
那他会对密歇根 and beliefs about Michigan,
产生些新的欲望以及信念 which perhaps Napoleon never gave any thought to at all.
也许是拿破仑压根就没想过的 Who knows?
谁知道呢 So this is Michigan over here.
这儿就是密歇根 And I said I was willing to entertain the possibility
并且我认为这些 that this is all Napoleon.
都是拿破仑 Napoleon, if you think of it,
你可以这样想 Napoleon's a person extended through space and time.
拿破仑穿越了时空 According to the personality view,
根据人格理论 what makes somebody in the future
确认一个未来的人与一个 the same person as somebody in the past
过去的人是否同一人的关键是 is if it's part of the same ongoing personality.
他们是否是整个延续人格中的两部分 So maybe that's what we've got going on in the Michigan case.
这就是密歇根的情况 Now, we imagine in our new version of the worry
现在来思考一个新的问题 somebody with Napoleon's personality over here in New York.
在纽约有另一个人拥有拿破仑的人格 Now, if the Michigan guy hadn't been there,
如果密歇根那个人并不存在 what I would have done,
情况会怎么样呢 if I believed in the personality theory or
如果我相信人格理论 when I believe in the personality theory,
或者说当我相信人格理论时 is say "Oh look, Napoleon--
我会说"看 拿破仑 reincarnated in New York."
在纽约转世了" That's what the personality theory should say
人格理论就应该这么说 and I said it doesn't seem like a crazy thing to say
并且如果我说纽约那个人是唯一的 if we only had the guy in New York.
其实也不是太离谱 Just like it wasn't a crazy thing to say
就像说密歇根那个人是唯一的一样 if we only had the guy in Michigan.
也并不离谱 The trouble is, imagine the case
问题是 想象一下 where we've got one guy
倘若我们发现一个在密歇根 who's got all of Napoleon's personality in Michigan,
拥有拿破仑全部人格的人 one guy who's got all of Napoleon's personality in New York.
还有一个在纽约拥有拿破仑全部人格的人 Now what should we say?
这又该怎么说呢 What are the choices here?
该怎样选择呢 Well, I suppose one possibility would be to say
我猜也许可以说 the guy in New York is Napoleon.
纽约的那个人是拿破仑 The guy in Michigan isn't.
密歇根的那个不是 He's just an insane guy who's got Napoleon's personality.
那家伙只是个拥有拿破仑人格的神经病 You could say that.
你是可以这么说 The reason that it seems difficult to say though is
这问题之所以难以回答 because it seems like
是因为似乎 it would be just as plausible to say the reverse.
反过来说也同样说得通 Say no, no, no. It's not the New York fellow who's Napoleon.
不不不 纽约的那个不是拿破仑 It's the Michigan fellow who's Napoleon.
密歇根的那个才是 Well, we could say that,
我们也可以这么说 but the difficulty is there seems to be no good reason
但问题在于没有什么好的理由 to favor the Michigan fellow over the New York fellow.
来支持密歇根的那家伙 而非纽约那个 Just like there was no good reason
同样也没什么好的理由 to favor the New York fellow over the Michigan fellow.
来支持纽约的那家伙 而非密歇根那个 Saying that one of them is Napoleon
似乎很难让人相信 and the other one isn't seems very hard to believe.
说其中一个是拿破仑而另一个不是 Well then, what's the alternative?
那还有什么别的选择呢 Well, I suppose another possibility is to say,
我想还有种可能就是 at least another possibility worth mentioning,
至少我觉得值得一提 is to say they're both Napoleon.
即 他们都是拿破仑 Somehow, bizarrely enough,
虽然这么说很离谱 Napoleon split into two.
拿破仑被一分为二了 But when splitting into two,
不过当拿破仑一分为二之时 he split on to two bodies,
分化到两个人体上 but they are both Napoleon.
而且这两人都是拿破仑 Now, it's very important to understand
现在 重要的是理解 how bizarre this proposal would be.
这一问题会变得多么离谱 The claim is not now we've got two Napoleons
这个观点并不是要说存在着两个拿破仑 who are, of course, not identical to each other.
而且两人还不尽相同 No, no, we've got a single Napoleon.
不是这样 它的意思是只有一个拿破仑 A Napoleon who was in one place
这个拿破仑过去生活于 in France
法国 and is now simultaneously in two places
而现在又同时出现在 in the U.S.
美国的两个地方 That seems very hard to believe.
这说法似乎难以置信 It seems to just violate one of our fundamental notions
它违背了我们对人的基本认知 about how people work, metaphysically speaking.
就形而上学的观点来说 People can't be in two places at the same time.
一个人不可能同时出现于两个地方 Well, maybe that metahphysical claim
但也许这种形而上学的质疑 I just made should be abandoned.
应该被摒弃 Maybe we should say, oh, under normal circumstances,
也许我们应该说 在正常情况下 people can't be in two places at the same time.
一个人不可能同时出现于两个地方 But if you had something like this,
但是在眼下这个案例中 by golly, this guy would be,
有可能会出现的情况是 Michigan dude is Napoleon and he's the very same person,
那个密歇根的人就是拿破仑 the very same person as New York dude.
而且他与纽约的那个是一个人 New York dude and Michigan dude are a single person,
在纽约和密歇根的两个人是同一个人 Napoleon, who is bilocated.
是分别位于两地的同一个拿破仑 It doesn't happen.
虽然这其实没发生 But if it did happen, it could happen.
但如果真的发生了 也是有可能的 Well, maybe that's what we should say.
也许我们只能这么总结 But again, all I can tell you is,
但是再一次 我能告诉你们的是 I find that too big a price to pay.
我觉得这实在是不容易办到 People can't be in two places.
一个人不可能同时出现于两处 It's one thing to say people are space-time worms
一种说法认为人类是时空虫 extended through space and extended through time.
在空间和时间之中不断延伸发展 It's another thing to say that
还有一种说法是 they are Y-shaped space-time worms.
人类是以这种Y字型结构发展的时空虫 It seems to violate one of
这似乎又违背了一项 the fundamental metaphysical things about how people work.
有关人的形而上学的基本观点 All right, I've got to remind you though,
不过我得提醒你们 none of the options here are all that attractive.
以上这些可能性都不怎么令人信服 So when I say,
所以当我说 you don't want to say that, you don't want to say that,
你不能做出这样那样的定论时 we're going to run out of possibilities.
我们就能逐渐排除错误的可能性 So maybe this is what you'll want to say.
继而得出我们接下来的结论 All right, saying that Napoleon is in Michigan
如果非得说拿破仑是那个密歇根人 but not New York doesn't seem very attractive.
而不是纽约人 似乎并不让人信服 Saying he's in New York
说他是纽约人 but not Michigan doesn't seem very attractive.
而不是密歇根人也不怎么让人信服 Saying he's in both places at the very same time
说他同时出现在两个地方 doesn't seem very attractive.
仍旧不是很可信 But what other possibilities are there?
那么还有别的可能性存在吗 If he's not one but not the other,
如果他不是其中一个人 and if he's not both,
而且也不是同时存在的两个人 the only other possibility is that he's neither.
那么唯一可能就是 两个都不是拿破仑 Given this situation,
考虑到这种情况 neither of these guys is Napoleon.
这两个人都不是拿破仑 You've got separate people.
这些人是相互独立的 There's the person Napoleon,
只有一个拿破仑 a space-time worm that came to an end in France.
这只时空虫 最终死于法国 And there's some space-time worm taking place in Michigan,
而另一只时空虫存在于密歇根 some space-time person worm taking place in New York.
另一只时空虫存在于纽约 But neither of them are Napoleon.
但这二人都不是拿破仑 That seems to me to be the least
对我而言 unattractive of the options
这似乎是目前所得的可能性里 we've got available.
最令人信服的 But notice that if we say this,
但是请注意 如果我们这么说 if we say neither of these guys,
认为这两个人 despite having Napoleon's personality,
尽管他们有着拿破仑的人格 neither of these guys is Napoleon,
但却都不是拿破仑的话 then the personality theory of personal identity
那么人格同一性的人格理论 is false.
就是错误的了 It's rejected. We're giving up on it.
这理论被驳回了 我们得放弃这一理论 Because the personality theory, after all,
因为根据人格理论 said if you've got Napoleon's personality,
如果你有了拿破仑的人格 you're Napoleon.
你就是拿破仑 But now we've got people that are not Napoleon
但是现在却出现了具有拿破仑人格 but they've got Napoleon's personality.
却不是拿破仑的人 So the personality theory, follow the personality,
所以如果我们认为这两个人 is wrong
都不是拿破仑的话 if we say neither of these guys
那么以人格为关键的人格理论 is Napoleon.
就是错误的了 But that does seem to be
不过这确实是所有可能性中 the least unacceptable of the options.
最能让人接受的一种 At least that's how it seems to me.
至少对我而言是如此 So the personality theory's got to be rejected.
那么人格理论被驳回了 Now, I think that's right. I think, in fact,
我认为这是对的 我认为事实上 the personality theory's got to be rejected.
人格理论是应当被驳回的 But that doesn't mean we couldn't revise it.
但这并不意味着我们不能修正它 We could try to change it in a way
我们可以试着做一些改变 that keeps much of the spirit of the personality theory,
保留人格理论中的大部分要义 but avoids some of the problems we've just been looking at.
同时避开我们刚才遇到的问题 Here's what I think
以下是我认为 is the best revision available
对人格理论的粉丝而言 to fans of the personality theory.
最佳修正版本 They should say we were simplifying
他们会说我们这是在简化理论 unduly.
而且简化得过了头 We were simplifying it, getting it wrong,
我们是在简化和歪曲这一理论 when we said, "Follow the personality.
因为我们会说"根据人格理论 If you've got Napoleon's personality,
如果你有拿破仑的人格 that's enough to make you Napoleon."
那就足以认为你就是拿破仑" That's not true.
这是不对的 We need to throw in an extra clause
我们需要加个额外条件 to deal with branching, splitting cases,
来解决上述的这种分歧 of the sort that I've just been talking about.
也就是我之前所谈的这一案例 We need to say,
我们应该说 if there's somebody in the future
如果未来有个人 who's got my personality,
拥有了我的人格 that person is me, as long as
只要 there's only one person around in the future
有且仅有这个人拥有我的人格 who's got my personality.
那么这个人就是我 If you have multiple examples,
但如果出现了重复的情况 duplications, splittings and branchings,
比如人格被分到不同的人身上 nobody, none of them is me.
那么他们之中没有一个人是我 So where the original personality theory said,
所以人格理论原本认为 same personality,
人格同一 that's good enough for being the same person,
就足以确定是同一个人 the new version throws in
新的版本则应该 a no-competitors clause,
增加没有竞争者这一条件 throws in a no branching clause.
也就是说人格没有出现分支 It says, same personality's good enough,
应该说 人格同一可以确定同一个人 as long as there's no branching.
只要人格没有被划分到其他人身上 If there is branching,
如果人格出现了分支 neither of the branches is me.
那么每一条分支所在者都不是我 Now, if we say that,
现在 如果我们这么说 if we throw in the no branching clause,
加入无分支这一限制条件 then we're able to say, look,
那我们也可以说 in the original story I was telling,
在我刚开始讲的故事里 where there was the Michigan guy
如果有一个密歇根人有着拿破仑的人格 who had Napoleon's personality but no New York guy,
同时并不存在那个纽约人 that really would be Napoleon,
那这个密歇根人就会是拿破仑 because it would have the same personality with no competitor.
因为只有他一个人拥有拿破仑的人格 Similarly, had we had
同样的 somebody with Napoleon's personality in New York
如果在纽约有个人有着拿破仑的人格 and nobody with the personality in Michigan,
同时没有那个有着相同人格的密歇根人 that guy would have been Napoleon,
那么这个纽约人就是拿破仑 because we would have had the same personality
因为这个人与拿破仑的人格相同 with no branching, with no competitor.
没有分支 没有竞争者 But in the case where we've got branching,
但是在这个案例里有着人格分支的情况 where we've got somebody with Napoleon's personality
出现了两个有着拿破仑人格的人 both in Michigan and New York,
一个在密歇根 一个在纽约 that violates the no branching rule,
这情况违背了无分支的规则 and we just have to say nobody's Napoleon in that case.
那么得出的结论就是他俩都不是拿破仑 As I say, that seems to me to be the best revision
正如我所说 对我而言这是现有的 of the personality theory available to them.
对人格理论的最佳修正版本 So what we now need to ask is,
那么我们现在要问的是 can we possibly believe that revision?
我们真能相信这一修正吗 Can we possibly accept the no branching rule?
我们真能接受这种无分支的规则吗 The no branching rule
这一无分支规则 seems rather bizarre
其本身 in its own right.
似乎就相当奇怪 Think about the ordinary familiar cases
回想一下之前最开始的那个例子 that we're trying to make sense of.
我们来让它有理可循 I'm the same person as the person
我和上次那个给大家讲课的人 that was lecturing to you last time.
是同一个人 According to the personality theory
根据人格理论 or the revised personality theory,
或者修正后的人格理论 that's because I've got the same personality.
这是因为我有相同的人格 The guy last time thought he was Shelly Kagan,
上次讲课的那个人认为自己是雪莱·卡根 believed he was professor of philosophy.
认为自己是哲学教授 I think I'm Shelly Kagan.
而我也认为我是雪莱·卡根 I believe I'm the professor of philosophy.
我也认为我是哲学教授 He's got all sorts of memories of his childhood.
他有着自己童年的全部记忆 I've got the same memories.
而我也有着相同的记忆 He's got desires about finishing his book.
他有着完成著作的欲望 I've got those desires about finishing my book.
而我也有着相同的欲望 Same personality, it's me.
人格同一 所以那个人就是我 That's what the personality theory says.
这就是人格理论得出的结论 So I conclude, hey, it's me.
所以我总结 这就是我 I know you were all worried
我知道你们都担心 whether I'd survive over the break a couple days.
几天不见 我是否还活着 Came back, it's still me.
你们回来上课 看到的还是我 I made it through Wednesday.
我活过了周三 Or did I? Or perhaps I should ask,
我真得活过周三了吗 或者我该问 "Or did he?"
"他活过了周三吗" Yeah, there was somebody there on Tuesday
没错 上周二的时候有个人在这 and yeah, there's somebody here on Thursday,
而现在周四 又有一个人在这 and yeah, this person here now
而且现在在这的这个人 has got the same personality as the guy
与周二在这的那个人 who was there on Tuesday.
有着相同的人格 But according to the no branching rule,
但是根据无分支规则 we can't yet conclude that I'm the same person
我们暂时无法认定 as the person that was lecturing to you on Tuesday.
我就是周二给你们上课的那个人 We can't conclude that
我们无法确定这是否是同一个人 until we know that there aren't any competitors,
除非我们知道没有别的竞争者 that there isn't anybody else right now
也就是眼下没有其他人 who also has the same personality.
和他具有相同的人格 If I'm the only one around today
如果今天我是所有人里 who's got Shelly Kagan's personality,
唯一具有雪莱·卡根人格的人 then I'm the same person as the person
那么我和周二时给你们上课的人 who was lecturing to you on Tuesday.
就是同一个人 But if, unbeknownst to me,
但假如 我自己并不知道 and I presume unbeknownst to you,
我假设大家也不知道 there's somebody in Michigan right now
现在在密歇根有一个人 who's got Shelly Kagan's personality,
也拥有雪莱·卡根的人格 then we have to say, huh,
那我们就得说 it turns out I'm not Shelly Kagan after all.
搞了半天 原来我不是雪莱·卡根 Neither is he. Neither of us are Shelly Kagan.
他也不是 咱俩都不是雪莱·卡根 Shelly Kagan died.
雪莱·卡根已经死了 So am I Shelly Kagan or am I not Shelly Kagan?
那我究竟还是不是雪莱·卡根呢 Can't tell until we know
除非我们知道密歇根那个人的情况 what's going on in Michigan.
否则我们没法下结论 Whoa! That seems
这似乎非常非常 very, very hard to believe.
难以置信 Whether I am the same person as the person
我究竟与上周二给大家讲课的那人 who was lecturing to you on Tuesday
是不是同一个人呢 presumably should turn on facts about
这似乎关系到 that guy who was lecturing to you on Tuesday,
上周二给大家讲课的那个人的状况 and facts about this guy
以及现在周四 who's lecturing to you today on Thursday,
给大家讲课的这个人的状况 and maybe some facts about
并且也许还与这两个人 the relationship between that guy and this guy--
之间的关系 或者说 or that stage and this stage,
这两个阶段之间的联系有关 if we prefer to talk about it that way.
如果大家愿意这么说的话 We can see how whether it's the same person or not
我们发现要定义两个人究竟是不是同一人 has to turn on the relations between the stages.
要参考两人所处的阶段之间的关系 But how could it possibly turn on
但是怎么会跟密歇根那边的情况 what's happening in Michigan?
有什么相干呢 How can whether or not I am the same guy
为什么要断定我究竟是不是上周二 as the guy who was lecturing to you on Tuesday
给大家讲课的那个人 depend on what's happening
需要参考到 in Pennsylvania or Australia
宾夕法尼亚或是澳大利亚 or Mars?
甚至火星上的状况呢 To use some philosophical jargon,
用哲学术语来讲 the nature of identity seems like
身份同一性的确认 it should depend only on intrinsic facts
似乎应该只建立于 about me or perhaps relational facts about
我个人的本质特征 the relations between my stages.
以及我所处的不同阶段之间的状况 But it shouldn't depend on extrinsic,
但不应建立于外在的 external facts about what's happening someplace else.
发生在别处的外部条件上 But if we accept the no branching rule,
但是如果我们接受无分支规则 we're saying whether or not we've got identity
我们也就接受了 depends on what's happening elsewhere.
身份确认需要依赖于别处的情况 With the no branching rule,
根据无分支规则 identity ceases to be
身份确认便不再只是 a strictly internal affair.
一个严格的内在问题了 It becomes, in part, an external affair.
而是在某种程度上成为了一个外部问题 That's very, very hard to believe.
这实在太难以置信了 And if you're not prepared to believe it,
而且如果你不打算接受这一说法的话 it looks as though you've got to give up on the personality view.
看上去你就不得不放弃人格理论了 Last thought.
最后一个想法 During all of these problems for the personality theorist,
经过这一系列对人格理论家提出的问题 the body theorist, the fans of the body theorist,
肉体理论家们还有肉体理论的信从者们 is standing there laughing.
正在旁边幸灾乐祸 "Ha! You poor fools.
"你们这些可怜的笨蛋 Look at all the problems you've got
就为了接受人格理论 adopting the personality theory.
给自己搞出这么多问题 See how easy it is to duplicate personalities,
又是怎么复制人格 leading to these totally implausible no branching rules.
又是什么莫名其妙的无分支规则 We can avoid all of that
要是我们都相信肉体理论的话 if we become body theorists."
就没这么多事了" What we'll ask ourselves next time
下一节课我们就来讨论 is whether or not the body theorist is in a better situation.
肉体理论是不是一个更好的选择