上节课 我们讲到了 Last time, we turned to the question of
人格同一性的的形而上学标准 what the metaphysical key to personal identity might be.
到底是什么 What makes it be the case that one person,
使得未来的我 some person that exists in the future,
和现在的我是同一个人 is the same person as me.
我们讨论的第一种理论是 The first approach to this that we considered
人格同一性的灵魂理论 was the soul theory of personal identity:
即成为同一个人的关键是拥有同一个灵魂 the key to being the same person is having the same soul.
灵魂同则人同 Same soul, same person.
灵魂不同则人不同 Different soul, different person.
这一理论的问题在于 And the difficulty with that approach,
即使我们先把灵魂是否存在 even if we bracket the question
这个问题放在一边 whether or not there are souls,
这一理论的问题还在于 the difficulty with that approach was that
灵魂似乎 it seems as though the soul
可以不断变化 could constantly be changing
而我们所说的人格却始终不变 while the personality, as we might call it, stays the same.
我可以有不变的信念 I have the same beliefs,
记忆 欲望 目标 memories, desires, goals,
还有偏好等等 preferences and so forth.
但是我内心的灵魂却 But the soul underneath it all keeps
每隔五分钟就发生变化 being swapped every five minutes.
如果人格同一性的灵魂理论成立 If the soul theory of personal identity were right,
那么后来的那个人就不是我了 that would not be me.
每隔五分钟就会死掉一个旧的我 I would be--every five minutes that person would die
由一个全新的人取而代之 and we'd have a new person,
尽管我们有着相同的人格 despite having the same personality.
大多数人难以接受 Most of us find that a rather difficult thing to believe,
人可以通过这种方式不断变化 that the person could be constantly changing in this way,
但却无法识别 without having any way at all to tell.
而倘若我们不愿接受这种结果的话 And if we're not willing to accept that implication,
我们似乎就得拒绝接受 it seems as though we need to reject
人格同一性的灵魂理论 The soul theory of personal identity.
我之所以说这么多 Now, I use this cumbersome phrase because, of course,
并非是在否认灵魂的存在 I'm not here talking about rejecting the existence of souls.
而是在思考 What I'm considering right now is the question
灵魂的一致性 whether sameness of soul
是否就是成为同一个人的关键 is the key to being the same person.
而这是个 And this is a--
这里有个逻辑上的区别值得一提 There's a logical distinction here that's worth drawing.
就算你相信灵魂存在 Even if you believe in souls,
你也无须说 you don't have to say
成为同一个人的关键 that having the very same soul is the key
就是拥有不变的灵魂 to being the very same person.
当然 如果你不信灵魂 And trivially, of course, if you don't believe in souls,
不相信灵魂的存在 if you don't believe that souls exist,
那么你当然不会认同灵魂的存在性 then you certainly can't appeal to the existence of souls,
灵魂的连续性 灵魂的一致性 the continuity of soul, the sameness of soul,
是人格同一性的关键 as the key to personal identity.
但接下来我们可能要问 But we might then ask,
"还有什么别的选择吗" "Well what's the alternative?"
自然而然 另一个观点就是 Now, the natural alternative is to say,
"成为同一个人的关键 "The key to being the same person
不是灵魂的一致性 is not the sameness of the soul,
且不论灵魂存在与否 whether or not it exists,
而是拥有同一肉体" but rather having the very same body."
再说一遍 我不打算 And again, although I'm not going to
反复讨论这个问题 go on and on about this point,
值得注意的是 it's worth noticing that
就算你真的相信灵魂存在 even if you do believe that souls exist,
也不妨碍你接受 nothing stops you from accepting
人格同一性的肉体理论 the body theory of personal identity.
不能排除这种可能 Nothing rules out the possibility that
即肉体同一是 having the very same body
成为同一个人的关键 is the key to being the very same person over time.
即使你相信灵魂存在 Even if you believe in souls,
你也可以接受肉体理论 you can accept the body theory.
而且显然 And it certainly looks as though
如果你不相信灵魂 if you don't believe in souls,
你就只能接受人格同一性的肉体理论了 you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.
事实证明 Now, as it turns out,
这种说法站不住脚 that appearance is deceptive.
对物理主义者来说还有其它的可能性 There are still other alternatives open to the physicalist,
这点我们等会儿再说 but let's come to that other alternative later.
先花点时间 Let's take a few minutes
来探讨下肉体理论 and consider the nature of the body theory,
人格同一性的肉体理论 the body theory of personal identity.
当然 就这个理论来说 On this theory, of course,
要成为同一个人必须肉体同一 the secret to being the same person is having the same body.
所以当我们问 So when we ask,
还记得上节课我说的 well, you remember last lecture I was talking about
怎么会有个人星期二 how there'd be somebody here lecturing to you,
在这里给你们讲哲学课 philosophy, on Tuesday.
这个人现在就在这里 Well, here somebody is.
这是同一个人吗 Is that the same person?
现在正给你们讲课的人 Is the person who's lecturing to you now
和之前给你们讲课的那个人 the same person as the person
是同一个人吗 who was lecturing to you before?
根据肉体理论 According to the body theory,
答案就是 问题转化为 the answer is--turns on the question,
"这具肉体是否就是 "Well, is this the same body as the
上星期在这里讲课的 lump of flesh and bone
那堆皮肉骨头呢" that was here last week?"
如果是 顺便说一下 确实是 If it is--and by the by it is--
那么这就是同一个人 if it is, then it's the same person.
所以 我是上周给你们讲课的那个人吗 So am I the person who was lecturing to you last week?
是的 因为我的肉体没有改变 Yes, I am, because it's the very same body.
这就是肉体理论的观点 That's what the body theory says.
不像灵魂理论那么神秘 And unlike souls, where it's all rather mysterious
你很难辨别灵魂 how you could tell whether soul swapping
改变了没有 was taking place or not,
而分辨到底是不是同一个肉体 it's not all that mysterious how we check out to see
则没有那么神秘 whether the same body's been around.
就算你不辨别 Even though you didn't do it,
你也可以潜入我的屋子 you could have snuck into my house,
监视我的肉体入睡又醒来 watched my body go to sleep, get up in the morning,
跟着我的肉体一整天 followed the body around over the course of the day,
然后看着它再次入睡 see it go to sleep again.
你可以追踪这个肉体的 You could have tracked that body
时空轨迹 然后说 through space and time and said,
"看 这是同一个肉体" "Hey look. It's the very same body."
同样地 In the same way
我们也可以追踪汽车 that we are able to track in principle cars,
这是我们之前讨论过的例子 our earlier example, and talk about yeah,
这是由同一金属 it's the same hunk of metal
电线 橡胶和塑料组成的物体 and wire and rubber and plastic.
同样的车身 同样的汽车 This is the same hunk, same body.
所以 同一个肉体 同一个人 All right, same body, same person.
这就是人格同一性的肉体理论 That's the body theory of personal identity.
现在 如果我们接受肉体理论 Now, if we accept the body theory,
那我们来看看这个问题 then of course if we turn to the question,
"我死后还能幸存下来吗 "Could I survive my death?
我在肉体死亡以后还能存活下来吗" Could I survive the death of my body?"
乍一看 At first glance,
好像答案是 it looks as though the answer's going to have to be,
"当然不会" "Well, of course not."
因为当我的肉体死亡 Because when my body dies, then,
它最终会腐烂 oh eventually the body begins to decay.
随之被分解成为分子 It decomposes, turns into molecules
被土壤吸收什么的 which get absorbed into the soil or what have you.
整个过程可能会花上几年 This may take years
几十年甚至几百年 or decades or even centuries.
但我的肉体一旦死亡 But my body no longer exists
就将不复存在 after death of my body.
那么在肉体死亡后我该如何存活 And so how could I survive the death of my body,
如果我要在肉体死亡后活下来 if for me to survive the death of my body,
那么就必须得有个人是我 there's got to be somebody who's me,
倘若他是我 就要求我们拥有同一肉体 and if being me requires it being the same body,
我的肉体就得继续存在 my body would have to still be around,
但它实际上已经不存在 but it's not.
这就是最初形成的答案 That's what it looks like at first glance.
但再想一想就会发现 But at second glance we see that
至少在逻辑上 there's at least a logical possibility
肉体死亡却仍然活着是有可能的 of surviving the death of my body.
条件就是把我的肉体拼回来 All it takes is for my body to be put back together.
肉体复活 Bodily resurrection.
现在我不打算追问 Now I'm not going to here pursue the question of,
"我们是否相信肉体复活 "Do we believe bodily resurrection
确有其事或者可能发生" occurs or will occur?"
我只想指出有些宗教传统 I'll note that there have been religious traditions
宣扬这样的教义并且笃信这种可能性 that have taught and believed in this possibility.
特别值得一提的是 In particular, it's probably worth mentioning
早期的基督徒就相信 that early Christians believed in
某种类似于人格同一性的肉体理论的教义 something like the body theory of personal identity
并且相信在审判日 and believed in bodily resurrection
神会于审判日出现 将死者复生并对他们进行裁决 分为永生者和打入地狱者 that would happen on Judgment Day.
会发生肉体复活 We can certainly understand the possibility
我们当然可以理解 that God would perform a miracle,
上帝可能会导演一场奇迹 put the molecules back together,
将分子重新排列组合起来 turn the body back on.
把肉体拼回来 Same body, same person,
同一个肉体 意味着同一个人 come Judgment Day.
在审判日复活 That's the possibility.
存在那种可能性 So it's at least worth emphasizing the fact
所以至少要强调这样一个事实 that even if we don't believe in souls,
即使我们不相信灵魂 we could still believe in the possibility
我们仍然可以相信在肉体死亡后 of surviving one's death, the death of one's body,
人有可能活下来 if we're willing to believe in bodily resurrection.
只要我们愿意相信肉体复活 Well, that's how it looks.
这就是其大意 Now let's take a harder look.
让我们再深入一点 Talking that way assumes
这种说法假设 that when you put the body back together,
当你把肉体复原的时候 when God puts the body back together on Judgment Day,
当上帝在审判日把肉体拼起来的时候 that that's still my body.
那个肉体仍旧是我的 Is that right?
是那样吗 I'm inclined to think it is right.
我倾向于认为那是对的 If God gathers up all the various molecules
如果上帝将所有组成我肉体的不同分子 that had composed my body,
都聚集起来 reassembles them in the right order,
以正确的方式排列 putting this calcium molecule next to that
将这个钙分子置于 hydrogen molecule and so forth and so on,
那个氢分子旁边 如此这般 reassembles them in the right way--
以正确的方式重新组装 obviously, if what He makes out of
当然 如果上帝用我的肉体分子 my body's molecules is a Cadillac,
造出一辆凯迪拉克的话 then that's not my body--
那就不是我的肉体 but if He puts them together in the right way,
但如果他以正确的方式组合分子 that seems like it should be my body.
那似乎就应该是我的肉体 So here's an analogy to give you
我打个比方 a sense of what's going on.
便于你们理解 Suppose I take my watch to the jeweler
假设我去修手表 because it stopped working.
因为它不走了 And in order to clean it and fix it, repair it,
为了清洗和修理它 what the jeweler does is he takes it apart.
钟表匠要把它拆开 He takes the rust off of the gears,
从齿轮间剔除铁锈 if there are still gears in watches.
如果说现在的手表里还有齿轮的话 Imagine it's an old stop watch.
想象这是一只坏了的旧手表 And he cleans all the pieces and buffs them and polishes them
他清洗擦亮并且润滑了所有零件 and then reassembles the whole thing.
然后把它们重新组合起来 And a week later, I come back and ask, "Where's my watch?"
一星期后我回来问他"表修好了吗" And he hands it to me.
他就把表递给我 Well, all well and good.
一切都很好 Now imagine some metaphysician saying,
现在想象一下 某个形而上学者要说 "Wait a minute, buster. Not so quick.
"等会 伙计 别急 That's not my watch.
那不是我的手表 Admittedly, it's composed of all the very same pieces
确实 它的零件 that made up my watch.
都是我手表里的 Admittedly, all these pieces are in the very same order as my watch,
这些零件也的确是按我表里的次序排列的 but still that's not my watch."
但它就不是我的表" On the contrary, it seems to me
我的观点则恰恰相反 the right thing to say about that example is,
这个例子的正确答案应该是 "No, that is my watch."
"不 那是我的手表" My watch was disassembled for a period of time.
我的手表在一段时间内被拆分了 Perhaps we should say my watch didn't exist
也许我们应该说我的手表 during that period of time.
在那一段时间里并不存在 But it got put back together.
但它被重新组装起来了 Now that's my watch.
于是我的手表回来了 If that's the right thing to say about the watch--
如果对于手表这样说是正确的 and it does seem to me to be the right thing to say about the watch--
其实我觉得这种说法并无任何问题 then God could presumably do the same thing on Judgment Day.
那么上帝大概也可以在审判日做同样的事 He could take our molecules, which had been scattered,
他可以把我们那些分解掉的分子 put them back together and say,
重新组合起来 然后说 "Ha! That's your body."
"哈 那就是你的肉体" And if the body theory of personal identity is right, well,
如果人格同一性的肉体理论成立 that would be me.
那么那个人就是我了 So it seems to me.
所以我觉得这个说法正确 But there's a different example
不过还有 that we have to worry about as well,
另一个不同的例子 which argues against this proposal
它反驳了肉体可以被分解 that the body could decompose and then be recomposed.
再被重构的说法 This is an example that's due to Peter van Inwagen.
由彼得·范·因瓦根提出 He's a contemporary metaphysician,
他是当代形而上学者 teaches at Notre Dame.
在巴黎圣母院传教 Suppose that my son builds a tower
假设我儿子用积木 out of wooden blocks.
搭了一座塔 We have a set of wooden blocks at home.
我家里有一套积木 Suppose that he builds some elaborate tower.
假设他搭了座很精致的塔 It's very impressive. And he says,
搭得非常好 然后他说 "Please show it to mom when she comes home."
"妈妈回来的时候请让她看看吧" And he goes to bed. And I'm very good.
然后他就睡觉去了 我很高兴 I'm cleaning up the house after he goes to bed
等他睡觉后我就开始打扫卫生 and oops,
可是一不小心 I knock over the tower.
我把塔给撞翻了 I say, "Oh my god, he's going to be so angry.
"上帝啊 他肯定要气死了 I promised him I'd be careful."
我答应过他我会当心的" So what I do is I take the blocks
于是我捡起积木 and I put them back together,
把它们重新搭起来 building a tower
按照我儿子的搭法 in the very same shape
把塔搭回原来的形状 and the very same structure,
按照原来的结构 the very same order as the tower that my son had built.
以及原来的次序重新搭建 And in fact I'm so careful--
我真的很小心 perhaps the blocks are numbered--
猜想这些积木可能都被编了号 I'm so careful that every block
我很小心地把所有积木 is in exactly the same position
都恢复原位 as in the case where my son built it.
和我儿子搭的一模一样 All right, I rebuild or I build this tower
我重搭或者说是我搭了这座塔 and my wife comes home and I say,
我妻子回到家 我说 "Look what our son built.
"看看咱儿子的杰作 This is the tower that our son built."
这是他造的塔" Ah, that doesn't sound right.
听起来不太对哦 That's not the tower that our son built.
那不是我儿子搭的塔 That's a tower that I built. This is a duplicate tower.
而是我搭的塔 只是个复制品 Sure, if my son were to wake up and I didn't tell him,
当然 如果儿子醒后我不告诉他的话 he wouldn't know that it was a duplicate.
他就不会知道那是赝品 But when you take a wooden block tower apart
但当你把构成塔的木块拆开 and then put the pieces back together,
再把它们拼回去 piece for piece, duplicate,
一块一块地复制回去 you don't have the very same tower
你搭出来的与拆开前的 that you started out with.
就不是同一个塔 That's what van Inwagen says and,
这就是范·因瓦根的观点 I've got to admit, sounds right to me.
对此我表示赞同 If I were to point to that tower and say,
如果我指着那个塔说 "Ari built that," I'd be saying something false.
"那是阿里搭的塔" 我便是在说假话 "That's the very same tower that Ari built."
"那个塔与阿里搭的是同一个塔" No, I'd be saying something false.
我则在胡说八道 So van Inwagen concludes,
所以范·因瓦根得出 if you have an object and you take it apart
如果你把一个物体拆开 and then put it all back together again,
再照原样拼回去 you don't have the very same object
你无法得到与拆开前 that you started out with.
相同的物体 So even if Judgment Day were to come,
所以即使审判日到来 and God were to reassemble the molecules
上帝重组了那些分子 and resurrect the body,
从而使肉体复活 it's not the very same body
重组前后的肉体 that you started out with.
也截然不同 And if having the very same body
所以如果人格同一性的关键 is the key to personal identity,
是拥有相同肉体的话 it's not the same person.
那复活的便是另一个人 Come Judgment Day,
审判日到来时 we've got a duplicate of me,
会生成我的一个复制品 but we don't have me.
但我将不复存在 That's what van Inwagen would say,
范·因瓦根认为 if that's the way bodily resurrection would work.
肉体即是以这种方式复活 I don't know, theology aside,
即便抛开神学避而不谈 I don't know what to say about the metaphysical questions.
我也不知该怎样回答这个形而上学的问题 When I think about the tower case,
当我想到塔的例子时 I do find myself inclined to say, with van Inwagen,
我自己也倾向于范·因瓦根的观点 that's not the tower my son built.
赞同那不是我儿子建的塔 But when I think about the watch case,
但当我想到手表的例子时 I find myself saying
我又会说 that is the very same watch.
那的确是同一只表 Now, all I can do is invite you
现在 我唯一能做的就是请你们 to think about these two cases
去思考这两个例子 and ask yourself, what should we say here?
然后问问自己 到底该如何解释 Of course, for those people who think
当然 有些人会认为 it really is the same tower, no problem.
那的确是同一个塔 没问题 Then we say, the watch and the tower,
这样我们就可以说 在手表和塔 in both cases, it's the very same object
这两个例子中 重组之后 when it's reassembled.
得到的是同一个物体 Reassemble the body,
肉体复活后 that'll be the very same body as well.
也仍旧是同一个肉体 For those people who say,
还有另一些人认为 "Yeah, van Inwagen was right about the tower,
"范·因瓦根关于塔的观点正确 and the same thing would be true about the watch.
同样适用于那个手表 The reassembled watch isn't the very same watch,"
重组前后不是同一只表" then we have to say bodily resurrection
那我们就可以说复活后的肉体 would not be the very same body.
和之前的肉体并不相同 So that wouldn't be me waking up on Judgment Day.
所以在审判日复活的那个人就不是我 The alternative is to try to find some relevant difference
还有个选择就是 between the watch case and the tower case.
找出这两个例子的异同点 Something that allows us to say that
这样我们就能说 "Well, when you reassemble the watch it is the same watch.
"手表重组后还是那支手表 When you reassemble the tower,
而塔经过重组后 it's not the same tower.
却不再是原来那座塔 Here's the explanation of why
关于为何 those two things work differently in the reassembly cases."
两者重组后有着不同结果的解释是这样的 And then of course, we'd have to further investigate
当然 我们还要更进一步研究 whether when you reassemble a body,
到底肉体重组 is it more like the watch case
更接近于手表的例子 or is it more like the tower case?
还是与塔的例子比较相像 I just have to confess,
我必须承认 I don't know what the best thing to say
我找不到 about these cases is.
对这些例子的最佳解释 I find myself inclined to think reassembled watch,
我倾向于认为重组手表时 same watch.
前后是同一只手表 Reassembled tower, not same tower.
而重组塔后 得到的是不同的塔 Maybe there's a difference there.
也许这两例的确存在不同 I don't have a good theory as to
但我就是没找到一个最佳理论 what the difference is.
来解释这个不同点到底是什么 Since I don't have a good theory as to what the difference is,
正因为此 I'm not in a good position to decide
我也就无法确定 whether a reassembled body
重组前后的肉体 would be the same body or a different body.
到底是否相同 I don't know.
我也不知道 So there's metaphysical work to be done here
因此这里有一个形而上学的问题 by anybody who's at least interested in
亟待那些对同一性理论 getting this theory of identity worked out properly.
感兴趣的人们来解决 Still, at least the possibility
不过至少 that we could work this out is still there.
这个问题是有可能被解决的 So I suppose there's still at least the possibility
所以我认为最起码 that bodily resurrection
按照这种方式 would be coherent in such a way
重新组合的肉体 that it would still be the same body.
仍有可能是同一个肉体 So if we accept the body theory,
所以如果我们接受肉体理论的话 could there be life after death?
那么人死后还有生命吗 Could there be survival of the death of my body?
肉体死亡之后还能够复活吗 Seems like, as far as I can tell,
似乎我只能说 it's still a possibility,
有这个可能 although there's some puzzles here
尽管还存有一些 that I don't know how to see my way through.
我不知该如何回答的未解之谜 Mind you, that's not to say that I myself do believe
请注意 这并不是说我相信 that there will be a Judgment Day,
所谓的审判日的确存在 and on that day God will reassemble the bodies.
上帝将在那天令肉体复活 But it at least seems like a coherent possibility.
但至少它的存在看上去比较合理 Let's refine the body view.
让我们来对肉体理论稍作提炼 I've been suggesting that the key here,
我一直在说该理论的关键点 the idea of whether it's the same person or not,
即 是否是同一个人的关键 is whether it's the same body.
在于肉体是否同一 But of course as we know in thinking about familiar objects,
但是对于那些为我们所熟悉的物体 we don't need to have every single piece of an object,
我们不必苛求要整体的每一部分 of an entity, stay the same to have the same thing.
都相同时它们才相同 So I think I previously talked about
就像我之前说的那个 the steering wheel in my car.
汽车方向盘的例子 Every time I drive the steering wheel in my car,
每当我转动方向盘时 I rub off some atoms. But that's okay.
会磨损掉一些原子 但这无关紧要 It's still the very same physical object.
它仍然是同一物体 The steering wheel is--
在此例中 having the same steering wheel
转动前后是否为同一个方向盘 is compatible with
与其中某些部分改变 changing of a few pieces.
并不矛盾 The same thing is true for bodies, right?
这也同样适用于肉体 对吧 You get sunburned, your skin peels,
你被晒伤了 皮肤脱落 you've lost some atoms in your body.
你失去了肉体的一些原子 It doesn't really matter. It's still the very same body.
这没什么大不了的 那仍然是同一肉体 So if body is the key to personal identity,
如果肉体是人格同一性的关键 we don't have to worry about the fact
我们也不需要担心自己 that we're constantly gaining and losing atoms.
在不断地增加或失去一些原子 Yes, question?
请提问 Good. The question was,
好的 问题是说 "What about somebody who loses a huge amount of weight?"
"如果某人大瘦身后会怎样" They feel different.
他感觉不同了 People treat them different.
人们对他的方式也不同了 What about that case?
怎样解释这个例子 Well, I think if we're doing metaphysics,
我认为我们这是在讨论形而上学 as opposed to psychology--Psychologically,
而非心理学 从心理学角度来看 we understand why losing weight
我们理解为何减轻体重 might make a real difference as to
会使你觉得 how you feel about yourself.
自己与以往有所不同 And we might even say, loosely,
我们甚至可以这么说 it's as though she's a whole new person.
她好像是变了个人 But strictly speaking, we don't think
但严格来说 我们不认为 it is literally a whole new person.
那的的确确是换了个人 It's not as though we say,
就好像我们不能说 "Poor Linda died when she entered the spa.
"可怜的琳达在进美容院时就死了 Or a week into the spa
或是说她去美容院一周 when she dropped those 50 pounds.
减掉50磅的体重之后就死了 Somebody else who remembers all of Linda's childhood,
出来的只是个拥有琳达儿时记忆的 some imitator came along."
仿真人类" We don't say "different person."
我们不会说"另一个人" We say "same person, lost a lot of weight."
我们会说是"减了些体重的同一个人" Now that's not a problem for the body view,
对肉体理论来说这完全不是个问题 because on the body view,
因为在肉体理论看来 the question is, is it the same body?
问题只在于那是否是同一个肉体 And what we want to say is, of course, look,
我们会说 当然是 just like it's still your body
就好比即使你没有了胳膊 even if you break your arm.
但那仍然是你的肉体 Even though--it's still your body
甚至在你吃完饭后 after you've eaten dinner,
那也仍然是你的肉体 and so now some molecules have been absorbed into your body
虽然有些分子被吸收到你的肉体中 that weren't there before.
而之前它们并不在那里 It's still your body after you lose some molecules,
即使失去一些分子也还是你的肉体 even a lot of molecules.
甚至在失去大量分子时亦然 There can be changes in your body
肉体发生变化 that are compatible with it still being the same body.
与变化前后为同一肉体并不矛盾 Now, we might worry about the--which changes?
我们可能会问哪些变化适用于这种说法呢 Are all the changes?
是不是所有变化都适用呢 You know, it's certainly not as though any change will do.
当然并不是任何变化都适用于此 I mean, suppose what happens is Linda goes to bed
我是说 假设琳达睡着后 and what we do in the middle of the night
然后我们三更半夜跑到床边 is we take away that body and put some new body there.
拿走旧肉体并放上一个新肉体 Well that 100% change,
那就是百分百的改变了 that's clearly too much.
显然变化太大了 Change of some small percentage,
改变一小部分 from eating, not a problem.
例如吃饭 那没问题 Change from a somewhat larger percentage of
改变一个大点的部分 losing a fair bit of weight doesn't seem to be a problem.
减轻相当比例的体重好像也没问题 So which changes in bodies
所以肉体上的哪些变化 make for a different body
会使其变成另一个人 and which changes in body make for the same body?
哪些变化又使其仍是同一个人呢 And in particular, how should we run
尤其是在我们探讨肉体 that if we're thinking about the body
是人格同一性的关键这一前提下 as the key to personal identity?
又该如何甄别 I think if we have that question in front of our minds,
我想如果我们之前就有这个疑虑 we're going to want to say
我们则会说 not all parts of the body are equally important.
肉体的每个部分并非同等重要 You lose a fair bit of weight,
你通过瘦身 some fat from your gut, not a problem.
减掉些赘肉 那没问题 Here's one of my favorite examples.
这有一个我喜欢的例子 In the Star Wars movies,
在电影《星球大战》里 Darth Vader whips out his light saber
黑武士达斯·维德挥动他的光剑 and slashes off
砍掉了 the hand of Luke Skywalker.
天行者卢克的手 "Luke, I am your father."
"卢克 我是你的父亲" "No!" Then the hand goes, right?
"不" 然后他的手就没了 对吧 The very next scene
接下来一幕 --this has always amazed me--the very next scene,
我一直觉得这是最精彩的一幕 Luke's got an artificial hand that's been attached to his body
卢克装上了一付假肢 and they never even mention it again.
之后就再也没人提起它了 No one says, "Oh, poor Luke.
没有人会说 "噢 可怜的卢克 He died when Darth Vader cut off the hand."
被达斯·维德砍掉手后就挂了 It seems pretty clear
所以很明显 that not all parts of the body matter.
并非肉体的所有部分都很重要 You can lose a hand and still survive.
你失去手后仍可以存活 Same body, except now without a hand.
即使失去一个手 你仍旧是同一个肉体 Suppose Darth Vader had aimed a little higher
假设达斯·维德选择在更高的位置下手 and cut off Luke's entire arm.
切掉了卢克的整个胳膊 It would still be Luke. It would still be Luke's body.
他仍然是卢克 那仍然是卢克的肉体 Suppose, even worse,
假设再糟糕一点 Darth Vader slices off both arms and both legs.
达斯·维德砍掉了卢克的四肢 It would still be Luke.
那还是卢克 It would still be Luke's body,
仍然是卢克的肉体 though now without arms and legs.
即便他失去了胳膊和腿 What part of the body,if any, is essential?
那究竟肉体的哪个部分才必不可少呢 Well here's a proposal.
我有个提议 It seems to me we'd say something rather different
要是弄烂卢克的脑袋 if what happened was that what got destroyed was Luke's brain.
情况估计就不大一样了 Suppose that Darth Vader uses the force--
假如黑武士达斯·维德用原力 the dark side of the force of course--
当然 是黑暗面的原力 Darth Vader uses the dark side of the force to destroy,
黑武士达斯·维德利用黑暗面的原力 to turn into pea soup, Luke Skywalker's brain.
把天行者卢克·行者的脑袋弄成了豌豆汤 Now I think we might want to say,
现在我们就可以说 "Well look, no more Luke."
"看吧 卢克没了" And if what happens is they drag out
如果他们替换掉 some replacement brain,
卢克大脑的一部分 it's still not Luke.
那仍然不是卢克 At least, that's a possible version
至少 肉体理论可能 of the body view.
会这么解释 According to this version,
按照这种说法 which I take to be the most promising,
这种我觉得最靠谱的说法 the best version of the body view,
同时也是肉体理论的最佳说法 the crucial question in thinking about personal identity
人格同一性的关键问题在于 is whether it's the same body--
是否是同一肉体 but not all parts of the body matter equally.
但肉体的所有部分并非都同等重要 The most important part of the body is the brain.
肉体中最重要的部分是大脑 Well, why the brain? No surprise there,
那么 为什么是大脑 毫无疑问 because of course the brain is the part, we now know,
因为我们都知道大脑 the brain is the part of the body
大脑是肉体中 that is the house of your personality,
形成人格的地方 your beliefs, your desires, your fears,
你的信仰 欲望 恐惧 your ambitions, your goals, your memories.
你的野心 目标 记忆 That's all housed in the brain.
都是由大脑产生的 And so that's the part of the brain
所以大脑这个部分 that's the key part of the body
便是肉体 for the purpose of personal identity.
形成人格同一性的关键 That's what I'm inclined to think
这就是我最为欣赏的 is the best version of the body view.
肉体理论的最佳说法 We find examples of this thought,
有关大脑重要性的例子 that the brain is the key, in odd places.
其实有很多 So let me actually share one with you.
我来给你们举个例子 This was something from the Internet
这是从网上找到的 that my brother sent to me some years ago.
数年前我哥把它发给了我 It purports to be from a transcript from an actual trial
据说取材于一个真实的案例 in which a lawyer's cross examining the doctor.
律师对医生提起诉讼 And you'll see.
你们会看到 I don't actually know whether it's true or not,
我无法确定此例的真实性 whether it's just somebody made it up.
也不知道这是不是别人瞎编的 But it purports to be true.
但据说是真的 Question: Doctor, before you performed the autopsy,
问 医生 你在验尸前 did you check for a pulse?
有检查过脉搏吗 Answer: No.
答 没有 Question: Did you check for blood pressure?
问 那你检查过血压吗 Answer: No.
答 没有 Question: Did you check for breathing?
问 那你检查过呼吸吗 Answer: No.
答 没有 Question: So then it is possible
问 那这么说有可能 that the patient was alive when you began the autopsy?
患者在你开始验尸的时候还是活着的咯 Answer: No.
答 不可能 Question: How can you be so sure, doctor?
问 你凭什么这么肯定呢 医生 Answer: Because his brain
答 因为他的大脑 was sitting on my desk in a jar.
在我桌上的一个罐子里 Question: But could the patient
问 虽然如此 但这位患者 have still been alive nevertheless?
还有可能依然活着吗 Answer: It is possible that he could have been alive
答 他有可能还活着 and practicing law somewhere.
并且在什么地方当律师 The point--The reason that this is funny,
这例子好笑是因为 other than of course the obvious moral,
除了其明显的寓意以外 which is that lawyers are morons,
即律师都是白痴 is that of course.
这点显而易见 Why is it so clear the lawyer's got to be a moron?
我们为何一眼就能看出这个律师很白痴呢 Because of course we think,
因为我们很容易想到 look, lose a hand, the guy could still be alive.
失去一只手这人也能活 Lose an arm, lose a leg.
失去一只胳膊 一条腿也一样能活 Lose the brain, he's not alive.
但失去大脑 他就活不了了 So again this is, this is hardly philosophical proof,
所以这在哲学上也不成立 but it shows that we're drawn to the thought
但它表明我们都深信 that the key part of the body is the brain.
大脑是人体的关键部位 Now, think about what the implication of holding that view.
现在想想我们持有那种想法意味着什么 Suppose we adopt that version of the body view.
假设我们采用这个肉体理论 If I get a liver transplant,
如果我做肝脏移植 so here I am
那么在这里 and we take out my liver
大家取出我的肝脏 and we put Jones' liver inside.
植入琼斯的肝脏 I've gotten a liver transplant. It's still me.
我虽然做了肝脏移植 但我还是我 Suppose we rip out my heart
假设我切除了心脏 and put Jones' heart in here.
植入琼斯的心脏 I've gotten a heart transplant. It's still me.
我虽然做了心脏移植 但我还是我 Suppose we rip out my lungs
假设我切除了肺 and put in Jones' lungs.
植入琼斯的肺 I've gotten a lung transplant. It's still me.
我虽然做了肺移植 但我还是我 Suppose we rip out my brain, put in Jones' brain.
假设我切除了大脑 植入琼斯的大脑 Have I gotten a brain transplant?
那我是做了大脑移植吗 No. What's happened is that
非也 事实上是 Jones has gotten
琼斯做了 a body transplant.
肉体移植 Or, as we might put it, a torso transplant.
也可以说是躯干移植 If we accept this version of the body theory,
如果我们接受这种肉体理论 we say the crucial part of the body for personal identity
那我们就可以说人格同一性中肉体的关键 is not sameness of torso.
并非躯干的同一性 The crucial part of the body is sameness of brain.
而是大脑的同一性 Just like "Follow the soul" was the answer
就像如果我们相信人格同一性的灵魂理论 if we believe in the soul theory of personal identity,
给出"跟随灵魂"这个回答一样 if we believe in the brain version
如果我们相信人格同一性的肉体理论中 of the body theory of personal identity,
大脑是关键的话 same person or not? Follow the brain.
那辨别是否是同一个人只需通过大脑 Same brain, same person.
大脑同则人同 Different brain, different person.
大脑不同则人不同 As I've now been saying several times,
正如我多次提到的 I think that's the best version of the body view,
我认为这是肉体理论的最佳说法 although not all body theorists believe that.
尽管并非所有的肉体理论学家都认同这点 As you know from reading your Perry, the assigned reading,
你们通过阅读作业中佩里的作品已经知道 his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,
他关于人格同一性和永生的对话 the heroine of that story, Gertrude
故事的女主人公格特鲁德 Gertrude actually thinks
其实格特鲁德认为 the key part of the body is the torso.
肉体的关键部位是躯干 Follow the torso, follow the person.
躯干同则人同 That's what she thinks.
这是她的观点 I'm inclined to say, no.
我倾向于说 非也 In those moods, when I accept the body theory,
如果我接受肉体理论的话 I'm inclined to think, no, follow the brain.
我会更倾向于认为应该根据大脑来辨别 Gertrude would presumably say you get a brain transplant,
估计格特鲁德会说你做了大脑移植 you got a brain transplant,
你之所以能做大脑移植 because it's the same torso.
是因为躯干没变 I want to say, as a fan of the brain theory,
而我想说 作为一个大脑理论的粉丝 you get a brain transplant,
你做的大脑移植 what's really happened
其实是 is somebody else has gotten a torso transplant.
另一个人做的躯干移植 Follow the brain.
根据大脑来决定 How much of the brain?
根据大脑的多大部分呢 Do we need all of the brain?
我们需要整个大脑吗 Well, just like we didn't have to follow the parts of the body
正如我们无须考虑身体中 that aren't essential for housing
与人格同一性 the personality,
无关的部分一样 we might ask ourselves,
我们或许会问自己 "Do we need all of the brain to house the personality?"
"我们需要整个大脑来保存人格吗" Research suggests
研究表明 that there's a fair bit of redundancy in the brain.
大脑中有不少冗余的部分 You can lose portions of the brain
你可以失去大脑的某些部分 and still have a perfectly functioning,
而依然运作完好 P-functioning person.
而且还是个功能健全的人 Some of you may know that there have been experiments in which,
你们或许有人知道曾经在有些实验中 for one reason or the other,
因为各种原因 the two halves of the brain have been separated.
大脑的两个半球被分开过 And you often end up there with,
你会发现 well, something closer to two persons
就像两个人 being housed within one skull,
住在同一个头骨里一样 because they can often still communicate in various ways.
因为它们仍可经常以各种方式交流 We don't quite get that.
对此我们并不是非常理解 I gather that the best research suggests
我收集了最好的研究结果以证明 we don't really have complete redundancy with hemispheres.
我们的大脑半球中并不存在绝对的冗余 But suppose that we did.
但假如有的话 Let's be science-fictiony.
大家可以想得科幻一些 Suppose that, as a kind of backup security,
假设有理论支撑 what evolution has done
进化使大脑中 is produced so much redundancy in the brain
产生了如此多的冗余 that either half of the brain would suffice.
只要半个大脑就够用了 All right, so think about our brain transplant example.
考虑一下大脑移植的例子 So there's an accident with Jones and Smith.
琼斯和史密斯发生了意外 Jones's torso gets destroyed.
琼斯的躯干遭到破坏 His brain is fine.
但他的大脑却完好无损 Smith's brain has gotten destroyed. His torso is fine.
史密斯的大脑被毁 但躯干完好 We take Jones's brain; we put it in Smith's torso.
我们将琼斯的大脑移植到史密斯的躯干上 We hook up all the wires, as it were.
按原来那样接好所有的神经 The thing wakes up.
然后他醒了 Who is that?
他是谁 Jones's brain, Smith's torso.
琼斯的大脑 史密斯的身体 Follow the brain.
根据大脑理论来看 That's Jones that woke up.
醒来的是琼斯 Version two.
版本二 Horrible accident.
一场可怕的事故 Jones's torso has been destroyed
使得琼斯的躯干被毁 and the left half of his brain has been destroyed.
他的左脑也受损 But the right half of his brain is still there.
但右脑无碍 Smith's torso is fine,
史密斯的躯干完好 but his entire brain has been destroyed.
但他的整个大脑都损坏了 We take the right half of Jones's brain,
我们将琼斯的右脑 put it into Smith's torso,
植入史密斯的躯干中 hook up all the wires the right way,
接好所有神经 the thing wakes up.
然后他醒了 Who is it?
他是谁 It's Jones.
是琼斯 Follow the brain,
根据大脑理论来看 and more particularly,
更确切地说 follow however much of the brain it takes
不论占用了多少大脑 to have enough of the brain there
只要它足以 to still give you the memories, beliefs, desires,
赋予你记忆 信仰 欲望 and so forth and so on.
等等即可 If it were true--it probably isn't true,
如果它成立 它也可能是错的 but if it were true--
但假若半个大脑就够用 that half of the brain was enough,
这一命题成立的话 then half the brain would be enough.
那么半个大脑就足够了 That would be Jones that woke up.
所以说醒来的是琼斯 Question?
有问题吗 Great. The question was,
很好 他的问题是 "On this theory, what do we say about the case
"照这个理论说的话 where we take the two halves of Jones's brain,
如果我们将琼斯的左右脑都取出 split them, put them in two different torsos.
并将它们分别植入到两个不同的躯干中去 They both wake up. Would they both be Jones?"
那当他们醒来后 两个人都是琼斯吗" That's a wonderful question.
这问题非常好 It's a wonderful case to think about and, indeed,
这的确是个非常值得思考的情况 I am going to come back to it.
我等会儿会来谈谈这个问题 But I just want to bracket it for the time being.
但我暂时想把它抛在一边避而不谈 But it's a great question to keep in mind
不过在你们思考 as you think about
肉体理论的合理性的时候 the plausibility of the body theory.
这个问题不容回避 All right, so I'm inclined to think
我倾向于认为 that the best version of the body theory
肉体理论的最佳说法 has to do with following the brain.
就是依据大脑来甄别 So one thing that a physicalist, who does not believe in souls,
那么一个不相信灵魂的物理主义者 one thing that a physicalist could say is,
他可能就会说 "What's the key to personal identity?
"什么是人格同一性的关键呢 The body. Sameness of body."
是肉体 肉体的同一性" And then I'm inclined to think
我更倾向于认为 the best version of the body view
肉体理论的最佳说法是 is the brain view.
大脑理论 So that's something that a physicalist can say.
这就是物理主义者的观点 And for that matter, it's something that a soul,
这样一来 有关灵魂的观点 somebody who believes in souls, could say as well:
相信灵魂的人也会说 even though there are souls,
即使有灵魂 that may not be the key to personal identity.
它也可能不是人格同一性的关键 Maybe sameness of body is the key to personal identity.
也许肉体同一性才是 That's something a physicalist or dualist can say.
这或许是物理主义者或是二元论者的观点 But, and this is not--
但这并不能 to make good on a promissory note I offered earlier.
帮我自圆其说 It's not the only view available to physicalists or,
这不是物理主义者或是 for that matter, dualists.
二元论者的唯一观点 Even if there are no souls,
即便灵魂不存在 we don't have to say that the key to
我们也不必说 personal identity is the sameness of the body.
人格同一性的关键就是肉体同一性 We could instead say the key to personal identity
我们也可以说人格同一性的关键 is the sameness of the personality.
就是人格的一致性 After all, go back to the Lockean
最后 回到洛克派学者 worries about the soul theory of personal identity.
约翰·洛克 英国哲学家 经验主义的开创人 认为人类所有的思想和观念都来自或反映了人类的感官经验 It seemed very hard to believe
对人格同一性的灵魂理论的担心 that it isn't the same person
似乎很难相信 when the memories and beliefs and desires
当记忆 信仰 欲望 and goals and ambitions and fears are all the same,
目标 野心 恐惧都相同时 even if a soul is constantly changing.
人却不同 It seems as though we wanted to say same person.
虽然灵魂在不断变化 Why? Roughly speaking, because it's the same personality.
我们也许会说这还是同一个人 And with the body view,
为什么呢 简单来说就是因为人格相同 when I started arguing a few moments ago
至于肉体理论 that the best version of the body view was the brain view,
当我刚才说 why did that seem plausible?
肉体理论的最佳说法就是大脑观点时 Why didn't we say that Luke died when he lost his wrist?
为什么听起来有点不可信 Because the brain, after all,
为什么我们不说卢克手被砍了他就死了 was the part of the body that houses the personality.
因为毕竟大脑才是 Enough of the brain was good enough, I said.
肉体保存人格的地方 What counts as good enough?
我说过只要大脑足够就好 Enough to keep the personality.
多少算足够呢 Well, if what we think is really important here
足够保持他的人格就行 is the personality,
既然我们在这里把人格 why don't we just say
看得这么重要 the key to personal identity is the personality?
我们何不直说 Let's just say it's me,
人格同一性的关键就是人格呢 provided that there's somebody
以我为例 who's got the same set of beliefs,
倘若有人 desires, goals, memories,
和我有相同的信仰 ambitions, fears.
欲望 目标 记忆 To coin a word, the same "Personality."
野心 恐惧 So the secret to personal identity on
一言以蔽之 就是相同的"人格" this new proposal isn't sameness of body,
那么在这一新的假设下 it's sameness of personality.
人格同一性的关键并非肉体的同一性 Now, it's important to bear in mind
而是人格的同一性 that this view is perfectly compatible
切记 with being a physicalist.
这一观点与物理主义者的身份 After all, we're not saying
并不冲突 that in order to have personalities
毕竟我们不能 you need to have something nonphysical.
要求你为了接受人格同一性理论 As physicalists, we can still say
就非得有点非物理主义的思想 that the basis of personality
作为物理主义者 is that there are bodies that are functioning in certain ways.
我们还是可以说人格的基础就是 But for all that,
以特定方式运作的肉体 the key to the same person could have to do with the personality
不过话虽如此 rather than the sameness of bodies.
判断是否是同一个人的关键还是人格 Of course, normally the way you get the same personality
而非肉体的同一性 is by having the same body.
当然 通常我们判断人格是否一致 Still, if we ask,
就是看肉体是否同一 "What's doing the metaphysical work here?
如果我们再问 What's the key to being the same person?"
"形而上学论在这里有什么作用 we can say
成为同一个人的关键到底是什么呢" sameness of body gave us the same personality,
我们可以说 but it was sameness of personality
肉体的同一性使我们拥有相同的人格 that made it be the very same person.
但是是相同的人格 Could there be some way to get sameness of personality
使之成为同一个人 while not having sameness of body?
有可能在具备相同人格的情况下 Maybe.
肉体却不相同吗 Suppose that we had some disease.
有可能 The doctor tells me the horrible news
假使有种疾病 that I'm going to have some disease
医生告诉我一个坏消息 that's going to eventually turn my brain into pea soup.
说我得了这种病 But luckily, just before it does it,
我的大脑最后会变成豌豆汤 they can take all of my personality
但幸运的是 在病变前 and put it into an artificial replacement brain.
他们能先取出我所有的人格 So there'll be --just like you can have artificial hearts, artificial livers,
并将其储存在一个人造的替代大脑中 you can have artificial brains,
就像安个人造心脏 人造肝脏一样 which will get imprinted with the same personality.
你也可以安个人造大脑 Same memory, same beliefs,
并装入相同的人格 same desires, same fears, same goals.
相同的记忆 相同的信仰 We obviously can't do that.
相同的欲望 恐惧 还有目标 This is a science fiction story.
很显然我们做不到 But at least it allows you to see how the body
这只是个科幻故事罢了 and the personality could come apart.
但至少我们可以从中了解到 And so we could have same personality
肉体和人格可以分离 without literally the same brain.
这样一来我们就可以在大脑不同的情况下 If personality is the key to personal identity,
依然拥有相同的人格 that would still be me.
如果人格是人格同一性的关键 Hold off again for a few minutes,
那么那个人就依然还是我 at least, on the question,
先花几分钟 "So what should we believe here,
来看下这个问题 the body, the personality view?"
"我们该相信哪种观点 Let's try to refine the personality theory.
躯干 还是人格" So again, the point I was just emphasizing was
让我们来试着提炼一下人格理论 even if we accept the personality theory,
我要再强调一下 this doesn't threaten our being physicalists.
即便我们接受了人格理论 We can still say the reason
这也不会影响我们的物理主义立场 that we've got the same personality in the normal case,
我们还是可以说 is there's some physical explanation of
在通常情况下 人之所以有相同人格 what houses the personality.
是因为人格所在之处 But for all that,
是存在物理主义上的解释的 the key to personal identity is same personality.
不过话虽如此 Notice, by the way,
人格同一性的关键在于人格相同 that somebody who believes in souls could also accept
顺便说一下 要注意 the personality theory of personal identity.
相信灵魂的人也可以接受 Locke believed in souls.
人格同一性的人格理论 He just didn't think they were the key to personal identity.
洛克就相信灵魂 So you might think,
只不过他不认为这是人格同一性的关键 "Oh no. The physicalist is wrong
你们或许会觉得 when the physicalist says that personality--
"不会吧 物理主义者错得也太离谱了 memory, belief, consciousness,
还说什么人格 what have you--is housed or based in the body.
记忆 信仰 意识 It's based in an immaterial soul."
这些都储存在躯干中 Dualists could say that.
其实是建立在非物质的灵魂的基础上的" And yet, for all that, the dualist could consistently say,
二元论者就会这么说 "Still, same soul is not the key to personal identity.
不过话虽如此 二元论者还是会说 Same personality is the key to personal identity.
"灵魂同一并不是人格同一性的关键 If God replaces my soul every 10 minutes,
人格同一才是人格同一性的关键 as long as He does it in such a way as to imprint
如果上帝每十分钟就要替换一次我的灵魂 the very same personality on the soul,
上帝之所以要这么做 it doesn't matter any more than
是为了保证灵魂具有完全相同的人格 it didn't matter whether or not
这样就万事大吉了 some of my body parts were changing."
即使肉体的某些部分发生了变化 So the personality theory of personal identity
也没什么关系 can be accepted by physicalists
所以人格同一性的人格理论 and it can be accepted by dualists.
既能为物理主义者所接受 So, just to keep score, right now
也能被二元论者接受 we've got three basic theories
记住了 of personal identity on the table.
我们现在已经讲了人格同一性的 The soul theory,
三种基本理论了 the key to personal identity is the same soul.
灵魂理论 The body theory,
即人格同一性的关键在于灵魂同一 the key to personal identity is the same body.
肉体理论 Where the best version, I think,
即人格同一性的关键在于肉体同一 is the brain version of the body theory.
我认为肉体理论的最佳说法是 And the personality theory,
大脑理论 the key to personal identity
还有人格理论 is having the very same personality.
即人格同一性的关键 Well again, we've got to be careful
在于人格同一 about refining this.
同样 我们得谨慎 Just like we all agreed, I suppose,
提炼这些理论 that you can have the very same body,
我先假定大家都认可 even though some of the parts come and go,
你可以保持肉体不变 atoms get added, other atoms get knocked off.
即使发生新陈代谢 We can say, we'd better say,
增加了一些原子 又脱落了一些原子 that you can have the very same personality
我们可以说 我们最好说 even if some of the elements
你的人格不会发生变化 in your personality change.
即使组成人格的一些元素 After all, we defined the personality
发生了变化 in terms of it being a set of beliefs and memories
毕竟 我们定义人格 and desires and goals and fears and so forth.
是由一系列诸如信仰 记忆 But those things are constantly changing.
需求 目标 恐惧等东西组成的 I have all sorts of memories now
而这些东西实在不断变化的 that I didn't have when I was 10.
我现在所拥有的记忆 I have memories of getting married, for example.
在我十岁时是绝不会有的 I wasn't married when I was 10.
例如 我有关于结婚的记忆 So does the personality theorist have to say,
但我十岁时却并没有结婚 "Uh-oh, different personality.
那么人格理论学家要说 That kid no longer exists.
"人格不同了 That person died,
那孩子已然消失了 got married, no memories, died."
那人已经死了 If we say that,
结婚了 记忆没了 人也就死了" we have very, very short lives.
要这么说的话 Because after all,
我们的生命就极为短暂了 right now I've got some memories
因为毕竟 that I didn't have two hours ago.
我现在具有的一些记忆 I have some memories I didn't have 20 minutes ago.
是我两小时前所没有的 If every time you got a new memory
还有些记忆是我二十分钟前所没有的 you had a new personality
倘若每获得新的记忆 and the personality theory said
就会产生新的人格的话 having the very same personality was the key to survival,
并且人格理论认为 then none of us survive more than a few seconds.
人存活的关键就是人格同一 Well, the answer presumably is going to be
那我们就只能活几秒钟 that the best version of the personality theory
如此推测 那么答案可能就是 doesn't require item for item
人格理论的最佳解释 having the very same beliefs,
无须满足那些条条框框 memories, desires, and so forth.
比如具有完全相同的信仰 But instead requires enough gradual overlap.
记忆或者需求等等 Your personality can change and evolve over time.
而是要求人格以渐进重叠的方式变化 So here I am as a 10 year old child.
你的人格会随着时间而发展变化 I've got certain desires, certain memories.
在我还是个十岁大的孩子的时候 As the year goes by, I get some new memories.
我拥有某些需求 某些记忆 I lose some of my goals.
随着时间流逝 我获得了新的记忆 I no longer--When I was 10,
并忘记了曾经的一些目标 when I grew up I wanted to be a trash collector.
我不再 我十岁的时候 That was my first chosen profession.
曾希望自己长大后当个拾荒者 At some point I gave up that desire.
这是我选的第一份职业 I didn't want to be a trash collector anymore.
某一天我放弃了这个想法 I wanted to be, I kid you not,
不再想成为拾荒者 I wanted to be a logician when I was a teenager.
我想成为 不骗你们 I wanted to study symbolic logic.
我年轻的时候想成为一名逻辑学家 So at a certain point I gave that up.
我想研究符号逻辑学 So my memories, my desires were changing,
接着在某一天我又放弃了这个想法 but they all changed gradually.
可见 我的记忆 需求一直都在变化 I lost some old memories.
但都是渐进式的变化 I don't remember everything
我失去了一些旧的记忆 I knew or remembered when I was 10.
我无法完全记起 When I was 10, I had pretty vivid memories of kindergarten.
自己十岁时记得的那些事 Now I have very sketchy memories of kindergarten.
我十岁时还对幼儿园有着生动的记忆 Still, it wasn't abrupt. It was gradual.
而现在我对幼儿园的记忆已经很模糊了 There was this slow evolution of the personality.
这种变化不是突然的 而是渐进的 And so when the personality theorist says
人格也在缓慢地发展 the key to personal identity is the same personality,
所以当人格理论学家说 they don't' mean literally
人格同一性的关键在于人格同一时 the very same set of beliefs and desires.
他们并不是死板地认为 They mean, rather,
信仰和需求必须绝对不变 the same slowly evolving personality.
相反 他们所说的人格同一 Here's an analogy.
是指缓慢演变的同一人格 Suppose I had a rope
打个比方 that stretched from that end of the room
假设我将一根绳子 all the way across to this end of the room.
从教室的那头 Very same rope at that end as this end.
一直拉到这头 What makes up a rope?
两头的绳子完全同一 Well, as you know,
绳子是由什么组成的 ropes are basically bundles of fibers,
正如你们所知 very thin fibers that have been woven together in a certain way.
绳子基本上都是由纤维组成的 But the interesting thing is the fibers themselves
很细的纤维以某种方式编织起来组成绳子 aren't actually all that long.
有趣的是 这些纤维的长度 They might be a couple of inches or at most a foot or so.
并没绳子那么长 And so no single fiber
它们可能就几英寸长 最多一英尺 stretches all the way across the room.
没有哪根纤维的长度 Or even if some fibers did, most of the fibers don't.
足够横穿整个教室 Does that force us to say,
即便某些纤维够长 但大部分还是不行 "Ah, so it's not the very same rope
这样我们是不是就得说 at the end as at the beginning"?
"始末两端的绳子 No. We don't have to say that at all.
并不是一条绳子呢" What we want to say is,
不 我们肯定不会这么说 "It's the same rope as long as
我们会说 there's this pattern of overlapping fibers."
"因为这根绳子是由纤维交织而成 Certain fibers end, but most of the fibers are continuing.
它具有同一性" Some new fibers get introduced. They continue for a while.
一些纤维不够长 会有更多的纤维接上 Eventually maybe those fibers end,
会加入些新纤维使绳子保持连续 but some new fibers have been introduced in the meantime.
这些纤维最后也会到头 As long as it's not abrupt.
但同时又加入了些新的纤维 Imagine I take my scissors and cut out a foot in the middle.
只要不出意外 Then we'd say there isn't the
比如我用剪刀将绳子从中剪断 right kind of pattern of overlap and continuity.
这时我们就得说 Now we really do have two ropes--
纤维交叠和连续的正常模式被打破 one rope here, one rope there.
现在我们就有两根绳子了 But if, in contrast,
一根绳子在这里 一根在那里 there is the right kind of pattern of overlap and continuity,
但如果没有发生意外的话 same rope, even though,
纤维就这样交叠连续着编织在一起 even if no single fiber makes it all the way across.
这根绳子就保持同一性 Something analogous needs to be
即使没有一根纤维能贯穿始终 said by the personality theorist.
这就可以类比 Even if I have few or no memories
人格理论学家的观点了 identical to the ones that I had when I was 10,
即使我现在的记忆 that's okay.
与我十岁时的记忆完全不同 We can still say it's the same personality,
也没有关系 the same evolving personality,
我们仍然可以说 人格是同一的 so long as there's a
因为人格的演变保持不变 pattern of overlap and continuity.
只要这种演变的模式是 New memories get added,
交叠连续的 some memories get lost.
产生新记忆 New goals get added, some goals get lost.
失去旧记忆 New beliefs get added, some beliefs get lost.
设定新目标 忘却旧目标 There might be few beliefs, desires, goals
树立新信仰 摒弃旧信仰 that made it all the way through.
可能有些信仰 需求 目标 But as long as there's the right kind of overlap and continuity,
能够贯彻始终 same personality.
但只要人格的变化是交叠连续的话 All right, so what have we got?
人格就是同一的 Three views--
好了 我们今天学到了什么 soul view, body view, personality view.
三种观点 Three rival theories about the key to personal identity.
灵魂观点 肉体观点 人格观点 Now, which of these is right?
这三种不同的观点直指人格同一性的关键 Well, I don't myself believe in souls,
那哪种是正确的呢 it's hardly going to surprise you to learn
其实我自己并不相信灵魂 that I don't think the soul theory
这样你们就不会惊讶于 of personal identity is right.
我不认为灵魂理论 For me, the choice boils down to the choice
是人格同一性的关键了 between the body theory of personal identity
对我来说 答案的选择缩减到 and the personality theory of personal identity.
人格同一性的肉体理论 Of course, in real life,
和人格理论二者之间 they go hand in hand.
当然 在实际生活中 In ordinary cases at least,
这二者总是同时出现 same body, same personality.
至少在一般情况下 Both theories are going to say
肉体同则人格同 it's the very same person.
从而两种理论都认为 And if you believe in souls,
人也同一 you are likely to think, same soul as well.
如果你相信灵魂存在的话 In ordinary cases, you have the same soul, same body,
那你可能会认为灵魂也同一 same personality, same person.
在通常情况下 你的灵魂 肉体 To think about which one of these
人格和人本身都不发生变化 is the key to personal identity,
要考虑到底哪个因素 we need to think about cases,
才是人格同一性的关键 maybe somewhat fantastical, science-fictiony,
我们就得具体问题具体分析 in which they come apart.
或许在有些奇幻 科幻故事里 Cases in which bodies and personalities
它们可以彼此分离 go their own ways, as it were.
就好像肉体和人格 So that's what I'm going to do.
是可以分离似的 I'm going to tell you a story
而那就是我将要做的事情 in which
我要给你们讲个故事 your body ends up one place
在这个故事里 and your personality ends up someplace else.
你的肉体到了某个地方 And I'm going to invite you to think about
而你的人格去了另一个地方 which of these two resulting end products
我希望大家能思考一下 is me.
在这两者当中 If you could figure out which one's you,
哪一个才是我 that would tell you whether you think
你若能辨别出哪一个是你的话 the body theory is the right theory
那将会有助于你理解 or the personality theory is the right theory.
到底是肉体理论正确 Now, what's going to be our guide?
还是人格理论正确 I'm going to, rather gruesomely
那现在用什么来指引我们进行思考呢 not in real life, a science fiction story--
我要讲一个比较恐怖的故事 I'm going to torture
当然不是现实生活中的 是个科幻故事 one of the two end products.
我将严刑拷打 I'm going to ask you,
这两种终产物中的一个 "Which one do you want to be tortured?"
我会问你们 Or to put the point more properly,
"你希望我拷问哪一个呢" "Which one do you want to not be tortured?"
或者换个更有针对性的问法 Because I'm going to assume, I'm going to take it,
"你不希望我拷问哪一个呢" that it's important to you
因为我假设 我也确实是这么认为的 that "you" not be tortured.
对你们来说 So by seeing who you want to keep safe,
不让"你"被拷问很重要 this will help you see
所以 通过观察你想保护谁 which one you think is you.
将可帮你发现两者中 Of course, I've got to be sure
哪个才是你心目中的真我 that you're thinking about this in the right way.
当然 我必须确定 Like some of you are probably good, moral individuals
你们都会正确地思考这个问题 and you don't want anybody to be tortured.
你们中有些人可能非常善良且道德高尚 I say, "Ah, I'm about to torture Linda over there."
不希望任何人受到拷问 You say, "No, no. Don't torture Linda."
当我说"我要拷打琳达了" Still, if I were to say to you,
你们会说"不 别拷打琳达" "I'm about to torture you."
同样 如果我对你们说 You'd say, "No, no! Don't torture me!"
"我要拷打你" And there'd be some extra little something
你们会说"不 别拷打我" when you said that, right?
当然你这么说的时候 So I want to invite you
其实还有一些小小的私心 对吧 to keep that extra little something in mind
那么 我希望你们 when we tell the stories,
记住这些小小的私心 which we won't get to until next time,
当我在讲故事的时候 when we tell the stories next time, and I say,
我们下节课才会讲这个故事 "Okay, who do you want to be tortured,
当我下次讲这个故事时 我会问 this person or that person?"
"好的 你们希望我拷打谁 The question is, from that special egoistic perspective
这个人或者那个人" that we're all familiar with,
问题在于 基于我们都很熟悉的 which is the one you really care about?
这种特殊的自私观点 That's going to be our guide to deciding
你真正在乎的到底是什么 what's the key to personal identity.
这将指引我们来确定 But to hear the stories,
人格同一性的关键是什么 you've got to come back next lecture.
但你们想要听这个故事的话
下次就得来上课