我们之前已经讨论过 We've been working our way
柏拉图对灵魂不朽的论证 through Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul.
上节课我花了些时间 And last time I spent a fair bit of time working
来反驳他的论证 through objections to,
不是我们讲的最后一个论证 not quite the last argument we're going to look at,
而是倒数第二个论证 but the penultimate argument,
柏拉图试图论证灵魂的单一性 in which Plato tries to argue for the simplicity of the soul.
你们还记得这一系列观点就是 The set of connected ideas, you'll recall, were these:
柏拉图想说明 that Plato wants to suggest that
要摧毁某样东西就得先令它分崩离析 in order to be destroyed you've got to have parts;
从本质上来说 to destroy something is to
摧毁某样东西就是要让它支离破碎 basically sort of take its parts apart.
如果他能让大家相信灵魂是单一的 If he could only convince us that the soul was simple,
那他就能下灵魂不可摧毁这样的结论 it would follow that it was indestructible and,
从而实现灵魂不朽 hence, immortal.
柏拉图问到 有什么证据能 He asks, what's our evidence
证明某些东西是不可摧毁的呢 for some things being indestructible?
哪些东西是单一的呢 What kinds of things are simple?
他说这些东西就是 Well, these are--
不可见的东西 he then goes on to claim--invisible things,
不发生变化的东西 things that don't change.
毕竟 After all,
所谓变化就是事物各部分的重组 changing is a matter of the rearrangement of the parts.
因此 如果某个东西可以变化 And so, if something can change,
那它就不单一 it can't be simple.
它也许就可以被摧毁 Maybe it could be destroyed.
但如果我们相信 But if we could become convinced that
灵魂不是复合物 the soul was not composite,
如果它是那种不能变化的东西 if it was something that couldn't change,
那么它就是单一的 then it would simple.
那么也许灵魂就不可摧毁 Perhaps then it would indestructible.
然后他继续说 And then he goes on to suggest that
灵魂的不可见性就是 the invisibility of the soul is evidence
它不能变化的证据 for it's being changeless,
进而推出它是单一的 所以它不可摧毁 and hence simple, and hence indestructible.
这就是我们上节课讨论过的论证 So that's the argument we worked through last time.
我还花时间给大家讲了 And I spent a fair bit of time suggesting
如果仔细推敲柏拉图对不可见下的定义 that if you pin down precisely what Plato means by invisible,
这条论证实际上并不成立 the argument doesn't actually go through.
在讲新课之前 Before leaving that argument,
我想再对这个论证做几点评论 there are a couple of extra remarks I want to make about it.
首先 我们也许不应该这么快就接受 First, we probably shouldn't have been so quick
灵魂不变 to want to buy into the suggestion that
这种说法 the soul is changeless.
毕竟 如果你仔细想想 After all, if you think about it,
至少从表面上看 it seems that at least on the face of it
灵魂确实是变化的 the soul does indeed change.
比如你有时觉得天很热 On one day you believe, for example, that it's hot;
有时又觉得天很冷 on another day you believe that it's cold.
有时你觉得 On one day you believe that
某人是个好人 so and so is a nice person;
过几天你就会认为 on the next day you believe that
这人卑鄙无耻 so and so is a mean person.
你想要学钢琴 You desire to learn the piano,
但过两天你就又不想学了 the next day you give up on that desire.
你的信念 目标 计划 欲望 Your beliefs, your goals, your intentions, your desires--
这些东西全都在不断变化 these things are all constantly changing.
所以至少从表面上看 And so, at least on the face of it,
我们似乎有充分的理由说灵魂 it looks as though we might well want to say the soul--
假如我们确实相信有灵魂的话 if we do believe there are souls--
因为灵魂包括思想和信念 the soul is changing as well,
所以灵魂也是在不断变化的 in terms of what thoughts and beliefs it's housing.
所以我们一开始就应该怀疑 So we should have been skeptical
持如下观点的论证 in the first place of any argument that said,
即根据灵魂的不可见性 based on the invisibility of the soul,
可以推断它是不变的 we can conclude that it's changeless.
事实上灵魂并非一成不变的 It doesn't seem to be in fact changeless.
更近一步说 我们应该 Furthermore, we should be,
或者我们至少应该 or at least we might well be,
对灵魂的单一性持怀疑态度 skeptical of the claim that the soul is simple.
实际上 柏拉图自己在其他对话中 Indeed, Plato himself, in other dialogues,
也驳斥了灵魂的单一性 argues against the simplicity of the soul.
这并不意味着他在其他对话中就是对的 Now, that doesn't mean he's right in the other dialogues,
但至少表明 我们不应对这条假设 but at least suggests that we shouldn't be so ready to assume
确信无疑 that sort of position is correct.
在著名的《理想国》一书中 In The Republic, famously,
柏拉图一直在论证 Plato goes on to argue
灵魂至少可以分为三个不同部分 that the soul has at least three different parts.
分别是 理性部分 掌管推理 There's a rational part that's in charge of reasoning;
精神部分 这部分有点像意志 there's a spirited part that's sort of like the will;
还有一部分与欲望有关 there's a part that has to do with appetite,
像食欲 性欲这类欲望等等 desires for food, drink, sex, what have you.
柏拉图在其他场合说过灵魂一点也不单一 Plato elsewhere argues the soul is not simple at all.
也许这并不令人惊讶 So perhaps it shouldn't shock us
柏拉图根据灵魂不变 that the argument he's sketching here
本质是灵魂不可见 for the simplicity of the soul based on the changeless,
推出灵魂的单一性 invisible nature of the soul--
也许我们看到这个论证说不通 perhaps it shouldn't shock us
也不该太过惊讶 that that argument doesn't succeed after all.
最后 尽管我之前替 Finally, although I gave Plato,
柏拉图做了这样的假设 previously, the assumption that
只要我们能相信灵魂的单一性 if only we could establish the simplicity of the soul,
那么就能得到灵魂不可毁灭的结论 it would follow that soul was indestructible--
毕竟你不能把灵魂撕成碎片 after all, you couldn't break a soul
如果它压根就没有碎片 by tearing its pieces apart if it didn't have pieces,
没有组成部分 if it didn't have parts--
尽管如此 我还是想说一下 nonetheless, I just want to register the thought that
单一的东西不可摧毁这一说法其实说不通 it's not actually obvious that simples can't be destroyed.
显然他们不能被某种 Well, they clearly can't be destroyed
特定的方法摧毁 by the particular method of destruction
比方说将其拆分 that involves taking them apart.
如果它们没有组成部分 If they don't have parts,
那你就无法拆分它们 you can't take them apart.
但话虽如此 But for all that,
从概念上来说 it still seems conceptually possible for a simple
还是可以通过以下方法来摧毁单一物的 to be destroyed in the following sense:
可以让它根本就没有存在过 it goes out of existence.
毕竟 单一物最初 After all, where did the simples come from
都是从哪来的呢 in the first place?
至少从逻辑角度来说 Well, at least from a logical point of view,
想象在某时某刻一个给定的单一物 it seems as though there's no difficulty in imagining
根本不存在 这看上去不难 that at one point a given simple didn't exist
在下个时刻 它突然就冒出来了 and then at the next point it popped into existence.
这是如何发生的呢 Well, how did that happen?
也许上帝会说 Maybe God said--
上帝在创世之初说 God says at the beginning of Genesis,
"要有光" "Let there be light."
那可能他还说了 So maybe He says,
"要有单一物" "Let there be simples."
在某个给定的时间点 单一物并不存在 At a given moment they weren't there;
但下一刻 它就出现了 the next moment they were.
可能再过一会上帝又说 Well, after a while maybe God says,
"让简单物湮灭吧" "Let the simples no longer exist."
那么这一刻它存在 Given moment there they were;
下一刻它就消失了 the next moment, they no longer exist.
似乎这还蛮说得通的 Seems as though that idea makes sense,
因此即使我们同意灵魂是单一的 and so even if we agreed that the soul was simple,
即使我们赞成柏拉图的论证中 even if we granted everything in Plato's argument
关于这一点的所有内容 up to this point and said,
即"灵魂确实是单一的" "the soul really is simple,"
我们还是不能推出它是不朽的 it still wouldn't follow that it's immortal.
我们仍然会担心这单一的灵魂 We'd still have to worry about the possibility
会不会在某一时刻 that the simple soul might simply pop
砰的一下就不见了 out of existence at a given point,
可能就是砸肉体死亡的时刻 perhaps the very point when the body gets destroyed.
所以我更倾向于考虑 So I'm inclined to think
柏拉图最近的这条论证 that this most recent argument of Plato's--
即源于单一性的论证 the argument from simplicity--
不 这条论证也不成功 no, that's not successful either.
在讲下面内容之前 Before leaving that argument,
还有一点我想拿来跟大家讨论一下 there's one other piece of business I want to discuss.
我之前在旁边加了条脚注 This is a footnote that I put aside,
写着我的观点 a point that I put aside previously.
回忆一下 我们曾担心 You'll recall that we were worried about
有人会反驳我们思考灵魂的正确方式 the objection got raised the right way to think about
说灵魂就好像竖琴演奏的音乐 the soul is like the harmony of a harp.
本来这个例子是为了给 And this was originally offered
不可见的东西就不可被摧毁 as a counterexample to the thought
这一结论做反例的 that invisible things couldn't be destroyed.
但音乐是可以被破坏的 But harmony could be destroyed.
它不可见 但不可见的东西却能被摧毁 It was invisible, so invisible things could be destroyed.
但我注意到 我说过 But I noticed, I mentioned that,
无论它是不是这个论证的问题所在 look, whether or not this is a problem for the argument,
这本身就是个有趣的说法 it's an interesting suggestion in its own right.
因为关于精神之于肉体 Because the suggestion that the mind is to the body,
灵魂之于肉体 the soul is to the body,
就好像音乐之于弦乐器这样的假设 like harmony is to an instrument with strings,
对我来说 这都是一种早期尝试 seems to me to be an early attempt to describe something
来对物理主义者关于思想的观点进行描述 like the physicalist conception of the mind.
就好像音乐是由 Just as harmony is something
一台调好音的乐器演奏出来一样 that gets produced by a well-tuned instrument,
灵魂或精神是由 the soul or the mind is something that
一个正常运转的肉体产生的 gets produced by a well-tuned body.
柏拉图不太认同将精神当作是 Now Plato's got some objections to the suggestion
肉体产生的音乐这一说法 that we should think of the mind as the harmony of the body.
因此我想花一点时间 And so I want to take just a moment
讲讲他的这些异议 and talk about those objections because,
因为如果这些异议有说服力的话 of course, if they were compelling objections
我们就有理由怀疑物理主义者的观点 that might well give us reason to doubt the physicalist view.
无论柏拉图关于灵魂不朽的论证 Whether or not Plato's arguments for the immortality
是否成立 of the soul work,
他的很多论证 he might still have some good arguments
还是可以有力地反驳物理主义者的观点 against the physicalist conception.
但是在思考这些异议时 But in thinking about these objections,
要记住 it's important to bear in mind
它的含义在于 that it's only meant--
关于音乐的类比仅仅只是 the harmony analogy is only meant--
一种类比 懂吗 as just that, as an analogy. Right?
至少不应该 The claim isn't, or at least it shouldn't be,
按照字面意思来理解"精神就是音乐" understood as saying literally, "the mind is harmony."
而应该是"精神像音乐" It's rather, the mind is like harmony;
它是由肉体产生的某种东西 it's the sort of thing to the body
就像音乐之于竖琴那样 like harmony is to a harp,
它是由那些功能良好 something that can be produced by a well-functioning,
调准音色的物理实体产生的 well-tuned physical object.
调准音色的乐器能够发出旋律以及音乐 A well-tuned instrument can produce melody and harmony.
而配合协调 正常工作的肉体 A well-tuned, properly functioning body
也能够产生精神活动 can produce mental activity.
这个假设就是如此 That's the suggestion.
因此 即使能够证明 And so even if it turns out that
精神在某些方面 there are some ways in which the mind
与音乐并不完全相同 isn't exactly like harmony,
也不能说明物理主义者的观点就是错误的 it doesn't show us that the physicalist view is wrong.
我们来快速看一下 Well, so let's quickly look at
柏拉图的论证都说了什么 what Plato's arguments were.
首先 First--this is,
我认为这是个有趣的论证 I think, an interesting argument--
柏拉图说 音乐不能先于 Plato says, harmony clearly cannot exist
竖琴的存在而存在 对吧 before the existence of the harp itself. Right?
竖琴悦耳的音调不能脱离 The melodiousness of the harp can't exist
竖琴物理结构的存在而存在 prior to the physical construction of the harp.
如果精神是这样一种东西 And if mind were the sort of thing that
它由正常工作的肉体产生 was produced by the proper functioning of the physical body,
十分明显 精神不能先于 then pretty obviously the mind could not exist
肉体的产生而存在 prior to the creation of the physical body.
然而 柏拉图之前在对话中曾论证过 However, Plato has already argued earlier in the dialogue
灵魂先于肉体而存在 that the soul does exist prior to the existence of the body.
这条论证来自于他的回忆录 That's the argument from recollection.
如果灵魂先于肉体存在的话 If the soul exists prior to the body,
那它就与音乐有所区别 it can't be like harmony;
显然物理主义是错的 physicalism has clearly got to be false.
但我说过 我并不觉得这个论证 But I said that I didn't find the argument--
我曾试着解释为什么我认为 I tried to explain why I didn't find the argument
回忆录里的这条论证没有说服力 from recollection persuasive.
我想如果我们相信 I certainly do want to agree that if we became convinced that
灵魂确实先于肉体而存在的话 the soul did exist prior to the existence of the body,
拿我们就一定赞成 we would certainly want to agree
灵魂不同于音乐这一观点 that the soul is not like harmony.
但我认为来自回忆录的这个论证并不靠谱 But I don't think the argument from recollection succeeds.
柏拉图第二条异议是 异议能千变万化 Plato's second objection is to point out that harmony can vary.
我们讲过竖琴悦耳的音调 We talk about the melodiousness of the harp.
音调能以不同方式组成和谐的曲子 Well, it could be harmonious in a variety of different ways
而且是不同程度的和谐 and, indeed, to different degrees.
乐器的声音或多或少都是悦耳的 Something--an instrument--could be more or less harmonious.
弹奏乐器多少都能产生些旋律 What it's playing can be in greater or lesser harmony.
但是灵魂看起来并没有程度之分 But it doesn't seem as though souls come in degrees.
你要么有灵魂 要么没有 You've got a soul or you don't have a soul.
这就是他的异议 That's the argument, that's the objection.
你要么有思想 要么没有 You've got a mind or you don't have a mind.
但我们也许应该 But perhaps we should--
这个异议如果成立的话 that's the objection, and of course
我们就能得出这个结论 if that was right then again we might have to conclude,
不管思想是什么 well, whatever the mind is,
它之于肉体并不像音乐那样 it's not quite like harmony is to the body.
但我也不确定我们是否就该认同 But I'm not so sure we should agree
思想没有程度之分的观点 that the mind can't come in degrees.
至少它可以 It can at least--
精神层面可以有程度之分 The mental aspects can come in degrees.
我们的智力层次有程度之分 We can have varying degrees of intelligence,
创造力有程度之分 varying degrees of creativity,
推理能力有程度之分 varying degrees of reasonableness,
沟通能力有程度之分 varying degrees of ability to communicate.
所以我们可以这样说 So just as, we might say,
就像竖琴的操作有优有劣 just as the functioning of the harp can come in varying degrees
旋律优美或者缺乏和谐 more or less harmony--
就思想来说 肉体的运转 the functioning of the body in terms of its mind
也是可以有程度之分的 can come in varying degrees.
所以我觉得第二个异议也不大站得住脚 So that second objection doesn't seem to me very compelling.
第三个异议 柏拉图指出 Third objection, Plato points out--
苏格拉底指出 Socrates points out--
灵魂可以是善的 也可以是恶的 that the soul can be good or it could be evil, wicked.
当灵魂是善的时候 When the soul is good,
当你看见一个精气神都很饱满的人 when you've got somebody who has got their stuff together,
我们就说他的灵魂很和谐 we might speak of them as having a harmonious soul.
假设灵魂之于肉体就像音乐之于乐器 If the soul were to the body like harmony is to the instrument
那么灵魂就可以是和谐的 and the soul can be harmonious,
看起来我们就可以这么说 it would seem as though we'd
音乐是和谐的 have to be able to talk about harmony being harmonious.
所以正如我们可以谈论灵魂的和谐一样 So just as we can talk about the harmony of the soul,
我们也可以谈论 we'd have to be able to--
前提是灵魂一如肉体的和谐 if the soul is like the harmony of the body--
我们就能够谈论音乐的和谐 we'd have to be able to talk about the harmony of the harmony.
但是我们不谈音乐的和谐 But we don't talk about harmony of the harmony.
我不太确定如何反驳这个异议 I'm not quite sure what to make of this objection.
这个论点可能正好可以 This might be a point where it would be well
提醒我们这样一个事实 to remind ourselves of the fact that
永远不能把灵魂 the suggestion was never that the soul
按字面理解为就是音乐 just literally is harmony.
它只是类似于物理主义者所说的音乐 It's just similar to harmony, says the physicalist,
在肉体如何产生音乐这个方面 in the way that harmony gets produced by the body--
说错了 是乐器产生音乐 by the instrument.
同样地 In that same way,
肉体产生思想或者精神活动 mind or mental activity gets produced by the body.
并不是说所有关于思想的真理 We don't have to say that everything
都适用于音乐 that's true of the mind is true of harmony
同时 也不是所有关于音乐的真理 and everything that's true of harmony
就都适用于肉体 或者说思想 is true of the body--or the mind.
不过我觉得对于这个异议 Still, I think there's a bit more we can say
我们还是有话可说的 in response to this objection,
那就是 and that's this:
就像我们可以探讨思想 Just as it's true that we can talk about minds
或者灵魂有善恶之分一样 or souls being good or wicked,
我们也可以探讨音乐的不同种类 we can talk about different kinds of harmony.
有如下种类 There are--
某些音乐比其他的更甜美 Certain harmonies are sweeter than others;
某些却更加刺耳 或是不和谐 some of them are more jarring and atonal or discordant.
尽管日常生活中我们并不谈论 Although we might not normally talk about
音乐到底有多和谐 how harmonious the harmony is,
但貌似音乐也可分为很多类别 it seems as though harmonies can come in different sorts
很多种类的 and different kinds.
所以 事实证明 And then, it turns out we really
它确实和思想很相像 would have an analogy to the mind,
也分很多种类 which can come in different sorts and different kinds.
所以我认为第三个异议也不是很有说服力 So I think this third objection isn't really compelling either.
最后 柏拉图又提出了一个异议 Finally, Plato raises one more objection.
他说"看 灵魂可以指导肉体 He says, "Look, the soul is capable of directing the body,
左右它 并且还可以反抗肉体" bossing it around, and indeed capable of opposing the body."
比如说你的肉体 You know, your body might
很垂涎那块巧克力蛋糕 want that piece of chocolate cake,
但这时你的灵魂发话了 but your soul says,
"不行 你在减肥呢 别吃了" "No, no. You're on a diet. Don't eat it."
对吧 Right?
你的灵魂会对抗肉体 Your soul can oppose the body.
但如果灵魂仅仅只是肉体的音乐 But if the soul was just harmony of the body,
那它是怎么做到的呢 how could it do that?
毕竟 竖琴发出的音乐并不能影响 After all, the harmoniousness of the harp can't affect
竖琴的活动 what the harp does.
这一切说明两者存在一种相互作用 All these cause interaction in one way,
我们可以这么说 as we might put it.
在竖琴 乐感 In the case of the harp and the musicality
旋律 音乐这个案例中 and the melodiousness and the harmony,
是竖琴的物理性质产生了 the physical state of the harp causes the melodiousness
这样那样的旋律 to be the way it is.
但是竖琴的音乐 But the harmoniousness of the harp,
从未改变或者说 doesn't ever change or alter
左右竖琴作为物理形态的存在 or direct the way the physical object the harp is.
相反 并不是只有肉体可以影响灵魂 In contrast, not only can the body affect the soul,
灵魂也可以影响肉体 the soul can affect the body.
这就说明灵魂和肉体的关系 So that suggests it can't really be like harmony
还是不等同于音乐和竖琴 and the harp after all.
我认为这是个很有意思的异议 I think that's a pretty interesting objection.
因为我们认为 至少以这门课 Since we do think, at least in the kind of position
所讲授的立场来看的话 that we've been taking for this class,
灵魂是可以影响肉体的 that the soul can affect the body,
我们可能会问 那怎么就说 we might ask, how could it be that it's--
物理主义者的观点就是对的呢 that the physicalist view is right?
假如谈论思想仅仅只谈论 If talk about the mind is just a way of talking about
肉体能做什么 what the body can do,
那肉体自身的能力又是如何影响它本身呢 how can the abilities of the body affect the body itself?
我觉得反驳这一异议 I think the answer to this objection
应该这样说 is probably going to be something like,
当我们说 what's really going on
灵魂影响肉体的时候 其实是说 when we talk about the soul affecting the body is that--
肉体的某些功能在影响肉体 when we say certain functions of the body are affecting the body
其实是某些大脑活动在影响肉体 that certain mental functions are affecting the body--
这是怎么发生的呢 how does this happen causally?
就像肉体的物理部分 Well, something like the physical parts of the body
隐藏于一些正常的活动下 that underwrite that lie beneath the proper fucntioning
肉体正常的精神活动 the proper mental functioning of body.
它们能够改变肉体的其他部分 Those are able to alter the other parts of the body.
所以我现在叫我的肉体 So look, right now I'm telling my body,
"扭扭我的手指" "Wiggle my fingers."
我的大脑就将指示传递给肉体 My soul is giving instructions to my body.
这怎么产生的呢 How does that happen?
是我的思想在给肉体施加指令 That's my mind giving instructions to my body.
从物理主义学角度来看这是怎么产生的呢 How does that happen on the physicalist view?
我的思想告诉我的肉体 Well, my mind giving instructions to my body,
"扭扭手指" 这只是我肉体的一部分 "wiggle my fingers," is just one part of my body,
我的大脑将指令告诉肉体的另一部分 my brain, giving instructions to another part of my body,
那就是手指部位的肌肉 the muscles in my fingers.
虽然我们在说思想如何作用肉体 So, although we talk about the mind altering the body,
但在物理主义学家看来 严格意义上说 strictly what's going on there, says the physicalist,
仅仅是肉体的一部分影响另一部分而已 is just one part of the body affecting another part of the body.
竖琴有没有类似的例子可举呢 Can we have something like that with a harp?
也许没有 对吧 Well, maybe not. Right?
也许竖琴是个再简单不过的器械 Maybe the harp's too simple a machine to have one part
不能像那样由一部分影响另一部分 of it affect another part of it in that way.
即便它可以 Even if that were true,
那也不能够成为 that wouldn't give us reason
让我们拒绝物理主义者观点的理由 to reject the physicalist conception.
那仅仅能让我们有理由相信 It would just give us reason to think
竖琴不是非常类似思想与肉体 the harp's not very much like the mind and the body.
这只是宏观体系中的一个序言 It's just the beginnings of a picture,
物理主义理论的宏观体系 of a physicalist picture.
就算我们只探讨竖琴和乐感 Still, even if we think about the harp and musicality,
我认为我们也是能够发现一些类似的 I think we can see something analogous.
假设我弹拨竖琴的一根弦 Suppose I pluck a string on my harp,
就产生了一个音符 producing a certain note.
大家都知道 一根弦的震动会导致 As we know, the vibrations of one string can set into
其他弦的震颤 play the other strings vibrating as well.
所以 在竖琴的 And so, suddenly, what's happening
某一部分发生的突然震动 in one part of the harp affects
会影响竖琴的其他部分 what's going on in other parts of the harp.
我在竖琴上弹了某一个和弦音 The musicality of my playing a certain chord on the harp
可能会产生好几种弦外音 may create certain kinds of overtones in the harp,
使得竖琴有几种不同的震颤方式 setting the harp vibrating in various other ways.
这就是一个类比了 Well, that would be analogous--
不能算是一个精确的类比 perhaps not a precise analogy,
但至少是一个勉强的类比 but at least a rough analogy
类似于思想如何作用肉体的机制 to what goes on when my mind affects my body--to--
即我肉体的一部分影响其他部分 if one part of my body affects other parts of my body.
一方面 我想给夸夸柏拉图 So, on the one hand, I want to give Plato a fair bit of credit
因为他把物理主义学很当回事 for taking the physicalist view seriously enough
并且试图批判它 to try to criticize it.
由于他写书的时代 And since when he was writing
并不存在我们现在拥有的那种 there weren't the kind of complicated thinking machines
复杂强大的思想机器 that we've got nowadays,
柏拉图用简易的器械 it's no criticism of Plato that he used simple machines
比如说乐器来试图勾画 like musical instruments to try to think about
物理主义的宏图也就无可厚非了 what a physicalist picture would look like.
我真得要向其致敬 I want to give him credit,
但我也想说 他针对物理主义 but I also want to suggest that the objections
提的那些异议并不靠谱 that he raises to the physicalist view just don't succeed.
好了 现在我们只剩下一个论点 All right. Now, there's one other argument
需要在课上讨论的了 that I want to consider in our dialogue.
在对灵魂的简单性进行了探索之后 And after the appeal to the simplicity of the soul,
摆在我们面前的是一个冗长而复杂的争论 there's a very long complicated discussion about
那就是充分的解释需要包括什么 what constitutes an adequate explanation,
苏格拉底举了他那个时代的例子 and Socrates gives some of his history there
描述了他在寻求事物的充分解释之路上 and talks about what he's looking for in trying to find
找到了什么 adequate explanations of things.
这些文章都非常 And these passages are very,
非常晦涩 很庆幸我们探讨的话题 very difficult and happily for our purposes
并不需要研究那些 we don't really need to go there.
在我们的课结束之前 Before the dialogue ends though,
还有一个论证 我称之为 there's one further argument, which I'll dub,
"关于基本属性的论证" "the argument from essential properties."
同样 切记 Now again, it's important to bear in mind
当我们努力解读这篇 as we try to make sense of this passage
柏拉图写于很久以前的文章时 that Plato is writing at a time
那时候没有 when we don't have, we didn't have,
现在这些概念性的华丽外衣 all the conceptual apparatus that we have nowadays.
我们站在他的肩膀上 We stand on his shoulders;
我们继承了一些不同的观点 we've inherited some of the distinctions
是他首先提出要加入这个问题的 that he was the first to try to put into play.
所以尽管 And so although, again, he's about to--
我想描绘论证的主干 重建它 I'm about to sketch or reconstruct an argument
认为这个论证并不成立 and claim that that the argument doesn't actually work,
这并不意味着我是在鄙视柏拉图的思想 this isn't really meant by way of being dismissive of Plato.
我要向他致以崇高的敬意 I want to give him a tremendous amount of credit.
他试图在问题重重的沼泽里找到明路 He's trying to see his way through a morass of issues
这些问题我们至今仍然会感到困惑 that are still confusing to us today,
但我认为我们能够 though I think we can see somewhat
比他当年看得更远 further than he was able to see.
总之 Anyway,
我们需要理解最后一个论证的区别 the distinction we need to understand the final argument,
就是关于基本属性和 is the distinction between an essential property
偶然属性的区别 and a contingent property.
基本属性是 An essential property is a property
物体必须具有的属性 that a given object must have;
通常和物体共存亡 it always has as long as it exists at all.
而偶然属性是 A contingent property is a property
物体可能具有的属性 that an object may have,
可能伴随着物体的整个存在过程 may happen to have its entire existence,
但是物体没有它也能存在 but could've existed without.
比方说 我的车是蓝色的 So my car is blue.
这是我的车的偶然属性 That's a contingent property of my car.
我可以把它开到烤漆店 I could take it to the paint shop
把它涂成红色 and get it painted red,
这样它就是红色的了 in which case it would be red.
它不再是蓝色的了 It would no longer be blue,
但车还是那车 but the car would still exist.
我的车是蓝色的 但也可以是红色的 My car is blue, but it could be red;
它可以作为一辆红色的车存在 it could exist as a red car.
即使我永不 And even if I never,
在我的车的整个存在过程中 over the entire course of existence of my car,
永不给它喷漆 never get it painted,
那么从下生产线开始的那一刻直到 so that from the moment it came into creation to the moment
它寿终正寝的那一刻 它始终是蓝色的 it gets smashed it's always blue--
我们也可以充分理解 still, we understand perfectly well the idea
它也可以是红色的 that it could've been red.
这与这辆车以红色形态存在 There's nothing incompatible with the idea
并不矛盾 that this car exists and is red.
这就是偶然属性的一个例子 So that's an example of a contingent property.
我可以有一支铅笔 它是完好的 And I might have a pencil, and the pencil is whole.
我从未把它折断 但我本可以折断它 And I never break it, but I could've broken it.
这就是一种偶然属性 That's a contingent property,
无论这铅笔是完好的还是折断的 whether the pencil is whole or broken.
我拿起一片金属 I take a piece of metal;
它是直的还是弯的 这也是偶然属性 it's a contingent property whether it's straight or bent.
我折了 它就变弯了 I bend it; now it's bent.
我也可以把它掰直 I might straighten it back out;
它就变直了 now it's straight.
很多很多情况都是偶然性的 Many, many properties are contingent properties.
你高兴还是悲伤 You're happy, you're sad,
你是醒着还是睡了 you're awake, you're asleep.
相反 有些属性是基本属性 But some properties, in contrast, are essential properties.
对于我们正在思考的某件事 For the particular thing that we're thinking about,
这件事与它的属性没有同时出现 it's not possible to have that thing
是根本不可能的 and not have the property in question.
柏拉图举过火和热的例子 Plato gives the example of fire and being hot.
火是热的 Fire is hot.
那就是火所具有的属性 That's a property that it's got,
但它不是偶然属性 but it's not a contingent property;
它是个基本属性 it's an essential property.
不能说有的火是热的 有的火是冷的 It's not as though some fire is hot and some fire is cold or,
"是啊 火确实一直都是热的 "Oh yes, it just happens that over the entire life
但那只是碰巧而已 of the fire the fire is hot,
我们可以让它变冷的" but we could have made it cold."
从来没有那样的事 There's no such thing;
不可能有什么冷的火 there could be no such thing as cold fire.
只要有一丁点火苗 它就一定是热的 As long as you've got a bit of fire, it's hot.
去掉热量 Take away the heat,
就等于把火也熄灭了 you take away the fire, you destroy the fire.
不可能有冷的火 You can't have cold fire.
这就是基本属性的一个例子 That's an example of an essential property.
也就是说 柏拉图觉得 That is to say, Plato sees,
实际上 我想起码大家大致上都觉得 as indeed I take it we all see at least roughly,
这两者应该有些区别 that there's some sort of distinction there,
他以他的方式想弄清这两者的区别 and he's trying to see his way clear on these matters.
这是今天仍然存在的争议问题 That remains a controversial question today--
直到今天还存在 until today.
世上真的有我们所说的 Are there really essential properties
那种基本属性吗 in the way we take there to be?
如果有 哪些属性是基本的 If so, which properties are essential?
哪些又是偶然的呢 Which ones are contingent?
水是H2O构成的 Water is composed of H2O
那是它的原子结构 that's its atomic structure.
它是不是水的基本属性呢 Is that an essential property of water?
你能不能说出某一种 Could you have something that
不是由H2O was water without being composed of H2O--
氢原子和氧原子构成的水呢 hydrogen and oxygen in that way?
有些人说可以 有些人说不行 Well, some people say yes, some people say no--
不过我们大多数人都会说 but most of us we want to say,
"这就是一个基本属性的例子 "Oh, there's an example of an essential property.
水必须得有那样的原子结构才行" To be water, you must have that atomic structure."
就是这样 All right. That's the thought.
有了这个区别 柏拉图说 Now, armed with this distinction, Plato says,
"灵魂有一个基本属性 "Here's an essential property for the soul.
有灵魂 就有生命" Wherever there's a soul, it's alive."
柏拉图所说的"生命" Now, by "alive,"
我认为是正在思考 I take it Plato means it's thinking,
或者是能够思考的意思 or it's capable of thought.
你只要有灵魂 Wherever you've got a soul,
你就有思考的能力 you've got something capable of thought.
我猜也许会有人试着对他的断言提出异议 I suppose one could try to resist this claim of Plato's,
但我觉得它是相当合理的 but I find it reasonably plausible.
于是我开始思考心灵的问题 我问自己 I start thinking about minds, and I ask myself,
"会不会有一种心灵是不能思考的" "Could there be a mind that was incapable of thought?"
也许不会有 Maybe not.
也许那只是一种定义上的心灵 Maybe that's just built into minds by definition.
就像不可能存在 Just like you couldn't have something
不热的火 that was fire without it being hot,
也不可能存在 you couldn't have something that was a mind
不能够思考的心灵 without it being capable of thought.
"能够"这个词在这里很重要 对吧 It's important to say the word capable here. Right?
不是说所有的心灵都一直在思考 It's not as though all minds always are thinking.
我假设在夜里会有一段时间 I presume there are stretches during the night
我的心灵既不在思考也不在做梦 when my mind is not thinking, not dreaming.
但是思考能力是存在的 即使 Still, it's capable of thought even though
心灵并不是一直在思考 it's not thinking at the time.
但是你会说 But you say,
"不对 有一种心灵是不会思考的" "No. Here's a mind that's not even capable of thought."
那么我要说"那它就根本不是心灵" I want to say, "Then, it's just not a mind."
所以 也许能够思考 So all right, maybe being capable of thought
就是心灵的一种基本属性 is an essential property of the mind.
柏拉图思考的是灵魂意义上的心灵 Plato thinks about the mind in terms of souls,
所以也许有思考能力 so maybe being capable of thought
就是灵魂的一种基本属性 is an essential property of the soul.
而且我觉得那就是柏拉图的意思 And I think that's what Plato means
当他说心灵本质上-- when he suggests the mind is essential--
灵魂本质上是有生命的 the soul is essentially alive.
这是灵魂的必要属性 我们可以这么说 It's a necessary property, as we might put it,
灵魂必然有生命 必然有思考能力 of the soul, that it's alive, that it's capable of thought.
所以我想说"这不是个不合理的断言" So I want to say, "Not an implausible claim."
让我们把问题抛给苏格拉底 Let's give it to Socrates.
但一旦请苏格拉底来回答 But once we give it to Socrates,
柏拉图就觉得没他什么事了 Plato thinks now he's pretty much done.
不管怎么样 想想看 说某物具有 After all, think about what it means to say that
某种基本属性是什么意思 something's got an essential property.
火具有热的基本属性 Fire's got the essential property of being hot.
也就是说只有两种可能 It means there are only two possibilities.
要么有火并且是热的 Either you've got some fire and it will be hot,
要么火被熄灭了 or the fire has been destroyed, it's been put out.
这是仅有的两种可能 Those are the only two possibilities.
要么 You either have--
如果热是火的基本属性 If heat is an essential property of fire,
要么有火并且是热的 either you've got some fire and it's hot,
要么火不存在了 它被熄灭了 or the fire no longer exists, it's been put out.
没有第三种可能出现不热的火 冷的火 There's no third possibility of a non-hot fire, of a cold fire.
所以如果你断言 So, if you've got the claim that
生命是灵魂的基本属性 life's an essential property of the soul,
那么也只有两种可能 only two possibilities:
要么你有灵魂并且活着-- either you've got the soul and it's alive--
也就是说 你能够思考-- to wit, it's capable of thought--
要么灵魂已经被毁灭了 or the soul's been destroyed.
但柏拉图认为可以排除这另一种可能 But Plato thinks we can rule out that other possibility.
怎么排除呢 How?
那就是去考察这种特殊的基本属性 Well, it's by thinking about this particular essential property.
在火有热的基本属性这一观点中 There's nothing in the idea that
我们没有任何理由 fire has the essential property of being hot
觉得火不能被熄灭 to make us think it couldn't be destroyed,
但柏拉图认为 but there is something, Plato thinks,
在本质上还活着这一观点中 in the idea of being essentially alive
已经排除了被毁灭的可能性 to rule out the possibility of its being destroyed.
实际上 当你说出这些词时就已开始 In fact, as you say the very words you begin to feel the force,
感受到柏拉图这一命题的力量 the pull of Plato's position.
如果灵魂本质上是活着的 If the soul is essentially alive,
如果它必然是活着的 那它就是活着的 if it's necessarily alive, it's got to be alive.
它不可能被毁灭 It can't be destroyed.
我认为那起码是一种 That's, I think, at least the kind of argument
柏拉图专门提出的观点 that Plato means to put forward.
他用"不死"这个词来表达 He does it in terms of the phrase, "deathless."
他说 我想把他的话写在这个板上 He says, I want to actually get this up here on the board
第一 One--
生命是灵魂的基本属性 life is an essential property of the soul.
但如果你思考那是什么意思 But if you think about what that means,
紧接着你会发现灵魂是不死的 it follows that the soul is deathless.
毕竟 如果灵魂是 After all, if the soul is--
如果灵魂的本质上是活着的 If it's essentially alive,
那就说明它不可能是死的 that means it can't be dead.
所以它是不死的 So it's deathless.
而不管怎样 任何不死的东西都不会死 But after all, anything that's deathless can't die.
所以灵魂不会死亡 So the soul cannot die,
也就是灵魂不可摧毁 which is just to say it's indestructible.
所以灵魂不可能被毁灭 So, soul can't be destroyed.
这有点像柏拉图的那个论证 Something like this seems to be Plato's argument.
第一 生命是灵魂的基本属性 One, life's an essential property of the soul,
但我们可以总结成灵魂不死 but we can just summarize that by saying the soul is deathless.
但如果灵魂不死 它就不会死亡 But if the soul is deathless, it can't die.
如果它不会死亡 那它就不可摧毁 If it can't die, it can't be destroyed, it's indestructible.
所以灵魂不可能被毁灭 So the soul can't be destroyed.
记住 一旦我们说灵魂是活着的 Remember, once we said the soul was alive,
就只有两种可能 there were only two possibilities.
如果灵魂本质上是活着的 要么有灵魂 If the soul was essentially alive, either we have the soul,
并且是活的 能够思考 it's alive, capable of thought,
要么就是灵魂被毁灭了 or it's destroyed.
但是如果灵魂不可能被毁灭 But if the soul can't be destroyed,
就只有唯一一个可能 灵魂是活着的 that leaves only the possibility the soul is alive,
并且能够思考 capable of thought.
这就是柏拉图的想法 That's just what Plato thinks;
灵魂永存 并且能够思考 the soul will always exist, capable of thought.
如果我说我觉得这种观点不成立 Well, it won't shock you to hear
你们应该也不会感到震惊 that I don't think this argument actually works.
我觉得它错误的地方就在于 And I think where it goes wrong is there's a certain kind
不死的概念有些模棱两可 of ambiguity in the idea of being deathless.
说某物不死到底是什么意思呢 What does it mean to say that something is deathless?
我觉得这个词有两种可能的理解方式 I think there are two possible interpretations of that phrase.
如果某物是不死的 If something is deathless,
那么它就不可能-- then it can't be that--
什么呢 well, what?
一种可能性是 One possibility is,
灵魂不可能以死亡形式存在 it can't be that the soul exists and is dead.
这是一种可能的解释 That's one possible interpretation.
说某物不死 To say that something is deathless
意味着从来没有一个灵魂存在的同时 means you'll never have a soul that exists
又是死亡的 and the same time that it exists it's dead.
但是还有第二种可能 But there's a second possible
来解释不死 interpretation of deathless.
灵魂不可能 It can't be that
被毁灭 the soul was destroyed.
很容易把这两种对不死的 It's very easy to confuse
解释混淆 我们暂且把它们叫做A和B these two interpretations of deathless, A and B.
从根本上来说 我觉得这要怪柏拉图 And basically, this is what I think is going on with Plato.
他自己就在这两种解释之间徘徊 He's running back and forth between these two interpretations.
如果生命是灵魂的基本属性 If life is an essential property of the soul,
就意味着我们永远不会找到 then that means we will never have, as it were,
一个存在的死亡的灵魂 a soul in our hand that exists and is dead.
就如同 Just in the same way that
你永远找不到 you'll never have a piece of fire in your hand,
存在的冷火 as it were, that exists and is cold.
这是不可能发生的 It can't happen.
只要有灵魂 它就是活着的 Wherever you've got a soul, it is alive.
所以它在观念A里是不灭的 So it's deathless in sense number, in sense A.
既然只要有灵魂就是活着的 Since wherever you've got a soul it must be alive,
也就不可能出现灵魂既存在又死亡的情况 it couldn't be the case that the soul exists and is dead.
所以它在观念A里是不死的 So it's deathless in sense A.
但是即使这样 逻辑上来讲 But for all that, it could still be, logically speaking,
灵魂仍然可以被毁灭 that the soul could be destroyed,
就像火可以被熄灭 just like a fire can be put out.
我们可以想象某个不能被毁灭的东西 We could imagine something that couldn't be destroyed.
那它在观念B里当然就是不死的 Then of course it would be deathless in sense B,
这种不死的观念要强大得多 a much stronger sense of deathless.
柏拉图要做的是 What Plato needs, what Plato wants,
说服我们相信灵魂在观念B中是不死的 is to convince us that the soul is deathless in sense B:
灵魂确实不能被毁灭 It's true of the soul that it can't be that it was destroyed.
但他的观点完全基于观念A But all he's entitled to is sense A:
不可能有既存在又死亡的灵魂 You'll never have a soul that exists and is dead,
因为生命是灵魂的一个基本属性 because being alive is an essential property of the soul.
但事实上 灵魂是活着的 But the mere fact that where there's a soul it's alive,
并不意味着灵魂不能被毁灭 doesn't mean the soul couldn't be destroyed.
就如同火是热的 Just like from the fact that where there's fire it's hot
不代表火不能被熄灭 doesn't mean the fire can't be destroyed.
我认为 这类问题 It's, I think, pretty easy to get confused
非常容易让人混淆 in thinking about these issues.
要想弄清这两种不死观念的区别 It's difficult to see your way clearly
是非常困难的 to these two different notions of deathless.
很难从基本属性的角度 It's difficult to get to the point
得出清晰的结论 where you can clearly use the language of essential properties
而不使人混淆 without getting screwed up.
不过我觉得我们正努力得出这样一个结论 Still, I think that's what happened here.
我们承认柏拉图关于 We grant Plato the thought that
活着是灵魂的基本属性这一观点是对的 the soul has an essential property of being alive;
由此推出 只要有灵魂它就是活着的 from this, it follows that where there's a soul it is alive,
所以在观念A中灵魂是不死的 and hence, it's deathless in sense A.
但是一旦我们开始思考 But once we start thinking about the category,
不死这一概念所属的范畴时 the notion of being deathless,
我们就会试着去重新理解 we're tempted to re-understand that
观念B里的不死 它是不可能被摧毁的 as being deathless in sense B, can't be destroyed.
我觉着这就是说不通的地方 And that, I think, doesn't follow.
好的 那我们得出什么结论了呢 All right. Where does that leave us?
柏拉图通过一系列论证来说明灵魂不朽 Plato's gone through a series of arguments for the immortality,
以及它不可被摧毁 the indestructibility of the soul,
可我觉得这些论证一个都说不通 and I've argued that none of them work.
其中一些还值得好好思考一番 Some of them are worth taking seriously.
这也是为什么我上周花了那么多时间 That's why we've spent the last week
来给大家介绍这些论证 or so going over them.
但在我看来 没有一个论证能站得住脚 But none of them, as far as I can see, are successful.
我想我不用提醒大家 And I hardly need remind you that
我们在此前一两周里 this comes on the heels of a previous week or two
讨论了其它各种论证 in which we talked about various other arguments
以说明非物质灵魂的存在 for the very existence of an immaterial soul.
我想说其实那些论证也全都不靠谱 And I've argued that none of those arguments work either.
在我看来 As far as I can see then,
这些想要证明 the arguments that might be offered
非物质灵魂的存在性的论证 for the existence of an immaterial soul,
更别提什么不朽的灵魂了 let alone an immortal soul,
都不靠谱 the arguments don't succeed.
倒不是说灵魂这个说法很蠢 It's not that the idea of a soul is in any way silly;
也不是说它不值得思考 it's not that it's not worth thinking about.
而是当我们扪心自问 It's that when we ask ourselves,
"我们是否有理由相信非物质灵魂呢" "Do we have any good reason to believe in an immaterial soul?"
并且对这些理由可以言之有物 and actually try to spell out what those reasons might be,
这样我们仔细看这些论证的时候 as we look more carefully we see the arguments
就会发现它们其实很没说服力 are not very compelling.
所以我准备下结论说灵魂是不存在的 So I'm prepared to conclude there is no soul.
没有理由相信灵魂存在 There's no good reason to believe in souls.
所以我做出这样的结论 And I so I conclude--
至少没有足够充分的理由 at least there's no good enough reason
让我们相信灵魂存在 to believe in souls--
所以我的结论是没有灵魂 and so I conclude there are none.
这就是我在接下来的课上 And this is the position that here on out
做的一个前提假设 I'm going to be assuming for the rest of the class.
我会和大家继续思考死亡 I'm going to have us continue to think about death,
但是是从物理主义角度来思考 but now think about death from the physicalist perspective.
假设只有肉体 Given the assumption that the body is all there is,
那么谈论思想就是在 that talk about the mind is just a way of talking about
谈论肉体所能做的 the abilities of the body to do
某种精神活动而已 certain special mental activities.
除了肉体 不存在别的东西 There are no extra things beyond the body,
没有什么非物质的灵魂 no immaterial souls.
如果你们现在指责我回避问题实质 Now, it wouldn't be unreasonable at this point
也不无道理 to accuse me of begging the question.
想想我做了什么 After all, think about what I've done.
我把举证这一重担全部交给了 I've put all of the burden of proof
灵魂存在论的信从者 on the fan of souls.
就好像我去问一个二元论者 I've asked the dualist,
"给我理由让我相信你的观点" "Give me some reason to believe your position."
然后我又代表二元论 And I've said the arguments
说这些论证不太有说服力 on behalf of dualism aren't very convincing.
我现在是不是也该对物理主义者 Don't I now need, in fairness,
做同样的事呢 以示公平 to do the same thing for the physicalist?
我是不是也该对物理主义者说 Don't I need to turn to the physicalist and say,
"给我理由让我相信物理主义才是真理 "Give me some reason to believe that physicalism is true?
给我理由让我相信灵魂并不存在" Give me some reason to believe souls don't exist."
我之前对二元论者说 After all, I turned to the dualist and said,
"给我理由让我相信灵魂存在" "Give me some reason to believe in souls."
可那些论证并不成立 Those arguments didn't work.
那我现在是不是也该对物理主义者说 Don't I now need to turn to the physicalist and say,
"给我理由让我相信灵魂并不存在 "Give me some reason not to believe in souls?
证明给我看 灵魂并不存在" Prove that souls don't exist."
这样是不是就公平了 Isn't that fair?
我们先停一下 问问自己 So let's pause and ask ourselves,
你要如何证明某物并不存在呢 how do you go about proving that something doesn't exist?
或者更准确地说 Or, to put it in a slightly better way,
你何时需要证明某物并不存在呢 when do you need to prove that something doesn't exist?
我们之前举过例子 When we have examples of things
我们相信某物不存在 whose existence we don't believe in,
那我们该怎样证明我们是对的呢 how do we decide when we're justified in disbelieving them?
以龙为例 Take something like dragons.
我假设全班所有人 教室里的所有人 Let me assume that everybody in this class, in this room,
都不相信龙的存在 does not believe in the existence of dragons.
那我该怎么证明真的没有龙呢 How do I prove that there aren't any dragons?
其实也是可能有龙的 I mean, there could be dragons.
对不 Couldn't there?
但实际上的确是没有的 But there aren't any.
我们不相信有龙 We don't believe in dragons.
那在你说自己不相信有龙存在之前 So don't you need to disprove the existence of dragons
是不是该证明它们真的并不存在呢 before you continue on your way of not believing in them?
我假设教室里大家都不相信 I imagine nobody in this room believes
希腊神话中天王宙斯的存在 in the existence of Zeus, the Greek god.
那你要怎么证明宙斯是不存在的呢 How do you disprove the existence of Zeus?
我们是否必须证明宙斯并不存在呢 Don't we have an obligation to prove that Zeus doesn't exist?
那该怎么做呢 But how could you do that?
其实我并认为 Well, unsurprisingly, I don't actually think you do
你必须证明这些不存在的东西 have an obligation to disprove those things.
但这并不是说你什么事都不用做 That doesn't mean you don't have any obligations.
你只需谨慎处理 You just have to be very careful about
那些思想上的义务 what the intellectual obligations come to.
回到龙这个话题 我们该做些什么 So back to dragons. What do we need to do for dragons?
要证明你对龙的存在性是合理的 Well, the most important thing you need to do,
最重要的一件事就是 to justify your skepticism about dragons,
驳斥所有说明龙存在的 is to refute all of the arguments that might be offered
论证 on behalf of dragons.
我儿子有本关于龙的书 My son's got a book about dragons
上面的图片非常精美 with some very nice photographs.
所以我要证明我对龙的怀疑是合理的 So, one of the things I need to do in order to justify
我就得解释这些照片 my skepticism about dragons is explain away the photographs,
或者说这些图片 都是假的 or the drawings, or what have you.
我得解释为什么会有这些图片 I need to explain why it is that we have pictures,
尽管根本不存在龙 even though there really aren't any dragons.
有些图片 Well, some of these are just drawings,
只是人们的奇思妙想 and people were drawing things out of their imagination.
那些看似照片的图 The things that look like photographs,
你们也知道 现在电脑绘图这么发达 you know, nowadays with computer generated graphics,
什么图都能做得跟照片一样 you can make things that look like photographs,
只需用Photoshop and given Photoshop you can make things
你就可以把那些根本不存在的东西 that look like pictures of just about anything
做得非常逼真 that doesn't even exist.
那我又该如何证明独角兽也是不存在的呢 How do I prove there aren't any unicorns?
我看过很多对独角兽的报道 Well, I look at the various reported sightings of unicorns
我现在要来解释这些都是假的 and I try to explain them away,
"人们第一次 "Well, you know, it's the first time people,
欧洲人第一次看到犀牛 Europeans, saw the rhinoceros.
随之联想到一头长着大角的马 It sort of reminded them of a horse with a big horn.
也许独角兽 And maybe that's where the reports of rhinoceros came--
就是这么来的 or the various reports of the unicorn came from.
各种各样独角兽的角 The various unicorn horns that
被收集起来 have been offered in various collections,
交给生物学家鉴定 结果证明 upon examination by biologists turn out to be narwhal horns,
其实就是独角鲸的角 或是别的什么 horns from whales, and so forth and so on."
每一条说独角兽存在的证据 You look at each bit of evidence that
你都能揭穿它们的真相 gets offered on behalf of the unicorn and you debunk it.
你可以解释这些论证为什么没有说服力 You explain why it's not compelling.
当你解释完之后 你就有资格说 And when you're done, you're entitled to say,
"据我所知 根本不存在独角兽 "You know, as far as I can tell, there aren't any unicorns.
据我所知 根本不存在龙" As far as I can tell, there aren't any dragons."
并不是说你必须得去 It's not as though you've got some obligation
一个个洞穴地检查 to look in every single cave
把地球表面每个角落搜个遍 anywhere on the surface of the Earth and say,
然后说 "这儿没有龙 那儿没有龙 "Oh, no dragons in there, no dragons in there,
这儿没有龙 那儿没有龙" no dragons in there, no dragons in there, no dragons in there."
只要你证明了那些声称有龙存在的论证 You are pretty much justified in being skeptical
是假的 about the existence of dragons
那你就能证明你对龙存在的怀疑是合理的 once you've undermined the arguments for dragons.
你还可以做些别的事 Now, there might be something more that you could do.
至少在某些情况下 In at least some cases,
你可以说我们讨论的某些东西 you can go on to argue the very idea of the kind of thing
是不可能存在的 we're talking about is impossible.
不仅 It's not just--
还是以龙为例 Take dragons again;
不仅没有理由相信龙的存在 it's not just that there's no good reason to believe in dragons.
而且从科学角度来看 The very idea of a dragon
龙这个说法也是不合逻辑的 may be scientifically incoherent,
至少就我们所理解的科学是这样认为的 at least given the science as we understand it.
据说龙可以喷火 I mean, dragons are supposed to breath fire.
那也是说它肚子里肯定得有火 So that must mean they've got fire in their belly.
但是火怎么可能一直在它肚子燃烧着呢 But how does the fire continue to exist in their belly,
肚子里又没氧气 absent--lack of oxygen?
而且它肚里的火怎么没有 Why isn't the fire in their belly busy burning
烧坏它的胃粘膜什么的呢 and destroying the membranes of their stomach or whatever?
我想你也许会 All right, you could, I suppose,
试着从科学角度证明龙是不可能存在的 try to prove that dragons were scientifically impossible.
如果你能证明的话 And if you could,
那你又有个理由可以相信它们不存在了 then you'd have an extra reason to not believe in them.
但不是说你只有证明了某物不可能存在 But it's not as though you have to prove that
才能有理由相信其不存在 something's impossible to be justified in not believing in it.
我其实并不觉得独角兽是不可能存在的 I don't think unicorns are impossible.
我只是认为它就是不存在 I just don't think there are any.
当然 可能是有些马 Surely, there could be horses with a single long horn
头上长着一根长长的独角的 growing out of their forehead.
但是并不存在独角兽啊 There just aren't any.
有了这些思想 So armed with these ideas,
我们回来继续探讨灵魂 come back to the discussion of souls.
作为一个物理主义者 Do I, as a physicalist who does not believe
我并不相信灵魂的存在 in the existence of souls,
也不相信什么超越肉体的非物质的存在 immaterial entities above and beyond the body,
我需要证明灵魂不存在吗 do I need to disprove the existence of souls?
"这儿没有灵魂 那儿没有灵魂" "Well, there's no soul here, no souls there."
不需要 No.
我只须看看那些声称 What I need to do is to take a look at each argument
灵魂存在的论证 that gets offered for the existence of a soul and rebut it--
然后一一解释为什么这些论证没有说服力 explain why those arguments are not compelling.
我无须证明灵魂不存在 I don't need to prove that souls are impossible.
我只须颠覆灵魂存在论即可 I just need to undermine the case for souls.
如果没有什么好的理由相信灵魂存在 If there's no good reason to believe in souls,
其实也就给了我们一个理由 that actually constitutes a reason
相信灵魂不存在 to believe there are no souls.
现在 你们如果愿意 可以试着证明 Now, if you want to, you could go on and try to prove
灵魂不可能存在 that souls are impossible in the same way
就像我刚才证明龙不可能存在一样 that maybe dragons are impossible.
但我不敢肯定我的这种证明方法 But I'm not sure that I myself find such impossibility claims
就特别有说服力 especially persuasive.
我不相信灵魂存在 I don't believe in the existence of souls,
并不意味着 but that doesn't mean that
我觉得像灵魂那样的非物质 I find the idea of an immaterial entity
也不存在 like the soul impossible.
现在也许有人会说 Now, some people might say,
"这违背了科学 "Well, you know, it violates science.
我们知道 非物质的存在违背了物理学" As we know it, it violates physics to have there be something immaterial."
但是科学是在不断发展进步的 But science is constantly coming around
那些之前不相信的实体或是属性 to believe in entities or properties
也是可以相信的 that it didn't believe in previously.
也许只是还没发展到相信灵魂存在这一步 Maybe it just hasn't gotten around to believing in souls yet.
如果现代科学排除了灵魂存在的可能性 Or if current science rules out the possibility of souls,
也许我们应该说 maybe we should say,
"现代科学也就到头了" "So much the worse for current science."
所以我并不是想说 So I'm not somebody who wants to say
我们能够证明灵魂不存在 we can disprove the existence of souls.
其实我并不认为我们能够证明这点 I don't think we can disprove them.
我不认为灵魂这个说法不合逻辑 I don't think the idea of a soul is in any way incoherent.
有些哲学家觉得是 There are philosophers who've thought that.
但我不这么想 I'm not one of them.
但我并不认为我必须得证明灵魂不存在 But I don't think I need to disprove the existence
才能证明自己不相信灵魂存在是合理的 of a soul to be justified in not believing in it.
独角兽并非不可能存在 但话虽如此 Unicorns aren't impossible, but for all that,
我还是坚信它们不存在 I'm justified in thinking there aren't any.
为什么呢 Why?
因为所有证明独角兽存在的证据 Because all the evidence for unicorns
都不够有说服力 just doesn't add up to very convincing case.
灵魂也并非不可能存在 但尽管如此 Souls are not impossible, but for all that,
我还是觉得并不存在灵魂 I think I'm justified in believing there aren't any.
为什么呢 因为当你 Why? Because when you look for the--
看那些试图说服我们 look at the arguments that have been offered
相信灵魂存在的论证时 to try to convince us of the existence of souls,
会发现那些论证也不怎么有说服力 those arguments just aren't very compelling,
至少在我看来是这样 or so it seems to me.
所以 从这点出发 So, from this point on out,
我就可以假设物理主义的观点是正确的 I'll be assuming the physicalist view is correct,
并且我将从物理主义的观点 and will be thinking about the issues of death
来思考死亡的问题 as they'd be understood from the physicalist point of view