今天我们接着上次课的内容继续讨论 Today we're going to take up the discussion where we left it last time.
围绕着 人是什么 We were talking about two main positions
我们探讨了两种观点 with regard to the question, "What is a person?"
一种是二元论的观点 On the one hand, we have the dualist view;
上堂课上我们用了很长的时间来介绍它 that's the view that we spent a fair bit of time sketching last meeting.
二元论认为 The dualist view,
人是由肉体和灵魂两部分组成 according to which a person is a body and a soul.
或者 严格地说来 Or perhaps, strictly speaking,
我们可以表达为 what we should say is
灵魂是人最本质的部分 the only part that's essential to the person is the soul,
尽管它和肉体间保持着密切的联系 though it's got a rather intimate connection to a particular body.
这是二元论的观点 That's the dualist view.
与之相对的 是物理主义的观点 In contrast to that, we've got the physicalist view,
认为人只有肉体 according to which there are just bodies.
换句话说 一个人就是一具肉体 A person is just a body, as we might put it.
但问题的中心 Now, the crucial point here,
即我在上次结课前谈到的关键点 the point I was turning to as we ended last time,
在于尽管从物理主义的角度来看 人只是肉体 is that although a person on the physicalist view is just a body,
但并不是普通的肉体 a person isn't just any old body.
人是拥有一套特定能力的肉体 A person is a body that has a certain set of abilities,
可以从事一系列特定的活动 can do a certain array of activities.
人是可以思考 可以互相交流的肉体 People are bodies that can think, that can communicate,
他有理性 可以规划 可以感知 that are rational, that can plan, that can feel things,
有创新等各种能力 that can be creative, and so forth and so on.
我们可以探究一下 Now, we might argue about
人具体有哪些能力 what's the exact best list of those abilities.
但鉴于课程的目的 For our purposes,
这点并不在我们的讨论重点之内 I think that won't be crucial,
所以我也许偶尔会提及人的这些能力 and so I'll sometimes talk about this set of abilities
但并不会把它们详尽地列举出来 without actually having a canonical list.
只是把它们视为人具备的能力 Just think of them as the set of abilities that people have,
作为人有别于粉笔 收音机 the things that we can do that other physical objects-- chalk, radios,
汽车等其他物体的能力 cars-- those things can't do.
这些能力使得我们成为人 Call those the abilities that make something a person.
用专业术语来说 To just introduce a piece of jargon,
我们可以称那些能力为P能力 P代表人 we could call those the P abilities, P for person.
或者我们还可以探讨更多的表达方式 Or we could talk about the various kinds of ways--
但以下是物理主义的观点 this is the physicalist way of thinking about it--
物理主义认为 人只是 according to the physicalist, a person is just a body
一具拥有实现各种P能力的肉体 that has the ability to fulfill the various P functions.
我们可以把人视为拥有P能力的肉体 And we can talk, then, about a person as a P-functioning body.
或者 我们可以说 Or we could say that
人就是具有人类能力的肉体 a person is a body that is P-functioning.
要理解这个观点最为重要的是 It's important to see that the idea is,
这里的肉体 不是随随便便的肉体 although it's a body, it's not just any old body.
事实上 它也不完全是人类的躯体 Indeed, it's not just any old human body.
毕竟你拔出枪 After all, if you rip out your gun,
击中我的心脏 我失血而亡 shoot me in the heart, I bleed to death,
我还是保持着肉体的形式 we still have a human body in front of us.
但这不是具有人类能力的肉体 But we don't have a P-functioning body.
不是那个可以思考 We don't have a body that's able to think,
可以规划 a body that's able to plan,
可以相互交流 有创造力有目标的肉体 to communicate, to be creative, to have goals.
所以说关键是 So the crucial thing about
人拥有一个具有人类能力的肉体 having a person is having a P-functioning body.
那么 这个观点又是如何定义心灵的呢 Now, what's a mind on this view?
在物理主义看来 On the physicalist view,
对心灵的探讨是完全合理的 it's still perfectly legitimate to talk about minds.
从物理主义的角度出发 The point, though, is that from the physicalist perspective,
用最确切的语言加以表达 the best thing to say is,
心灵是表述 talk about a mind is a way of talking
肉体各种精神能力的方式 about these various mental abilities of the body.
我们给它起了个名字 称它为心灵 We nominalize it. We talk about it using a noun, the mind.
但是心灵 But talk of the mind is
仅仅是在肉体还能正常工作时 just a way of talking about these abilities
对这些精神能力的一种表述 that the body has when it's functioning properly.
这和探讨微笑很相似 This is similar, let's say, to talking about a smile.
我们相信微笑是存在的 We believe that there are smiles.
物理主义者们不否认心灵的存在 Physicalists don't deny that there are minds.
正如我们不否认 笑的存在 Just like we don't deny, we all believe, that there are smiles.
但是笑究竟是什么 But what is a smile?
笑就是我们表达 Well, a smile is just a way of talking about
肉体某项能力的一种方式 the ability of the body to do something.
这种特有的 This characteristic thing
咧嘴露齿的动作 we do with our lips exposing our teeth and so forth.
这就是笑 It's a smile,
一个相当呆气的笑 但也仍然是笑 a rather dorky smile, but there's a smile.
如果要罗列完成这个动作牵涉到的身体部位 Now, if you were listing the parts of the body,
你也许会列举牙齿 嘴唇 you would list the teeth, you would list the lips,
你会列举牙龈 舌头 you would list the gums, you would list the tongue,
但你不会列举出笑 but you wouldn't list the smile.
那么 我们是否该像二元论者一样宣称 So, should we conclude, as dualists,
笑是某种与肉体有着某种 that smiles are these extra nonphysical things
特殊紧密联系的非物质呢 that have a special intimate relationship with bodies?
你当然可以那样想 Well, you could imagine a view like that,
不过那是一个相当愚蠢的看法 but it would be rather a silly view.
用笑作举例只是想说明 Talk about a smile is just a way of talking about
肉体具有笑的能力 the body's ability to smile.
并无其他 There's no extra part.
即使我们有笑容这个名词 Even though we have a noun, the smile,
如果你不够谨慎 可能会想当然地认为 that if you're not careful might lull you into thinking
一定存在着笑容这一事物 there must be a thing, the smile.
随即你便会陷入一堆形而上学的谜团中去 And then you'd have all these metaphysical conundrums.
笑到底在哪里 Where is the smile located?
它好像在嘴的附近 It seems to be in the vicinity of the mouth.
但是笑不是嘴唇 But the smile isn't the lips.
笑也不是牙齿 The smile isn't the teeth.
那么它一定是某种无形的东西 So it must be something nonphysical.
以上只是一种对笑的愚蠢思考 No, that would just be a silly way to think about smiles.
我们会谈到笑只是为了表达 Talk of smiles is just a way of talking about
肉体具有笑的能力 the ability of the body to smile,
能够微笑 to form a smile.
这是我们肉体都拥有的能力 That's an ability that we have, our bodies have.
相似地 物理主义观点认为 Similarly, then, according to the physicalist,
心灵 即便这个名词的确存在 talk of the mind, despite the fact that we have a noun there,
只是我们表达 is just a way of talking about the abilities
肉体各种行为能力的一种方式 of the body to do various things.
心灵只是我们用来表达 The mind is just a way of talking about
肉体可以思考 the fact that our body can think,
可以相互交流 可以规划 可以深思熟虑 can communicate, can plan, can deliberate,
可以富有创造力 可以写诗 can be creative, can write poetry,
可以彼此相爱的一种方式 can fall in love.
这些能力才是心灵所表达的对象 Talk of all of those things is what we mean by the mind,
但是离开肉体 心灵就没有意义了 but there's no extra thing, the mind, above and beyond the body.
这就是物理主义的观点 That's the physicalist view.
因此 从物理主义的 So it's important, in particular,
角度理解这一点尤为重要 to understand that from the physicalist's point of view,
心灵并不是大脑 the mind is not the brain.
你可能会想 You might think,
根据物理主义的说法心灵就是大脑 "Look, according to physicalists minds are just brains."
而且那么说也不会错得很离谱 And that wouldn't be a horrendously misleading thing to say,
因为目前最先进的科学研究表明 because according to the best science that we've got,
大脑是身体的一部分 the brain is the part of the body
是给予我们各种能力的 that is the seat or house or the underlying mechanical structure
基石或归属的支撑性机械结构 that gives us these various abilities.
我们依靠大脑才拥有这些能力 These P functions are functions that we have by virtue of our brain.
这可能会让你觉得心灵 So that might tempt you into saying the mind
在物理主义那里就是大脑 on the physicalist view is just a brain.
但是我们也许不该那么说 毕竟 But we probably shouldn't say that. After all,
假如你射杀了我 我的尸体倒在讲台上 if you shoot me, there's my corpse lying on the stage.
的确 那是我的大脑 Well, there's my brain.
我的大脑仍然在我的脑袋里 My brain is still there in my head.
但那时我已经不是一个人了 But we no longer have a person.
我已经死了 The person has died.
意味着我这个人不复存在了 The person, it seems, no longer exists.
这到底正确与否 Whether strictly that's the best thing to say or not
就是我们未来两周将要讨论的问题 is a question we'll have to come to in a couple of weeks.
但我们可以确定的是心灵已经被摧毁了 But it seems pretty clear that the mind has been destroyed,
即使大脑还在 even though the brain is still there.
所以我认为 至少在需要严谨的时候 So I think, at least when there's the need to be careful--
也许我们并不常需要如此严谨 maybe we don't normally have a need to be careful--
但是当我们需要谨慎时 but when there's the need to be careful,
我们应该会说 we should say,
心灵是表达 talk of the mind is a way of talking about
肉体人类能力的一种方式 the P-functioning of the body.
现今科学认为 Our best science suggests
一个运作良好的肉体能够做到以下事情 that a well-functioning body can perform these things,
思考 规划 以及彼此相爱 这都得益于 can think and plan and fall in love by virtue of the fact
大脑的正常运作 that the brain is functioning properly.
这是物理主义的观点 That's the physicalist view.
二元论认为 什么是死亡 On the dualist view, what was death?
死亡可能是心灵和肉体的分离 Death is presumably the separation of the mind and the body,
也许是伴随着躯体 perhaps the permanent separation,
殒灭的永久分离 with the destruction of the body.
物理主义认为死亡是什么 What's death on the physicalist view?
灵魂这种额外的实体并不存在 Well, there is no extra entity, the soul.
心灵也只是肉体所拥有的一项特殊的能力 The mind is just the proper P-functioning of the body.
所以 心灵也就伴随着身体 So, the mind gets destroyed when the ability of the body
正常运作能力的毁灭而毁灭 to function in that way has been destroyed.
死亡 简单地说 就是一系列功能的终结 Death is, roughly, the end of this set of functioning.
以上内容还有待梳理 Again, this probably should be cleaned up
未来两周我们将会花上一天半左右的时间 and in a couple of weeks we'll spend a day or half period trying,
试着梳理这些内容 使其更加精确 to clean it up and make it somewhat more precise.
但是死亡没有什么神秘可言 But there's nothing mysterious about death
从物理主义的角度来看 from the physicalist point of view,
至少死亡的基本定义是不神秘的 at least about the basic idea of what's going on in death.
比如 我有一个立体声音响 I've got a stereo.
假设我拿着我的扬声器给你们播放音乐 Suppose I hold up my boom box for you and it's playing music.
这是它的功能之一 It's one of the things it can do.
随后我把它扔到地上 摔碎它 And I drop in on the ground, smashing it.
那它就不能正常工作了 Well, it no longer can function properly.
它坏掉了 It's broken.
一旦坏了就不能正常运转 这并不神秘 There's no mystery why it can't function once it's broken.
死亡从根本上说就是我们肉体的损坏 Death is basically just the breaking down of the body,
在物理主义看来 on the physicalist point of view,
肉体再也不能正常工作了 so that it no longer functions properly.
另一个值得一提的 One other point worth emphasizing
物理主义观点是这样的 and sketching the physicalist view is this.
如前所说 物理主义者不否认心灵的存在 So, as I said, physicalists don't deny that there are minds.
即使我们说 我们只是肉体 Even though we say "We're just bodies,"
但那并不意味着我们只是随随便便的肉体 that doesn't mean that we're just any old body.
物理主义并不是说 It's not as though the physicalist view is,
我们是有思维幻觉的肉体 "We're bodies that have some illusion of thinking."
不 我们是具有真正思考能力的肉体 No, we're bodies that really do think.
所以心灵的确存在 So there really are minds.
我们可以站在物理主义者的角度上 We could, on the physicalist point of view,
称其为灵魂 call those souls.
如同从物理主义的角度探讨心灵一样 Just like there's no danger in talking of the mind from the physicalist perspective
探讨灵魂也不是什么特别危险的事情 there wouldn't be any serious danger in talking about a soul.
而且 在某些情况下 And so, in certain contexts,
依照我这个物理主义者的心情 我感到很惬意 I'm perfectly comfortable--in my physicalist moods,
探讨人的灵魂 我也感到很惬意 I am perfectly comfortable--talking about this person's soul.
思考灵魂是高尚还是卑劣时 He's got a good soul, a bad soul,
阅读莎士比亚作品时 我都感到很惬意 how the soul soars when I read Shakespeare, or what have you.
谈论灵魂并不是什么令人沮丧或不得体的事情 There's nothing upsetting or improper about the language of the soul,
即使是从物理主义的角度来看 even on the physicalist point of view.
不过在课堂上 为了避免歧义 But in this class, just to try to keep us from getting confused,
就像我之前说的 而且我要再次重申 as I indicated before and I want to remind you,
我会尽量少用"灵魂"这个词 I'm going to save the word "Soul";
至少我会将"灵魂"这个词留到 I'm going to at least try to save the word "Soul" for
我讲二元论的时候再用 when I'm talking about the dualist view.
这么说吧 So we might put it this way.
中立的表达方式是"心灵" The neutral term is going to be "Mind."
我们都赞同人是有心灵的 We all agree that people have minds,
它就像是我们人格的归属或是基石 sort of the house or the seat of our personalities.
问题是 心灵是什么 The question is, "What is a mind?"
二元论认为心灵就是灵魂 The dualist position is that the mind is a soul
而灵魂是一种非物质实体 and the soul is an immaterial object.
所以当我使用"灵魂"这个词时 So when I use the word "Soul,"
我将会把它用在形而上学的观点里 I will try to reserve it for the metaphysical view,
这种观点认为 灵魂是非物质的 according to which souls are something immaterial.
而物理主义的观点则与之相对 In contrast to that, we've got the physicalist view.
物理主义者也相信人有心灵 Physicalists also believe in minds.
但是心灵只不过是肉体能力的 But minds are just a way of talking about
另一种表达方式 the abilities of the body.
所以物理主义者不相信 So physicalists do not believe in
任何超越肉体的非物质实体的存在 any immaterial object above and beyond the body that's part of a person.
说得更明白一点 Just to keep things clear,
我会说物理主义者 I will say that physicalists,
唯物主义者 不相信灵魂 materialists, do not believe in souls.
为了讲课的需要 Because, for the purposes of this class,
我会将"灵魂"这个词 I'm going to reserve the word "Soul"
留到讲心灵的非物质性概念时再用 for the immaterialist conception of the mind.
在其他情形下 则可以对灵魂畅所欲言 In other contexts--no harm in talking about souls.
以上就是两种基本的理论 So these are the two basic positions:
一种是二元论的观点 the dualist view on the one hand,
另一种是物理主义的观点 the physicalist view on the other.
需要注意的是 The question we need to turn to--
如果说二元论是一种熟知的观点 I take it that just as the dualist view is a familiar one,
那么物理主义的观点其实也很常见 so it's true that the physicalist view is a familiar one.
不论你自己相信与否 Whether or not you believe it,
毕竟 你知道有些人是相信的 you are familiar with the fact that some people believe it,
最起码 你想知道它到底正不正确 or at least you wonder whether it's true.
科学有没有强制要求 Does science require that
我们接受物理主义的观点 we believe in the physicalist view or not?
接下来 我们的问题是 The question we want to turn to, then, is,
这两种观点 我们到底应该相信哪一种 "Which of these two views should we believe:
二元论还是物理主义 the dualist position or the physicalist position?"
而最为关键的 也许是 And the crucial question, presumably, is,
我们应该相信灵魂是存在的吗 "Should we believe in the existence of a soul?"
两种观点都承认肉体的存在 Both sides believe in bodies.
前面已经谈到 二元论 As I say, the dualist position,
就我们的理解 as we're understanding it,
并不认为只有心灵而没有肉体 is not a view that says there are only minds, there are no bodies.
二元论者认同肉体的存在 Dualists believe that there are bodies.
他们相信 肉体与灵魂都是存在的 They believe that there are souls as well as bodies.
而物理主义者认为 肉体存在而灵魂不存在 Physicalists believe there are bodies but no souls.
所以他们都赞同肉体的存在 So there's an agreement that there are bodies.
这里就有一具 Here is one.
你们每个人也都"拖着"肉体 Each one of you is sort of dragging one around with you.
大家一致都同意存在肉体 There's agreement that there's bodies.
问题是 有没有什么凌驾于肉体之上的东西 The question is, "Are there anything beyond bodies?"
存在某种凌驾于肉体之上的东西吗 Is there anything beyond the body?
那是灵魂吗 Is there a soul?
灵魂存在吗 Are there souls?
这是我们今后几周主要考虑的问题 That's the question that's going to concern us for a couple of weeks.
如果我们扪心自问 If we ask ourselves,
我们凭什么相信灵魂存在 "What reasons do we have to believe in a soul?"
我们也许就会开始怀疑 we might start by asking,
我们凭什么相信其他所有事物存在 what reasons do we have to believe in anything?
怎样证明事物的存在呢 How do we prove the existence of things?
对于很多我们熟悉的日常物体 For lots of familiar everyday objects,
答案十分明确 the answer is fairly straightforward.
我们可以通过我们的五感来证明它们的存在 We prove their existence by using our five senses.
我们可以看到它们 We just see them.
我如何知道椅子是存在的 How do I know that there are chairs?
我面前有一些椅子 Well, there are some chairs in front of me.
张开眼睛我就能看到他们 Open my eyes, I see them.
我怎么知道讲台是存在的 How do I know that there is a lectern?
因为我看到它了 我能触摸它 感受到它 Well, I see it. I can touch it. I feel it.
我怎么知道树木是存在的 How do I know that there are trees?
因为我可以看到它们 I see them.
我怎么知道鸟是存在的 How do I know that there are birds?
我可以看到它们 可以听见它们的声音 I see them. I hear them.
我怎么知道苹果是存在的 How do I know that there are apples?
我可以看到它们 尝尝它们的味道 等等 I see them. I taste them. So forth and so on.
但这种方法显然不能用来证明灵魂的存在 That approach pretty clearly isn't going to work for souls,
因为灵魂 我再一次说明 because a soul--and again,
从这种形而上学的角度来看 we've got in mind this metaphysical view,
灵魂是非物质实体 according to which it's something immaterial--
我们看不到它 isn't something we see.
我们无法尝到摸到闻到或者听到 It's not something we taste or touch or smell or hear.
我们无法通过五感直接观察到灵魂 We don't directly observe souls with our five senses.
你可能会想 You might wonder, well,
难道我自己没有直接观察到我有灵魂吗 don't I sort of directly observe it in myself that I have a soul?
尽管我想有些人 Although I guess there have been people
声称他们能观察到 但我对此并不苟同 who've made that sort of claim, it seems false to me.
我想请各位内视自己一下 I can only ask each of you to sort of introspect for a second.
睁开你们的心灵之眼 然后问自己 Turn your mind's eye inward and ask.
有没有看到体内的灵魂 Do you see a soul inside you?
我的答案是否定的 I don't think so.
我只能看到身外的事物 I see things outside me.
我能感应到肉体里某些特定的感觉 I feel certain sensations in my body,
但我并不认为那样我就能观察到灵魂 but it doesn't seem as though I observe a soul.
即便我相信灵魂存在 我也看不到它 Even if I believe in a soul, I don't see it.
我们如何能证明那些 How do we prove the existence of things
我们无法依靠五感感知的事物呢 we can't see or hear or taste and so forth?
通常的做法 The usual method,
当然 这也许不是唯一的方法 maybe not the only method,
不过通常的做法是这样 but the usual method is something like this.
有时 我们通过假设 Sometimes, we posit
存在某些 the existence of something
我们看不到的事物以解释另一些 that we can't see so as to explain something else
我们一致认同存在着的事物 that we all agree takes place.
我为什么会相信原子的存在 Why do I believe in the existence of atoms?
我并没有看到具体的原子 I don't see individual atoms.
为什么我相信原子的存在 它是如此之小 Why do I believe in the existence of atoms so small
以至于我根本就看不到它们 that I can't see them?
因为原子理论能够解释一些现象 Because atomic theory explains things.
当我假设原子以某种特定结构存在 When I posit the existence of atoms with certain structures
以一定的方式相互作用 and certain sort of ways of interacting
互相结合 集聚 and combining and building up,
通过假定原子存在 when I posit atoms,
我立即就能够解释 suddenly I can explain all
物理世界中各种各样的现象了 sorts of things about the physical world.
所以说我推测原子的存在是基于 So, I infer the existence of atoms based on the fact
该假设使得我能够解释 that doing that allows me to explain
所需解释的一些现象 things that need explaining.
这是我们常用的一种论证方式 This is a kind of argument that we use all the time.
我如何证实 How do I posit--
我为什么会相信X射线是存在的 why do I believe in x-rays,
尽管我压根看不见它 even though I don't see them?
因为那样做使我可以解释特定的现象 Because doing that allows me to explain certain things.
我为什么会相信在望远镜正常观测范围外的 Why do I believe in certain planets too far away
遥远之处存在行星 to be observed directly through a telescope?
因为这样假定能帮助你解释 Because positing them allows you explain things
诸如星体运行 引力波动 about the rotation of the star or the gravitational fluctuations,
等现象 what have you.
我们推断一些看不到的事物的存在 We make inferences to the existence of things we can't see,
因为这样做可以便于我们 when doing that helps us
解释某些我们不相信就无法解释的事情 to explain something we can't otherwise explain.
这种论证模式 This pattern of argument,
十分普遍 被称为 which is ubiquitous, is called
最佳解释推理 "Inference to the best explanation."
关于最佳解释 我想强调一点 I want to emphasize this bit about "Best explanation."
我们确信我们需要某些东西 What we're justified in believing are those things that we need,
不仅在于它们为我们提供了某种解释 not simply when they would offer us some kind of explanation,
还在于它们能使我们 but when they offer us
想出的最佳解释 the best explanation that we can think of.
所以 我为什么相信微生物 So look, why am I justified in believing in germs,
相信各种肉眼无法看到的病毒 various kinds of viruses that I can't see,
细菌等诸如此类我看不到的东西确实存在 or bacteria or what have you, that I can't see?
因为那样做我就可以解释人为什么会生病 Because doing that allows me to explain why people get sick.
不过还有一些其他的东西 But there's other things
也可以帮助我解释这些现象 that would allow me to explain that as well.
比如魔鬼 How about demons?
我可以相信存在魔鬼 然后说 I could believe in demons and say,
人为什么会生病和死亡 "Why does a person get sick and die?
那是恶魔在作祟 Well, it is demonic possession."
我为什么不认为相信恶魔的存在是正确的呢 Why aren't I justified in believing in the existence of demons?
它也提供了一种可能的解释 It's a possible explanation.
但是 我们认为正确并坚信着的 But what we seem to be justified in believing
不是某些随便的陈旧解释 is not just any old explanation,
而是 最佳解释 but the "Best explanation."
现在我们得到了两种对立的解释 So we've got two rival explanations.
把它们概括一下 We've got, roughly,
微生物理论和恶魔理论 germ theory and we've got demon theory.
我们需要问问自己 We have to ask ourselves,
这两者哪一个能更好地 "Which of these does a better job
解释关于疾病的一系列现象 of explaining the facts about disease?"
谁得了什么病 Who gets what kinds of diseases?
病情如何蔓延 How diseases spread,
应该怎样治疗或治愈疾病 how they can be treated or cured,
它们什么时候会置人于死地 when they kill somebody.
事实上 The fact of the matter is,
恶魔理论并不能很好地解释疾病的问题 demon theory doesn't do a very good job of explaining disease,
而微生物理论却能将问题分析得很透彻 while germ theory does do a good job.
相较之下 微生物理论是更好的解释 It's the better explanation.
所以 我们相信微生物理论合理 So we're justified in believing in germs,
而恶魔理论则不合理 but not demons.
这是逻辑推论的结果 It's a matter of inference,
不是随便什么陈旧的解释 not just to any old explanation,
而是最佳解释的推论结果 but inference to the best explanation.
那好 现在我们要问问自己 All right, so, what we need to ask ourselves,
灵魂是什么 then, is, "What about the soul?"
我们无法看到灵魂 We can't observe souls.
不过还是有支持它存在的论证方式 But here's a possible way of arguing for them.
有没有这样的事物 Are there things that need to be explained
只有假定灵魂 这种凌驾于肉体之上的 that we could explain if we posited the existence
非物质实体存在 才能对其进行解释 of a soul, an immaterial object, above and beyond the body?
是否有某种现象 使得用灵魂存在的假设 Are there things that the existence of a soul could explain
能比局限于肉体本身的分析 and explain better than the explanation
解释得更好呢 that we would have if we had to limit ourselves to bodies?
你也可以把它当作 You might put it this way
这种论证的最简解释方式 as sort of the easiest version of this kind of argument,
以便于理解 for our purposes.
我们是否存在一些 Are there things about us
物理主义者无法解释的问题 that the physicalist cannot explain?
是否存在某些人类的奥秘或谜团 Are there mysteries or puzzles about people
物理主义对此束手无策 that the physicalist just draws a blank,
而二元论者 but if we become dualists,
却能解释它们 we can explain these features?
假设 存在这样的一个特性 Suppose there was a feature like that,
称之为特性F 那我们会说 feature F. Then we'd say,
尽管我们看不见灵魂 "Look, although we can't see the soul,
但我们仍然有理由相信灵魂存在 we have reason to believe in the soul,
因为假设灵魂存在能够帮我们 because positing the existence of a soul helps us
解释那个我们都承认的 to explain the existence of feature F,
F的存在 which we all agree we've got."
假设 我们不能从物理主义的角度 Suppose it was true that you couldn't explain love
来解释爱 from the physicalist perspective.
但是我们都知道人会坠入爱河 But we all know that people do fall in love,
而灵魂能够帮助我们解释这一点 but souls would allow us to explain that.
于是 我们就有了一个灵魂存在的论证 Boom, we'd have an argument for the existence of a soul.
这可以作为一个 It would be an example of
最佳解释推论的例子 "Inference to the best explanation."
但关键问题是 Now, the crucial question, of course, is,
那个相关的特性F是什么 "What's the relevant feature F?"
是否存在物理主义者不能解释的这种特性 Is there some feature that the physicalist can't explain
使得我们不得不诉诸于 and so we need to appeal
某些超物理的东西来解释 to something extra-physical to explain it?
或者 物理主义者只能 Or the physicalist can
提供一个很蹩脚的解释 only do a rotten job of explaining,
就像恶魔理论那样 like demon theory did?
而如果我们诉诸于非物理的方式 And then, if we were to appeal to something nonphysical,
就能解释得更好 we would do a better job of explaining.
如果我们能找到合适的特性F If we could find the right F,
并且给出论证 and make out the argument,
物理主义者无法解释 the physicalist can't explain it
或者解释得很牵强 or does a bad job of explaining it
而二元论的解释更合理 and the dualist does a better job of explaining it,
那么我们就有理由相信有灵魂存在 we'd have reason to believe in the soul.
与哲学里的其他论证一样 Like all arguments in philosophy,
这将是一个暂时性的论证 it would be a tentative argument.
我们可能会有理由相信灵魂的存在 We'd sort of have some reason to believe in the soul
直到我们沿着这个方向探究到其他论证的存在 until we sort of see what next argument comes down the road.
但至少它给了我们一些相信灵魂存在的理由 But at least it would give us some reason to believe in the soul.
我的问题是 What I want to do is ask,
特性F可能是什么 "What might feature F be?"
特性F存在吗 Is there any such feature F?
为这样的事实打下基础也是很有价值的 It's probably also worth underlining the fact
我正在做的 that what I've really been doing
是将一系列的论证串联起来 is running through a series of arguments.
最佳解释的推论 "Inference to the best explanation"
并不仅仅是关于灵魂的一个论证 is not a single argument for the soul.
而更像是某类论证的总称 It's rather the name for a kind of argument.
根据你所挑选的不同功能特性F Depending on what F you fill in the blank with,
以及你试图解释的现象或事实 what pet feature or fact you're trying
诉诸于灵魂来进行解释 to explain by appeal to the soul,
你会得到不同的论点 you get a different argument.
所以让我们扪心自问 So let's ask ourselves,
有没有这样的现象 需要我们诉诸于灵魂 "Are there things that we need to appeal to the soul
才能对其作出合理的解释 in order to explain these things about us?"
我先举个例子 Here's a first try.
我首先来 Actually, let me start by saying
区分一下两个不同种类的特征 I'm going to distinguish two broad families of characteristics
我们也许会用到它们 we might appeal to.
我们可能会说 We might say,
一种方法主要关注于我们自身普遍 one set of approaches focus on ordinary,
常见的日常事实 familiar, everyday facts about us.
我们有彼此相爱的能力 The fact that we love,
我们有思考的能力 the fact that we think,
我们有感受情绪的能力 the fact that we experience emotions,
这些都是我们普遍具有的能力 what have you--these are ordinary features of us.
我将从这里开始 然后转而讨论 I'm going to start with those and then I'll turn,
另一些 eventually, to another set of possible things
需要给予解释的现象 that might need explaining,
那些我们可能视之为异乎寻常的 which we might think of as extraordinary,
超自然现象 supernatural things.
也许有某些超自然的关于 Maybe there are certain supernatural things about
亡者或是弥留之人的交流 或是 communication from the dead or
濒死体验 near-death experiences
需要借助灵魂才能解释得通 that need to be explained in terms of the soul.
我们之后会讲到那些 We'll get to those,
但是我们将从我们自身常见的 but we'll start with ordinary,
日常事实讲起 everyday, hum-drum facts about us.
虽然我们对其早已司空见惯 Even though they're ordinary and familiar,
但还是需要 it still could turn out that we need to
诉诸灵魂来解释它们 appeal to souls in order to explain them.
那么 首先 So, to start, how about this?
我们以一个熟知的事实开头 Start with a familiar fact,
我已经多次提到过 which I've already drawn your attention to a couple of times,
以死尸来说明 that you can have a body that's dead.
一具尸体显然不是一个人 You could have a corpse, and that's clearly not a person.
它不具有生命 It's not a living being.
就不能称之为人 It's not a person.
它无法动弹 It doesn't do anything.
只是躺在那里 It just lies there;
而你我的肉体都是有生命的 whereas your body, my body is animated.
我的双手可以挥舞 I move my hands around,
我的嘴唇可以翕张 my mouth is going up and down,
我可以从讲台的一处 it walks from one part
走到另一处 of the stage to the other part of the stage.
也许我们需要诉诸灵魂 Maybe we need to appeal to the soul
来解释 什么赋予肉体以生命 in order to explain what animates the body.
也就是说 The thought would be,
当灵魂与肉体分离时 when the soul and the body have been separated--
以二元论的解释 such the dualist explains--
灵魂就丧失了对肉体的控制能力 the soul has lost its ability to give commands to the body.
所以肉体不再具有生命力 So the body is no longer animated.
于是我们得到了对 So we've got a possible explanation of the difference
生命体与非生命体之间区别的一种可能的解释 between an animated and an unanimated or an inanimate body to it.
灵魂是否与肉体保持着对应的联系呢 Is the soul in contact of the right sort with the body?
有一种可能的解释 There's a possible explanation.
你可能会说 You might say,
你看 物理主义不会告诉我们那些的 "Look, the physicalist can't tell us that,
因为尸体所有的 because all the physical parts are still there
身体器官部分都还存在 when you've got the corpse,
至少对于还未腐烂的尸体而言是这样的 at least if it's a fresh corpse before the decay has set in.
所以我们需要诉诸于灵魂的存在 So, we need to appeal to the existence of a soul
以解释你我都具有的肉体的生命力 in order to explain the animation of bodies
我之前说过 我会将 Well, I said I was going to run through
一系列的论证串联起来 a series of arguments
不过那并不意味着 but that doesn't mean that--
灯光熄灭了一下 the lights have just turned off;
我也不知道怎么回事 I don't know why--
那并不意味着我认为这些论点都成立 that doesn't mean that I think the arguments will all work.
第一节课上 我就声明 I announced on the first day of class that I don't,
本人并不相信灵魂的存在 myself, believe in the existence of a soul.
因此 你们大可不必惊异于 As such, it shouldn't be any surprise to you
我接下来的举动 that what I'm going to do
当我们讨论这些论点时 我会说 as we run through each of these arguments is to say,
我并不赞同这个观点 我的理由是 "I'm not convinced by it and here's why."
由于我并不认同我将要介绍的论点 Now since I think that the arguments I'm about to sketch--
尽管我已经开始概述其中的第一个分论点了 and I've just started sketching the first of is fails
我希望你们能够认真思考 I hope you'll think it over
最终你们也会同我的观点一致 and you'll eventually come to agree with me,
的确 这些论点都不成立 yeah, these arguments don't really work after all.
不过对我来说更重要的是 But what's more important to me is
你们至少对这些论点做出思考 that you at least think about each of these arguments.
这个论点有能力 Is this a convincing argument
说明灵魂存在吗 for the existence of a soul?
如果你觉得有 If you think so,
你会如何驳斥 what response do you want to offer to
我的反对意见呢 the objections that I'm giving?
如果这个论点没有说服力 If this argument doesn't work,
有没有其他更具说服力的论点 is there another argument for the existence of a soul
来论述灵魂的存在呢 that you think is a better one?
第一个论点 First argument,
你需要借助灵魂来解释肉体的生命力 you need the soul in order to explain the animation of the body.
从物理主义的角度来说 From the physicalist point of view,
下此结论 为时尚早 of course, the answer is going to be "Too quick."
一具有生命力的肉体 To have an animated body,
必须能正常运作 you need to have a functioning body.
当你面对一具死尸时 It's true that when you've got a corpse,
肉体所有的部分的确都摆在那里 you've got all the parts there,
但它们显然无法正常运作 but clearly they're not functioning properly.
只能告诉我们 部件都损坏了 But all that shows us is, the parts have broken.
还记得音响的例子吗 Remember my stereo?
我扔下音响 I dropped my stereo.
它掉到了地上 It falls on the stage.
再也不能工作了 It doesn't work anymore.
它无法再播放音乐 It stops giving off music.
于是 扬声器不再发出乐曲声了 My boombox stops giving off music.
那并不是因为我们之前在里面放了一张CD That's not because previously--we had a CD inside of it,
装上了电池 we had some batteries.
我们把整个音响摔到地上 We dropped the whole thing.
并非由于先前 It's not as though previously
有什么非物质在里面 there was something nonmaterial there.
现在所有的元件都还在 We've got all the same parts there,
只不过是被摔坏了 but the parts are now broken.
他们之间的连接方式出了问题 They're not connected to each other in the right way.
能量无法再从电池 The energy is not flowing from the batteries
通过电线流入CD部件中 through the wires to the CD component.
对于物理主义来说 There's nothing mysterious from the physicalist perspective
物体会损坏是微不足道的 about the idea that a physical object can break.
尽管我们还需要探讨 Although we need to offer a story about
是什么因素 what makes the parts work
使得各部分在正确的连接方式下 when they're connected with each other
可以正常工作 and interacting in the right way,
但无需诉诸于物质之外的事物 there's no need to appeal to anything beyond the physical.
假如要提炼这个观点 Suppose we try to refine the argument.
比如说 Suppose we say,
你需要诉诸灵魂以解释 "You need to appeal to the soul in order to explain not just
肉体不仅能够活动 无意识地手舞足蹈 that the body moves around, flails,
还能有目的性地运动 but the body acts purposefully."
应该是有什么在发出指令 We need something to be pulling the strings,
引导肉体活动 to be directing the body.
那就是灵魂的职责 That's what the soul does,
二元论如是说 so says the dualist.
然而 物理主义会回击道 In response, the physicalist is going to say,
对 肉体的确 "Yes it's true that bodies
不仅仅是在做无规则运动 don't just move around in random patterns."
人类的肉体不只是这样 Human bodies don't do that.
所以我们需要某个东西来引导 So we need something to direct it,
但是为什么不可能仅仅是 but why couldn't that just be,
肉体某个特定的部分在扮演着 one particular part of the body plays
指挥舱的角色呢 the part of the command module?
假设有一个热追踪导弹 Suppose I've got a heat-seeking missile
正在追踪一架飞机 which tracks down the plane.
当飞机进行闪避时 As the plane tries to dodge it,
导弹会自动修正路线 the missile corrects its course.
它并不是随机变动 It's not just moving randomly,
而是有目的地移动 it's moving purposefully.
最好存在某种东西可以解释 There had better be something that explains,
是什么控制着导弹的运动 that's controlling, the motions of the missile.
这个问题的答案 But for all that,
可能是导弹上的某一特定部分 it could just be a particular piece of the missile that does it.
说得再远一点 More gloriously,
想象我们正在开发机器人 we could imagine building some kind of a robot
那种可以执行各种任务的机器人 that does a variety of tasks.
它不能随机移动 It's not moving randomly,
所有任务都由机器人里的CPU掌控 but the tasks are all controlled by the CPU within the robot.
物理主义认为 The physicalist says
我们并不需要诉诸任何 we don't need to appeal to anything
像灵魂那样夸张的东西来解释 as extravagant as a soul in order to explain
为什么肉体不会随机乱动 the fact that bodies don't just move randomly,
而是在控制下进行的有目的的活动 but they move in purposeful ways that are controlled.
任何一个质疑 都会有回应 For each objection, there's a response.
你可以假想二元论反驳说 You could imagine the dualist coming back and saying,
在热追踪导弹 "Look, in the case of the heat-seeking missile
或是机器人的例子里 or the robot for that matter,
尽管他们各尽其职 although it's doing things,
但也只是恪守命令 it's just obeying orders.
而这些命令 And the orders were given to it
则是由外部发出的 from something outside itself."
有程序操控着机器人和导弹 Something programmed the robot or the missile.
所以我们是不是也需要肉体的外部程序 So don't we need there to be something outside the body
来操控自身呢 那可能就是灵魂了 that programs the body? That could be the soul.
这个问题更深刻了 That's a harder question.
一定有某种物质在体外操控我们的躯体吗 Must there be something outside the body that controls the body?
当然有一种说法是 One possibility, of course, is,
为什么不说人类也是 why not say that people are just robots
也是由外部指令控制着的机器人呢 as well and we get our commands from outside?
从某个大家熟悉的宗教观点来看 On a familiar religious view,
上帝用泥沙尘土建造亚当 God built Adam out of dirt, out of dust.
于是亚当就相当于某种形式的机器人 Adam is just a certain kind of robot then.
上帝为亚当注入生命 God breathes into Adam.
在某种形式上就是打开了他的开关 That's sort of turning it on.
也许人们就是被上帝控制的机器人 Maybe people are just robots commanded from outside by God.
不过那并不意味着我们比 But that doesn't mean that there's anything more to us
机器人更高级 than there is to the robot.
可能会有这样一种回应 That's one possible response.
另一种不同的回应 A different response, of course,
为什么我们不能拥有制造机器人的机器人呢 is why couldn't we have robots that just build more robots?
这样 如果你问起 Then, if you ask,
这些命令从哪里发出 "Where did the commands come from?"
答案是 the answer is,
在他们被创造出来时 "When they were built,
就被构造成一种拥有特定指令 they were built in such a way as to have certain instructions
使它们能够依之开始工作的样子 that they begin to follow out."
就像人类拥有基因编码 Just like people have a genetic code, perhaps,
给我们传达各种各样 that gives us various instructions
得以遵循的指示 that we begin to follow out,
或者是某种与生俱来的心理 等等等等 or certain innate psychology or what have you.
这个观点很快变得离经叛道 The argument quickly becomes very, very messy.
灵魂的支持者开始想要抗议 The fan of the soul begins to want to protest,
听着 我们不是机器人 "Look, we're not just robots.
我们不是 We're not just robots
脑袋里被设定了某种程序只知服从的机器人 with some sort of program in our brain that we're following.
我们拥有自由的意志 We've got free will.
机器人没有自由意志 Robots can't have free will.
所以我们比机器人高级很多 So there's got to be something more to us than robots.
我们不可能只是物质的东西 We can't just be physical things."
这是一个非常有趣的观点 This is an interesting argument,
也很有新意 and I think it's a new argument.
一开始 我们诉诸于灵魂这样一个概念 We started with the idea you needed to appeal to souls
是为了解释 in order to roughly explain
为何人类的肉体能移动 why human bodies move,
为何我们有生命力 why we're animated
为何我们能够非随机性的运动 or why we move in nonrandom ways.
我想大家应该能非常清楚地看到 I think it's fairly clear that you don't need to
这样的诉求并非是必须的 appeal to souls in order to do that.
我认为 如果我们能分辨生命体和 Appeal to a physical body suffices,
非生命体的区别 I think, to have an explanation as to the difference between
理解我们的非随机行为 an animated and an inanimate body,
就足以解释有关物理的肉体的一切问题了 how bodies will move in nonrandom ways.
如果大脑是我们的中央处理器 If the brain is our CPU,
那么我们将会有深思熟虑的 then we'll behave in deliberate,
有目的的行为 purposeful ways just like a
就像如此运作的机器人一样 robot will behave in deliberate, purposeful ways.
因此对于这个初始的论点 So this initial argument,
我认为它并不令人信服 I think, is not compelling.
不过我们仍想知道 这个新的论点怎么样 Still, we might wonder, what about this new argument?
这个事实怎么样 What about the fact that--
我们说过有一大类观点 We said there's a family of arguments,
它们有一些共同的结构 all of which have the general structure,
有关于这个最佳解释的推论 inference to the best explanation,
需要用灵魂的概念 you need souls in order to
来解释功能特征F 代入一个不同的 explain feature F. Plug in a different feature F
功能特征就会得到一个新的论点 and you get a new argument.
我们一开始提到的那个观点 The one we started with--
你需要灵魂来解释肉体的生命力 you need the soul to explain the animation of the body--
我想那个论点并不成立 that argument, I think, doesn't work.
现在我们有了一个新论点 Now we've got a new one.
那就是我们需要灵魂来解释自由意志 You need the soul in order to explain free will.
我们等会再回到这个论点上 Let me come back to that argument later.
这是个很好的论点 It's a good argument.
值得认真探讨 It's an argument well worth taking seriously,
但我们待会再说 but let's come back to it later.
首先 让我们来了解一下其他 First, let's run through some other things
那些备选的功能特征的诉求对象 that might be appealed to as candidates for feature F.
假如有人说 Suppose somebody says,
听着 我承认我们不需要诉诸 "Look, it's true that we don't need to
灵魂来解释 appeal to souls in order to explain
为何肉体能以非随机的形式移动 why bodies move around in a nonrandom fashion.
但人类有一种特殊的技能 But people have a very special ability"--
于是论证得以延续 and so the argument goes--
纯粹的肉体无法拥有 "That mere bodies couldn't have,
物理主义者不能解释的技能 即思考 physicalists can't explain. That's the ability to think.
这就是推理的能力 It's the ability to reason.
人们拥有信仰和欲望 People have beliefs and desires.
而基于他们满足自己欲望的信仰 And based on their beliefs about how to fulfill their desires,
人们作出计划 they make plans.
他们拥有策略 They have strategies.
他们琢磨该怎么做 They reason about what to do.
这些与我们自身联系紧密的东西 This tightly connected set of facts about us--
信仰 欲望 论证 谋略 规划 beliefs, desires, reasoning, strategizing, planning--
非得诉求灵魂才能解释 you need to appeal to a soul"--
这个论点于是变成这样 so the argument goes--;
你需要诉诸灵魂来解释这些 "You need to appeal to a soul to explain that.
没有一个机器拥有信仰 No mere machine could believe.
没有一个机器拥有欲望 No mere machine has desires.
没有一个机器可以推理 No mere machine could reason."
你对于简单机器抱有这种想法 It's easy to see why you might think that sort of thing
是很自然的事 when you stick to simple machines.
很显然对于很多种机器来说 It's pretty clear that there are lots of machines
讨论它们的信仰 欲望 目标或论证 that it doesn't seem natural to
是一件很不自然的事 ascribe beliefs or desires or goals or reasoning to.
譬如说 我的割草机并不想割草 My lawnmower, for example, doesn't want to cut the grass.
虽然事实上它割了草 Even though it does cut the grass,
但它并没有这个愿望 it doesn't have the desire.
它并不会对自己发问 It doesn't think to itself,
我该如何割掉那束一直躲着我的草 "How shall I get that blade of grass that's been eluding me?"
所以很容易明白 So it's easy to see
为什么机器无法做到 why we might be tempted to say
我们刚才讨论的那些特质 no mere machine could think or reason or have beliefs or desires.
这个论点在今天远不及在20年前 That argument's much less compelling nowadays
或40年前有说服力了 than I think it would have been 20 or 40 years ago.
在一个有着能搭载极端复杂程序的电脑的时代 In an era of computers with quite sophisticated computer programs,
最起码 it seems, at the very least,
谈论信仰 欲望 natural to talk about beliefs, desires,
论证 谋划 是很自然的事 and reasoning and strategizing.
所以假如说我们有一个会下国际象棋的电脑 So suppose, for example, we've got a chess-playing computer.
在我家里的电脑里有一个 On my computer at home I've got a program
玩国际象棋的程序 that allows my computer to play chess.
我自己下棋下得很臭 I, myself, stink at chess.
这个程序瞎下都能击败我 This program can beat me blind.
我移动我的象 I move my bishop,
电脑就会下皇后 the computer moves its queen.
我们会怎么理解电脑呢 What do we say about the computer?
为什么它要移动它的皇后 Why did the computer move its queen,
或说成是一个虚拟的后 or virtual queen?
为什么它要移动它的皇后 Why did the computer move its queen?
一个很自然的说法是 The natural thing to say is,
它担心它的王会暴露出来 it's worried about the fact that the king is exposed
因此它试图通过吃掉我的象来封死我 and it's trying to block me by capturing my bishop.
这就是我们对电脑程序的理解 That is what we say about computer-playing programs.
想想我们的做法 Think about what we're doing.
我们把欲望归咎于程序 We're ascribing desires to the program.
我们认为它有最终赢得比赛的欲望 We're saying it's got an ultimate desire to win the game.
而其中的一个附属愿望就是 A certain subsidiary desire is
保护它的王 吃掉我的王 to protect its king, to capture my king.
而另一个附属欲望 A certain other subsidiary desire is,
毫无疑问 则是保护它其他的棋子们 no doubt, to protect its various other pieces along the way.
它有通过阻断特定棋路 It's got beliefs about how to do that by blocking certain paths
或者攻击我的棋子来达到目的的信念 or by making other pieces on my side vulnerable.
它有关于如何达成它的目标的信念 It's got beliefs about how to achieve its goals.
然后 它把那些信念和欲望组合起来 Then, it puts those combinations of beliefs
通过对我的棋路的理性回应 and desires into action by moving in a way
组成它的棋路 that's a rational response to my move.
这看起来好像是一件自然的事情 It looks as though the natural thing
说象棋程序 to say about the chess-playing computer is,
有自己的信念 有欲望 it does have beliefs. It does have desires.
有意图 It does have intentions.
有目标 It does have goals.
它能推理 It does reason.
它可以做到所有的这些 It does all of this.
这在有限的范围内是合理的 It's rational to this limited extent.
它只会下象棋 It's only able to play chess.
但从那种程度来说 But to that extent,
它做到了所有的这一切 it's doing all these things
而我们也没有说 and yet we're not tempted to say, are we,
这个电脑有个非物质的部分 that the computer has a nonphysical part?
我们能从纯物理的角度来解释 We can explain how the computer does all of this
电脑是怎么做到这些的 in strictly physical terms.
当然 一旦你开始用这种思维方式思考 Of course, once you start thinking of it this way,
你就会很自然地把这种思维应用到 it's natural to talk this way across a variety of things
电脑可能想要做的其它事情上 that the computer may be trying to do.
你们完全可以用二元论的观点来回应 It's perfectly open to you, as dualists, to respond by saying,
虽然我们把电脑拟人化 "Although we personify the computer,
把它当作一个人来对待 we treat it as though it was a person,
假定它也具有信念欲望等等那些特质 as though it had beliefs and desires and so forth,
但它并不真正拥有这些相关的信念和欲望 it doesn't really have the relevant beliefs and desires,
因为它没有任何信念或欲望 because it doesn't have any beliefs and desires,
因为任何物理对象都没有信念欲望 because no physical object could have beliefs and desires."
对此 我只想说 In response to that, I just want to say,
那会不会只是一种偏见呢 "Isn't that just prejudice?"
当然 Of course,
如果我们只是单纯地坚持 it is true that if we
说任何纯物理对象都不能真正 simply insist no physical object could really
拥有信念和欲望 have beliefs or desires,
那么当我们试图赋予象棋程序 then it will follow that when we are tempted to ascribe beliefs
信念和欲望的时候 and desires to my chess-playing computer,
我们就陷入了一个错觉 we're falling into an illusion.
这是我们假定 That will follow once we assume
物理对象没有信念或欲望的必然结果 that no physical object has beliefs or desires.
但我们这么说的理由何在 But what reason is there for saying it has no beliefs or desires?
剥夺电脑这些特质的 What grounds are there for withholding ascriptions
依据是什么 of beliefs and desires to the computer?
而这并不明朗 That's far from obvious.
有一种可能 Here's a possibility.
欲望 看上去 Desires, at the very least, seem to be,
起码在常规的例子里 at least in typical cases,
似乎是跟一系列的情绪紧密相连的 very closely tied to a series of emotions.
在玩象棋的时候 你因为希望 You get excited when you're playing chess
吃掉我的皇后下赢我而感到兴奋 at the prospect of capturing my queen and crushing me.
当你的棋子被威胁时你感到惊慌 You get worried when your pieces are threatened.
当然 更常见的情况下 Of course, more generally,
在你的爱人说爱你的时候 you get excited, your heart goes pitter-pat,
你会很激动 心跳加速 when your girlfriend or boyfriend says they love you.
当你考试考砸的时候 Your stomach sinks,
你的胃会垂下去 或者说 you have that sinking feeling in the pit of your stomach,
会有胃部下垂的感觉 when you get a bad grade on a test.
也许正是因为 Maybe what's really going on is the thought
欲望的因素 that there's an aspect of desire
以一种纯粹的行为面显现出来 that has a purely behavioral side,
致使你在下棋时一直抱有这个目标 that's moving pieces around in a way that would make sense
也许机器也能做到这一点 if you had this goal. And maybe machines can do that.
但是欲望的情绪面 But there's an aspect of desires, the emotional side,
是机器没有的 而我们有 that machines can't have, but we clearly do have.
也许我们想把情绪面整合到对欲望的讨论中 Maybe we want to build that emotional side into talk of desires.
所以如果我们说机器 So maybe if we want to say machines
没有也不可能有精神生活 don't have a mental life and couldn't have a mental life,
我们真正的意思是 what we really mean is
机器不能对事物产生情绪 no machine could feel anything emotionally.
我们来区分一下 So let's distinguish.
假设有一种 Let's say there's a way of
讨论信仰和欲望的方式 talking about beliefs and desires
是被一系列 which is just going to be captured
特定环境的 in terms of responding in
回应而捕获的 a way that makes sense given the environment.
也许电脑和机器人能做到这一点 Maybe computers and robots could do that.
显然我们的某个精神方面 But there's clearly a side of our mental life,
情绪方面 才我们最为担心的 the emotional side, where we might really worry,
机器人能感觉到爱吗 could a robot feel love?
它会畏惧什么吗 Could it be afraid of anything?
我们的问题是 Again, our question was,
我们是否需要诉诸灵魂来解释我们自己 "Do we need to appeal to souls to explain something about us?"
物理主义派说不而二元论者说是 The physicalist says "No"; the dualist says "Yes."
如果我们说的是精神的某个方面 If what we mean is the mental, but that the aspect,
即精神的表现面 the behavioral aspect of the mental,
是一个甚至连象棋程序都可能拥有的方面 where even a chess-playing computer probably has it,
那这就不是一个令人信服的论点 then that's not a very compelling argument.
物理主义者会说 The physicalist will say,
精神的那个方面已经很清楚了 "Look, that aspect of the mental is pretty clear.
我们可以从物理的层面来解释 We can explain it in physical terms."
但让我们来换个论点 But let's just switch the argument.
感情这个方面呢 What about emotions?
一个机器人有感情吗 Can a robot feel emotions?
一个纯粹的物理对象能坠入爱河吗 Could a purely physical being fall in love?
它能畏惧什么吗 Could it be afraid of things?
它会期待什么吗 Could it hope for something?
那么我们最新版本的论点就是 The latest version of our argument then is,
人可以有感情 "People can feel emotions.
但如果仔细想想 But if you think about it,
很明显机器人没有感情 it's pretty clear no robot could feel emotions.
没有任何纯物理对象是有感情的 No merely physical thing could feel emotions.
所以我们绝不是一个纯粹物理对象 So there must be more to us than a merely physical thing."
这将作为我们下次课讨论的论点 That's the argument we'll start with next time.