

## Meditation

Usually used in religion as a synonym for contemplation, by which one beholds some spiritual object or obtains spiritual insight. Descartes chose this word for the title of his metaphysical masterpiece: *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1664). Meditation here is the reflection of a solitary thinker or meditator who retreats from the sensible world and frees himself from the influence of preconceived opinions. The purpose of meditation is to discover the indubitable first principles which can serve as the secure foundation of the system of knowledge. The *Meditations on First Philosophy* purports to describe the soul's solitary quest for truth and its discovery.

"I shall first of all set forth in these *Meditations* the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which persuaded me, I can also persuade others." —Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Preface.

## Memory

The capacity to recall past experience and to retain in the present the knowledge acquired in the past. Although some sceptics reject belief based on memory as knowledge on the grounds that there is always a gap between the present remembering and the past, many philosophers consider memory to be a source of knowledge. In most cases memory gives us knowledge of the past. There has been some debate as to what counts as memory, how it is possible to have knowledge of that which is no longer present, and how past knowledge can be retained in the present. Because it is generally taken that there is an analogy between memory and perception, all theories of perception have their counterparts in theories of memory. While indirect realism, or the representative theory of memory developed by Aristotle and Hume, claims that what we remember is an image which represents the past, direct realism argues that our awareness of the past is direct without an intermediary image. For phenomenalism the existence of the past is nothing more than the availability of memory experience.

"Memory demands (a) an image, (b) a belief in past existence. The belief may be expressed in the words 'This existed'." —Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, 1921, p. 186.

## Mens rea

[Latin: guilty mind or guilty mental state] The mental state that a defendant has when he commits a crime. In order to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant has a guilty mind. The malice aforethought of such a mind and the defendant's *actus reus* (Latin: guilty activity) constitute sufficient grounds for the defendant to be liable to punishment. Accordingly, a person is punishable if and only

## 沉思

通常用在宗教中,作为 contemplation 的同义词,指观照某个精神对象,或获得了精神上的洞见。笛卡尔选用这个词作为他的形而上学名著《第一哲学沉思》(1664)的标题。这里的沉思是指一位躲开了可感的世界,摆脱了先入之见影响的孤独思想家(沉思者)的反思。沉思的目的是发现可以作为知识体系可靠基础的不容置疑的第一原理。《第一哲学沉思》打算描述灵魂对真理以及对真理的发现的孤独追求。

"在这些沉思中我将首先提出我的思考,这些思考使我相信我已经达到了关于真理的确实明白的知识,以便看一看根据使我信服的同理由是否也能说服其他人。"——笛卡尔:《第一哲学沉思》,序言。

## 记忆

唤起过去的经验并将过去获得的知识保存至今的官能。尽管有些怀疑论者根据现在的记忆与过去之间所存在的鸿沟而反对将基于记忆之上的信念视为知识,但许多哲学家仍然将记忆视为知识的一个来源。在大多数情况下,记忆给予我们关于过去的知识。关于什么算作记忆、如何能够具有关于不再呈现的东西的知识、过去的知识如何得以保存至今等问题一直存在争论。由于通常认为记忆与知觉之间有相似之处,因此所有的知觉理论都有一个对应的记忆理论。由亚里士多德和休谟所提出的间接实在论或记忆的表征理论声称我们所记住的东西就是表征了过去的映象,而直接实在论则辩称我们对过去的意识是直接的,并没有一个中介的映象。对于现象论来说,过去的存在只是记忆经验的可得性。

"记忆要求 (a) 一个映象, (b) 关于过去存在的信念。这个信念可以表达为 '这曾经存在过'。"——罗素:《心的分析》, 1921年, 第186页。

## 犯罪心态

[拉丁文, "犯罪心态"或"有罪的心态"]被告在犯罪时具有的那种心态。为了保证定罪准确,原告及其律师必须证明被告具有犯罪之心。这种心态的预谋和被告的 *actus reus* (拉丁文:犯罪行为),构成被告应受惩罚的充足根据。因此,只要他或她做出抉择,无论这一抉择是犯罪还是不犯罪,并且实现了那种导致犯法的抉择

if he or she had a choice whether or not to break the law and exercised that choice in favour of breaking it. *Mens rea* varies from crime to crime, and the common feature is that the defendant has knowledge of the bad consequence of the action but still recklessly intends to bring it about. The *mens rea* requirement is contained in the definition of almost all crimes, with the exception of strict liability which does not depend upon mental state. If *mens rea* can be negated for example by insanity or negligence, the same act will be treated rather differently. The *mens rea* point is viewed as a restraint upon the utilitarian theory of punishment according to which a punishment is justified if it promotes generally good consequences.

“In order to prove murder, the state has the burden of proving, among other things, that the accused acted with the appropriate mental states. Such mental states requirements are usually called *mens rea* (very loosely, ‘guilty mind’) requirements.” —Murphy and Coleman, *The Philosophy of Law*, 1984, p. 132.

### Mental act

Activities or processes such as seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling pains, calculating or deliberating in one's own mind. Starting with Brentano, there has been a tradition which separates the occurrence of a mental act from its content. All mental acts are mental events, but not *vice versa*. Mental events such as suddenly noticing something are not regarded as mental acts. But how precisely to distinguish between mental acts and other mental events has been an intensively debated problem. Other philosophers such as Russell claim that is unnecessary to establish a special category of mental acts.

“To begin with, then, I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, etc. ... And because, in a wide sense, they are all of them things which I do, I propose to call them all ‘mental acts’. By calling them ‘acts’ I do not wish to imply that I am always particularly active when I do them.” —G. E. Moore, “The subjectivity of psychology”, in Vesey (ed.) *Body and Mind*, 1964, p. 237.

### Mental causation

A term for the phenomenon of a mental event causing another event, whether physical or mental. As causation involving mental phenomena, it contrasts with physical causation. It is, however, uncertain whether there can be an intelligible notion of non-physical causation. Some believe that mental causation can be understood in purely mental terms. Some argue that mental events have both physical and mental properties. Mental properties are not epiphenomenal and have a significant causal role. A satisfactory explanation of behaviour or mental events is implausible without referring to the mental properties of other mental events.

这个人就该受到惩罚。犯罪心态随罪行的不同而有所不同。其共同的特征是,被告明知其行为的恶果但仍不顾一切地想要去实现它。除了严格的取决于心态的责任以外,犯罪心态要求包含于几乎所有犯罪的界定之中。如果犯罪心态能为(例如)精神病或疏忽所否定,那同样的行为将会受到相当不同的对待。犯罪心态这一条被视为对功利主义的惩罚理论的限制,根据后者,一种惩罚只要它一般说来有助于好的结果就是正当的。

“为了证明谋杀,国家有责任除了其他情况外,提供被告的行为具有相应的心态。这种心态要求通常被称为 *mens rea* (非常宽泛地,‘犯罪之心’)要求。”——墨菲和科耳曼:《法哲学》,1984年,第132页。

### 心的活动

像看、听、闻、感觉疼痛、计算或盘算等等这样的心的活动或过程。自布伦塔诺以来,就有试图将心的活动的发生与其内容分离开的传统。所有心的活动都是心的事件,但反之不然。像突然注意到某事这样的心事件并不被认为是心的活动。但究竟如何严格区分心的活动与心的事件曾是一个大有争议的问题。另外一些像罗素这样的哲学家则声称,将心的活动作为一个特别的范畴是不必要的。

“那么从我看、我听、我闻、我尝等开始……由于在广义上,它们都是我所做的事情,所以我提议将它们都称作‘心的活动’。我把它们叫作‘活动’并不意味着我在做这些事情时总是特别地主动积极。”——摩尔:《心理学的主观性》,见韦西(编)《身与心》,1964年,第237页。

### 心的因果性

这一术语指心的事件导致另一物理的或心的事件的现象。作为涉及心的现象的因果作用,它与物理的因果性相对。然而,很难说能否有一个说得清的非物理的因果性概念。有人相信心的因果性可以以纯粹的心的语汇来理解。有人论辩说心的事件既有物理特性也有心的特性。心的特性并非附随现象,它们具有重要的因果作用。不借助于其他的心事件的心特性就不可能令人满意地解释行为或心的事件。这一说法有时被叫作“心的不可替代性”。戴维森的“变异一元论”声称不存在心物定律。按照这一

Such a claim is sometimes called mental indispensability. Davidson's anomalous monism claims that there are no psycho-physical laws. Following this line, many philosophers believe that mental events, if they can produce any physical effects, must be themselves physical and that mental causation is due to the physical properties of mental events. They claim that mental causation is intelligible only when mental events or states are related to physical phenomena and to physical causality by being determined by physical causality or supervenient upon it.

"The mental causation must be realized or constituted by the physical process." —Child, *Causality, Interpretation and the Mind*, 1994, p. 116.

### Mental event

An event that has mental properties, such as thinking, feeling or willing. Either mental events exist independently or they have more fundamental physical properties. If a mental event causes some effect, must this causation be explained in terms of its physical properties, or is it because its mental properties themselves are causally potent? This question is related to the problem about the relationship between mental events and physical events which is one of the central issues in the current debate of philosophy of mind. Davidson's anomalous monism claims that while every mental event is a physical event, there are no strict psychophysical laws that connect the mental and physical realms.

"Mental events (by which I mean events described in the mental vocabulary, whatever exactly that may be) are like many other sorts of events, and like material objects, in that we give their locations with no more accuracy than easy individuation (within the relevant vocabulary) demands." —Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 176.

**Mental indispensability**, see mental causation

### Mental phenomenon

Brentano's term, also called a psychical phenomenon, in contrast to a physical phenomenon. He argued that mental phenomena are characterised by their reference to something as an object, but that their objects, using the scholastic term, have intentional inexistence and need not exist. Mental phenomena have immanent contents of consciousness and intentional objects, in contrast to physical phenomena which contain external objects which transcend the mind. Brentano's distinction between mental and physical phenomena in terms of intentionality has had great influence. He classified mental phenomena into presentation (I see, I hear), judgement (I affirm, I reject) and emotional acts (I feel, I wish). Mental phenomena are not merely static, but

思路,许多哲学家认为,心的事件如果能够产生任何物理效应,那么它们本身一定是物理的,而心的因果性则源于心的事件的物理特性。他们认为,只有当心的事件或状态因由物理因果性所决定或伴随于物理因果性而与物理现象和物理因果性相关时,心的因果性才是可以理解的。

"心的因果性一定由物理过程来实现或组成。"——恰尔德:《因果力、解释与心》,1994年,第116页。

### 心的事件

具有思维、感觉、意愿等等这样的心的特性的事件。心的事件或者独立存在,或者具有更为基本的物理特性。如果一个心的事件产生某种效应,这应当用其物理特性来解释呢,还是因为心的特性本身具有因果力?这一问题与心的事件与物理事件的关系问题相关联,后者是当代心的哲学中的中心议题。戴维森的变异一元论声称,每一心的事件都是一个物理事件,但并不存在严格的心物定律来连接心的领域和物的领域。

"心的事件(我是指那些用心的词汇来描述的事件,不管那到底是什么)像许多其他种类的事件一样,也像物质对象一样,我们对它们的定位并不比简单的(用相关词汇所做的)区分更为精确。"——戴维森:《关于行为与事件的论文集》,1980年,第176页。

### 心的不可替代性

见“心的因果性”条。

### 心的现象

布伦塔诺所使用的一个与物理现象相对的词,也被称作心理现象。他认为,心的现象的特点在于它们总是将某物作为一个对象来指谓;而且,这些对象具有意向性的内存在(intentional inexistence,这是取自经院主义的一个词),它们不必实际地存在(exist)。心的现象有内在的意识内容和意向对象,这完全不同于物理现象;物理现象包含超出了心的外在对象。布伦塔诺通过意向性来区分心的现象和物理现象的做法产生了重大影响。他将心的现象分为表象(我看,我听)、判断(我断定,我拒绝)和情感行为(我感到,我希望)。心的现象不是纯静态的,而是以积极主动为特征的,直接

are characteristically active and directed upon some object. A mental phenomenon is the object of inner perception and the subject-matter of psychology. The terms "mental phenomenon" and "intentional inexistence" have been closely examined by R. Chisholm and have been the subject of vigorous debate.

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity." — Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (tr, McAlister), 1973, p. 88.

### Mental representation

Representation in the mind. It is commonly believed that to think about something is to have that thing represented in one's mind. Etymologically, "meaning" is associated with the "mind". To mean something is to have it in one's mind. To think about the White House is to have an image of the White House in one's mind. A word or a concept is associated with a certain image in the mind of the language-user. If two concepts are synonymous, they are associated with the same mental representation. But the problem of clarifying the nature of mental representation is a vexed issue. Some believe that to represent the world is to have a model of it in your mind; some believe that a representation is an image which represents things in virtue of resembling them; some suggest that a mental representation is a language-like symbol that does not have to be similar to what is symbolised; and still others think that mental representation is simply a neurophysiological state. According to Fodor, mental representations are linguistic expressions within the language of thought, and mental representations have syntactic and semantic properties comparable to those of a natural or an artificial language. There are various types of representation. Which kind counts precisely as a mental representation? Does mental representation constitute the content of thought? Does mental representation serve merely as an image or have a causal role in the brain? How can representations get to be about things in the world? These and other problems have been matters of dispute.

"The central question about mental representation is this: what is it for a mental state to have a semantic property? Equivalently what makes a state (or an object) in a cognitive system a representation?" — Cummins, *Meaning and Mental Representation*, 1989, p. 11.

### Mental state

Mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, intentions,

作用于某个对象。心的现象是内在知觉的对象，因而是心理学的题材。齐硕姆仔细地研讨了“心的现象”和“意向性的内存在”这两个词，它们是被人们激烈争论的主题。

“每个心的现象的特征在于中世纪经院哲学家所说的某个对象的意向性的(或心的)内存在，以及我们可以不那么精确地称为对某个内容的指谓、对某个对象(这里不是指一个事物)的指向，或内在的客观性那样的东西。”——布伦塔诺：《从经验立场看的心理学》(麦克阿里斯特英译)，1973年，第88页。

### 心的表征

存在于心中的表征，人们通常认为，思考某事就是将此事表征于心中。在词源学上，“意义”与“心”相关联。意味某事即是心中有此事。想到白宫即是在心中有一个关于白宫的映象。一个词汇或一个概念与语言使用者心中的某个映象相联系。如果两个概念是同义的，它们就与同一个心的表征相联系。但澄清心的表征的本质这一问题十分令人烦恼。有人认为，表征世界就是在心中有一个世界的模型；有人则认为，一个表征是一个借助于相似于事物来表征事物的映象；另有人认为，一个心的表征是一个类似于语言的符号，无须相似于所代表的东西；还有人认为，心的表征只是一个神经生理状态。根据福多的观点，心的表征是在“思维语言”中的语言表达。心的表征具有可比于自然语言或人工语言的句法特征和语义特性。有各种不同的表征。究竟哪一种恰可看做是心的表征呢？心的表征构成思维的内容吗？心的表征只是一个映象，还是在大脑中具有因果作用？表征如何得以关涉世界中的事物？这一系列问题都曾引起争论。

“心的表征的中心问题是：心的状态具有语义特性是怎么回事？同样地，什么使得认知系统中的一个状态(或对象)成为表征？”——库敏斯：《意义与心的表征》，1989年，第11页。

### 心的状态

像信念、需求、意向和感觉这样的心的现

and sensations. The nature of these phenomena has been a central question in the philosophy of mind. Different theories of mind are distinguished largely according to their respective answers to this problem. According to Cartesian dualism, mental states are inner, non-material states of a mental substance. According to Hume, the self or mind is a succession of mental states. According to behaviourism, mental states consist simply in dispositions to behave in various ways. According to the identity theory, mental states are identical with states of the brain. According to functionalism, mental states are defined in terms of their causal relations to input stimuli, other mental states and external behaviour. All mental events are mental states, but not all mental states are mental events.

“Let us describe a mental state as a state which can be directly observed only through introspection and cannot be directly observed by more than one individual, viz. the individual who is in that mental state.” —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 267.

**Mentalese**, another term for language of thought

### Mentalism

Synonymous with idealism and panpsychism. The position that physical or bodily things can be explained in terms of mental things, and that the latter exist in a real sense. On this view, everything is mental in character. Mentalism is thus opposed to materialist claim that all mental things are explained in terms of physical things and that the latter exist in a real sense. Berkeley and other mentalists claim that physical objects are nothing but sensations or perceptions. Leibniz said that the monads which compose the world are ultimately spiritual. Hegel and other absolute idealists consider the whole material world to be mental in nature. These philosophers hold different versions of mentalism.

“Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called mentalist theories.” —Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, 1968, p. 5.

### Mentalistic linguistics

Chomsky's characterisation for his own approach to linguistics. On the basis of the distinction between competence and performance, he claims that linguistics should study competence, that is the speaker's internalised transformational-generative rules of language. Introspection is one excellent source of data for the study of language. Linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology which deals with structure and process in human minds and can be connected with observed behaviour only in an indirect way.

象。这些现象的本质一直是心的哲学的中心议题。不同的心的理论在很大程度上依其对这一问题不同回答来区分。根据笛卡尔的二元论,心的状态是心的实体的内部的、非物质的状态。根据休谟的观点,自我或心是一系列心的状态。根据行为主义的观点,心的状态只是由以各种方式进行行为的倾向所组成。根据“同一论”,心的状态同一于大脑状态。根据“功能主义”,心的状态由其与输入刺激、其他的心状态和外部行为之间的因果关系来定义。所有的心事件都是心的状态,但并非所有的心状态都是心的事件。

“让我们将心的状态描述为这样一个状态:它只能通过内省而被直接观察到,而无法由某个人,亦即处于那个心的状态的那个人之外的其他人直接观察到。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第267页。

### 心的语言

“思维语言”的别名。

### 心灵主义

“观念论”和“泛心论”的同义语。这种观点认为,物理的或身体的东西可以用心的东西来解释,并且后者在真正的意义上存在。根据这种观点,所有的东西在本质上都是心的。因此它与唯物论是对立的,后者主张所有的心东西都用物理的东西来解释并且后者在真正的意义上存在。巴克莱和其他的心灵主义者声称,物理对象只是感觉或知觉。莱布尼茨说道,构成世界的单子最终是精神的。黑格尔及其他绝对观念论者认为整个物质世界归根结蒂都是心的。所有这些哲学家主张不同形式的心灵主义。

“有些关于心与身的理论试图将身还原为心或心的某种特性。这样的理论可以叫作心灵主义理论。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯物主义的心的理论》,1968年,第5页。

### 心灵主义语言学

乔姆斯基对自己语言学方法的描述。根据能力和运用的区分,他认为语言学应该研究能力,即内在于说者的语言转换生成规则。内省对语言研究来说是最好的论据来源。语言学是研究人类心的结构和过程的认知心理学分支,它只能以间接的方式与观察行为相联系。这样一种心灵主义的方法是与行为主义方法相对立的。行为主义方法为了解释行为抛弃了内省、意识以及其他心灵主义术语。心灵主义与行为主

Such a mentalistic approach is opposed to behaviourist approaches which reject introspection, consciousness and other mentalistic terms for the purpose of explaining behaviour. The contrast between mentalism and behaviourism in the philosophy of language is essentially a contrast between rationalism and empiricism.

“Mentalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data (along with other data, for example the data provided by introspection) for the determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of its investigation.” —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 93.

### Mentality

The possession of a mind. The features which enable a human being to think, feel, imagine, and act. Different philosophies have different explanations of mentality. According to Cartesian dualism, mentality consists of inner states independent of physical states. According to some versions of physicalism, all facts about mentality can be reduced to facts about the states of central nervous systems. Mentality in this sense becomes the subject-matter of brain science. Non-reductive physicalism identifies mental states with brain states, but retains the mental for discussion at an autonomous level of theory. Mentality can also refer to what is going on in an individual's mind which makes him a distinct person. In this broad sense, mentality is synonymous with style of thought or way of thinking and is formed partly as a result of one's social and cultural setting.

“[H] is own mentality, ... is his own assumptions, values, expectations, and perceptions of what is possible.” — Tiles and Tiles, *An Introduction to Historical Epistemology*, 1993, p. 46.

### Mercy

Also called nonmaleficence, an ethical demand that one should do one's best to relieve the pain or suffering of another person where this is possible and to the extent that the relief is in the suffering person's interest. In contemporary ethics, this moral demand is closely linked with the issue of euthanasia or mercy killing, that is whether it is morally justified to end the life of a terminally ill and gravely suffering patient who is of sound mind and wants to die. Mercy is a major reason for supporting the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia, but some consider such deaths as murder. There are also problems about patients who make choices under the influence of others, about the presentation of cases of involuntary euthanasia as voluntary cases, and about euthanasia for those who are not of sound mind or who cannot express a view. In all of these cases, considerations of mercy might support euthanasia, but respect for life and free consent might oppose it.

义在语言哲学中的对立，基本上就是理性主义与经验主义的对立。

“心灵主义语言学只是理论语言学，它把运用作为确定能力的论据（当然还有其他的论据，例如由内省提供的论据），而能力则被看作是它研究的主要对象。”——乔姆斯基：《句法理论的若干方面》，1965年，第93页。

### 心性

拥有一个心，是指能使一个人去思维、感觉、想像和行为的那些特征。不同的哲学家对心性具有不同的解释。根据笛卡尔的二元论，心性由独立于物理状态的内部状态所组成。根据某些形式的物理主义，关于心性的所有事实都可以被还原为关于神经中枢系统的状态事实。心性在这个意义上是脑科学的课题。非还原的物理主义将心的状态同一于大脑状态，但仍在理论的自主水平上讨论心的东西。心性亦可指一个人的心中所发生的那些使其成为一个独特的人的东西。在这一宽泛的意义上，心性是“思维风格”或“思维方式”的同义语并且部分地由其社会文化背景所形成。

“他自己的心性……是他自己的假定、价值、期望和对可能的东西的知觉。”——泰尔斯和泰尔斯：《历史认识论引论》，1993年，第46页。

### 怜悯

也叫不做恶，一种道德上的要求：一个人在可能的情况下应尽其最大可能去解除另一个人的痛苦或苦难，这种解除要限于符合受苦难人利益的范围。在当代伦理学中，这一道德要求与有关安乐死或慈杀的争论有密切关系，即在一个神智正常的身患绝症并极度痛苦的病人要求死的情况下，结束这个人的生命在道德上是否是正当的。怜悯是支持容许自愿安乐死的一个重要理由，但有些人认为这样致死是谋杀。与此相关的问题还有：病人是在他人影响下做出的选择；把不自愿的情况说成是自愿的；对那些神智不正常或不能表达自己意见的人实行安乐死。在所有这些情况中，对怜悯的考虑会支持安乐死，但对生命和自由同意的重视会反对它。

“这种怜悯原则确立了两种组合起来的义务：1. 不造成进一步痛苦或苦难的义务；2. 去结束已发生的痛苦或苦难的义务。”——巴廷；

“This principle of mercy establishes two component duties: 1. the duty not to cause further pain or suffering, and 2, the duty to act to end pain or suffering already occurring.” —Battin, *The Least Worst Death*, 1994, p. 102.

**Mercy killing**, another term for euthanasia

### Mereological essentialism

A theory developed by Roderick Chisholm which claims that if anything is ever a part of a whole, then it is a part of that whole as long as the whole exists. The whole possesses that part in every possible world in which the whole exists. The theory is mereological because it deals with the relationship between wholes and parts, and it is essentialist because it holds that the parts of an object are essential to that object. At first glance, this claim conflicts with common sense, for we usually deny that having a part is essential for an ordinary thing to persist. But Chisholm argues that we must distinguish between a proper part in a strict philosophical sense and an improper part in a looser ordinary sense. The loss of a proper part will cause an object to change its identity, whilst the identity of an object will be maintained with the loss of an improper part. Chisholm's theory deals with parts which a whole has necessarily and which are essential to that whole. This theory is useful in dealing with puzzles such as that of the ship of Theseus, in which we ask whether an object maintains its identity after each of its parts is successively replaced.

“The principle of mereological essentialism that I have advocated may be put this way: For every X and Y, if X is ever part of Y, then Y is necessarily such that X is part of Y at any time that Y exists.” —Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 149.

### Mereology

[from Greek: *meros*, part] The formal theory of logical relationships between wholes and parts, derived from Aristotle and developed in the twentieth century by figures such as Lesniewski, Tarski and Nelson Goodman. It claims that any individual whole is a mereological sum, that is the least inclusive thing that includes all of its parts. It is composed of these parts and of nothing else. Consequently, two individuals, X and Y, if identical, must have the same proper parts. David Lewis claims that a world is the mereological sum of all the possible individuals that are parts of it. Mereology was intended to provide an alternative foundation of mathematics, but its claims are controversial. Many counterexamples exist to its theorems, especially with regard to organic wholes. Nevertheless, the applications of this important formalism are still being explored. Because mereology applies to individuals, it is called the calculus of

《最佳死亡》，1994年，第102页。

### 慈杀

“安乐死”的另一个名称。

### 部分学的本质主义

齐硕姆提出的一种理论，它断言：如果任何事物是一整体的一部分，那么，只要该整体存在，它就是该整体的一部分。该整体在它存在的每一个可能世界中都具有该部分。此理论是部分学的，因为它处理整体和部分之间的关系；它是本质主义的，因为它主张一对象的部分对于该对象是本质性的。初看起来，这一断言是与常识相冲突的，因为我们通常否认有一部分对于一持续存在的普通事物是本质性的。但齐硕姆论证说，我们必须区分严格的哲学意义上的真部分和松散的日常意义的非真部分。失去真部分将使得一对象改变它的身份，若失去一非真部分，一对象的身份却仍将保持住。齐硕姆的理论处理一整体必然具有且对于该整体是本质性的部分。这一理论在处理忒修斯(Theseus)之船疑难这样的问题时是有用的，在后者中我们问：在一对象的每一部分都相继被替换后，该对象是否仍保持它的身份。

“我所提倡的部分学本质主义的原则可以这样表述：对于每一个X和Y，如果X曾是Y的部分，则Y必然使得在Y存在的任何时间内X都是Y的部分。”——齐硕姆：《人与物》，1976年，第149页。

### 部分论

[源自希腊文 *meros*，部分] 部分论是关于部分与整体的逻辑关系的形式理论，来自亚里士多德，20世纪由莱斯涅夫斯基、塔斯基和N. 古德曼等人所发展。它声称任何单个整体都是部分的总和，亦即包含其所有部分的范围最小的东西。它只由这些部分所组成。结果，如果两个个体X和Y是同一的，就一定具有相同的真部分。D. 刘易斯声称，世界是作为其部分的所有可能个体的部分总和。有人试图以部分论作为数学的另一基础，但这种主张颇有争议，其定理存在许多反例，特别是对有机整体而言。然而，对这种重要的形式主义的应用仍在探索之中。因为部分论应用于个体，所以被称为个体演算，与被称为类别演算的集合论相对立。

“部分论是关于部分与整体的关系的理论，是关于隶属关系的概念。这些隶属关系之一就

individuals, in contrast to set theory, which is called the calculus of classes.

“Mereology is the theory of the relation of parts to wholes, and kindred notions. One of these kindred relations is that of a mereological fusion, or sum; the whole composed of some given parts.” —David Lewis, *Parts of Classes*, 1991, p. 1.

### Merit

Excellence or worth which deserves reward. We can distinguish between moral merits, such as virtues, and non-moral merits, such as skills and abilities. All merits are qualities that are or should be respected and admired in society. Whether or not a quality is a merit is determined in relation to the social purpose it serves. In contrast to egalitarianism and utilitarianism, a meritocratic political philosophy would distribute benefits and responsibilities in proportion to the merit of those who receive them, and a society would be just if it conformed to this distribution. Since merit is not allotted equally, distribution according to merit demands that unlike cases should be treated unequally. On this view, those possessing special merit deserve special and discriminatory treatment. Merit is closely related to the idea of desert, equity, fairness and justice. A distribution based on merit is not an equal one, but it aims to promote fairness and justice. A difficulty facing this position is the ease with which power, influence and the pretence of merit can displace real merit as a basis for enhanced reward.

“I distinguish desert, which is concerned with what an agent has done, from merit, which is concerned with what he is.” —Lucas, *Responsibility*, 1993, p. 3.

### Meritocracy

A society in which all institutional positions are filled according to selection procedures based on relevant qualifications, skills, abilities, achievements and promise. It judges and promotes people on the grounds of the quality of their existing service. Meritocracy is a type of aristocracy, for it creates an elite group of people with special powers; but it is also democratic, for it is based on the equality of opportunities, according to which the distribution of opportunities is in accordance with capacities and achievements. However, meritocracy might lead to many types of inequalities, and it is controversial whether talent is a suitable fundamental ground for justifying these inequalities. In contrast to traditional inegalitarian meritocracy, two new forms of meritocracies have recently been proposed. In egalitarian meritocracy, inequalities would not be based on the social functions of the job but on the needs or other deserts of the job holders. In maximum meritocracy, inequalities would be allowed, but under certain conditions that are favourable to those whose abilities are

是部分融合或总和：整体由某些给定的部分所组成。”——刘易斯：《类的部分》，1991年，第1页。

### 才能

值得奖励的优点或价值。我们可以区分道德才能（例如美德）和非道德才能（例如技巧和能力）。所有的才能都是在社会中受到或应当受到尊重和羡慕的品质。对一种品质是否是才能的确定与它所服务的社会目的有关。相对于平等主义和功利主义而言，才能主义的政治哲学要按人们具有才能的多少来分配利益与责任，如果一个社会遵从这样的分配，它就是公正的。由于才能不是平均分摊的，所以按才能分配就要求不同情况予以不同对待。根据这一观点，那些拥有特殊才能的人应受到特殊的、有差别的对待。才能与功过、平等、公平和正义等观念密切相联。以才能为基础的分配不是一种平等的分配，但它的目标是促进公平和正义。这种观点面临的困难是容易出现权力、影响和假才能取代作为增强奖励基础的真才能的情况。

“我把功过与才能加以区分，前者涉及一个人做了什么，后者涉及他是什么样的人。”——鲁卡斯：《责任》，1993年，第3页。

### 能人统治

指的是一个社会中所有机构的职务都是根据基于相应的资格、技能、能力、成绩和前途的选举程序来任命的。它对人们的评价和提升依据的是他们现在的办事质量。能人统治是一种贵族统治，因为它造就了一个握有特殊权力的精英集团；但它又是民主的，因为它以机会平等为基础，即机会的分配是与能力和贡献相一致的。可是，能人统治也会导致很多不平等，在天资是否是证明这些不平等的适宜的的基本论据这一问题上存在争论。最近提出了两种与传统的平等的能人统治不同的新的能人统治形式。在平等的能人统治中，不平等不是基于工作的社会功能，而是基于对工作持有者来讲是必要的东西或其他方面的美德。在最大限度的能人统治中，不平等的存在是允许的，但只是在一定的条件下，即要利于那些其能力不可能使他们得到高薪工作的人。在一个正义的社会中，能人统治中用作分配职务的基础的天资应否视为直接属于个人，罗尔斯对此提出了质疑。

unlikely to gain high-reward jobs. Rawls raises the question of whether the talents which are used in a meritocracy as a basis of assigning positions should be seen as straightforwardly belonging to the individual in a just society.

“Meritocracy: a social order built around a particular notion of merit.” —Daniels, *Justice and Justification*, 1996, p. 302.

### Meshing problem

According to classical utilitarianism, we should choose a society containing the maximum total good over societies containing less good. We also believe that we should choose a society with the most nearly equal distribution of good over other societies in which the good is distributed more unequally. The ideal, of course, is to combine the greatest possible total good with the most nearly equal distribution. But the world is not perfect, and we cannot necessarily realise this ideal. The meshing problem asks how we can mesh or harmonise the desire to maximise good and the desire to distribute good relatively equally. If one society possesses more good but distributes it less equally and another society possesses less good but distributes it more equally, which one should we choose? How can we assess the merits of each society, and how can we strike a balance between them? The meshing problem indicates that the principle of utility has the severe limitation of ignoring distributive justice.

“This ‘meshing problem’ of balancing the total amount of good at issue in a given putative distribution against the fairness of the distribution in cases where these two desiderata cut against one another is one which utilitarians (and non-utilitarians, for that matter) has never been resolved satisfactorily.” —Rescher, *Distributive Justice*, 1966, p. 40.

### Meta-epistemology

Meta-epistemology is the epistemology of epistemology. Normal epistemology can be called “substantive epistemology” which concerns the relation between knowledge and belief, between knowledge and truth and between knowledge and justification, and deals with inquires about the origin of knowledge, while meta-epistemology compares and evaluates all kinds of epistemology. It analyses basic epistemic concepts, determining their limits and the conditions of their application.

“Meta-epistemology is concerned with the basic concepts we employ in epistemology, concepts of knowledge, truth, belief, justification, rationality, and so on, and with the methods, procedures, and criteria to be employed in determining how to apply these concepts.” —Alston, *Epistemic Justification*, 1989, p. 2.

“能人统治：一种围绕才能这一特定概念建立的社会秩序。”——丹尼尔森：《正义与辩护》，1996年，第302页。

### 协调上的问题

根据经典的功利主义，我们应选择包含最大的总体利益的社会，而不是包含较少利益的社会。我们还相信，我们应选择利益分配最为平等的社会，而不是利益分配更为不平等的社会。当然，理想的东西是将最大可能的总体利益与最为平等的分配结合起来。但世界是不完美的，我们必然无法实现这一理想。协调上的问题要我们回答，如何才能把要求最大利益与要求相对平等地分配利益协调或一致起来。如果一个社会拥有较多的利益而分配利益较少公平，另一个社会拥有较少的利益但分配利益更为公平，我们应选择哪一个呢？我们怎样才能确定每一社会的长处？我们怎样才能能在它们之间取得平衡？这一协调上的问题表明功利原则有严重的忽视分配公正的局限性。

“争论中的‘协调上的问题’，即在两个迫切需要的东西相互排斥的情况下，在一既定的、公认是不公正的分配中平衡全部利益的问题，是功利主义者（及非功利主义者，就这一问题而言）从未做出令人满意的解决的问题。”——雷谢尔：《分配上的公正》，1966年，第40页。

### 元认识论

元认识论是关于认识论的认识论。规范的认识论可以称作“实质的认识论”，它关心的是知识与信念、真理、辨明的关系，研究知识的起源，而元认识论则是比较和评价所有的认识论。它分析基本的认识概念，确定它们的基本范围以及适用的条件。

“元认识论关心的是我们在认识论中运用的基本概念，如知识、真理、信念、辨明、合理性等等概念，以及用于确定如何运用这些概念的方法、步骤和标准。”——阿尔斯通：《认知辨明》，1989年，第2页。

## Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics is usually said to deal with ethics itself, in contrast to normative ethics which deals with substantive ethical questions. The major components of meta-ethics include the study of the nature of ethics, the conceptual analysis of key moral terms and inquiry into the method for answering moral questions. The purpose of the study of the nature of ethics is to discuss what ethics is and does and to discuss the objectivity and validity of ethical claims themselves. The purpose of conceptual analysis is to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of major moral concepts. The purpose of the inquiry into method is to specify the ways to answer moral questions from a moral point of view. Meta-ethics is, then, a logical and epistemological inquiry concerning the nature of normative ethical statements.

The distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics appeared with the development of linguistic philosophy in this century and was deeply influenced by Moore's distinction between saying what goodness is and saying what things are good. Ayer and Stevenson explicitly drew upon this distinction. Many analytical philosophers believed that meta-ethics should be the main concern of ethics, and this claim became one of the main characteristics of the development of ethics in English-speaking countries in this century. However, this distinction itself has become more and more problematic. Recent moral philosophers view meta-ethical judgements and normative judgements as interdependent and many judgements are hard to classify according to this distinction.

"Twenty or thirty years ago, it was standard practice to distinguish 'ethical' from 'meta-ethical' theories. The first made substantive claims about what one should do, how one should live, what was worthwhile, and so on. The second concerned itself with the status of those claims: whether they could be knowledge, how they could be validated, whether they were (and in what sense) objective, and so on." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 72.

## Metalanguage

Tarski drew a distinction between object language and metalanguage. The object language is that with which we talk about extra-linguistic things and objects (the language in which we speak), while the metalanguage is the language in which we talk about the object language (the language about which we speak). An example of an object language statement is "New York is a large city" and an example of the latter is " 'That New York is a large city' is true". Tarski argued that the definition of truth must be relative to a language, for the one and the same sentence may be true in

## 元伦理学

与研究实质性伦理问题的规范伦理学不同,元伦理学一般被认为是研究伦理学本身的。元伦理学主要成分包括对伦理学性质的研究,对于关键性的道德词汇进行概念分析,以及对于回答道德问题的方法的研究。对于伦理学性质的研究在于讨论伦理学是什么和做什么,讨论伦理主张本身的客观性和正当性。概念分析的目的在于说明运用主要的道德概念的有效性和充分条件。关于方法探求的目的在于说明以何种方式从道德观念上回答道德问题。因此,元伦理学是一种对于规范伦理学陈述性质的一种逻辑的和认识论的研究。

元伦理学和规范伦理学区分的出现是20世纪语言哲学发展的结果。这一区分深受摩尔对于说善是什么和说什么是善的区分的影响。艾耶尔和C.L. 斯蒂文森明确地划分了元伦理学与规范伦理学。长期以来,许多分析哲学家相信,元伦理学应是伦理学的主要内容,这种主张成为20世纪英语国家伦理学发展的主要特征之一。不过,这种区分本身越来越成问题。最近以来的哲学家把元伦理的判断和规范伦理的判断看成是相互依赖的,许多判断很难以此类分。

"20或30年前,将'伦理的'从'元伦理理论'中区分出来是一般的做法。伦理学对一个人应做什么,应该怎样生活,什么是值得的等提出实质性的主张;元伦理则涉及到这些主张本身的地位,即它们是否能是知识,它们何以能是有效的,它们是否是(和在什么意义上是)客观的等。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第72页。

## 元语言

塔斯基在"对象语言"和"元语言"之间作出了区分。对象语言是我们用以谈论语言之外的事物和对象的语言(我们在其中说的那个语言),而元语言则是我们在其中谈论对象语言(我们所谈说的那个语言)的语言。前者的例子是"纽约是一座大城市",后者的例子是" '纽约是一座大城市'是真的"。塔斯基论证说,真定义必须是相对于某个语言而言的,因为同一个句子可以在一语言内为真,但在另一语言内为假。对象语言是相对于它而定义真的语言,元

one language but false in another. The object language is the language for which truth is defined, and the metalanguage is the language in which we construct the definition of truth in the object language. Truth is in this way viewed as a semantic property of object language sentences and a predicate of a metalanguage applicable to sentences of its object language. A metalanguage contains either the object sentence itself or a translation of it. The appeal to metalanguage can avoid the danger of semantic paradoxes, for in a metalanguage the object sentences are not used but only mentioned and discussed. This distinction is significant for formal semantics.

“The names of the expressions of the first language, and of the relations between them, belong to the second language, called metalanguage.” —Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, 1983, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 167.

### Metalogic

Motivated by Hilbert's distinction in mathematics between meaningful inference and formalised calculus, metalogic takes the systems of formal logic as its subject matter. It is therefore the theory of logic. It is the result of the combination of Boole's formalism and Frege's theory of proof. The first system of metalogic was developed by Tarski. It differs from formal logic in that it is not concerned with meaningful inference, but only with purely formal questions arising from formal logical systems, that is formal properties of formal logic systems such as consistency; consequence, completeness, decision procedure, deduction, categoricity and satisfaction. It differs from the philosophy of logic because it deals with the conditions under which various formal theories possess these properties, rather than with the philosophical issues raised by logic systems.

“Metalogic is the study of formal properties of formal logical systems.” —S. Haack, *Philosophy of Logics*, 1978, p. 1.

### Metaphilosophy

A term introduced by Lazerowitz for the philosophical discussion of philosophy itself, including, for example, its nature, method, goals, autonomy and objectivity. Hence it is second-order philosophy. According to the first-order branch of philosophy under discussion, such as metaphysics, epistemology or ethics, we can also divide metaphilosophy into metametaphysics (meta-ontology), meta-epistemology, and meta-ethics. The division between first-order and second-order studies has lost some of its popularity, and philosophers now find it more difficult to draw a sharp distinction between metaphilosophy and philosophy. For those who believe that philosophy comes to an end, metaphilosophy refers to the theoretical activities after the

语言则是我们在其中用对象语言构造真定义的那个语言。这样一来,真被视为对象语言句子的语义性质,并且是一个适用于其对象语言句子的元语言谓词。元语言或者包含对象句子本身,或者包含该句子的译文。诉诸元语言可以避免语义悖论的危险,因为在元语言中对象句子不被使用,仅被提及和讨论。这一区分对于形式语义学是意义重大的。

“第一语言的表达式的名称,以及这些表达式之间关系的名称,都属于第二语言,后者叫做元语言。”——塔斯基:《逻辑、语义学与元数学》,1983年,第2版,第167页。

### 元逻辑

受希尔伯特在数学中区分有意义的推理和形式化演算的启发,元逻辑以形式逻辑系统作为它的研究对象,所以它是关于逻辑的理论。它是布尔的形式主义和弗雷格的证明理论相结合的产物。第一个元逻辑系统是由塔斯基提出的。它区别于形式逻辑之处在于:它并不关注有意义的推理,而只关注从形式逻辑系统中产生的纯形式问题,即形式逻辑系统的形式性质,如相容性,后承,完全性,判定程序,演绎,范畴性,满足等等。它区别于逻辑哲学之处在于:它讨论各种形式理论具有上述性质的条件,而不是处理由逻辑系统所提出的哲学问题。

“元逻辑是对于形式逻辑系统的形式性质的研究。”——哈克:《逻辑哲学》,1978年,第1页。

### 元哲学

拉泽诺维茨引入的哲学术语,旨在对哲学自身作哲学讨论,包括(例如)哲学的性质、方法、目标、自主性和客观性。因此它是二阶哲学。根据所讨论的哲学的一阶分支,诸如形而上学、认识论或伦理学,我们也可以把元哲学划分为元形而上学(元本体论)、元认识论和元伦理学。一阶和二阶研究之间的划分已经不再流行,哲学家们现在发现要在元哲学和哲学之间作出明晰区分是更为困难了。对于那些认为哲学已告终结的人来说,元哲学指在哲学消亡之后的理论活动。

“我们必须承认在哲学和元哲学方面的区分:发挥和捍卫哲学见解的人与批判性地考察

death of philosophy.

“We must recognize the distinction between the philosophic and meta-philosophic perspectives: there is a difference between the one who develops and defends a philosophical position and the one who examines that position critically.” —Yolton, *Metaphysical Analysis*, 1968, p. 19.

## Metaphor

[from Greek; *metaphora*, a transfer, a change] A figure of speech or a verbal composition in which an expression is used to denote a thing to which its literal sense does not apply. For example, “a baby is a flower” is a metaphor because “flower”, taken literally, does not describe a baby. If there were only literal meaning, all metaphors would be false. The best metaphors evoke a complex and productive mental response through indicating certain likenesses between what an expression literally denotes and the thing it metaphorically describes. The power of metaphors can also involve dissimilarities as well as likenesses. Starting from Aristotle, the nature and scope of metaphor has been of interest to philosophers. This interest has intensified in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Major issues concerning metaphor include: can a metaphor itself be literally paraphrased? How clear-cut is the distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning? Traditionally metaphor is regarded as a decoration of speech which does not contribute to the cognitive meaning of discourse. Others argue that metaphor contributes indispensably to the cognitive meaning of discourse, but there is no agreement over the kind of contribution it makes. Davidson claims that what is crucial to a metaphor is not a matter of meaning, but of use. In his view, a metaphor lacks meaning peculiar to itself other than literal meaning. But Nietzsche claimed that the nature of language itself is metaphorical, for it works by means of transference from one kind of reality to another. This view that has been widely adopted by continental philosophers, who regard metaphor not merely as a rhetorical device or an aspect of the expressive function of language, but as one of the essential conditions of speech. They claim that as the way in which many kinds of discourse are structured, metaphor powerfully influences how we conceive things.

“The study of metaphor is becoming important as it is being realised that language does not simply reflect reality but helps to constitute it.” —Sarup, *A Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-Modernism*, 1993, p. 47.

## Metaphysica generalis

General metaphysics, in contrast to *metaphysica specialis*, special or particular metaphysics. The distinction

那种见解的人之间是有区别的。”——尤尔顿：《形而上学分析》，1968年，第19页。

## 隐喻

[源自希腊词 *metaphora*, 意指“转换”、“变化”]一种修辞格或文字组合法,用于指某种与其字面意思不符的表达式。譬如,“婴儿是朵花”是个隐喻,因为“花”从字面意思上看并非描写婴儿的。如果只有字面意思,那么所有隐喻就成为虚假的了。最上乘的隐喻是通过表明某一词汇的字面意思与其所暗示的事物之间的相似性,来唤起一种复合词意的和构成新词意的内心反应。隐喻的作用也能涉及到相异和相像。从亚里士多德开始,隐喻的本质与范围一直倍受哲学家们的关注。当代心的哲学和语言哲学强化了对隐喻的关注。关于隐喻的主要问题包括:隐喻本身能从字面上得到意释吗?字面含义与隐喻含义的区别到底会有多么明确呢?在传统意义上,隐喻被视为一种言语修饰,它对话语的认知意义并不起什么作用。其他一些人则争辩说,隐喻以不可或缺的方式有助于话语的认知意义,但是对隐喻的这种作用没有达成一致的看法。戴维森认为,对隐喻来讲,至关重要的并非是意义问题,而是使用问题。在他看来,隐喻并不具有不同于字面意义上的独特意义。可是,尼采则认为,语言自身的性质就是隐喻性的,因为语言是通过将一种现实转换为另一种现实而发挥作用的。这一观点得到欧洲大陆哲学家的广泛认同,他们把隐喻不仅看作一种修辞手段或语言表达功能的一个方面,而且将其看作言语的基本条件之一。他们还认为隐喻作为各种话语构成的一种方式,对人们如何感知或理解事物具有重大的影响。

“隐喻研究日益重要,因为人们正在认识到语言不仅反映而且有助于构成隐喻。”——萨罗波:《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》,1993年,第47页。

## 一般形而上学

一般形而上学,相比较于特殊形而上学而言。这一区分可溯至亚里士多德的形而上学。亚

an be traced back to Aristotle's metaphysics. Aristotle himself referred to metaphysics as first philosophy or *sophia* (wisdom), that is the science of ultimate causes and principles. Sometimes he said that metaphysics is the science of being *qua* being and that such an enquiry provides a starting point for all other sciences. Elsewhere he held that metaphysics is concerned with a special kind of being which is beyond the sensible substances, namely God, and that it is therefore theology. The medieval philosophers called these two accounts of metaphysics respectively *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*. Aristotle believed that these two accounts of metaphysics are reconcilable, but did not offer any convincing argument for that conclusion. The problem of dealing with these two accounts has given rise to major debate in Aristotelian scholarship and greatly affects our understanding of his metaphysics. The distinction was retained in the later development of metaphysics, but the meaning varied. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, general metaphysics was identified with ontology, which was concerned with general concepts, while special metaphysics was identified with natural theology. For Wolff, general metaphysics concerned *ens qua ens* (being *qua* being), and special metaphysics concerned substance and its attributes. Brentano distinguished between broad ontology and narrow ontology. The former amounts to general metaphysics, discussing the general nature of things, and the latter amounts to special metaphysics, with theology as its subject-matter.

"What is important... is the conception of an inquiry into being in general—general ontology, or what medieval philosophers called *metaphysica generalis*, as opposed to *metaphysica specialis*." —Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, 1984, p. 2.

*Metaphysica specialis*, see *metaphysica generalis*.

### Metaphysical deduction

Part of the transcendental analytic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, although its official title is "the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding". The metaphysical deduction is concerned with uncovering the origin of the categories and identifying them systematically, in contrast to the transcendental deduction which is concerned with establishing the legitimacy of these categories. Knowledge must be derived from what is given in sensible intuition and the judgements we make on that basis. Taken together, these two determinations indicate that our intuition of things must conform to the logical functions of judgement. The categories are or stem from these logical functions of judgement. Kant therefore derived twelve categories or pure concepts of the understanding from what he regarded as the complete classification of the kinds of

里士多德自己把形而上学称作“第一哲学”或“智慧”，即关于终极原因与原则的科学。有时他把这一形而上学称作关于“作为是的是”的科学，并认为这一研究为其他科学提供了出发点。有时他又说形而上学探讨一类超越可感本体的特殊存在（即神），所以是神学。中世纪哲学家们把这两种形而上学分别叫做“一般形而上学”和“特殊形而上学”。亚里士多德相信它们是可以调和的，可却未能对此提供令人信服的论证。这在亚里士多德研究中引起了重大争论，极大地影响了我们对他的形而上学的理解。这一区分在形而上学的后来发展中得到了保存，但意义却有了变化。在17和18世纪，一般形而上学等同于本体论，关注一般概念；而特殊形而上学却等同于自然神学。在沃尔夫哲学中，一般形而上学研究“作为是的是”，而特殊形而上学则研究本体及其属性。布伦塔诺区分了广义本体论和狭义本体论。前者相当于一般形而上学，讨论事物的一般性质，而后者相当于特殊形而上学，以神学作为其主题。

“真正重要的是对一般存在的探究这一概念，即一般本体论；也即是中世纪哲学家们所称为的与特殊形而上学相对的一般形而上学。”——哈姆林：《形而上学》，1984年，第2页。

### 特殊形而上学

见“一般形而上学”条。

### 形而上学演绎

康德《纯粹理性批判》中先验分析论中的一部分，尽管其正式题目为：“发现一切纯粹知性概念之思路。”它论及对范畴本源的揭示和对它们的系统辨明。形而上学演绎相对于论及确立这些范畴的合法性的先验演绎。知识必须来源于感性直观中所给予的东西和我们以此为基础而作出的判断。这两个规定一起表明：我们对事物的直观必须遵照判断的逻辑功能。范畴来源于或简直就是判断的这种逻辑功能。因此康德把十二个范畴或纯粹知性概念从他视为各种判断的完满分类体系中推导出来。只有将某一范畴应用于经验，我们才能作出判断。这种推导就是他对范畴的形而上学演绎。它表明，在判断中存在着思维的基本结构，它对直观杂多的综合给予统一。批评家们可以接受范畴与判断的演

judgements. Only by applying one of these categories to experience can we make a judgement. This derivation is his metaphysical deduction of the categories. It shows that there is a fundamental structure of thought in judgement which gives unity to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Critics might accept the relation of categories to the logical functions of judgement, but seek to revise his classification of kinds of judgement in line with modern developments of logic.

“In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought.” — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B159.

### Metaphysical entities

Also called inferred entities. The term that Russell uses to refer to such items as material objects, space and time, which are initially postulated as the ultimate constituents of reality, but which cannot be directly experienced and are instead known by inference. He also calls them unknown entities or inferred entities. In Russell's logical atomism, these entities can be eliminated and replaced by logical constructions, and we therefore need not include them among the real constituents of the world. In contrast, the class of entities which comprise the logical constructions are called known entities.

“By metaphysical entities I mean those things which are supposed to be part of the ultimate constituents of the world, but not to be the kind of thing that is ever empirically given.” — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VIII, p. 238.

### Metaphysical exposition

Part of the transcendental aesthetic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of space contains four arguments: (1) “space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences”; (2) “space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions”; (3) “space is not a discursive, . . . but a pure intuition”; and (4) “space is represented as an infinite given magnitude”. The first two argue claim that space is a priori, and the latter two claim that space is an intuition. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of time makes similar points about time.

“The exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.” — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B38.

### Metaphysical subject

The Cartesian self and related versions of the “philosophical ‘I’”, classically a separate, simple thinking substance, tracing a subjective path through the world and

辑功能的联系,但力图依据现代逻辑的发展来修订他对判断的分类。

“在形而上学演绎中,通过范畴与思维的一般逻辑功能的完全一致,已证明了范畴的先天起源。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B159。

### 形而上学实体

也叫“推论出的实体”。罗素用这个词来指称诸如物质对象、空间和时间这样的东西,这些东西本来被规定为实在的最终组成部分,但不能被直接经验到,而是由推论而为人所知。他也将它们称为未知实体或推论出来的实体。在罗素的逻辑原子论中,这些实体可以被消除,并由逻辑构造来取代。因此我们无需将其纳入世界的真正组成部分之中。相反,由逻辑构造组成的那类实体称为“已知实体”。

“所谓形而上学实体,我指的是这样的东西,它们被认为是世界的最终成分的一部分,但不是在经验中所予的东西。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第八卷,第238页。

### 形而上学阐明

康德的《纯粹理性批判》中先验感性论的一部分。空间概念的形而上学阐明由四个论证组成:(1)“空间不是从外部经验得来的经验概念”;(2)“空间是作为一切外部直观根基的必然的先天表象”;(3)“空间不是论证性的,而是纯直观”;(4)“空间被表象为一种无限给予的量”。前两个论证说明这个主张:空间是先天的,后两个论证说明:空间是一种直观。时间概念的形而上学阐明与空间概念的形而上学阐明相类似。

“当阐明包含把概念展示为先天给予的东西,它就是形而上学阐明。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B38。

### 形而上学主体

笛卡尔的自我,与“哲学上的‘我’”相关的说法,按经典的表达就是一种分离的、简单的思维主体,它通过世界回溯到主观道路,可以在

capable of surviving bodily death. Hume's discussion of personal identity and Kant's rejection of the main aspects of the rational theory of the soul does much to undermine such positions. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, the "I think" which accompanies all of my representations, provides a more austere grounds for an account of the metaphysical subject. Contemporary philosophers have also raised questions about the metaphysical self. Heidegger's *Dasein* is an attempt to replace the traditional notion of the self as part of his rejection of metaphysics. Wittgenstein, like Kant, rejects the view that the metaphysical subject is one object among others in the world and links his discussion of the self to his assessment of solipsism and the claim that the world is my world.

"The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world." —Wittgenstein, *Notebooks* 1914—1916, 2 September 1916.

## Metaphysics

A term originally used as the title of a compilation of Aristotle's writings, according to tradition by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century AD. The title *Ta meta ta phusika* was used because the compilation came after (*meta*) the physical writings in the classification of Aristotle's works. This position, however, had a philosophical basis in its subject-matter, because Aristotle intended it to be an inquiry into objects which are prior to or higher than physical objects, giving reasons for what we instinctively believe. Hence this title can be applied to a whole branch of philosophy. Metaphysics now generally refers to the study of the most basic items or features of reality (ontology) or to the study of the most basic concepts used in an account of reality. On some accounts, metaphysics deals primarily with non-sensible entities or with things outside the scope of scientific method, but other metaphysical views reject these claims.

Aristotle himself referred to this kind of investigation as first philosophy or *sophia* (wisdom), that is the science of ultimate causes and principles. He sometimes said that it is the science of being *qua* being, or what it is simply to be. Sometimes, he identified it with theology because it is concerned with a special kind of being, namely God, which is beyond the sensible substances. Medieval philosophers called these aspects of metaphysics respectively *metaphysica generalis* (general metaphysics) and *metaphysica specialis* (special or particular metaphysics).

In the rationalist tradition, metaphysics was seen to be an inquiry conducted by pure reason into the nature of an underlying reality which is beyond sense-perception, although major metaphysicians, such as Plato, Descartes,

身体死亡后继续存在。休谟对个人同一性的讨论以及康德对灵魂唯理论的主要方面的否认，都极大地打击了这些见解。康德的统觉的先验统一性，即伴随着我的全部表象的“我思”，提供了更可靠的理由来对形而上学主体加以说明。当代哲学家也对形而上学的自我提出质疑。海德格尔的“此在”是一种努力，作为他拒斥形而上学的一部分，要取代传统的自我概念。维特根斯坦像康德一样，拒绝形而上学主体是世上各种对象之一一种的看法，并把他对自我的讨论与他对唯我论的评价相联系，主张世界就是我的世界。

“哲学上的我不是人类，不是人的身体或具有心理学性质的人的灵魂，而是形而上学的主体，世界的分界线（而不是一部分）。”——维特根斯坦：《笔记本 1914—1916》，1916年9月2日。

## 形而上学

传统认为，“形而上学”这一词最初是罗德岛的安德罗尼科在公元1世纪用来作亚里士多德一集作品的标题的。他之所以用 *ta meta ta phusika*（直译是“在物理学之后”）这一标题，是因为在他对亚里士多德作品的分类中，这集作品摆在关于物理学的作品之后 (*meta*)。不过，这样一个位置在其主题上有他的哲学基础，因为亚里士多德在这些作品中研究的乃是那先于或高于物理对象的事物，从而对我们在直观上相信的一切给出理由。因此，这一标题便能应用于整个哲学分支。现在，形而上学一般是指对实在的最基本的成分或特征的研究（本体论），或者对我们在叙述实在时所用的最基本概念的研究。按照某些用法，形而上学主要讨论不可感的事物，或者科学方法范围之外的事物。但其他的形而上学观点则反对这些说法。

亚里士多德自己把这类研究称作“第一哲学”或 *sophia*（智慧），即关于终极原因和原则的科学。有时他称之为“作为是的是”的科学（即什么是“是”的科学），有时他又将之等同于神学，因为它讨论一类特殊的是（存在），即超越可感本体的神。中世纪哲学家把形而上学的这些不同方面分别叫做“一般形而上学”和“特殊形而上学”（或具体形而上学）。

在理性主义传统中，形而上学被看做是由纯理性所操作的对超越感官知觉的内在实在性质的研究，虽然主要的形而上学家，如柏拉图、笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨和黑格尔，对内在实在是什么具有完全不同的见解。C. 沃尔夫把形而上学分成四部分：本体论（关于是或存在的一般理论）、理性神学（关于上帝）、理性心理学

Spinoza, Leibniz and Hegel disagreed sharply over what the underlying reality might be. Christian Wolff divided metaphysics into four parts: ontology (a general theory of being or existence), rational theology (about God), rational psychology (about the soul) and rational cosmology (about the world).

Kant labelled all attempts to use pure reason to account for a transcendent reality beyond human understanding as speculative metaphysics. Kant thought that metaphysics is a necessary propensity of the human mind towards total explanation and that its transcendent subject-matter (God, Freedom of the Will and Immortality) can be the grounds for the right way to act (metaphysics of morals), even though speculative metaphysics cannot yield knowledge. Kant's critical philosophy is a metaphysics in another sense, which deals with the conditions for the possibility of experience and the presuppositions of science.

Carnap and other logical positivists defined metaphysics as the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of empirical sciences and believed that this field should be eliminated as nonsensical. On the other hand, they considered that their own work was restricted to logic and experience and should be called scientific philosophy.

For different motives, Heidegger and Derrida also sought to exclude metaphysics from their thought although they did not satisfy themselves that they succeeded.

Strawson drew a famous distinction between revisionary metaphysics and descriptive metaphysics. He called speculative metaphysicians revisionary, in contrast to descriptive metaphysics, which is concerned with the conceptual scheme according to which we think and talk about the world. Accordingly, logical positivism and other anti-metaphysical philosophies are themselves a kind of metaphysics insofar as they deal with the conceptual structure of human language and thought.

In a special use associated with Marxism, metaphysics is considered to be a partial, stationary and isolated way of thinking opposed to Hegelian dialectics.

"Metaphysics is for us the name of a science, and has been for many centuries, because for many centuries it has been found necessary, and still is found necessary, to think in a systematic or orderly fashion about the subjects that Aristotle discussed in the group of treatises collectively known by that science." —Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, 1940, p. 4.

### Metaphysics (Kant)

In a positive sense, metaphysics for Kant is the system of knowledge arising out of pure reason, that is knowledge which is attained *a priori* and involves only *a priori* concepts. It is divided into a speculative part, the

(关于灵魂) 以及理性宇宙论 (关于世界)。

康德把一切力图以纯理性来叙述超越人类理智的超验实在的努力都归作思辨的形而上学。他认为,形而上学乃是人类心灵寻求整体解释的一种必然倾向。虽然思辨的形而上学不能产生知识,它的超验主题(上帝,自由意志和灵魂不朽)可以作为正当行为的根据("道德形而上学")。康德的批判哲学是另一意义上的形而上学,它研究经验可能性及科学设定的条件。

卡尔纳普及其他逻辑实证主义者把形而上学看做是声称对超越经验科学领域的事物的本质具有知识的领域。他们认为,这一领域应作为无意义的东西而加以清除。另一方面,他们又主张他们自己的工作限制在逻辑和经验之内,应称作科学哲学。

出于不同的目的,海德格尔和德里达也试图从他们的思想中排除形而上学,尽管他们对自己的工作并不感到满意。

斯特劳森提出了"修正的形而上学"和"描述的形而上学"这一著名区分。他把思辨的形而上学称作是修正性的,而与之相对立的描述的形而上学则讨论我们据以思考和谈论世界的概念构架。据此,逻辑实证主义和其他反形而上学的哲学也都是一种形而上学,因为它们都在讨论人类语言和思想的概念结构。

在一种与马克思主义有关的专门的意义上,形而上学被看做是一种片面的、静止的和孤立的思维方式,与黑格尔的辩证法相对立。

"形而上学对我们来说是一门科学,已经存在许多世纪了。因为许多世纪以来人们一直觉得有必要,现在仍觉得有必要,以系统的或有序的方式来思考亚里士多德在以那门科学命名的一组论著中所讨论的主题。"——柯林伍德:《论形而上学》,1940年,第4页。

### 形而上学 (康德)

在其正面意义中,对康德来说,形而上学是产生于纯粹理性的知识体系,即先天地获得的和只涉及先天概念的知识。它划分为思辨的部分(即自然形而上学)和实践的部分(即道德形

metaphysics of nature, and a practical part, the metaphysics of morals. In a strict sense, metaphysics is confined to the metaphysics of nature, but in a wider sense, metaphysics also includes the metaphysics of morals and criticism, that is the investigation of the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure *a priori* knowledge and is propaedeutic. Metaphysics in this wide sense is the same as the philosophy of pure reason.

The metaphysics of nature discusses the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts and employed in the theoretical knowledge of all things. It is further divided into transcendental philosophy, which deals with understanding and reason without taking into account the objects given, and the physiology of pure reason, that is the rational physiology of objects that can be given in experience. The latter is divided into transcendent and immanent parts. The metaphysics of morals, also called morals proper, deals with the *a priori* principles of morality, that is the principles that determine and make necessary all of our actions.

In both the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, there is a transcendental analytic, which concerns the legitimate application of their *a priori* principles within the limits of experience, and a transcendental dialectic, which exposes the fallacies in traditional metaphysics arising when pure reason applies these principles to things in themselves beyond experience. The *Critique of Pure Reason* reveals in detail the illusions or errors of traditional metaphysics, especially of rational cosmology, rational psychology and rational theology. The represents both sides of Kant's attitude toward metaphysics. He scorns the claim of traditional metaphysics to be the queen of the sciences, but believes that the metaphysics of his critical philosophy can inquire into the properties of things and show the limits of human reason. Hence, rather than being totally demolished, metaphysics needed redefinition or reconstruction.

"The title 'metaphysics' may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type — in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason."  
—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A841/B869.

**Metaphysics of morals**, see metaphysics (Kant)

**Metaphysics of nature**, see metaphysics (Kant)

而上学)。在其严格意义上,形而上学只是指自然形而上学。但在广义上,形而上学也包括道德形而上学和“批判”的东西,即对与一切纯粹先天知识有关的理性官能的研究,并且是预备性的研究。广义的形而上学就是关于纯粹理性哲学。

自然形而上学探究那种从纯概念推导的、并且应用于一切事物的理论知识的纯粹理性原理。它进一步划分为先验哲学和纯粹理性自然学,前者只论及知性和理性而不考虑给予的对象,后者是能在经验中给予对象的理性自然学。理性自然学又进而分为超验的和内在的部分。道德形而上学也称为“严格意义的道德”;它论及道德的先天原理,即决定我们的一切行为并使它们成为必然的原理。

在自然形而上学和道德形而上学中,有先验分析论,它涉及把这些先天的原理合法地应用到经验的界限内;还有先验辩证论,它揭示由于纯粹理性超越经验而把这些原理应用于物自身所产生的传统形而上学的谬误。《纯粹理性批判》详细地揭露了传统形而上学,特别是理性宇宙学、理性心理学和理性神学的幻象和谬误。这表现了康德对待形而上学的两方面态度。一方面,他排斥把形而上学作为科学之王后的主张。另一方面,他相信他的批判哲学的形而上学能探究事物的性质,并能表明人类理性的界限。因此形而上学不能全部推翻,但需要重新规定或重构。

“然而,‘形而上学’之名称,也可加于纯粹哲学之全体,包括批判在内,因此也包括一切能先天认识的东西之探究,以及构成此类知识的纯粹哲学方式体系之阐明——这样与理性的一切经验的和数学的应用相区别。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A841/B869。

**道德形而上学**

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

**自然形而上学**

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

**Metaphysics of presence**, see presence

**Metempsychosis**, see transmigration of soul; reincarnation

**Methexis**, Greek term for participation

## Method

A combination of rules, assumptions, procedures and examples determining the scope and limits of a subject and establishing acceptable ways of working within those limits to achieve truth. The question of philosophical method is itself a matter for philosophy and constitutes a major example of the reflective nature of the subject. Philosophers disagree about the appropriate philosophical method. The identifying mark of a philosophical school or movement lies mainly in the method it adopts. Ancient philosophy was developed according to various interpretations of dialectic method, and modern philosophy was initiated by Descartes' method of doubt. Analytic philosophy is characterised by linguistic method, while non-analytic European philosophy is characterised by phenomenological, historical and textual methods. Historically, philosophers have tried to model their work on the methods of successful sciences, such as mathematics, physics, biology, psychology and computer science, but the appropriate relationship between philosophical and scientific method is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers draw methodological implications from the claim that philosophy is a part of science or ancillary to science, while others derive their account of philosophical method from the claim that philosophy is prior to science and other disciplines and presupposed by them.

“By a ‘method’ I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly increase one’s knowledge till one arrives at a true understanding of everything within one’s capacity.”—Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham, et al.), 1985, I, p. 16.

## Method of agreement

The first of Mill’s five inductive canons. Take two instances, A and B, of a given phenomenon. If we observe that the possible causes of A include c, d and e, and the possible causes for B include f, g and e, we eliminate c and d, which are peculiar to A, and f and g which are peculiar to B. There remains a common factor e for both A and B, and we may conclude that e is the cause or part of the cause of the phenomenon. The principle underlying this method is that whatever can be excluded without doing injustice to the

## 在场的形而上学

见“在场”条。

## 灵魂转生

见“灵魂轮回”、“再生”条。

## 分有

“分有 (participation)” 的希腊词。

## 方法

方法是决定一个主题的范围和界限,并确定在这些界限内可接受的获取真理的工作方式的准则、假定、程序和范例的组合。哲学方法问题本身也是一个哲学问题,并成为哲学的反思性质的一个主要特征。哲学家们对什么是合适的哲学方法并无一致意见。鉴别一个哲学学派或运动的标志,主要在于它所采用的方法。古代哲学的发展充满了对辩证法不同解释。近代哲学始于笛卡尔的怀疑方法。分析哲学为其语言方法所表征,而非分析的欧洲哲学为其现象学方法、历史方法和本文方法所刻画。在历史上,哲学家曾尝试模仿成功科学的方法,例如数学、物理学、生物学、心理学和如今的计算机科学的方法,然而哲学方法与科学方法之间的适当关系是一个争论的话题。有些哲学家从哲学是科学的一部分或科学的辅助这一观点得出其方法论含义,而其他人则从哲学先于科学并为科学及其他学科所预设这一立场来发展其对哲学方法的叙述。

“我所说的‘方法’意思指可靠的规则,它们是易于应用的,并且如果人们严格地遵循它们,就绝不会把假的当做真的,或是无效地耗费人们的精神上的努力,而将逐步和不断地增加人们的知识,直至达到对人们能力范围内每一事物的真实理解。”——笛卡尔,《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等人译),1985年,第一卷,第16页。

## 契合法

密尔五条归纳规则的第一条。假定有一既定现象的两个事例A和B,如果观察到A的可能原因包括c、d、e,B的可能原因包括f、g、e,然后我们排除A特有的c、d,排除B特有的f、g,留下了A和B的共同因子e,于是,我们可以得出结论:e是该现象的原因或部分原因。这个方法所根据的原理是:凡是对一现象可以并无不当地加以排除的因素,就与该现象没有因果关系。我们通过这个方法所揭示的是被考

phenomenon has no causation with it. What we uncover through this method is a sufficient condition for the phenomenon under investigation.

“As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to ascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the method of agreement.” —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 390.

### Method of concomitant variations

The fifth of Mill's five inductive canons states that if it is the case that when the phenomenon P changes, another phenomenon Q changes concomitantly, this sort of functional dependence between these two phenomena suggests that P must be a cause of Q, or Q of P, or both of them are the effect of the same cause. However, we need further methods to determine the exact relationship between P and Q.

“Method of concomitant variations... is regulated by the following canon: whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.” —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 401.

### Method of difference

The second of Mill's five canons or inductive methods. Suppose a phenomenon P happens in circumstances A, but not in the circumstances B. A contains conditions c, d, e and f, and B contains conditions c, d and e. Since A and B differ only in condition f, and P occurs in A but not B, we may conclude that f is the cause of the phenomenon P. The principle underlying this method is that whatever cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon is the cause of the phenomenon. What we uncover through the method of difference is a necessary condition for a phenomenon.

“The canon which is the regulating principle of the method of difference may be expressed as follows: If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.” —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 392.

**Method of elimination**, another expression for induction by elimination

### Method of residues

The fourth of Mill's five canons applies to cases in which a phenomenon P can be caused by any one of the conditions e, f, or g, and we wish to determine which condition is the cause. We already know through previous induction that

察现象的充足条件。

“这个方法是通过比较不同事例,确定它们在什么方面相同,所以我把它称作契合法。”——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第390页。

### 共变法

密尔五条归纳规则的第五条,表述为:现象P发生变化,另一现象Q伴随着变化,如果情况是这样,那么,这两个现象的这种相互作用就表明,P必定是Q的原因,或Q是P的原因,或两者都是同一个原因的结果。不过,我们需要进一步的方法来确定P和Q的确切关系。

“共变法……依据如下规则:凡是一现象以任何方式变化,这时都有另一现象以某种特定方式变化,那么,这个现象要么是另一个现象的原因,要么是另一个现象的结果,要么与另一个现象通过某个因果事实联系着。”——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第401页。

### 差异法

密尔的五规则或五条归纳规则的第二条。假定现象P在情形A下发生,但未在情形B下发生。A包含条件c、d、e、f,B包含条件c、d、e。因为A和B只在条件f上不同,而P发生于A而不是B,于是我们可以得出结论:f是现象P的原因。这个方法所根据的原理是:凡是不排除就不能制止现象发生的因素,就是该现象的原因。我们通过差异法所揭示的是现象的必要条件。

“作为差异法规范原理的规则,可以表述如下:如果一个被考察现象出现的事例,和一个被考察现象未出现的事例,除了只发生在前者的一个情况外,一切情况都相同,那么,两个事例惟一不一致的这个情况是该现象的结果,或原因,或原因的不可缺少的部分。”——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第392页。

### 淘汰法

“淘汰归纳法”的另一种表述。

### 剩余法

密尔五条归纳规则的第四条,适用于如下情况:如果一现象P可以被条件e、f、g中的任何一个所引起,而我们希望确定是哪一个。我们通过前面的归纳已知e、f都不是P的原因。那

neither e nor f is the cause of P. Then, the remaining condition g, which is the residue, might be the sufficient condition of P. Such a conclusion is inferred and needs to be proved by further observations.

“The canon of the method of residues is as follows: subtract from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedent.” — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 398.

### Methodological collectivism

Also called methodological holism, a collective or holistic approach to social phenomena. In contrast to the assertion of methodological individualism that all explanations of social phenomena must be reduced to facts about individuals, methodological collectivism holds that collective phenomena are explanatorily prior to facts about individuals. Social wholes are much better known and more immediately accessible than the individuals that constitute them. Whilst we can learn much from the study of aspects of individual humans and their actions, the social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be defined by appeal to the features of its component individuals. Facts about society cannot be reduced to the decisions, attitudes and dispositions of the individuals. The social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of the description of individuals, for in most of their activities individuals behave in culturally sanctioned ways. Methodological collectivism was developed by Comte and Durkheim. Hegelians and Marxists are also generally regarded as methodological collectivists.

“[M]ethodological collectivism [is the] tendency to treat ‘wholes’ like ‘society’ or the ‘economy’, ‘capitalism’ (as a given historical ‘phase’) or a particular ‘industry’ or ‘class’ or ‘country’, as definitely given objects about which we can discover laws by observing their behaviours as wholes.” — Hayek, in O’Neill, *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, 1973, p. 44.

**Methodological holism**, another expression for methodological collectivism

### Methodological individualism

A kind of reductionism which believes that a social whole or structure is merely a logical construction out of its individual components or parts, and hence that statements about the social whole can be explained in terms of statements about the features or properties of the individuals. An explanation is sound only if it is couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals. No explanations that appeal to social structures, institutional factors and so

么剩下的条件g,即剩余者,也许是P的充足条件。这样的结论是推断出来的,需要进一步观察的证明。

“剩余法的规则如下:从任何现象中去掉由以前归纳所知是某些前例的结果的部分,该现象的剩余部分是剩下的前例的结果。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第398页。

### 方法论的集体主义

也被称为方法论的整体主义,一种研究社会现象的集体的或整体的方法。方法论的集体主义与方法论的个人主义不同,后者断言,所有对社会现象的解释都必须归结为关于个人的事实,前者则认为,社会的集体现象在解释上比有关个人的事实更重要。人们对社会整体的了解比对构成它们的个人的了解更多,也更直接。虽然我们可以从对个人及他们行为方面的研究中了解到很多东西,但社会整体有它自己的高级复杂的规律,这些规律是不能通过求助其组成者的个人特征来解释的。有关社会的事实不能还原为个人的决定、态度和性情。社会整体是一个真实的整体,是使个体的描述具有意义的基础,因为在其绝大多数活动中,个人是按文化上认可的方式行事的。方法论的集体主义是由孔德和杜克海姆提出的。黑格尔主义者和马克思主义者一般也被视为方法论的集体主义者。

“方法论的集体主义是这样一种倾向,即把‘社会’,或‘经济’、‘资本主义’(作为既定的历史‘阶段’),或一特定的‘工业’,或‘阶级’,或‘国家’这些‘整体’作为明确的既定的对象来对待,通过观察它们的作为整体的行为,我们可以发现有关它们的规律。”——海雅克,载《个人主义的模式和集体主义的模式》(奥尼尔编辑),1973年,第44页。

### 方法论的整体主义

“方法论的集体主义”的另一种表述。

### 方法论的个人主义

一种还原论,相信社会整体或社会结构仅仅是来自于它的个体成分或部分的逻辑构造,因此关于社会整体的陈述能够依据对个体特性的陈述来解释。只有完全依据个人事实的解释才是正确的解释。那诉诸于社会结构、制度因素及诸如此类的任何解释都不具有合法性。这种观点可以追溯至霍布斯。他宣称,在我们能够适当地理解一个组合物之前,必须了解一个组合

on are legitimate. The position can be traced back to Hobbes who claimed that it is necessary to understand the constitutive parts out of which a compound is built before we can properly understand the compound itself. This methodology was further maintained by Comte, J. S. Mill, Max Weber and Karl Popper. All of them held that the basic elements in the explanation of historical and social progress are individual human beings. The beliefs, dispositions, and situations of the individuals are essential for understanding social phenomena. The theory is opposed to methodological holism, which holds that a social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be reduced to laws about its component individuals. On the contrary, a social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of statements about its constituent individuals. The debate between methodological individualism and holism is prominent in sociology and the philosophy of social sciences.

“The doctrine of methodological individualism may therefore be viewed as implying the reducibility of the specific concepts and laws of the social sciences (in a broad sense, including group psychology, the theory of economic behaviour, and the like) to those of individual psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics.” —Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, 1966, p. 110.

### Methodological solipsism

A term introduced by Putnam in 1975 in relation to his claim that there are two types of mental state, wide and narrow. Narrow mental states, such as pain, do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. Wide mental states, such as being jealous of somebody, carry reference to the world outside the subject. Narrow mental content is intrinsic, while wide content refers to one's physical or social environment. Methodological solipsism is the doctrine that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states and that mental states should be individuated by reference to items internal to the individual whose mental states they are. We should explain the content of a propositional attitude solely by identifying it with events occurring inside the mind. There is no need to investigate the environmental causes or behavioural effects of the mental states or processes. The doctrine likens a mental process to the computing of a machine which is not fully determined by the physical elements. In a sense, both physicalism and functionalism carry the restriction of methodological solipsism forward to their physical account of the mental. Fodor takes it as a research strategy in cognitive psychology that psychological states are individuated without respect to their semantic evaluation. And he contrasts this strategy with his rendering of methodological individualism which tries to individuate psychological states by reference to

物得以构成的结构性部分。这个方法论得到孔德、J. S. 密尔、M. 韦伯和 K. 波普的进一步肯定。他们都相信,对于历史和社会进步的解释的基本要素,是个体的人类。个人的信念、气质和处境是理解社会现象的实质所在。相反的理论被称为“方法论的整体主义”。这种理论相信,社会整体有它自己成熟的和复杂的法则,这是不能还原为有关它的组成个体的法则的。相反,社会整体是一种真实的整体,是使个体的描述具有意义的基础。方法论的个人主义和整体主义的争论主要是在社会学和社会科学哲学中。

“因此,方法论个人主义的学说可以说隐含着把社会科学(更广义地说,包括群体心理学、经济行为理论以及类似的理论)的法则和专门的概念还原为个人心理学、生物学、化学和物理学的理论。”——亨佩尔:《自然科学的哲学》,1966年,第110页。

### 方法论的唯我论

这一术语由普特南于1975年引进。他声称有两种心的状态:广义的和狭义的。“狭义的”心的状态,像疼痛,不预设任何具有这一心的状态的主体以外的个体的存在。“广义的”心的状态,像忌妒某人,对主体以外的世界有所指。狭义的心的内容是内在的,而广义的内容则指称一个人的物理或社会环境。方法论的唯我论是这样一个学说,它认为心理学只应当关心狭义的心的状态或心理状态,而心的状态应当由具有这一心的状态的个体的内部东西来区分。我们只应当通过将命题态度同一为心的内部所发生的事件来解释命题态度的内容,无须探究这一心的状态或过程的环境原因或行为效应。这一学说将心的过程比作不完全由物理因素所决定的机器的计算。在某种意义上,物理主义和功能主义对心的东西的物理解释都受到方法论的唯我论的局限。福多把不借助于语义评价来区分心理状态作为认知心理学的一个研究策略。他将之与他“方法论的个人主义”的反应相对立,后者试图借助于因果力来区分心理状态。但普特南反对方法论的唯我论这一限制性的纲领,其根据是,它与像信念、忌妒和后悔这样的通常的心的状态的存在不相容。

“当传统的哲学家谈论心理状态(或‘心的状态’)时,他们作了一个我们称为方法论的唯我论假定这样一个假定。这个假定认为,严格地

their causal powers. But Putnam objects to the restrictive programme of methodological solipsism on the grounds that it is incompatible with the existence of ordinary mental states such as belief, jealousy and regret.

“When traditional philosophers talked about psychological states (or ‘mental states’), they made an assumption which we may call the assumption of methodological solipsism. This assumption is the assumption that no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed.” —Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, p. 220.

### Middle knowledge

[Latin: *scientia media*] A kind of knowledge that was first ascribed to God by the Spanish Theologian Luis de Molina, with the aim of reconciling the tension between God’s foreknowledge and human free will. According to this doctrine, God knows what free action a person would perform were a counterfactual condition actualised. He knows that P would freely do A were he in condition F. It is true that it is up to God to decide whether to instantiate the condition F, but before he makes his decision, the statement of what P would do in condition F has a true-value. Since this kind of knowledge falls between God’s knowledge of what is actual (*scientia visionis*, knowledge by intuition) and his knowledge of what is possible (*scientia simplicis intelligentia*, knowledge of simple understanding), it is called middle knowledge. This term was recently revived in this century by A. Plantinga in his approach to solving the problem of evil. It is also called counterfactuals of freedom.

“What they call middle knowledge is nothing but the knowledge of contingent possibles.” —Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 98.

### Midwifery

In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates’ art of eliciting from others what was in their minds. In *Theaetetus*, Socrates said that his mother was a midwife, a job that was normally taken by women who were too old to conceive or bear children themselves. He then claimed that he himself virtually practised the art of midwifery in philosophy. He did not produce philosophical wisdom himself, but could elicit ideas from others and test these ideas for correctness. The characteristic of his midwifery was to be concerned with the soul rather the body, and the offspring were not real children but ideas which could be checked for truth and falsehood. The description of this method fits with Socrates’ practice in the earlier Platonic dialogues and has deeply influenced Western philosophy of education. Because the Greek term for midwifery is *maieutikos*, this method is also called the *maieutic method*.

说,任何心理状态都不预设具有该状态的主体以外的任何个体的存在。”——普特南:《心智、语言与实在》,1975年,第220页。

### 中间知识

[拉丁语是 *scientia media*] 这类知识首先被西班牙神学家 L. 德·摩尼纳归于上帝,其目的是缓和上帝的预知和人的自由意志之间的紧张状态。按照这种学说,上帝知道如若实现一个反事实条件,人会采取什么自由行动。这就是说,他知道“P 会自由地做 A,如若他处于条件 F 中”。的确,决定是否例示条件 F 的权利在上帝,但在他作出决定前,“P 在条件 F 中会做什么”的陈述就有真价值。既然这类知识处于上帝的现实东西知识 (*scientia visionis*, 靠直觉的知识) 和可能东西知识 (*scientia simplicis intelligentia*, 单纯理解的知识) 之间,就被称作“中间知识”。在本世纪,这个术语近来被 A. 普兰汀格复活,用于解决恶的问题。它也被叫做“反事实自由”。

“他们所谓的中间知识,其实不过是偶然可能的知识。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第98页。

### 助产术

在柏拉图的对话中,苏格拉底用于把他人头脑中的想法诱导出来的技艺。在《泰阿泰德篇》中,苏格拉底说他的母亲是一个助产妇。这种工作通常是由年龄过大已不能自己生育孩子的妇女做的。他然后声称自己在哲学中也基本上在实施助产术。他自己并不产生哲学智慧,却能引导出他人的观点,并测试这些观点的正确性。他的助产术的特点是关涉灵魂而不是身体;所生出的不是真正的孩子,而是可检验其真假的观念。对这种方法的描绘与苏格拉底在早期柏拉图对话中的实践相符,对西方的教育哲学有重大影响。由于在希腊文中,助产术为 *maieutikos*, 故这方法也写作 *maieutic method*。

“上天制约我做一个产妇,但又禁止我生育。”——柏拉图:《泰阿泰德篇》,150d。

“Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giving birth.” —Plato, *Theaetetus*, 150d.

### Mill's Canons

Also called Mill's methods, the five inductive laws formulated and generalised by Mill for discovering the causal relations among phenomena. (1) The Canon or Method of Agreement: “If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances appear is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon” (2) The Canon or Method of Difference: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon”. (3) The Joint Canon or Method of Agreement and Difference: “If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause” (4) The Canon or Method of Concomitant Variations: “Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation” (5) The Canon or Method of Residues: “Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents”.

“The classical exposition of the inductive method is as Mill's Canons.” —Harré, *The Philosophy of Science*, 1972, p. 58.

**Mill's methods**, another expression for Mill's canons

**Mimesis**, Greek term for imitation

**Mimetic theory**, another expression for imitation theory

### Mind

Descartes used the terms mind and soul interchangeably. For him, the mind is identical to self, person, the substance that thinks, believes, doubts, desires and acts. For others, like Hume, the mind is a set of

### 密尔规则

也称作“密尔方法”，由密尔系统提出并使之一般化的五条归纳法则，用以发现现象中的因果关系。(1) 求同规则（或契合法）：“如果所研究现象的两个或两个以上的事例只有一个共同的情况，这个所有事例仅在它中出现的情况就是给定现象的原因（或者结果）。”(2) 差异规则（或差异法）：“如果在一个事例中所研究的现象发生，而另一事例中它不发生，二者所有情况都相同，只有一点不同，这一点发生于前者中；这两个事例惟一不同之处，就是这个现象的结果或原因，或是原因中不可缺少的一部分。”(3) 同异并用规则（或契合差异并用法）：“如果两个或两个以上的事例中现象的发生仅有一个共同的情况，而在其他两个或两个以上现象不发生的事例中除缺少上述共同情况外没有共同情况，则两组事例相差异的这个惟一情况是这现象的结果或原因，或原因中不可缺少的一部分。”(4) 共变规则（或共变法）：“凡是一种现象，当别的现象发生某种特殊变化时，它也以任何方式变化，则它或者是那种现象的原因或结果，或者经由某种因果关系的事实与之相连接。”(5) 剩余规则（或剩余法）：“从任意现象中消去由先前的归纳已知为某些前项之结果的部分，现象中的剩余部分就是所余前项的结果。”

“归纳法的经典说明即如密尔规则。”——哈雷：《科学哲学》，1972年，第58页。

### 密尔方法

“密尔规则”的另一种表述。

### 模仿

“模仿 (imitation)” 的希腊词。

### 模仿说

“模仿说 (imitation theory)” 的另一种表述。

### 心

笛卡尔所使用的“灵魂”和“心”这两个术语是可以互换的。对于他来说，心同一于“自我”、“个人”以及思维、相信、怀疑、欲求和行为着的实体。对于像休谟等其他他人而言，“心”指

psychological states, and in this sense it is close to consciousness but contrasts to physical states. Different understandings of mind lead to different understandings of the mind-body problem. If one believes in a Cartesian mental substance, the mind-body problem involves the relationship between one's mind as a mental substance and one's body as a physical substance. If, on the other hand, one holds that minds are collections of psychological states, the problem is to explain the relation between one's psychological properties and one's physical properties. There has been renewed interest in the Aristotelian account of the mind that Descartes displaced. On this view, the mind or soul is the form of the body, although this position might have theoretical presuppositions that cannot be revived.

"The substance in which thought immediately resides is called mind. I use the term 'mind' rather than 'soul', since the word 'soul' is ambiguous and is often applied to something corporeal." —Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham, etc.), vol. II, p. 114.

### Mind-body problem

Problems concerning the relationship between soul and body can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, but it is Descartes who gave the issue a central position in modern philosophy. He believed that mind has thinking as its essence and is an entity totally distinct from body or extended substance. This view is an expression of mind-body dualism. How, then, can a spatial body interact with a non-spatial mind? How can mental phenomena be both irreducibly psychological and somehow dependent on a mechanistic causal base, such as the brain or nervous system? Descartes' failure to provide a satisfactory account to the problem has led to many objections to his dualism and various alternative accounts of the relationship between mind and body or between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. This has become the central topic of the philosophy of mind. Of various theories developed, the most influential ones include: occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, idealism, dual aspect theory, panpsychism, behaviourism, identity-theory or central-state materialism, functionalism, and anomalous monism, all of which are discussed in separate dictionary entries. The mind-body problem continues to provoke important debate in current philosophy. Until recently, the discussion of this problem has been from the standpoint of mind, but some philosophers are taking our new scientific understanding of the workings of the brain and nervous system as a starting point for dealing with the question. If there is an adequate solution to the mind-body problem, it could lead to an integrated science of human nature. Other philosophers argue that there cannot be an adequate solution because raising the problem is a mistake based on misleading Cartesian assumptions. In some, they

一系列心理状态,在这个意义上,它与意识相近并与物理状态相对。对心的不同理解导致对“心身问题”的不同理解。如果一个人相信笛卡尔的心的实体,心身问题就包含着一个人作为心的实体的心和一个人作为物理实体的身之间的关系。另一方面,如果一个人相信心是心理状态的集合,问题就变成对一个人的心理特性和一个人的物理特性之间的关系的解释。现在人们恢复了对笛卡尔所取代的亚里士多德关于心的描述的兴趣。根据亚里士多德的观点,心或灵魂是身体的形式,尽管这种立场可能立足于一些不可能得到复兴的前提。

“思维所直接归属的实体叫做心。我使用‘心’而不是‘灵魂’这一术语是因为‘灵魂’一词意义含混且常被应用于身体的东西。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,第114页。

### 心身问题

关于灵魂与身体的关系问题可以追溯到柏拉图和亚里士多德,但将这一问题置于现代哲学之中心地位的是笛卡尔。他认为心的实质是思维,是与身或广延实体完全不同的存在物。这是心身二元论的一个表达。那么,一个广延的身体如何与一个非广延的心相互作用呢?心的现象如何可能既是不可还原的心理的东西又在某种意义上完全依赖于一个像大脑或神经系统这样的机械的因果基础?笛卡尔未能对这个问题给出令人满意的说明,这导致对其二元论的许多反驳以及关于心与身或心的现象与物理现象之关系的许多不同的描述。这成为心的哲学的中心议题。在所提出的各种理论中,最有影响的包括:“偶因论”、“附随现象论”、“心身平行论”、“唯心论”、“双面理论”、“泛心论”、“行为主义”、“同一论”或“中心状态唯物论”、“功能主义”、“变异一元论”,所有这些都不同条目中分别讨论。心身问题依然在当今哲学中引起重要争论。迄今为止,对这一问题的讨论一直是从心的观点出发,而有的哲学家则以对脑及神经系统活动的新的科学理解为出发点来处理这一问题。如能彻底解决心身问题,就有可能导致关于人性的整体科学。而其他哲学家认为这一问题得不到彻底解决,因为问题的提出本身是一个错误,它建立在笛卡尔的错误假设上。有人也力图回到亚里士多德把心解释为身之形式这一观点上。

“关于心的现象世界与身的物理状态的关系问题通常被称为‘心身问题’。”——麦金:《心的特性》,1982年,第19页。

seek to return to an Aristotelian account of the mind or soul as the form of the body.

“The question as to the relation between mental phenomenal world and physical states of the body, specifically the brain, is generally referred to as ‘the mind-body problem’.” —McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 19.

### Minimal theory of truth

One form of the deflationary theory of truth, proposed by Horwich. It holds that truth like existence is a logical property rather than a natural property. The truth predicate does not invoke meaning-like entities. Instead, it provides a device that enables us to formulate propositions that can be the objects of belief, desire and so on, in cases where the proposition of primary concern is inaccessible. The simplest way of introducing this device is to introduce a new predicate of being true.

“Because it contains no more than what is expressed by uncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema ‘(E) It is true that “p” if and only if p’, I shall call my theory of truth ‘the minimal theory’.” —Horwich, *Truth*, 1990, pp. 6-7.

**Minimax rule**, see maximin rule

### Minimum sensible

A term introduced by Berkeley for the least number of our sense-impressions of extension required in order to reject the idea that extension is infinitely divisible. This is similar to what Locke calls the sensible point, that is the smallest particle of matter or space we can discern. Berkeley’s argument is that all the objects of immediate perceptions are sense-impressions. There is nothing in a sense-impression but what is actually perceived in it, and I cannot be mistaken about my immediate sensations. The capacities of our senses are finite. Hence, sense-impressions are not infinitely divisible, but must be composed of a finite number of minimum sensibilia. There must be a minimum tangible or a minimum visible, beyond which sense cannot perceive. A minimum visible should be the same for all beings endowed with the faculty of vision. It does not include any parts and the ultimate component of any sensation is extension. Furthermore, since to be is to be perceived, the immediate objects of perceptions must also be composed of minimum sensibilia. Hence, the idea of the minimum sensible is closely related to Berkeley’s immaterialism. For Berkeley, a minimum visible has no existence without the mind of the perceiver. The position encounters difficulties in meeting Zeno’s paradoxes. It is also difficult to determine what we actually perceive.

### 真理最小理论

真理紧缩论的一种形式,由霍维奇提出。它认为,真像存在一样是逻辑性质而不是自然性质。真谓词并不引发意义之类的实体。相反,在至关重要的命题[概念]难以理喻之处,它提供了使我们能够把命题表述成为信念、意愿等等的对象的手段。引入这一手段的最简单的途径,就是引入“是真的”这一新谓词。

“因为它所包含的仅仅是由等值模式‘(E) “p” 是真的当且仅当 p’ 的无争议例证所表达的东西,我将把我的真理论称之为‘最小理论’。”——霍维奇:《真理》,1990年,第6—7页。

### 最小最大值规则

见“最大最小值规则”条。

### 最小可感体

巴克莱采用的术语,指我们最少的广延感觉印象,用来反驳广延无限可分思想。这个术语类似于洛克所说的“可感觉的点”,即我们可察觉到的最小的物质颗粒或空间。巴克莱的论证如下:当下知觉的全部对象是感觉印象。在感觉印象中并没有别的,只有在它之中实际感知到的东西,而且我对我的当下感觉不可能弄错。我们的感觉能力是有限的。因此,感觉印象不是无限可分的,必定是由有限数目的最小可感体组成的。最小的可触体或最小的可见体必定是存在的,感官无法感知超出它们之外的东西。最小的可见体对于一切具有视觉能力的存在物都是同样的。它不包含任何部分,任何感觉的最基本组成部分是广延。而且,既然存在就是被感知,知觉的当下对象必定也是由最小的可感体组成的。因此,最小可感体的思想与巴克莱的非物质论有密切关系。在巴克莱看来,最小的可见体没有感知者的心灵就不存在。这个观点在处理芝诺悖论时遇到不少困难。要确定“我们实际感知到了什么”也是困难的。

“经过彻底考察将发现,在任何情况下利用或设想有限线段的无限部分,或设想甚至比最小可感体更小的量,都是不必要的;不,显然我们决不那样做,因为那是不可能的。”——巴克

“Upon a thorough examination it will not be found, that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident that this is never done, it being impossible.”—Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, I, p. 132.

### Minimum vocabulary

For Russell, the words contained in a minimum vocabulary allow us to express every proposition in a given body of knowledge. No word in this vocabulary can be defined in terms of other words in it, but can only be mastered by acquaintance with the things. These words represent the hard core of experience by which our sentences are connected to the extra-linguistic world. For Russell such a vocabulary will reduce the number of entities one's language forces us to assume and so lessen the possibility of an unwarranted metaphysics of substance. The minimum vocabulary required for a given subject-matter diminishes with the development of the inquiry into that subject matter.

“I call a vocabulary a ‘minimum’ one if it contains no word which is capable of a verbal definition in terms of the other words of the vocabulary.”—Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 94.

### Miracle

[from Latin: *miror*, wonder at] An extraordinary event whose occurrence does not conform with natural law, and which is deemed to have a supernatural cause, such as God. The Bible records many miracles, such as the waters of the Red Sea dividing for Moses and Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead. The miracles are used as sign of God's omnipotence. However, the nature and possibility of miracle has been a topic of debate. It is difficult to ascertain whether events of this kind occur. Even if extraordinary events do occur, we may provide a scientific explanation for them. Even if science cannot explain such events, we still do not need to posit a supernatural cause for them, for the explanatory gap might be due to the limitation of our present knowledge. Since the view that miracles are possible is sharply in conflict with science, it has been rejected by many religious thinkers.

“A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”—Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sect. X, Part 1.

**Mitigating circumstance**, see excuse

### Mitigation

The procedure of administering a less severe penalty for

罪:《人类知识原理》,第一章,第132页。

### 最低量词汇

对罗素而言,包含在最低量词汇中的语词可以使我们表达已知知识体系中的每个命题。这套词汇中的任何语词都无法用其中的其他语词来定义,而只能通过熟知事物来把握。这些语词代表了经验的硬核,由此,我们的语句与语言之外的世界相关联。对罗素来说,这套词汇将减少某人的语言强迫我们假设的实体数量,从而减低无保证的关于本体的形而上学的可能性。某一特定主题所要求的最低量词汇将随着对该主题研究的发展而减少。

“我把这样的词汇称为‘最低量’词汇,如果它不包含可以由该词汇中其他语词来作字面定义的语词。”——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第94页。

### 奇迹

[源自拉丁语 *miror* (惊异)] 指其发生不合自然规律,且被认为有一超自然原因即上帝的非常事件。《圣经》记载着许多奇迹,譬如,为摩西和耶稣分开的红海之水使拉撒路重新复活。奇迹被当做上帝全能的标记。但是,奇迹的本性和可能性一直是争论的题目。很难确定这类事件是否发生。即使非常事件真的发生,我们也可以对它们提供一种科学的解释。即使科学不能解释这样的事件,我们也依然不需要为它们假定超自然的原因,因为解释的缺陷可能是由于我们现行知识的限制所致。由于奇迹可能的观点与科学尖锐冲突,所以,它已经被许多宗教思想家抛弃。

“奇迹可以被准确地界定为是神的特殊意志对自然规律的违背,或由于某个不可见的行为者的干预。”——休谟:《人类理智研究》,第十部,第一部分。

### 减责环境

见“藉口”条。

### 减刑

对已证明有罪的被告实施较轻惩罚的程

a convicted accused. In a criminal trial, before sentence is passed on someone convicted of a crime, a plea in mitigation can normally be presented by or on behalf of the accused, suggesting why the penalty should be moderated. This is usually done by citing evidence such as the abnormality of his mentality when he conducted the crime or by debating the effect of minimising the importance of other evidence or facts. Mitigation is different from justification, which proves that an action is in accordance with law, and excuse, which seeks to acquit the accused of responsibility for the action.

“Mitigation... presupposes that someone is convicted and liable to be punished and the question of the severity of his punishment is to be decided.” —Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, 1968, p. 15.

### Mixed hypothetical syllogism

A syllogism which has a conditional proposition as one premise, and a categorical proposition as another. Its conclusion is a categorical proposition. It has two correct forms of inference: the constructive hypothetical syllogism (also called *modus ponens*): “If p then q; p; therefore q”, and the destructive hypothetical syllogism (also called *modus tollens*): “If p then q; not q, therefore, not p”. It also has two incorrect forms of inference. In contrast to the constructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of affirming the consequent: “If p then q; q; then p”. In contrast to the destructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of denying the antecedent: “If p then q; not p; therefore not q”. A mixed hypothetical syllogism contrasts with a pure hypothetical syllogism which has conditional propositions as both of its premises and also has a conditional proposition as its conclusion.

“A syllogism having one conditional premise and one categorical premise is called a mixed hypothetical syllogism.” —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 252.

**Mixed modes**, see mode (Locke)

### Mnemic causation

[from Greek, *mneme*, memory] A term employed by Russell, inspired by the psychologist Richard Semon, to express the relationship between a past event and the subsequent remembering of it. An animal's response to present impulse is determined not only by the present value of a stimulus but also by memories of past rewards and frustration. It is a kind of action at a distance by which experience produces subsequent memory-images, but it is argued that such a relation does not have to be causal.

“We find sometimes that, in mnemic causation, an image or word, as stimulus, has the same effect (or very nearly the same effect) as belongs to some object.” —

序。在刑事审判中,在对某人确定有罪的判决宣布之前,通常可由被告或被告的代表提出减刑的请求,提出为什么对被告的惩罚应当减轻。这通常是通过引用诸如他在犯罪时精神反常这类证据,或通过使其他证据或事实的重要性降至最低的辩论进行的。减刑与无罪辩护不同,后者证明一种行为是依据法律的,而赦免则是试图宣判对这行为负有责任的被告无罪。

“减刑的前提条件是,某人被证明是有罪的并且应受到惩罚,但对他惩罚的严厉程度的问题还有待解决。”——哈特:《惩罚与责任》,1968年,第15页。

### 混合的假言三段论

一种以一条件命题作为一个前提,以一直言命题作为另一前提的三段论,其结论是一直言命题。它有两种正确的推理形式:构成式假言三段论(亦称肯定前件式):“如果p则q; p; 所以q。” 破斥式假言三段论(亦称否定后件式):“如果p则q; 非q; 所以非p。” 它也有两种不正确的推理形式。与构成式假言三段论相对的是肯定后件的谬误:“如果p则q; q; 所以p”; 与破斥式假言三段论相对的是否定前件式:“如果p则q; 非p; 所以非q”。混合的假言三段论与纯假言三段论形成对照,后者以条件命题作为它的两个前提,并且还以一条件命题作为它的结论。

“有一个条件前提和一个直言前提的三段论叫做混合的假言三段论。”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,1986年,第7版,第252页。

### 混合样式

见“样式(洛克)”条。

### 记忆因果关系

[源自希腊文: *mneme*, 指“记忆”] 罗素采用的术语,得自于心理学家R. 西蒙的启发,用以表示一个过去事件与随后关于它的记忆之间的关系。动物对于当下刺激的反应,不仅取决于当下的刺激值,也取决于对以往酬劳和挫折的记忆。它是经验借以产生随后的记忆映象的一种远距行为。但有人认为这样的关系并非必须是因果的。

“我们发现有时(在记忆因果关系中)一个映象或语词作为刺激,有着与属于某个对象的不同效果(或非常近于相同的效果)。”——罗素:《心的分析》,1921年,第209页。

Russell, *An Analysis of Mind*, 1921, p. 209.

**Modal epistemic logic**, see epistemic modalities

### Modal logic

A branch of logic which deals with the logical relationships between propositions containing modal terms such as necessarily or possibly. Its study originated with Aristotle and flourished in the medieval period. In this century it was revived by C. I. Lewis out of dissatisfaction with the account of material implication given by Frege and Russell. Lewis introduced two new operators to propositional and predicate calculus and used them to construct modal axiom systems. The operator L is symbolised as  $\Box$  and read as "It is necessary that... ", and the operator M is symbolised as  $\Diamond$  and read as "It is possible that... ". Important additional modal systems have been constructed, but the validity of the principles of inference in modal logic has been a matter of debate. Quine has been especially critical of modality. However, through the work of Kripke, D. Lewis and others, modal logic has been closely associated with possible world semantics and has become a central focus of work in contemporary logic.

"Modal logic is intended to represent arguments involving essentially the concepts of necessity and possibility." —Haack, *Philosophy of Logic*, 1978, p. 170.

### Modal realism

A theory associated with the American philosopher David Lewis, claiming that different possible worlds exist and are as real as the actual world. These others worlds are unactualised possibilities. The inhabitants of possible worlds have their respective counterparts in our world. The only significant difference between the actual world and other possible worlds is that the actual world is the world that we inhabit and that is spatially and temporally related to us. Hence, to think in terms of logical possibilities is to think of different real worlds. Every way that a world could be is a way that some world is. Whenever such-and-such might be the case, there is some world in which such-and-such is the case.

This theory has been under attack. One criticism is that if possible worlds and the actual world have the same ontological status, then a possible world would be actual rather than possible. If this were true, we could not account for the difference between an event happening in our world and merely being a logical possibility. But Lewis argues that his theory can provide the most satisfactory interpretation of modal propositions. On his account, "it is possible that p" is true if and only if in some possible worlds, p; and "it is necessary that p" is true if and only if in every possible

### 模态认知逻辑

见“认知模态”条。

### 模态逻辑

一个逻辑分支,处理含模态词如“必然”或“可能”的命题之间的逻辑关系。模态逻辑研究起源于亚里士多德,在中世纪曾繁盛一时。在本世纪, C. I. 刘易斯由于不满意弗雷格和罗素给出的对实质蕴涵的说明,而使模态逻辑得到复兴。刘易斯把两个新的算子引入命题演算和谓词演算,并使用它们构造模态公理系统。算子“L”被符号化为 $\Box$ ,读作“……是必然的”;算子“M”被符号化为 $\Diamond$ ,读作“……是可能的”。已经构造出各种另外的模态系统,但关于模态逻辑中推理原则的有效性一直存在争论。奎因对模态提出了特殊的批评意见。不过,由于克里普克、D. 刘易斯和其他人的工作,模态逻辑已经与可能世界语义学紧密连在一起,并且已成为当代逻辑中最为核心的领域。

“模态逻辑旨在展示本质上包含必然性和可能性概念的论证。”——哈克:《逻辑哲学》,1978年,第170页。

### 模态实在论

与美国哲学家D. 刘易斯相关联的一种理论,它断言:不同的可能世界存在着,并且像现实世界一样是实在的。这些另外的世界是未现实化的可能性。可能世界的居民在我们的世界中有它们各自的对应体。现实世界和其他可能世界之间惟一有意义的差别在于:现实世界是我们所居住的世界,是在空间上和时间内与我们相关联的世界。所以,根据逻辑可能性去思考就是思考不同的实在世界。一世界的每一种可能存在方式就是某个世界的实际存在方式。只要如此这般的情形可能发生,则存在某个世界,如此这般的情形在其中确实发生。

这一理论已经受到了攻击。批评之一是:如果可能世界和现实世界有同样的本体论地位,则可能世界将是现实的而不是可能的。如果这样的话,我们就不能说明在我们的世界中发生的一个事件和单纯的逻辑可能性之间的差别。但刘易斯争辩说,他的理论能够对模态命题提供最令人满意的解释。按他的说明,“p是可能的”为真当且仅当在某个可能世界中p;“p是必然的”为真当且仅当在每个可能世界中p。他还相信,模态实在论能够用于解释像因果性、条件句、命题态度的内容和存在量化等现象。

world, p. He also believes that modal realism can be used to explain phenomena such as causation, conditionals, the content of propositional attitudes and existential quantification.

“I advocate a thesis of the plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds that our world is but one world among many.” —D. Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 1986, p. 2.

## Modality

The ways or modes in which a proposition or statement is judged to be true or false. There are various classifications of modalities, such as epistemic modality [it is known (or unknown) that p]; deontic modality [it is obligatory (or permissible) that p]; temporal modality [it was (or is now or will be) p]. Of central concern to logic is logical or alethic modality [necessarily (or possibly) p]. Modal logic studies the logical relationships between statements of alethic modality. The doctrine of possible worlds has been developed to provide a semantics for modal logic and has stirred much recent debate in logic and metaphysics.

Modality can be distinguished into *de re* modality (in which a modal term modifies a predicate ascribed to a subject, such as “a is necessarily f”) and *de dicto* modality (in which a modal term modifies a whole proposition, such as “it is necessary that fa”).

“Another set of notions as to which philosophy has allowed itself to fall into hopeless confusions through not sufficiently separating propositions and propositional functions are the notions of ‘modality’: *necessary*, *possible*, and *impossible*. (Sometimes *contingent* or *assertoric* is used instead of possible).” —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 165.

## Modality *de dicto*

Modality *de dicto* attributes modal terms (necessary, possible) to describe a proposition (Latin: *dictum*), such as “it is necessary that p”. This contrasts with modality *de re* which attributes modal terms to modify an object (Latin: *res*), such as “a is necessarily f”. The distinction can be traced to Aristotle’s *Prior Analytic*, I. 9, and is widely discussed together with essentialism because modality *de re* asserts of some object that it has some property essentially. This seems to support the recent revival of essentialism, but anti-essentialists or nominalists reject the claim that an object can necessarily possess a property and argue that all necessity is *de dicto*.

“An assertion *de dicto*, for example, ‘necessarily nine is composite’, predicates a modal property—in this instance necessary truth—of another dictum or proposition—‘nine is composite’.” —Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 1974, p. 9.

“我提倡世界多样性的论题，或模态实在论，它主张我们的世界只不过是众多世界中的一个。”——刘易斯：《论多样世界》，1986年，第2页。

## 模态

一命题或陈述被断定为真或为假的方式或样式。存在各种不同的模态分类：认知模态 [已知 (或未知) p]；道义模态 [p 是义务的 (或允许的)]；时间模态 [过去 (或现在或将来) p]。对于逻辑来说至关重要是“逻辑模态”或“真势模态” (“必然 p” 或 “可能 p”)。模态逻辑研究真势模态的陈述之间的逻辑关系。为了给模态逻辑提供语文学，已经发展出可能世界的学说，后者近来在逻辑学和形而上学中引发了许多论战。

模态能够区分为“从物”模态 (其中模态词修饰从属于一主词的谓词，例如 “a 必然是 f”) 和“从言”模态 (其中模态词修饰整个命题，例如 “必然 fa”)。

“此外尚有一组概念，关于这些概念的讨论由于没有把命题和命题函项完全区分开，哲学已使自身陷入无望的混乱之中。这组概念就是‘模态’的概念：“必然”、“可能”和“不可能” (有时偶然或实然被用来代替可能)。”——罗素：《数理哲学导论》，1919年，第165页。

## 从言模态

“从言”模态把模态词 (必然，可能) 用于描述命题 (拉丁文 *dictum*)，例如 “必然 p”。这与“从物”模态恰成对照，后者把模态词用于修饰对象 (拉丁文 *res*)，例如 “a 必然是 f”。这一区分可以追溯到亚里士多德的《前分析》第 I 卷第 9 章，并且与本质主义一起得到广泛讨论，因为“从物”模态断定某对象具有某些本质属性。这似乎支持了本质主义的新近复兴，但反本质主义者或唯名论者拒绝一对象能够必然地具有一属性这一断言，并论证说所有必然性都是从言的。

“一个从言的断定，举例来说，‘必然地 9 是复合的’，对另一话语或命题——‘9 是复合的’——断定了一模态性质，在此例中是必然真。”——普兰汀格：《必然性的本性》，1974年，第9页。

**Modality de re**, see *modality de dicto*

## Mode

[from Latin; *modus*, measure, form or manner] The determinations a thing possesses, the way a quality presents itself or the form in which a thing can be understood. In medieval philosophy, a mode is a characteristic of a thing which marks it out from other things. In both Descartes and Spinoza, there is a system of substance-attribute-mode. Thinking and extension are the two principal attributes of substance, and modes are various ways or forms of thinking or extension. Locke took modes as one kind of complex idea. He divided them into simple modes, which are different combinations of the same ideas, and mixed modes, which are the combinations of several different simple modes.

“By mode I understand the modifications of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived.” —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, def. 5.

## Mode (Locke)

Both Descartes and Spinoza defined a mode as the affection of substance, but Locke used the word for one sort of complex idea which depends on substances. Modes are further divided into two kinds: simple and mixed. Simple modes are complex ideas which are combinations of the same simple ideas or ideas of the same kind. They are the result of the mental operations of compounding or enlarging the simple ideas given in experience. Space, time, number and infinity, for example, are all classified as simple modes. Mixed modes are complex ideas which are combinations of different kinds of simple ideas. They can be gained through experience and observation, by invention and by explaining the names of actions. Mixed modes differ from ideas of substance because ideas of substance must have a prototype in nature, but the mind in framing mixed modes need not determine whether they designate what exists in nature. The majority of examples of mixed modes lie in the sphere of morals and law. Mixed modes can be said to be the names of specific qualities and actions that are important for social life, especially for moral judgements.

“First, modes I call such complex *ideas* which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances;... And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon.” —Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 12, 4.

## Mode of production

The way of producing goods. Marx used this term in

## 从物模态

见“从言模态”条。

## 样式

[源自拉丁文 *modus*, 尺度、形式或方式] 指一个事物所具有的规定, 一个性质呈现自身的方式, 一个事物借以能被理解的形式等等。在中世纪哲学中, 一个样式就是事物的一个特征, 它使该事物同其他事物区分开。在笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎那里都有实体—属性—样式结构的体系。思维和广延是实体的两个主要属性, 样式是思维或广延的各种各样的方式或形式。洛克把样式当做一种复杂观念, 区分为“简单样式”和“混合样式”。简单样式是同一观念的不同结合, 混合样式是若干不同简单样式的结合。

“我将样式理解为实体的变状, 或在他物内, 通过他物而被构想的东西。”——斯宾诺莎: 《伦理学》, 第一部分, 定义5。

## 样式 (洛克)

笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎都把样式界定为实体的作用, 而洛克用该词指一种依赖于实体的混合观念。样式进而分为两类: 简单样式和混合样式。简单样式是同样一些简单观念或同一种简单观念结合起来的复杂观念, 是对经验中给予的简单观念进行“混合”或“扩大”的内心活动的结果。例如, 空间、时间、数目、无限等都被归类为简单观念。混合样式是由不同种类的简单观念结合起来的复杂观念。它们可以通过经验和观察, 借助发明和对行为名称的解释来获得。混合样式与实体观念的不同在于, 实体观念必须有自然界中的原型, 而心灵在构成混合样式时不必确定它们是否指示在自然界中存在的东西。混合样式的大多数例子都出在道德和法律领域。所以, 它们可以说是对于社会生活, 尤其是对于道德判断很重要的特定性质和行为的名称。

“首先, 我将这样一些复杂“观念”称作样式, 它们不论怎样混合, 其中都不包含它们独自存在的假定, 反而它们被认为是依赖于实体、或受实体影响的……而如果在此我使用样式这个词的含义与通常意义有些不同, 我请求原谅。”——洛克: 《人类理智论》, 第二卷, 第十二章, 第4节。

## 生产方式

生产财富的方式。马克思在许多意义上使

various senses. The material mode of production contains the productive forces. The social mode of production comprises the social characteristics of the productive process, including the purpose of production, the form of surplus labour presented by production and the mode of exploitation in the production. In some uses, the mode of production includes both material and social modes and combines the productive forces and the relations of production. For Marx, modes of production vary historically.

“The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process generally.” — Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*.

**Modern logic**, another name for symbolic logic

### Modernity

An ambiguous term that generally refers to the central characteristic of the modern period as established in the Enlightenment. Postmodernists contrast modernity with postmodernity. In philosophy, modernity is normally taken to begin with Descartes' work in the seventeenth century and to be concerned with the issues, problems and standards of relevance which have since occupied Western philosophers. Authors and critics vary in their accounts of the main strands of modernity. In general, modernity is associated with the supremacy of pure rationality and with the self-assertiveness of the modern self. Equipped with rationality, modern persons seek consensus over a unified metaphysical framework to view the world. They seek their own subjective autonomy and ignore the constraints of history, tradition and culture. They aggressively attempt to organise and control the natural environment, with science as their guiding discipline. Aesthetic objects and their appreciation are measured in terms of economic benefit. Modernity was effective in the rise of industrial capitalism. The critique of modernity has been the chief topic of critical theory, postmodernism, post-structuralism and communitarianism. Each criticism was from a separate standpoint and from a different understanding of modernity.

“The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their own logic.” —Habermas, in Foster (ed), *Postmodern Culture*, p. 9.

### Modes of scepticism

[from Greek; *tropos*, wa, manner + *skepsis*, investigation, enquiry]. As a technical term in ancient scepticism, a pattern of argument, something like Aristotle's *topos*. Ancient scepticism established many modes aiming to

用这个词。物质生产方式包括生产力。社会生产方式构成生产过程的社会特征,包括生产目的,生产所存在的剩余劳动形式和生产中的剥削方式。在某些用法上,生产方式包括物质的和社会的方式,和生产力与生产关系的结合。对马克思来说,生产方式具有历史性。

“物质生活条件的生产方式决定社会的、政治的和理智生活的一般过程。”——马克思:《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》。

### 现代逻辑

“符号逻辑”的另一个名称。

### 现代性〔或译“近代性”〕

这是一个含糊用语,用来一般性地指称由启蒙运动建立起的现代(近代)时期所具有的特点。后现代主义者把现代性与后现代性对立起来。在哲学中,一般认为现代性始于17世纪笛卡尔的工作,与那时以来西方哲学家们所关注的争论、问题和标准相关。关于现代性的主要成分,作家们和批评家们的说明多有不同。一般讲来,现代性与纯粹理性的至上和近代自我的自我肯定相关联。依据理性,现代(近代)的人们寻找那看待世界的统一形而上学构架。他们追求自己主体的独立性,忽视历史、传统和文化的限制。他们以科学为利器,得寸进尺地试图安排和控制自然环境,通过经济利益来衡量美学对象并形成自己的评价。现代性在工业资本主义上升期间是有效的。对于现代性的批判已成为批判理论、后现代主义、后结构主义和共同体主义的首要论题。每种批判都从某个特殊立场出发并基于对现代性的不同理解。

“由18世纪的启蒙哲学家们制定的现代性方案包含他们的这样一些努力:依照他们的逻辑发展客观的科学、普遍的道德和法律,以及独立的艺术。”——哈贝马斯,见《后现代文化》(福斯特编辑),第9页。

### 怀疑派论式

[源自希腊语 *tropos* (方式、样式) 和 *skepsis* (考察、探究)] 作为古代怀疑派的专业术语,它意指论证的范型,有些像亚里士多德的 *topos*。古代怀疑派建立了多种论式,其目的是要表明

show the oppositions or contradictions of appearance and to conclude that suspension of judgement is necessary. The most famous and important are the Ten Modes, which form the methodology of scepticism. They are recorded by Sextus Empiricus and ascribed to the Pyrrhonist philosopher Aenesidemus: (1) the mode depending on the variations among animals; (2) that depending on the differences among animals; (3) that depending on the variable constitutions of the sense-organs; (4) that depending on circumstances; (5) that depending on positions; (6) that depending on admixtures; (7) that depending on the quantities of things; (8) that depending on relativity; (9) that depending on the frequency of encounters; (10) that depending on customs and laws.

"In order for us to get a more accurate impression of these oppositions, I shall append the modes through which suspension of judgement is inferred." —Sextus, *Outline of Pyrrhonism*, I, pp. 35-9.

### Modularity

A theory of the cognitive processes in the philosophy of mind that originated largely with Jerry Fodor's book *The Modularity of Mind* (1983). The traditional theory of mind considers it to be a general faculty which is exercised in various domains. But theorists of modularity claim that mind is composed mainly of modules. Modules are cognitive systems (input systems) which are relatively independent of each other, each performing its own information-processing autonomously. Fodor lists eight characteristics of being a module: domain specificity, mandatoriness, information encapsulation, speed, shallow output, lack of access of other processes to intermediate representations, natural localization and susceptibility to characteristic breakdown. According to the modularity hypothesis, the human mind should have unique physical structures for acquiring language and for parsing sensations. Although this hypothesis has been disputed, it has led to much fruitful debate.

"Roughly, modular cognitive systems are domain specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled. Since modular systems are domain-specific computational mechanisms, it follows that they are species of veridical faculties. I shall assume, hopefully, that this gives us a notion of modularity that is good enough to work with." —Fodor, *Modularity of Mind*, 1983, p. 37.

### Modus ponens

[Latin: affirming mood, also called *modus ponendo ponens*] A form of hypothetical syllogism named by medieval logicians and providing a rule of inference of the form: "If p then q; p; therefore q". By this rule we infer from the antecedent of a true implication to its consequent. It is the principle that whatever a true proposition implies is itself

现象的对立或矛盾,并得出有必要悬置判断的结论。其中最著名也是最重要的是“十论式”,它们构成怀疑派的方法论。塞克斯都·恩披里柯记录下这十个论式,并将其归功于皮浪主义哲学家爱那西德穆。(1)关于动物中不同变化的论式;(2)关于动物中差异的论式;(3)关于感官可变构造的论式;(4)关于环境情况的论式;(5)关于位置的论式;(6)关于混合物的论式;(7)关于事物数量的论式;(8)关于相对关系的论式;(9)关于经常遭遇的论式;(10)关于习俗和法律的论式。

“为了使我们对这些对立能得到更为准确的印象,我将附上这些论式,通过它们,推出悬置判断的结论。”——塞克斯都:《皮浪主义纲要》,I,第35—39页。

### 组合性

心的哲学中一种关于认知加工的理论,主要产生于J. 福多的《心的组合性》(1983)一书。心的传统理论将心视为在各种不同领域起作用的普遍官能。但组合论声称,心主要是由组件构成的。组件是彼此相对独立的认知系统(输入系统),各自自主地完成自己的信息加工。福多列举了组件的八个特性:领域特定性、强制性、信息封闭、快捷、浅输出、封闭于中介表征的其他加工、自然定位及敏感于特性损坏。根据组合性假设,人的心应当有独特的物理结构来习得语言和解析感觉。尽管这一假设引起争论,但它所引发的争论是富有成果的。

“大致地说,组件认知系统是特定领域的、先天确定的、硬件的、自主的和非集合的。因为组件系统是特定领域的计算机制,所以它们是那种真实的官能。我该假定,这有希望给予我们一个足够好的组合性概念。”——福多:《心的组合性》,1983年,第37页。

### 肯定前件式

[拉丁文,肯定式,也叫 *modus ponendo ponens*] 中世纪逻辑学家命名的一种假言三段论形式,提供了一条推理规则,其形式是:“如果p则q; p; 所以q。”根据这一规则,我们从真蕴涵式的前件推出它的后件。它是这样一条原理:真命题所蕴涵的命题本身是真的。它亦称

true. It is also called the affirming mood. In contrast, *modus tollens* has the form: "If  $p$  then  $q$ , not  $q$ ; not  $p$ ". In *modus ponens*, if the categorical premise affirms the consequent rather than the antecedent of the conditional premise, that is, "If  $p$  then  $q$ ;  $q$ ; therefore  $p$ ", the argument commits a fallacy called affirming the consequent.

"In the *modus ponens* (also called the constructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise affirms the antecedent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the affirmation of its consequent." —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 352.

### Modus tollens

[Latin; denying mood, also called *modus tollendo tollens*]

A form of hypothetical syllogism providing a rule of inference of the form: "If  $p$  then  $q$ ; not  $q$ ; therefore not  $p$ ". By *modus tollens*, we infer from the denial of the consequent of an implication to the denial of its antecedent. It is the principle that whatever implies a false proposition is itself false. It contrasts with *modus ponens*: "If  $p$  then  $q$ ;  $p$ ; therefore  $q$ ". In *modus tollens*, if the categorical premise denies the antecedent rather than the consequent of the conditional premises, the argument commits a fallacy called denying the antecedent.

"In the *modus tollens* (also called the destructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise denies the consequent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the denial of its antecedent" —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 352.

**Molecular facts**, see atomic facts

### Molecular propositions

Propositions which are built from the conjunction of atomic propositions related by words such as "and", "or" and "if-then". For example, " $p$  or  $q$ " is a molecular proposition made from the atomic propositions " $p$ " and " $q$ " and the logical connective "or". While atomic propositions represent atomic facts, molecular propositions represent molecular facts composed of atomic facts. A molecular proposition is a truth-functional compound of atomic propositions. That is, its truth-value is decided by the truth values of the atomic propositions composing it and by the logical terms conjoining those atomic propositions.

" 'Molecular' propositions are such as contain conjunctions—if, or, and, unless, etc. —and such words are the marks of molecular proposition." —Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 63.

"肯定式"。与它构成对照的是所谓的"否定后件式",其形式为:"如果  $p$  则  $q$ ; 非  $q$ ; 所以非  $p$ 。"在肯定前件式中,如果直言前提肯定的是条件前提的后件而不是前件,即是说,"如果  $p$  则  $q$ ;  $q$ ; 所以  $p$ ",该论证就犯了肯定后件的谬误。

"在肯定前件式(亦称构成式假言三段论)中,直言前提肯定假言前提的前件,由此证明以肯定它的后件作为结论是合理的。"——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第352页。

### 否定后件式

[拉丁文,否定式,亦称 *modus tollendo tollens*] 假言三段论的一种形式,规定了一条推理规则,其形式如下:"如果  $p$  则  $q$ ; 非  $q$ , 所以非  $p$ 。"根据否定后件式,我们从一蕴涵式后件的否定推出其前件的否定。它是这样一条原理:蕴涵假命题的命题本身是假的。它相对于肯定前件式:"如果  $p$  则  $q$ ;  $p$ ; 所以  $q$ 。"在否定后件式中,如果直言前提否定条件前提的前件而不是后件,该论证就犯了所谓的否定前件的谬误。

"在否定后件式(亦称破坏式假言三段论)中,直言前提否定假言前提的后件,由此证实否定其前件作为结论是合理的。"——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第352页。

### 分子事实

见"原子事实"条。

### 分子命题

由诸如"和"、"或"、"如果……那么"等词连接,从"原子命题"的结合而建构成的命题。例如," $p$  或  $q$ "就是由原子命题" $p$ "和" $q$ "以及逻辑联结词"或"构成的分子命题。如原子命题表现了"原子事实",分子命题也表现了由原子事实构成的"分子事实"。分子命题是原子命题的真值函项的复合。这就是说,其真值由构成它的原子命题的真值和连接这些原子命题的逻辑词来决定。

" '分子命题' 是这样的,它们包含某些联结词——如果、或者、并且、除非等等——因而这些词是分子命题的标记。"——罗素:《我们关于外部世界的知识》,1926年,第63页。

### Molyneux's problem

A problem about the correlation between sight and touch, proposed by the Irish politician and scientist Williams Molyneux (1656-1698) in a letter addressed to Locke, and which is included by Locke in the second edition of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ii, ix, 8). Suppose a blind person has learned to distinguish a cube from a sphere of the same metal by the sense of touch. If the person is suddenly made to see, can he immediately distinguish the two objects by sight before touching them? Both Molyneux and Locke answered this question in the negative. They believed that our ordinary perceptions depend on judgements based on experience. A perceiver must learn to build perceptual knowledge by correlating the contents from different channels. Berkeley agreed with this solution but claimed that it proved his own thesis that the data of touch and the data of sight are heterogeneous. Leibniz also discussed this problem, but derived a different answer. He suggested that the two sets of experience have one element in common, that is, extension. Hence it is possible to infer from one type of idea to another. Empirical testing seems to favour Locke's solution.

"A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke in his *Essay* :... that the blind man at first sight would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe which the cube, whilst he only saw them."—Berkeley, *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, Sect. 132.

**Monadical relation**, Russell's term for quality

**Monadology**, see monads

### Monads

[from Greek: *monas*, unit] Leibniz's mature term for his conception of substance. In his early period he used terms such as substantial form, substantial unity, atom of substance or *entelechy*. Monads are the ultimate constituents of reality. They are simple, without parts, extension, or shape and are indivisible. They do not affect each other. So each monad is windowless, like a world of its own. It is self-sufficient and a true atom of nature. The simplicity of a monad, however, is compatible with its internal complexity. Leibniz identified monads with perception and appetite. Thus each monad changes, but its change comes from an internal principle and not from an external cause. To be active is the main characteristic of monads. Based on the contents of their perceptions, Leibniz distinguishes three grades of monads. The first grade possesses only basic properties of perception and appetite, with no self-

### 莫利纽克斯问题

关于视觉和触觉相互关系的问题,由爱尔兰政治家和科学家 W. 莫利纽克斯(1656—1698)在给洛克的一封信中提出。洛克将它收入《人类理智论》第二版(第二卷,第九章,第8节)。假定一个盲人学会用触觉区分同样金属的立方体和球体。如果这个人突然能视物了,他在触到它们之前能够马上用视觉区分两个物体吗?对这个问题莫利纽克斯和洛克两人都给了否定的回答。他们认为,我们的普通知觉依赖于以经验为基础的判断。一个知觉者必须学会通过将来来自不同渠道的内容相互联系起来建立感性知识。巴克莱同意这一解答,但声称这一解答证明了他自己的论点:触觉和视觉的材料是异类的。莱布尼茨也讨论了这个问题,但引出了不同的回答。他提出,这两组经验有一共同的元素,那就是广延。因此,从一类观念推出另一类观念是可能的。经验的验证似乎有利于洛克的答案。

“对我们的原则的进一步确定,可以从莫利纽克斯问题的解决中得出,该解决办法由洛克先生发表于他的《人类理智论》中……盲人第一眼不能确切说出哪一个是球体,哪一个是立方体,而只是看见它们。”——巴克莱:《视觉新论》,第132节。

### 一元关系

罗素用于性质的术语。

### 单子论

见“单子”条。

### 单子

[源自希腊文 *monas*, 单位] 莱布尼茨对其实体概念所用的一个成熟的词。在早期,他使用“实体形式”、“实体单位”、“实体原子”、“隐得来希”等词。单子是实在的终极要素。它们是简单的,没有部分、广延或形状,它们是不可分割的。它们互不影响。所以,每个单子都“没有窗户”,就像一个属于它自己的世界。它是自足的,是自然界的真正原子。然而,单子的单纯性可以同它内在的复杂性相容。莱布尼茨将单子等同于知觉和欲望。这样,每一个单子都在变化,但它的变化来自一个内在的原则,而非来自外部的原因。具有能动性是单子的主要特点。根据单子的知觉内容,莱布尼茨将单子区分为三个等级。第一等的单子只有知觉和欲望的基本性质,没有自我意识。第二等的单子是动物的灵魂,它具有比较明晰的知觉,并有记忆相伴。第三等的单

consciousness. The second grade is animal soul whose perceptions are more distinct and accompanied by memory. The third grade is spirits or rational minds, which are completely self-conscious. Within any monad's perceptual states there is a representation of the relatedness of that monad to all other monads. This provides the foundation for intermonadic relations. Each monad is a mirror of the whole universe. Although each of them is self-enclosed, there is a perfect harmonious relation among them which is pre-established by God. Leibniz's theory of monads is called monadology. Many of the puzzling features of Leibniz's doctrine of monads can be understood in the context of his logic and science.

"A simple substance is that which has no parts. A composite substance is a collection of simple substances, or monads. Monad is a Greek word signifying unity, or what is one."—Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 207.

## Monarchy

[from Greek: *mon*, one + *arche*, rule, rule by one] A type of government in which supreme power and sovereignty are held by one person; the monarch, king or emperor. In many cases, especially where succession to the monarchy is determined by a long-standing hereditary principle, the monarch is viewed as an incarnation of the historical national identity. In some cases, monarchs are elected or emerge through victory in war. The power of monarchical government does not arise from consent or a social contract. The traditional absolute monarchy was inherited and supported by the theory of the divine right of kings. Monarchy contrasts with aristocracy, in which sovereignty lies in the hands of a class of persons, and with democracy, in which sovereignty is in the hands of the majority of people. European monarchies were threatened by the French revolution. Britain developed a compromise between absolute monarchy and liberalism, called constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch mainly plays a ceremonial role, with sovereignty formally held by the monarch and parliament.

"The sovereign may concentrate the entire government in the hands of one single magistrate, from whom all the others will derive their power. This... form of government is the most common, and is called monarchy or royal government."—Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, III, 3.

## Mongrel categorical statements

Ryle's term for a statement which falls between categorical statements, which are statements of fact, and hypothetical statements, which are statements of inference or conditionals. They are semi-dispositional claims which explain something as being an occurrence but at the same time a disposition, for example "The bird is migrating" and

子是完全能自我意识的精神或“理性的心灵”。在任何单子的知觉状态内,都表现该单子与其他单子的关系。这就为单子之间的联系提供了根据。每一个单子都是整个宇宙的一面镜子。虽然它们的每一个都是自身封闭的,它们之间却有完全和谐的关系,这个关系是由上帝预先确定的。莱布尼茨关于单子的理论被称作“单子论”。莱布尼茨单子学说的许多令人不解的特征可以在他的逻辑和科学的范围内得到理解。

“单纯的实体是没有部分的实体。复合的实体是简单实体、或单子的集合。‘单子’是希腊词,意思是‘单位’,或‘单一的东西’。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第207页。

## 君主政体

[源自希腊文,*mon*(一个)和*arche*(统治),即一个人的统治]一种类型的政体,其最高权力和统治权掌握在一个人手里,即君主、国王或皇帝手里。在很多情况下,特别是在君主的继承是由长期存在的世袭原则决定的情况下,君主被看做是历史的国家特性的化身。在有些情况下,君主是通过战争的胜利被选出或涌现出来的。君主政体的权力不是来自人们的同意或社会契约。传统的专制的君主政体是世袭的,并得到国王的神权理论支持。君主政体与统治权掌握在一个阶层手里的贵族政体不同,与统治权掌握在大多数人手里的民主政体也不同。欧洲的君主政体曾受到法国大革命的威胁。英国在专制君主政体和自由主义之间达成了一种妥协,被称为君主立宪制,在这一制度下,君主主要起礼仪性的作用,统治权在形式上掌握在君主和议会手里。

“主权者可以把整个政府都集中于一个独一无二的行政官手里,所有其余的人都从他那里取得权力。这种……政体形式是最常见的,它被称为君主政体或皇家政府。”——卢梭:《社会契约论》,Ⅲ,3。

## 混杂范畴陈述

赖尔的术语。范畴陈述是关于事实的陈述,假想陈述是对推理或条件句的陈述,混杂范畴陈述则居于二者之间,指将某种东西解释为一个事件并同时又是一个倾向的准倾向说法,例如,“这只鸟正在迁移”和“约翰小心地开车”。它们被用来指一个实际上是一个倾向性表现的活

“John drives carefully”. They are employed to refer to an activity which is the actual display of a disposition and thus to explain something in terms of both occurrence and disposition. These kinds of statements can make sense of some mental concepts such as heeding and minding, which seem always to include an element of the actual or the here and now.

“I shall call statements like ‘you would do the thing you did’ ‘semi-hypothetical’ or ‘mongrel categorical statements’.”  
—Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 135.

### Monism

A term coined by Christian Wolff for any metaphysical theory claiming that only one kind of entity really exists. What really exists may be matter (as materialism holds) or mind (as idealism holds). Neutral monism holds that mind and matter are both derived from some neutral primary reality. Spinoza's monism argued that God-Nature was the single ultimate reality. The argument for monism can be traced to Parmenides in ancient Greece. Monism is opposed both to dualism, which claims that there are two fundamental realities in the world, and to pluralism, which claims that there are many ultimate non-reducible principles in reality. A special case of monism was put forward by the British Neo-Hegelians, especially Bradley. According to this claim, all relations are internal to their terms and form part of the identity of the related terms. In saying that any one object exists, we are therefore implicitly affirming the existence of all other objects and reality forms a single unity. Monism has a wider application, referring to any attempt to account for phenomena by a single principle.

“In its extreme form monism sees it as a matter of logic that everything is unified.”—Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 10.

### Mood

In syllogistic logic, mood is every valid form within each of the four figures of categorical syllogism. For instance, the first mood of the first figure is called “Barbara”, with the form: “If all S are Q, and all P are S, then all P are Q”.

In the philosophy of mind, mood is a temporary emotional state of the mind which colours a person's reactions.

In the philosophy of language, different moods, such as indicative, imperative, optative and subjunctive, indicate different forces of the same utterance.

“Given any signal  $\sigma$  of the system, L is to assign it an interpretation  $\langle \mu, \tau \rangle$ . The component,  $\mu$ , called a mood, indicates whether  $\sigma$  is indicative or imperative. The component  $\tau$  of an interpretation, called a truth condition, indicates the state of affairs in which  $\sigma$  is true.”—Lewis, *Conventions*, 1969, p. 151.

动因而同时用发生和倾向性来解释某个东西。这种陈述可以解释像注意、留心这样的心的概念。这种概念似乎总是包含一个实际的或当前的元素。

“我将称像‘你会做你曾做的事’这样的陈述为‘准假设的’或‘混杂范畴陈述’。”——赖尔:《心的概念》, 1949年, 第135页。

### 一元论

C. 沃尔夫发明的术语,指任何主张实际上只存在一类实体的形而上学理论。实际存在的可以是物(如唯物主义所主张的),或是心(如唯心主义所主张的)。中立一元论认为,心和物二者都来自于某种中立的基本实在。斯宾诺莎的一元论认为,上帝—自然是单一的最终实在。对一元论的论证可以追溯到古希腊的巴门尼德。一元论既反对二元论——它主张世界上有两种基本实在,又反对多元论——它主张实在中有许多终极的、不可还原的基质。英国的新黑格尔主义者,尤其是布拉德雷提出了一种特别的一元论。根据这种主张,所有的关系都内在于其关系项,并构成关系项同一性的一部分。在我们说对象存在时,我们也由此隐舍地断定了所有其他对象的存在,实在构成单一的统一体。一元论应用得较广,指任何用单一原理来说明现象的企图。

“最极端的一元论把任何事物都是统一的看成一件逻辑上的事。”——艾耶尔:《20世纪的哲学》, 1982年, 第10页。

### 论式, 情绪, 语气

在三段论逻辑中, mood(论式)是直言三段论的四个格每个格内的每一有效式。例如, 第一格的第一论式叫做“巴巴拉”, 其形式是: “如果所有的S都是Q, 而所有的P都是S, 那么所有的P都是Q。”

在心的哲学中, mood(情绪)是心的一种暂时的感情上的状态, 这一状态使一个人的反应带有感情色彩。

在语言哲学中, 不同的 mood(语气), 例如陈述的、祈使的、祈愿的、虚拟的, 表示的是同一话语的不同意义。

“设定这一系统为任意符号  $\sigma$ , L 被指定为它的解释  $\langle \mu, \tau \rangle$ 。解释组成部分  $\mu$  叫做语气, 它表明  $\sigma$  是陈述的还是祈使的。解释组成部分  $\tau$  叫做真值条件, 表明  $\sigma$  于其中是真的那种事态。”——刘易斯:《约定》, 1969年, 第151页。

## Moral

[from Latin: *moralis*, manner, custom, conduct, corresponding to Greek *ēthos*. Latin *moralis* places greater emphasis on the sense of social expectation, while Greek *ēthos* gives heavier weight to individual character.] Being moral concerns human actions which can be evaluated as good or bad and right or wrong. These actions are in our power and we can be held responsible for them. If a person's actions conform to rules of what is morally right, he is said to be moral. If he violates them, he is immoral or morally wrong. A moral action is also opposed to an amoral action, which is morally value-free, that is, neither right nor wrong. Conflicts can arise between socially accepted rules of morality and rules determined by reason and individual conscience.

"The word 'moral' when it is used as a term of praise is contrasted with 'immoral', or sometimes 'amoral', but is contrasted with 'non-moral' when used as a universe-of-discourse word."—Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 26.

## Moral absolutism

The view that there are certain moral objective principles which are eternally and universally true, no matter what consequences they bring about. These principles can never justifiably be violated or given up. Paradigms of such principles include "don't lie", "keep your promises", and "don't kill innocent people". Moral absolutism is generally represented by various religious moral systems. Kantian deontology is closely associated with moral absolutism, since it claims that some actions are right or wrong intrinsically or in themselves and that they may never be used as means to ends. However, contemporary deontology tends to distance itself from absolutism by admitting the principle of double effect, although the extent to which this stance is successful is disputed. Generally, moral absolutism is contrasted to consequentialism, which believes that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the consequences it promotes, and hence any moral principle can be overridden. It is also contrasted to moral relativism which claims that all concepts of right and wrong are culturally relative and provincial.

"By 'moral absolutism' is meant the theory according to which there are certain kinds of actions that are absolutely wrong; actions that could never be right whatever the consequences."—Haber (ed), *Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics*, p. 1.

## Moral agent

Any individual who is capable of formulating or following general moral principles and rules, and who has an

## 道德的

[源自拉丁词 *moralis*, 意为“风度(举止)、习惯、行为”, 对应于希腊词 *ēthos*。拉丁词 *moralis* 更多强调的是社会期望, 而希腊词 *ēthos* 则有更重的个人品质的色彩] 有道德的是指能够评价为善或恶、对或错的人类行为。这些行为是我们能够控制的, 也是我们能够负责的。如果一个人的行为符合道德上正当的规则, 他就可说是有道德的。如果他违反了它们, 他就是不道德的或在道德上是错的。一个道德行为也是与一种非道德的活动相对的, 后者是一种无道德价值的行为, 即既不是对的, 也不是错的。而在社会所接受的道德规则与为理性所确立的规则和个人的良知之间可能会产生冲突。

“‘道德的’一词, 当它用作一个赞美词时, 是与‘不道德的’相对的, 有时是与‘非道德的’相对的, 而当它用作一种普遍的描述词时, 它是与‘无道德的’相对的。”——库珀:《道德思考的多样性》, 1981年, 第26页。

## 道德绝对主义

这个论点是, 有一定的道德客观原则, 它们 是永恒地、普遍地正确, 不论它带来的后果是什么。这些原则绝不能被合理地侵犯或放弃。这种原则的范例包括“不许撒谎”、“遵守诺言”、“不得杀害无辜”等等。道德绝对主义一般为宗教道德体系所代表。康德的道义论是与道德绝对主义密切相关的, 因为它主张, 某些行为的正当与否, 是由这些行为本身所决定的, 而且这些行为决不是达到目的的手段。不过, 当代道义论通过承认“双重效果原则”而倾向于把它自己与绝对主义区别开来, 虽然对这种姿态成功的程度还有争议。一般而言, 道德绝对主义是与效果论相对的。效果论相信, 一个行为的正当与错误是为它所致的后果所决定的, 因此, 任何道德原则都是可以超越的。它也是与道德相对主义对立的, 道德相对主义宣称, 所有关于正当与错误的道德概念, 都是在文化上相对的和有地方性的。

“‘道德绝对主义’是指这种理论: 它认为某些行为绝对是错的, 不论其后果是什么, 这些行为决不可能是正当的。”——哈伯(编):《绝对主义和对它的效果论的批评》, 第1页。

## 道德行为者

指任何能够构建或遵循普遍的道德原则和规则的人, 他或她有着自律意志, 能最终决定应

autonomous will so that he can decide ultimately what acts he should perform and not perform. Moral agents can react to the acts of other moral agents. Accordingly they are responsible for their acts and are the subject of blame or praise. Adult human beings are paradigmatic moral agents. Moral agents are contrasted to moral patients; beings that lacks rationality and cannot be held morally accountable for their acts.

“Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as he conceives it, requires.”—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 151.

### Moral argument for the existence of God

An argument credited to Kant for the existence of God based upon human moral experience. Kant derived morality from reason alone and not from divine authority, but believed that being moral is not sufficient to secure happiness. Happiness must be added to morality, although only a moral person is worthy of being happy. Being happy means that everything proceeds according to my will and desire. A happy moral person has the highest good that can be acquired in the world. But to guarantee that everything will go according to a person's will and desire and thus to ensure the moral person's ultimate happiness, it is inevitable that we postulate the existence of God. The moral argument has been very popular since Hume and Kant attacked the ontological and cosmological arguments and the argument from design, although later versions depart from Kant's formulation. In later versions the argument proceeds from the existence of moral commands to the existence of God as moral commander, from the existence of moral authority to the existence of God as the authoriser, and from the existence of moral laws to the existence of God as law-giver. Thus, morality itself is claimed to be determined by divine will. This argument is criticised by naturalistic ethics which sees no need to postulate God in order to explain the existence of human moral institutions.

“The Moral Argument is a transcendental argument in the sense that it endeavours to show the existence of God is a necessary condition of morality.”—T. McPherson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1965, p. 89.

### Moral atomism

A variety of ethical theories which take individuals, their rights, value or interests, as the basis for our thinking about moral right and wrong. It contrasts with moral holism, which places ultimate value on the system rather than on the individuals which compose the system. Most

履行和不应履行什么行为的人。一个道德行为者能对其他的道德行为者的行为作出反应。因此,他们对自己的行为负有责任,而且也是责备和赞扬的主体。成年人是典型的道德行为者。道德行为者是与道德被动者相对照的。道德被动者是指一个缺乏理性、不能为他们的行为负道德责任的人。

“道德行为者是指这样的个体,他们具有多种复杂的能力,尤其是具有能运用公正的道德原则去决定(深思熟虑之后)在道德上应当做以及已经做出这个决定的能力,和能自由地选择或不选择按他所认为的道德要求行为的能力。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第151页。

### 上帝存在的道德论证

以人类的道德经验为基础论证上帝存在,此论证归于康德。康德仅从理性而不从神的权威引出道德,但他相信,有道德不足以获得幸福,必须把幸福加到道德上,虽然只有道德的人才配享有幸福。幸福意味着每件事情都按我的意志和欲望进行。一位幸福的、道德的人具有最高的善,而这种善是能在这个世界获得的。但是,为了确保每件事情会按人的意志和欲望进行,并因此而确保道德之人的最终幸福,我们不得不假定上帝存在。由于休谟和康德抨击了本体论论证、宇宙论论证和设计论证,这种道德论证就非常流行,虽然后来的种种说法超出了康德的阐述。在后来的说法中,该论证从道德命令的存在推到作为道德命令者的上帝的存在,从道德权威的存在推到作为授权者的上帝的存在,从道德法则的存在推到作为立法者的上帝的存在。这样,道德本身就被说成是由神的意志决定的。这种论证受到了自然主义伦理学的批判,后者认为,为解释人类道德设定的存在,无需假定上帝。

“‘道德论证’是一种超验论证,因为它竭力表明上帝的存在是道德的必要条件。”——麦克斐尔逊:《宗教哲学》,1965年,第89页。

### 道德原子主义

指那些把个人以及个人的权利、价值或利益作为思考道德对错的基础的理论。它与道德整体主义相对立,后者强调终极价值在于系统而不在于组成系统的个人。大多数西方伦理理论属于道德原子主义,而柏拉图在他的《国家

Western ethical theories belong to moral atomism, while Plato's ethics in the *Republic* is an example of moral holism. The contrast between moral atomism and holism is striking in environmental ethics. While one position extends human-centred ethics to consider the rights or interests of animals, the other position, represented by land ethics, claims that the ecosystem rather than the various individuals in it should be the focus of our moral consideration. This version of moral holism is also called ecological holism.

"Despite their many differences, all of the normative ethical theories discussed so far are in a certain sense atomistic; that is, each demands that individuals be considered equitably."—Regan (ed.), *Matters of Life and Death*, 1993, p. 25.

### Moral certainty

The certainty that the natural sciences possess is regarded to be universal or demonstrative, while the social sciences cannot achieve such a degree of certainty, for it involves human affairs. Accordingly, social science is said to possess only moral certainty, because it is generally but not universally true. The word "moral" here is not associated with good or bad, but means pertaining to human affairs or practical concerns. This distinction can be traced to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and has been widely endorsed in the history of philosophy.

"Moral certainty is sufficient to regulate the conduct of one's life even if it is in principle possible that we can be mistaken."—Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, sect. 4.

### Moral community

Those within the scope of moral consideration. In traditional ethics, only human beings were held to have membership of the moral community. They are the only objects of moral concern because only human beings have reason and hence know what they are doing. Furthermore, only human beings can be in reciprocal relationships involving the recognition of oneself and others as being in a moral relationship. This implies that the moral community consists exclusively of moral agents. Some contemporary moral philosophers, especially those working in environmental ethics, claims that it is a prejudice to restrict the moral community to human beings. If cognitive conditions are necessary for moral concern, some humans, such as infants and brain-damaged persons, should be excluded, and some kinds of animals should be included. They claim that rationality should not be the grounds for belonging to the moral community. But the question of what the criterion should be is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers suggest that all subjects-of-a-life should have the same right to be respected as a member and that the moral community should extend to many kinds of animals. Others believe that

篇》中的伦理学是道德整体主义的一个例证。道德原子主义与整体主义的对立 in 环境伦理学中最为显著。当一种观点在于将人类中心伦理学扩展到考虑动物的权利与利益时,以土地伦理学为代表的另一种观点主张,应该成为我们道德考虑中心的是生态系统而不是在生态系统中的多样个体。道德整体主义的这种观点也称“生态整体主义”。

“尽管它们有许多不同,目前为止讨论的所有规范伦理学理论在一定的意义上都是原子主义;即每种理论都要求平等地考虑个人。”——里根(编):《生命与死亡的问题》,1993年,第25页。

### 道德确然性

自然科学所具有的确然性被看做是普遍的和证明性的,而社会科学不能获得这种程度的确然性,因为它涉及到人类的事务。因此,社会科学据说仅有“道德的确然性”,因为它是一般性的,但不是普遍正确的。“道德的”这一词在这里并不与善或恶相联,而是意味着与人类的事务或实践相关。这个区分可追溯到亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》,并在哲学史上多有同道者。

“即使我们犯错误在原则上是可能的,道德确然性也足以调整一个人的行为。”——笛卡尔:《哲学原理》,第四部分。

### 道德群体

在道德考虑范围内的那些群体。在传统的伦理学中,只有人类被认为具有道德群体成员资格。他们是道德关注的惟一对象,因为只有人类才有理性,因而知道他们在做什么。进而言之,只有人类才能处于交往关系之中,这些关系包括承认自己和他人处于道德关系之中。这意味着道德群体仅是由道德行为者构成的。当代一些道德哲学家,特别是从事环境伦理学研究的那些人提出,把道德群体限于人类是一种偏见。如果认识条件对于道德关注是必须的,那一些人,如婴儿和脑损伤者,就应被排除在外,而某些动物则应包括在内。他们主张,理性不应是属于道德群体的根据。但判断的标准应是什么却是一个有争议的问题。一些哲学家提出,所有生命主体都应拥有作为一个成员同样受到尊重的权利,因而道德群体应扩展到很多动物。另一些哲学家认为,感觉能力应是判断的标准,因而道德群体应包括任何能感受到痛苦的生命。一些哲学家争论说植物和动物都应被包括在内;还有一些哲学家认为整个生态系统及其成员都属于道德群体。一些哲学家主张,即使我们遇上

sentence should be the criterion and that the moral community should include any being that is capable of suffering. Some argue that plants as well as animals should be included, while others believe that the whole ecosystem and its members belong to the moral community. Some philosophers claim that even if we encountered fully rational non-human beings, our basic moral concern would be restricted to humans on the basis of a recognition of ourselves as members of a species.

“Let us define the notion of the moral community as comprising all those individuals who are of direct moral concern or alternatively, as consisting of all those individuals toward whom moral agents have direct duties.”—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 152.

**Moral compromise**, see compromise

### Moral conservatism

A contemporary ethical position emerging out of the anti-theory movement, represented by Williams, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre. It attempts to establish ethics without appealing to universal principles, but through examination of particular social conventions, traditions and practices. Its central characteristics include an emphasis on the plurality and diversity of the values and practices of a community, and an objection to any impersonal or universal point of view which places moral judgements above local context. It believes that moral claims can only be assessed from within the historical tradition in which they are embedded, and objects to the universal application of prescriptions. It denies the dichotomy of reason and emotion, and emphasises the formation of virtue. Moral conservatism is associated with virtue ethics, moral particularism, and communitarianism. However, though it tries to distance itself from moral relativism and advocates the practice of critical reflection, it still faces the major difficulty of explaining how it is possible to criticise a culture if the ethical life of the community is primary. The theory is still being developed.

“The second group of writings, *moral conservatism*, offers positive accounts of morality in terms of custom and practice.”—Clarke and Simpson, *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*, 1989, p. 3.

### Moral dilemma

A situation in which one person is morally pulled in opposite directions. In these situations, different apparently sound reasons support different courses of action that cannot be jointly undertaken. The moral agent has reason to do A and has reason to do B, but he cannot do both A and B. Although it is not this person's fault for getting into the dilemma, whatever direction is chosen will inevitably be

完全理性的非人类的生命,我们基本的道德考虑也应只限于人,理由是我们把自己视为一个物种的成员。

“让我们把道德群体概念定义为包括所有那些直接受到道德关注的个人,或是由所有那些道德行为者对其负有直接责任的个人构成的。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第152页。

### 道德妥协

见“妥协”条。

### 道德保守主义

出现在当代反理论运动中的一种伦理观点,以威廉姆斯、纽斯堡姆、麦金泰尔等人为代表。它企图不诉诸于普遍性准则,而是依据特殊的社会习俗、传统和实践来建立伦理学。它的主要特征包括,强调共同体的实践和价值的多元性和差异性,反对把道德判断置于具体情景之上的非个人或普遍的观点。它相信,道德主张只有在它们所体现的历史传统范围内才可能得到评价,它也反对对规定的普遍运用。它否定理性和情感的二分法,而强调德性的形成。道德保守主义与德性伦理学、道德特殊主义和共同体主义相关。不过,虽然它力图把自己与道德相对主义区分开来,提倡实行批评性反思,它仍然面对着这样的主要困难:如果一种共同体的伦理生活是主要的,怎么可能批评这种文化。这个理论仍然在发展中。

“第二类著作,道德保守主义,根据习俗和实践而对道德给予明确说明。”——克拉克和辛普森:《伦理学中的反理论和道德保守主义》,1989年,第3页。

### 道德困境

这个处境是,一个人在道德上同时被推向了相反的方向。在这类处境中,明显不同可又似乎合理的理由支持着无法联合完成的不同行为过程。道德行为者有理由做A,也有理由做B,但不能既做A又做B。虽然一个人进入这种困境不是他或她个人的过错,但不论这人选择什么方向,都将不可避免地在某些方面犯道德错

morally wrong in some respect and result in the sense of guilt or remorse. For example, a case may arise in which telling the truth (which is required as a moral principle) will involve moral wrongdoing by breaking a promise to someone else to remain silent. In another case, returning a weapon one has borrowed may predictably lead to serious injuries to some innocent person. In such cases one cannot do all that is morally required. Moral dilemmas are the stuff of tragedies. Since to hold that there is one sovereign moral principle, for example utilitarianism, leads to moral dilemmas in many circumstances, this phenomenon represents a challenge to such theories. However, it is a test of every moral theory that it provides some reasonable way to deal with moral dilemmas, although the fact that no way is completely effective might tell us something about the nature of morality.

“The standard definition of moral dilemmas seems to include all and only situations when (at the same time) an agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives separately but cannot adopt both together.”—Sinnott-Armstrong, *Moral Dilemmas*, 1988, p. 5.

**Moral epistemology**, see ethical knowledge

### Moral expert

Moral philosophers are often regarded as being able to offer advice about how one should live or about whether an action is wrong or right, just as an art-historian can advise whether an artwork is real or a forgery. This attitude takes moral philosophers to be moral experts. The notion of a moral expert is strongly objected to by moral non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivism denies the existence of objective ethical value and accordingly rejects the view that there is any authority who can tell us how to live our lives. According to this theory, morality is nothing but an expression of one's own preferences or emotions. What I need to know when I am making a moral judgement is what I feel in the situation in question. The position of non-cognitivism is not widely shared. Nowadays many philosophers sit on government commissions of enquiry and corporate and institutional ethics committees. The need for advice on a variety of morally complicated issues has greatly promoted the development of applied ethics. However, it is not clear whether moral advice is a matter of good judgement which can be detached from any moral theory, an ability to articulate and clarify moral issues without drawing moral conclusions or a combined capacity to provide moral theory leading to moral conclusions. Although they accept the notion of moral advice, some philosophers object to moral experts making moral decisions for us on the grounds that this would compromise our autonomy as moral agents. They

误,而产生一种负疚感或自责感。例如,在一种情形下说真话(这是道德原则所要求的),将不可避免地要毁了对另一个人保持沉默的诺言,或者是归还某人所借的武器,可以预见到将导致对某些无辜者产生严重的伤害。在这些情形中,一个人不能做道德上所要求的所有事。道德困境永远是悲剧的素材。如果我们认为有一种主导性的道德原则,例如功利主义在许多情况下易于导致道德困境,这种现象就代表了对这种理论的一种挑战。不过,提供某种合理的方式来解决道德困境,这已成了每一道德理论的试金石,尽管没有一种方式是完全有效的,而这一事实也许会揭示道德的某种性质。

“对于道德困境的标准定义似乎包括所有并只有这样的处境:即一个行为者在同一时刻应当分别采用两者之一而不能一并采用。”——辛诺特-阿姆斯特朗:《道德困境》,1988年,第5页。

### 道德知识论

见“伦理知识”条。

### 道德专家

道德哲学家常常被认为能够对一个人应如何生活,或一个行为是对还是错提出建议,就如同艺术史学家可以提出一件艺术品是否是赝品的建议一样。这一看法把道德哲学家看做道德专家。道德专家这一概念受到道德非认知主义的强烈反对。非认知主义否认客观的道德价值的存在,因此拒绝接受世上存在能告诉我们怎样生活的权威这一观点。按照这一理论,道德不过是某人自我的偏爱或感情的一种表达。在我做出一个道德判断的时候,我需要知道的是在所说的处境中感觉如何。非认知主义的见解不为人们所广泛认同。现今很多哲学家是政府咨询委员会和社团的、公共机构的伦理委员会的成员。对种种复杂的道德问题提出建议的需要极大地促进了应用伦理学的发展。不过,道德建议是否是一种可与任何道德理论相分离的好的判断的问题,是否是一种无需给出道德结论而可以清楚地表达和阐述道德问题的能力,或是否是一种提供通向道德结论的道德理论的综合能力,这些都不清楚。尽管一些哲学家接受道德建议的看法,但他们反对道德专家为我们作道德决定,其理由是这将危及我们作为道德行为者的自律性。他们认为,按他人的计划去生活不会带来一种好生活,无论这种计划有多么好。总之,他们争论说,道德不像其他学科一样是可以教授的。据此,道德专家的性质就成问题了。

claim that leading a life on someone else's plan is not to lead a good life, however good the plan might be. In any case, they argue that morality cannot be taught like other subjects. On this view, the nature of moral expertise becomes problematic.

“The notion of a moral expert makes no sense on the non-cognitivist view, (for) there are no moral facts about which he or she might have special knowledge.”—McNaughton, *Moral Vision*, 1988.

**Moral holism**, see moral atomism

### Moral judgement

The content of a proposition which typically discriminates between good or bad or between right and wrong and determines what should be done in a moral context. Also, moral judgement is the capacity to make such judgements or to make them well. Moral judgements are practical in that they provide direct guidance for action. Different ethical theories have different views about the nature of moral judgements and their relation to action. Moral objectivism claims that a true moral judgement corresponds to objective moral properties, but leaves open the question of why knowledge of such facts would guide action. Deontology holds that a moral judgement is a type of command, used to telling people, including ourselves, what we should or should not do. Emotivism claims that a moral judgement is an expression of a purely personal preference. A view derived from Aristotle holds that a moral judgement is an application of universal moral principles to a particular situation within the scope of the principles. This view recognises that practical reason might need to reach an equilibrium between universal rules and particular circumstances when the rules cannot be straightforwardly applied to the circumstance. On this view, a moral judgement has cognitive and rational elements and is more than a mere a response of feeling. It can be universalised and publicly advocated rather than merely privately preferred.

“To make a moral judgement of an action, person, etc. is to judge the action by relating it to either a moral rule or a moral ideal.”—Gert, *The Moral Rules*, 1973, p. 173.

**Moral knowledge**, another term for ethical knowledge

### Moral law

For Kant, all moral laws are principles or maxims, but not all principles or maxims are moral laws. A moral law is a maxim on which a rational being acts, and which he would will to be a maxim for all rational beings. A moral law must have objective necessity and be recognised by reason. It must

“道德专家这一概念在非认知主义的观点看来是毫无意义的,因为不存在他或她能具有专门知识的道德事实。”——麦克诺顿:《道德见解》,1988年。

### 道德整体主义

见“道德原子主义”条。

### 道德判断

一种命题内容,它典型地区分了好与坏或对与错,并确定了在道德情景中应做什么。道德判断也是做出这种判断或使判断更好的能力。道德判断具有实践性,因为它们提供对行为的直接指导。不同的道德理论对道德判断的本质及它们与行为的关系有不同的看法。道德客观主义主张真实的道德判断是与客观的道德特性相符合的,但没有解决为什么关于这种事实的知识能够指导行为这一问题。义务论认为道德判断是一类命令,它是用来告诉人们,包括我们自己,什么是我们应当或不应当做的。情感主义认为道德判断是纯粹的个人偏爱的表示。一种出自亚里士多德的观点认为,道德判断是普遍的道德原则在这些原则所及范围内的特殊情况中的应用。这一观点认识到,当普遍规范不能直接应用于特殊情况时,实践理性就要求在普遍规范和特殊情况之间达成一种平衡。根据这一观点,道德判断具有认识的和理性的因素,并不只是感情的反应。它可以普遍化并可以公开提倡,而不仅仅是个人的偏好。

“对一个行为、一个人等等做出道德判断,就是将它与道德规范或道德理想联系起来去判断那一行为。”——格特:《道德规范》,1973年,第173页。

### 道德知识

“伦理知识”的另一个词。

### 道德法则

对于康德来说,一切道德法则都是原则或准则,但并非所有的原则或准则都是道德法则。道德法则是理性存在者按照它来行动并愿意把它作为一切理性存在者的准则的准则。道德法则必须具有客观必然性并通过理性来认识。它

give rise to imperatives which are definite and specific, yet universal in application. In Kant's ethics, a moral law applies only to rational beings and determines how a rational being as such would necessarily act. It lays down a rule that does not admit of exceptions and which commands rather than counsels. A moral law is a categorical imperative. It is not derived from empirical fact, but is prescribed by reason itself as the ground of its own action. Since Kant believed that a person obeys a categorical imperative only if his will is free, the notion of a moral law leads to an assertion of the existence of freedom.

Kant's notion of a moral law is the culmination of a tradition in Western ethics which views ethics as a network of moral laws which are recognised *a priori* and applied universally. This tradition is opposed to the tradition of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which holds that the application of universal principles should be adjusted according to the salient features of the circumstances in which the principles are applied. Kant's notion of a moral law has become the main target of the current revival of virtue ethics.

"In contrast to laws of nature, these laws of freedom are called moral laws." — Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Introduction, I.

### Moral luck

Traditional ethics claims that one's moral status is not subject to luck, that is to matters of chance or factors beyond one's control. Kant states at the outset of his *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* that good will, which is the source of moral worth, is independent of the contingencies of the world. Hence he distinguishes between a moral area which is immune to luck and an amoral area which is inevitably vulnerable to luck, and confines his ethics to rational agency and universal principles. This luck-free morality is challenged by Williams and Nagel. They argue that the estimation of moral worth, and notions such as responsibility, justification, and blame, are indeed subject to luck, and hence morality is also threatened by luck. Williams maintains that luck will influence one's motives, intentions and personality, and is hence closely related to one's moral decisions and moral justifications. Nagel distinguishes different kinds of luck which deeply affect morality: constitutive luck, that is the factors which influence one's constitution as an agent (for example different family background, different environment or education); circumstantial luck, for example the problems and situations one faces; the luck which affects the cause of an action; and the luck which affects the result of an action. Moral dilemmas can also be viewed as a kind of circumstantial luck. Different luck will result in different levels of responsibility for the agent and different moral judgements by others. If I drive a car carelessly, my action will not mean much if no

必须导致确定的、专门的, 然而却是普遍应用的命令。在康德的伦理学中, 道德法则只应用于理性存在者, 确定了这种理性存在者如何必然地行动。它规定了一种不允许有例外并且是作出命令而不是劝告的规则。因此, 道德法则是绝对命令。它不是来自经验事实, 而是理性把自身规定为它自己行为的根据。由于康德认为, 一个人如果他的意志是自由的, 就只会服从绝对命令, 所以道德法则的观念导致了对自由的存在的确否定。

康德的道德法则概念是这样一种西方伦理学传统的顶端, 这种传统把伦理学视为道德法则之网, 而道德法则被先天地认识和普遍地应用。这种传统对立于亚里士多德德性伦理学的传统。后者主张普遍原则的应用应当根据原则被应用的情况的显著特征而调整。康德的道德法则的概念在现代的德性伦理学的复兴中已成为众矢之的。

“相对于自然法则, 这些自由法则称为道德法则。”——康德:《道德形而上学》, 导言, I。

### 道德运气

传统伦理学宣称, 一个人的道德形象不受运气、即不受人们不能控制的机遇或因素的影响。康德在他的《道德形而上学基础》的开篇处谈到, 善良意志是道德价值的来源, 是独立于世界的偶然性的。因此, 他区分了一个不受运气影响的道德领域, 和一个不可避免地要受运气影响的非道德领域, 而把他的伦理学界定在理性主体和普遍原则上。这种不受运气约束的道德受到威廉姆斯和内格尔的挑战。他们论证道, 对于道德价值、责任、合理性证明、指责等概念的评估, 确实受到运气的影响, 因此道德也受到运气的威胁。威廉姆斯认为, 运气也影响到一个人的动机、意图和人格, 因此是与一个人的道德决定和道德合理性证明密切相关的。内格尔区分了四种深深影响道德的运气: 构成性运气, 即影响到作为一个行为者的构成性主体的因素(例如, 不同的家庭背景、不同的环境或教育); 环境运气, 即一个人所面对的问题和处境; 影响行为原因的运气以及影响行为结果的运气。道德困境也可看做是一种环境运气。不同的运气对行为者将导致不同层次的责任和对他人会形成不同的道德判断。我心不在焉地开车, 如果不发生什么严重后果, 这种行为没有什么意义, 而如果我碰巧撞倒和压死一个孩子, 那事情就完全不同了。道德运气的问题是反理论运动的一个必不可少的部分, 并导致了诸如德性伦理学和道德情景主义这样的承认运气偶然性的道德思考

serious consequence occurs, but it means something entirely different if I happen to crash and kill a child. The problem of moral luck is an indispensable part of the anti-theory movement, and leads to the creation of moral stances that recognise the contingencies of luck, such as virtue ethics and moral contextualism.

“If moral luck is thinkable, possibly even acceptable, in regard to the character of particular acts, then perhaps the status of certain virtues as virtues can depend on a kind of cosmic (moral) luck.”—Slote, *Goods and Virtues*, 1983, p. 57.

### Moral patient

A moral status, in contrast to that of moral agent. Traditionally, only rational human beings can be moral agents, for they must hold responsibility for their actions. Marginal human beings, such as children and brain-damaged people are not regarded as having moral responsibility for their behaviour, and hence are not moral agents. However, they are still the objects of moral consideration and are protected from suffering by moral laws. Accordingly they are referred to as moral patients. Moral patients cannot formulate or follow moral principles and rules. They can bring about great pain and even disasters to others, but we cannot say that they are morally wrong for doing that. Equally, their acts may bring about good consequences, but we do not say that they are morally right for performing them. Moral agents can act wrongly or rightly in ways that affect moral patients, but moral patients cannot act reciprocally towards moral agents. Contemporary environmental ethics claims that the scope of moral patients should not only include marginal human beings, but also sentient animals, and even the whole biocommunity. A difference in moral status requires different moral considerations and can involve the appeal to different moral principles. This results in a variety of moral tensions in practice. For instance, a foetus is a moral patient. To consider its interest might make abortion immoral. On the other hand, if we appeal to the autonomy of the mother, abortion would be permissible.

“In contrast to moral agents, moral patients lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behaviours in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do.”—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 152.

**Moral philosophy**, see ethics and morality

### Moral point of view

To consider or judge behaviour from the perspective of moral rules or principles, rather than from the viewpoint of

方式的创造。

“就具体行为的特性而言,如果道德运气是可以考虑的、可能的并且是可接受的话,那么,也许把一定的德性作为德性的地位就取决于一种宇宙性的(道德的)运气。”——斯洛特:《善与德性》,1983年,第57页。

### 道德被动者

一种道德身份,与道德行为者相对。在传统意义上,惟有有理性的人能够是道德行为者,因为他们能对他们的行为负责。边缘人,诸如儿童和脑损伤者就不被认为能对他们自己的行为负有道德责任,因此不是道德行为者。不过,他们仍然是道德考虑的对象并受到道德法则的保护以免受伤害。因此,他们被归为道德被动者。道德被动者不能构建或遵循道德原则或规范。他们能对他人带来巨大的痛苦甚至灾难,但我们不能说他们这样做在道德上是错的。同样,他们的行为也能带来好的后果,但我们也不能因此而说他们在道德上是正当的。道德行为者影响道德被动者的方式可能是错误的或正当的,但道德被动者不能以相应的行为来回应道德行为者。当代环境伦理学宣称道德被动者的范围不仅应包括边缘人,也应包括有感觉能力的动物,甚至整个生物共同体。不同的道德身份要求不同的道德考虑,涉及到诉诸不同的道德原则。这导致了实践中的多种道德张力。例如,胎儿是一个道德被动者。要考虑他的利益则堕胎就是不道德的。另一方面,假如我们诉诸于母亲的自主性,堕胎就应是许可的。

“与道德行为者相对,道德被动者缺乏使们能够控制他们自己行为的先决条件,即使他们在道德上能对他们所做的负责。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,152页。

### 道德哲学

见“伦理学和道德”条。

### 道德观点

从道德规范或原则的视角而不是从自我利益的视角来考虑或判断行为。道德哲学的主要

one's self-interest. The main question of moral philosophy is "Why ought I to be moral?". Thus we must justify why human beings should consider their acts from a moral point of view. Different moralists provide and argue for different points of view, and they are always in conflict. The central tradition of modern moral philosophy claims that morality is the only important thing in one's life, but contemporary virtue ethics believes that it is only a part and that human lives should have other commitments. On this basis, the main question of moral philosophy would be Socrates' question "How should I live?".

"In order to consider the relation between individual rationality and what is sometimes called 'the moral point of view' one has to decide on criteria of rationality, and this is a semi-conceptual investigation."—Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 10.

**Moral principle**, see moral rule

### Moral psychology

An essential part of ethics, especially in contemporary virtue ethics, concerned with the structure and phenomenological analysis of those psychological phenomena which have great bearing on moral behaviour or action. These phenomena include cognitive states such as deliberation and choice; emotional states such as love, mercy, satisfaction, guilt, remorse and shame; and desires, character and personality. Moral psychology aims to improve understanding of human motivations and emotions. It is also related to the philosophy of law.

"... The problem of the origin of moral judgements and moral sentiments, which is often discussed in 'ethical' writings... but nonetheless belongs to the province of moral psychology"—Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 16.

### Moral realism

Any moral theory which holds that moral facts or ethical properties, such as being good or bad or being virtuous or evil, exist independent of our beliefs and will, and that ethics should find out truths about them. It is realism applied to moral affairs and moral statements. It is related to moral objectivism, but contrasts to moral subjectivism and moral relativism. Corresponding to Dummett's characterisation of realism, moral realism is also defined as the claim that moral judgements obey the law of excluded middle and can be true or false. The truth of moral judgements is independent of the evaluator's moral beliefs.

Sometimes it is used in a special sense to refer to Jean Piaget's theory which suggests that we have gone through an essential early stage of moral belief in which moral rules are

问题是“我为什么应当是道德的?”我们必须论证为什么人类应当从一种道德观点考虑他们的行为。不同的道德学家提供和论证了不同的道德观点,它们经常是冲突的。现代道德哲学的核心传统认为道德在一个人的生活中是惟一重要的事情,但当代德性伦理学相信道德仅是生活的一部分,人类的生活应该有其他承诺。据此,道德哲学的主要问题应该是苏格拉底的问题:“我应该怎样生活?”

“为了考虑个人理性与有时被称为‘道德观点’的东西的联系,一个人不得不决定理性的标准,并且这是一种准概念式的研究。”——库珀:《道德思考的多样性》,1981年,第10页。

### 道德原则

见“道德规范”条。

### 道德心理学

伦理学的一个实质性部分,特别是在当代德性伦理学中,它涉及到那些与道德行为有重大关系的心理现象的结构和现象学的分析。这些现象包括审慎和选择等认知状态,爱、怜悯、满意、负疚、自责、羞愧等情感状态以及欲求、品格、人格等。道德心理学的目的在于较好地理解人的动机和情感。道德心理学也与法哲学相关。

“……道德判断和道德情感的起源问题,常常在‘伦理的’著作中得到讨论……但它们属于道德心理学的范围。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第16页。

### 道德实在论

这样的道德理论相信,道德事实或伦理性质诸如好(善)与坏、德与恶是不依赖我们的信念和意志而存在的,并认为伦理学应当发现有关它们的真理。它是运用于道德事务和道德陈述的实在论。它与道德客观主义相关,而与道德主观主义和道德相对主义对立。相应于达米特对实在论的描述,道德实在论也被界定为这样的一种主张:道德判断服从排中律因而能够是真或是假。道德判断的真独立于评价者的道德信念。

有时它在一种特别的意义上使用,即指称J. 皮亚杰的理论。皮亚杰的理论认为,我们已经经过了一个道德信念的实质性的早期阶段,在这个阶段,道德规则被看做是永恒的和独立

viewed as eternal and independent of social function and in which the degree of praise and blame depends on the consequences of actions rather than intent. According to Piaget, this may be found in the moral development of children in our societies and among adults in primitive societies.

“Moral realism can now be defined as the claim that some moral judgements are true and every moral judgement is true if and only if certain conditions obtain that are independent of the actual and ideal moral beliefs and choices of the people who judge and are judged.”—Sinnott-Armstrong, *Moral Dilemmas*, 1988, p. 5.

### Moral reason

The representative form of practical reason, the sort of thinking which leads one to make moral judgements and which guides one's moral acts. Moral reason brings general moral principles to bear on the particular situations of the agent and judges whether one's action and the way it is performed conform to the requirements of moral principles. It enables an agent to decide whether he should act and what he should do. The characteristic feature of moral reason is that it employs ethical terms and makes moral judgements which issue commands and advice. It has been disputed whether the procedure of moral reasoning can be formalised into practical syllogism and whether it deals with ends as well as means.

“Moral reasons are ordinary considerations such as the pain I will cause here if I don't tell her soon. This is a moral reason because it is a salient feature of a situation which generates a demand—the demand that I tell her soon, perhaps.”—Dancy, *Moral Reasons*, 1993, p. 251.

### Moral rule

A general statement guiding action and feeling by characterising certain kinds of action, such as telling the truth or stealing, as generally right or generally wrong. Moral rules are distinguished from moral principles which underlie moral rules, justify their validity and clarify their scope of application. While moral rules are specific and concrete, moral principles are general and abstract. While moral rules are variable, moral principles hold in all circumstances. Moral principles are used to justify rules and to generate new rules to cope with unforeseen circumstances. Rules are more directly involved than principles in determining the morality of behaviour. The elaboration of a consistent and intelligible body of moral principles and rules is the central task of an ethical theory.

“A moral rule states that a certain kind of actions is generally right (or obligatory), and leaves open the possibility that an act (or omission) of that kind may be justifiable.”—Singer, *Generalization in Ethics*, 1963, p. 103.

于其社会功能的;在这个阶段,赞扬和责备的程度取决于行为的后果而不是意图。据皮亚杰看来,这可以在我们社会中的儿童道德发展和原始社会的成年人中发现。

“道德实在论现在能被界定为这种主张:当且仅当一定的条件得到满足,某种道德判断就是真的,甚至每一种道德判断都是真的。这种条件就是:它们独立于下判断和被判断人的实际的和理想的道德信念。”——辛诺特-阿姆斯特朗:《道德困境》,1988年,第5页。

### 道德理性

实践理性的代表形式,一种引导一个人做出道德判断和指导一个人的道德行为的思维。道德理性使一般的道德原则影响一个人所处的特殊境况,影响对一个人的行为及行为方式是否符合道德原则要求的判断。它能使一个人决定他是否应行动和应做什么。道德理性的典型特征是,它使用伦理学的术语并做出成为要求和推荐的道德判断。道德推理的过程是否可被公式化为实践三段论,以及它是否既涉及目的又涉及手段,对这两个问题一直存在争议。

“道德理性是普通的考虑,就如同如果这时我不很快讲出我将招致的痛苦一样。它是道德理性,是因为它的显著特征是一种产生要求的情境,这种要求也许是我这时要很快讲出的。”——丹西:《道德理性》,1993年,第251页。

### 道德规范

一种通过表明某种行为的性质(如讲真话通常是对的,偷窃通常是错误的)来指导行为和情感的一般陈述。道德规范与道德原则不同,道德原则构成道德规范的基础,它论证道德规范的合理性和阐明它们适用的范围。道德规范是特殊的和具体的,而道德原则是一般的和抽象的。道德规范是易变的,而道德原则适用于所有的情况。道德原则用于论证规范,并产生新的规范以应付意料之外的情况。规范在确定行为的道德性时直接比原则包括更多的内容。对道德原则和规范的一致性和可理解性的详细阐述,是道德理论的中心问题。

“道德规范说明某些行为通常是对的(或必须做的),但留下了是否有可能证明那类行为(或没有履行那类行为)会是正当的问题。”——辛格:《伦理学中的普遍化》,1963年,第103页。

**Moral sense**

Analogous to the sense of beauty, moral sense is supposed to be an intuitive, disinterested faculty which enables us to recognise moral qualities such as being good and bad, virtuous and vicious from what we feel. If the observation of an action is painful and disquieting, the action must be bad or evil. If the observation of an action results in a pleasant feeling, the action is good and virtuous. On such a basis, moral sense further motivates us towards morally right and virtuous behaviour. Moral sense conflicts with the theological position that God's will is the basis of morality and is also opposed to rationalism, since it insists that reason cannot account for our motivation and claims that morality is felt rather than reasoned. The theory which argues for the existence of moral sense is called moral sense theory, and is particularly associated with the eighteenth century British philosophers Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Moral sense theory tries to base itself on Locke's theory of knowledge, and it is a version of moral intuitionism. It is also called sentimentalism. Its major contribution is to emphasise the role of feeling in morality. Criticism of this theory generally alludes to the fact that there is no justification for positing an extra faculty of moral sense and that such a theory cannot avoid moral relativism.

"One man (Lord Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, etc) says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called 'moral sense'."—Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, III, 1970, p. 26.

**Moral sense theory**, see moral sense

**Moral theory**, see ethics and morality

**Moral virtue**, an alternative expression for ethical virtue

**Morality**, see ethics and morality

**Morals**, another term for ethics or moral philosophy

**Morals proper**, see metaphysics (Kant)

**Motion**, see change

**道德感**

类似于美感,道德感被认为是直觉性的、无利害关系的官能,它使我们能够从我们所感觉到的东西认识到诸如好(善)与坏、德性与恶的道德性质。假如对一个行为的观察是痛苦的和令人不安的,这种行为必定是坏的或恶的,如果对一种行为的观察导致一种愉快的感觉,这种行为必定是善的和有道德的。在这样一种基础上,道德感进一步推动我们迈向道德上正当的和有德性的行为。它是与把上帝的意志当做道德基础的神学观对立的,也是与理性主义相对的,因为它坚持认为,理性不能说明我们的动机,道德是感觉到的而不是推理得到的。主张道德感存在的这种理论被称为“道德感理论”,它尤其相联于18世纪的英国哲学家莎夫茨伯利、F. 哈奇森和D. 休谟。道德感理论力图把它自己建立在洛克的认识论上,是道德直觉主义的一种形式,也称为情感主义。其主要贡献在于强调道德中的情感作用。对这个理论的批评一般间接提到这个事实:提出道德感这样一种额外的官能,不可能有任何证明,以及这样一种理论不能避免道德相对主义。

“有人(莎夫茨伯利伯爵、哈奇森、休谟等)说,他有一种东西有意要告诉他什么是对的、什么是错的,它就叫做‘道德感’。”——边沁:《道德与立法原则导论》,第三章,1970年,第26页。

**道德感理论**

见“道德感”条。

**道德理论**

见“伦理学和道德”条。

**道德德性**

“伦理德性”的另一表述。

**道德**

见“伦理学和道德”条。

**道德**

被用作“伦理学”或“道德哲学”的另一个名称。

**严格意义的道德**

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

**运动**

见“变化”条。

## Motive

The moving force which leads a person to behave or act in this way rather than in another way. A motive is closely related to our desire for the objects for which we act. Reason and cause are generally appealed to for explaining behaviour. While many philosophers believe that reason is also a motive, Hume denied that reason has a moving force. It is a continuing matter of controversy whether motivational explanation is also a type of causal explanation, and there is also some disagreement whether a motivational explanation is an explanation in terms of pattern.

“A motive is a want that leads to action, that is, a goal appraised as good for action without further deliberation; it includes effective and deliberate action tendencies.”—Arnold, in Mischel (ed.), *Human Action*, 1969, p. 196.

## Motive utilitarianism

A version of utilitarianism which applies the principle of utility directly to behavioural dispositions and indirectly to actions. It claims that concern for the maximisation of human happiness is good, but tries to shift ethical consideration from the traditional utilitarian focus on the moral assessment of actions to the assessment of motives which give rise to actions.

“The theory that will be my principal subject here is that one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has more utility than the latter... Let us call this doctrine motive utilitarianism.”—Adams, “Motive Utilitarianism”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 73 (1976), p. 470.

**Motive-consequentialism**, see consequentialism

## Moving rows, paradox of

One of Zeno's paradoxes designed to show the impossibility of motion. Suppose that there are three equally sized rows A, B and C. Each member of each row occupies a minimal unit of time and a minimal part of space. The row A is at rest, but rows C and B move in opposite directions with equal velocities. When the first member of B passes two members of A (taking two units of time), it will at the same time pass four members of C (taking four units of time), leading to the conclusion that “double the time is equal to half the time”. The arguments of this paradox are complicated, and there are various other versions.

“The fourth argument is that concerning the two rows of bodies... This, he thinks, involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to double that time.”—Aristotle, *Physics*, 239b33-6.

**M-predicate**, see P-predicate

## 动机

使得一个人以这种而不是那种方式行为或活动的动力。动机与一个人对其行为对象的欲求密切相关。对一个行为的解释常常要借助于理由和原因。许多哲学家认为理由也是动机,但休谟却否认理由具有动力。动机解释是否也是一种因果解释的问题不断引起争议。关于动机解释是否是一种模式解释也存在争议。

“动机是导致活动的愿望,亦即,一个无须进一步的推敲而被褒扬为善的活动目标;它包括有效的和蓄意的活动倾向。”——阿诺德,贝米谢尔(编):《人类活动》,1969年,第196页。

## 动机功利主义

功利主义的一种形式,它将功利原则直接应用于行为的意向,间接地应用于行为。它认为,对人的最大幸福的关切就是善,但它却试图将伦理学的思考从传统功利主义的以对行为的道德评价为中心,转换为对产生行为的动机评价为中心。

“这个在此将成为我的主题的理论是,就一种动机模式比另一种更多功利色彩而言,前者在道德上优于后者,……让我们把这一学说称为动机功利主义。”——亚当斯:《动机的功利主义》,《哲学杂志》,73(1976),第470页。

## 动机—效果论

见“效果论”条。

## 运动悖论

芝诺关于运动不可能的悖论之一。设想有三个大小相等的排列A、B及C。每一列的每一成员都占据一小段时间单位和一小空间单位。A列处于静止状态;C和B则以同等速度向相反方向运动。结果,当B的第一个成员越过两个A列成员(两个时间单位)时,它在相同时间中越过四个C列成员(四个时间单位),其结论是,“一倍的时间等于一半的时间”。这一悖论的论证极其复杂,而且有许多不同形式。

“第四个论证是关于两列物体,……他认为这会得出结论说,一给定时间的一半会等于其一倍。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》,239b33—36。

## 物—谓词

见“人一谓词”条。

**Mundus intelligibilis**, see intelligible world

**Mundus sensibilis**, see intelligible world

### Mysticism

The view that there exists a transcendent or ultimate reality which cannot be experienced or rationally conceived. That domain is beyond the description of ordinary language, and knowledge of it can only be achieved through mysterious intuition resulting from long-term spiritual cultivation. By gaining a vision of this ineffable ultimate reality, one reaches a joyous and ecstatic union with it, and this union constitutes the ultimate meaning of human life. Mysticism is associated with religious experience and doctrines. Many properties of the Christian God are ineffable and can only be divinely revealed. Mysticism is also associated with traditional metaphysics or speculative philosophy, which seeks after the first principles that cannot be rationally discussed. Since the existence of mystical entities is not provable, and mystical experience is untestable, mysticism is always under suspicion. Wittgenstein was also concerned with mysticism. For him, the mystical is a realm of ultimate importance which can be shown, but cannot be said. This view of the mystical is aesthetic and ethical value and is distinguished from logic.

“The term mysticism is at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible; and in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with superstition and deception.”—Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 82.

### Myth of passage

A term introduced by D. C. Williams in his paper “The Myth of Passage” (1951). It is a very common to believe that time flows and is a passage. Some philosophers even believe that time as a rolling stream is the feature which distinguishes time from other instances of one-dimensional order, such as the order of points on a line. Williams argued that if time flows past us or if we advance through time, this would be a motion with respect to a hypertime because we could not say that the motion of time is a motion with respect to time itself. Furthermore, if it is of the essence of time that time passes, then hypertime will pass as well, requiring a hyper-hypertime and so on *ad infinitum*. Williams concluded that the passage of time is a myth and should be abandoned.

### 理智世界

〔“理智世界(intelligible world)”的拉丁词〕见“理智世界(intelligible world)”条。

### 感性世界

〔“感性世界(sensible world)”的拉丁词〕见“理智世界”条。

### 神秘主义

这种观点主张,存在着一个超验的或终极的实在,它既不能被经验,也不能被理性把握。那个领域超出日常语言的描述范围,对它的知识只能通过长期的精神教化所形成的神秘直觉才能达到。人一旦目睹这不可名状的终极实在,他就达到一种与它合一的快乐而痴迷的境界,这种合一构成人类生活的终极意义。神秘主义与宗教体验和学说相关联。基督教上帝的许多特性就是不可名状的,只能被神圣启示。神秘主义也与传统形而上学或思辨哲学相关联,因为这种哲学追寻不能被理性讨论的第一原理。既然神秘实体的存在是不可证明的,神秘的体验是不可检验的,那么,神秘主义就总是被怀疑。维特根斯坦也关注神秘主义。在他看来,神秘是第一重要的领域,它能被显示,但却不能被言说。这种神秘的观点具有美学和伦理学价值,但与逻辑相区别。

“在现时,大家一律地把神秘主义一词当做神奇玄妙和不可思议的东西;由于各自的文化背景和思维方式不同,他们对神秘主义的评价也因此相异,一类人认为所指真实无妄,另一类人则称为与迷信和欺诈相关。”——黑格尔《小逻辑》,第82节。

### 迁移神话

由 D. C. 威廉姆斯在一篇题为《迁移的神话》的论文(1951年)中引入的术语。一种非常普遍的看法认为时间流逝着,并且是一种迁移。有些哲学家甚至相信,时间作为一种潺潺的溪流,是它借以区别于其他一维序列的事例(例如一条线上的点的序列)的特征。威廉姆斯论辩说,如果时间流经我们或者我们穿过时间前进,这将是一种关于超时间的运动,因为我们不能说时间的运动是关于时间自身的。而且,如果时间的本质即时间流逝,那么超时间也将流逝,需要一种超超时间,如此以至无穷。威廉姆斯得出的结论是:时间迁移是一个神话,应当被抛弃。

“[有一个命题]在事件的纯粹扩展之上,和它们的若干特性一起,沿着时间轴,……有着在

“[There is a proposition] that over and above the sheer spread of events, with their several qualities, along the time axis, ... there is something extra, something active and dynamic, which is often and perhaps best described as passage. This something extra, I am going to plead, is a myth.”—D. C. Williams, *Principles of Empirical Realism*, 1966, p. 283.

### Myth of the given

A term introduced by the American philosopher W. Sellars in his essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Many empiricists claim that there is a sort of knowledge which is directly presented to our consciousness and call this knowledge the given. The given, to which each of us has privileged access, presupposes no learning and no forming of associations, but provides the foundation for empirical knowledge. It offers the ultimate court of appeals for all our knowledge claims about the world. All other forms of knowledge are derived from the given according to certain rules.

Sellars labels the alleged existence of such knowledge as “the myth of the given”. To call something a myth means that it does not exist at all. Sellars rejects all the central arguments that were put forward to support the existence of the given and claims that empirical knowledge, which is a rational and self-correcting enterprise, has no need for the given. His position has had much influence in questioning the need for foundations in epistemology and other areas of philosophy.

“The idea that observation, strictly and properly so-called, is constituted by certain self-authenticating non-verbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are made ‘in conformity with the semantical rules of the language’, is, of course, the heart of the myth of the given.”—Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality*, 1963, p. 169.

此之外的某种东西,某种主动的、动态的东西,它经常并且最好被描述为迁移。我想申明的是,这一之外的某种东西是一种神话。”——威廉姆斯:《经验实在论原理》,1966年,第283页。

### 所予的神话

美国哲学家 W. 塞拉斯在其论文《经验主义和心的哲学》中提出的术语。许多经验主义者认为,有一种直接呈现于我们意识的知识,并将这种知识称为“所予”。我们每个人都有特权得知的所予不以学习和形成联系为先决条件,但对于经验知识提供了基础。对于我们的有关世界的知识,它设置了上诉的终审法庭。所有其他形式的知识都是根据某些规则从所予中得来的。

塞拉斯把所谓的这种知识的存在贴了个标签,叫做“所予的神话”。把某种东西叫做神话,意味着它根本不存在。塞拉斯反驳了为证明所予存在而提出的所有核心论证,主张经验知识——它是一项理性的、自我校正的事业——并不需要所予。在质疑认识论和哲学其他领域需要基础时,他的立场有极大的影响。

“有人认为观察——严格地和恰当地称呼的——由某种自我证明、非言词的事件构成,当人们‘按照语言的句法规则’做出言词和类似言词的行动时,它的权威性会传递给它们,当然,这种想法是所予的神话的核心。”——塞拉斯:《科学、知觉和实在》,1963年,第169页。

## N

**Naive realism**

The common-sense view of the world held by most ordinary people. According to this view, the external world consists of objects such as rocks and trees and the qualities they possess. The world exists and develops independently of our sensations and thought. Our sensations, like mirrors, reflect this world as it is. Such a view also believes uncritically that we have the ability to know the world. However, upon reflection, philosophers find that the nature of the world and our knowledge about it are both much more complicated and puzzling than naive realism suggests. Many so-called secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell are inseparable from our senses rather than properties of things independent of us. Our perceptions sometimes deceive us. From here we may derive many fundamental philosophical questions such as “What is real?”, “What is appearance?”, “How is illusion possible?”, “Is our experience a reliable source of knowledge?”. One of the major tasks of philosophy is to uncover the difficulties hidden in the common assumptions of views such as naive realism in order to understand the world better.

“Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.”—Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 15.

**Name**

A name is traditionally believed to be a mark, sign or expression referring to things in the world. Names are generally divided into general or common names (referring to kinds of individuals) and single or proper names (referring to particular individuals). Names help people to communicate ideas or to remember ideas. Frege distinguished between the sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*) of a name. He held that the fact that two names for the same thing cannot always be used interchangeably indicates that names are not merely referential devices but also have sense in terms of which they refer to objects. Russell rejected Frege's distinction between sense and reference and claimed that only logically proper names such as “this” or “that” refer to objects. Ordinary proper names are actually definite descriptions in disguise. Kripke rejects the view that names are descriptions in part on the grounds that the user of a name does not require identifying information about the object in question. He has pro-

**素朴实在论**

大多数普通人对于世界所持的一种常识观点。照这种观点,外在世界由诸如岩石、树木及它们所具有的性质构成。世界的存在和发展独立于我们的感觉和思想。我们的感觉像镜子一样如实地反映这个世界。这种观点也不加批判地认为我们有能力认识世界。然而,哲学家在反思之后发现,世界的本性和我们对此的知识都要比素朴实在论所认为的要复杂和令人困惑得多。许多所谓的第二性质,诸如颜色、味道、气味,与我们的感觉不可分,它们不是事物独立于我们的性质。我们的知觉有时会欺骗我们。由此我们会得到许多基本的哲学问题,诸如“什么是实在的?”“什么是现象?”“幻象如何可能?”“我们的经验是知识可靠的源泉吗?”哲学的主要任务之一就是发现隐藏在诸如素朴实在论这样的日常假设中的困难,以便更好地理解世界。

“素朴实在论导致物理学,而物理学则正确地表明素朴实在论是错的,因此,素朴实在论的确是错的;因此,它就是错的。”——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第15页。

**名称**

名称在传统上被看做是指称世界中事物的标记、记号或表达式。名称通常被分为一般名称或普通名称(指称个体的种类)和单个名称或专门名称(指称特殊的个体)。名称帮助人们交流观念或记忆观念。弗雷格区分了名称的意义(*Sinn*)和指称(*Bedeutung*)。他认为,同一个事物具有的两个名称往往不能交替使用,这一事实表明,名称不仅是指称的手段,而且具有意义,由于这种意义它们才指称对象。罗素抛弃了弗雷格对意义和指称的区分,认为只有“逻辑上的专名”诸如“这个”或“那个”才指称对象。日常的专名实际上是伪装的限定摹状词。克里普克反对认为名称是摹状词的看法,在他看来,名称的使用者并不必须对这个对象有比较清楚的了解。他自己的名称理论认为,名称是严格的指示词,指称在所有世界中存在的同一个体。按这种理解,名词与对象之间关系的建立与维系

posed a theory of names according to which a name is a rigid designator, which refers to the same individual in all worlds in which that individual exists. On his account, the connection between a name and its object is established and maintained causally rather than through descriptive content.

“The name itself is merely a means of pointing to the thing.” —Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 245.

### Narcissism

[from the Greek myth: *Narkissos*, the youth at the riverside who fell in love with his own reflection in water] Narcissism is self-love or an erotic interest in oneself. Freud believed that narcissism exists when the libido is directed toward the self. Narcissism as a psychological phenomenon normally occurs in childhood when individuals believe that they possess every valued perfection and that they are their own ideal. When people grow up, the response of others and their own critical judgement will lead to the realisation that they are not perfect and they will seek to replace childhood narcissism with a new form of ego ideal.

“Clinical experience had made us familiar with people who behaved in a striking fashion as though they were in love with themselves and this perversion had been given the name of narcissism.” —Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 257.

### Narrative

A mode of discourse, which establishes orders or logical relations among various events, and makes them into a sequence. Such a sequence is not merely a chronology of events, but provides a configurational understanding by which each occurrence introduced in the narrative forms part of a meaningful whole. In this way a narrative forms a story. A narrative can be oral or written, about what has happened or about the present, in the first person, third person or in a mixture of the two. Narrative differs from analysis and dialogue. We also need to distinguish between the narrative and its narration, as we distinguish between the story and its telling. Any narrative is open to infinite possibilities of re-narration. Narrative is merely a form of language, and is neutral regarding the truth of its contents. However, narrative has its own discoverable structure rather than being a purely subjective projection. Narrative is the characteristic way of presenting historical knowledge and literature. Its epistemological status and ontological implications have been major topics in contemporary analytic philosophy of history and philosophy of literature. Narrative seems to have important cognitive functions, but it is difficult to settle what these function might be.

“Narrative is a major organising device. It is as important to literature as representation to painting and sculpture;

是因果性的，而不是通过摹状内容的。

“名称本身只是指出事物的手段。”——罗素：《逻辑和知识》，1956年，第245页。

### 自恋

[源自希腊神话：那喀索斯 (*Narkissos*) 乃一河岸边上的美少年，爱上了自己在水中的倒影，死后化为水仙花] 自恋是指对自己产生爱情或对自己有性爱那样的兴趣。弗洛伊德相信，当里比多 (libido, 由性本能产生的动力) 朝向自我时，就会出现自恋。作为一种心理现象，自恋通常出现在儿童期；表现为当事人相信他们具有一切有价值的完美性，并相信他们是自己的理想。当人们长大后，他人的反应和他们自己的批判性判断使他们认识到自己并非完美，并且试图以新的自我理想形式来代替童年期的自恋。

“临床经验已使我们熟悉这样一种人，他们的行为非同寻常仿佛是在与自己恋爱一样。这样一种反常现象被称之为自恋。”——弗洛伊德：《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》，第18卷，第257页。

### 叙述

一种话语模式，旨在于不同事件中建立序列或逻辑关系，将其按顺序排列。这种顺序不仅是指事件按照发生的年月顺序排列，而且还提供一种完形的理解力，藉此使得记叙文中所发生的每一事件构成有意义整体的组成部分。这样一来，叙述便构成故事。叙述可以是口头的或笔头的，是关于过去的或现在的，可以用第一人称、第三人称或二者混用。叙述有别于分析和对话。我们在区别故事和讲故事时也需要分清叙述与叙述内容。任何叙述都具有复述的无限可能性。叙述纯然是一种语言形式，对其内容的真实性采取不偏不倚的态度。尽管如此，叙述有其自身的展示结构，并非是单纯的主观投射。叙述是传授历史知识与文学的特有方式。其认识论地位与本体论内涵向来是当代分析的历史哲学与文学哲学的主要话题。叙述看来具有重要的认知功能，但是难以确定这些功能会是什么。

“叙述是一种主要的组织手段。它对文学的重要性犹如再现对绘画和雕塑的重要性；就是说，叙述并非文学的本质所在，因为叙述（类似造型艺术中的再现）不是必不可少的，但是它却是设计多数作品的结构基础。”——朗格：《情感与形式》，1953年，第261页。

that is to say, it is not the essence of literature, for (like representation in plastic art) it is not indispensable, but it is the structural basic on which most works are designed.” — Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 1953, p. 261.

### Narrative sentence

A sentence employed by historians in ascribing historical significance to events or persons by connecting them to something which came afterwards, such as “When Petrarch climbed Mount Ventoux he opened the Renaissance”. The problem of assessing the truth value of narrative sentences reflects a distinctive feature of historical knowledge. A person who saw Petrarch climb Mount Ventoux did not know that Petrarch opened Renaissance because no one at that time knew that there would be a Renaissance. As a consequence, a contemporary witness could not know the truth of that narrative sentence. However, historians know that it is true through knowing what happened later. In general, the truth value of a narrative sentence can be known only by those who have access to a temporal whole including all of the relevant time periods.

“I shall designate them as ‘narrative sentences’. Their most general characteristic is that they refer to at least two time-separated events though they only *describe* (are only *about*) the earliest event to which they refer.” — A. C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 1965, p. 43.

### Narrow content

The kind of content of a mental state that is purely “in the head” of the subject. It is not related to the world, and is taxonomised according to causal power. It is not subject to existential generalisation, and is not freely substitutable by co-extensive terms. Narrow content contrasts with the ordinary attributes of occurring thoughts and propositional attitudes, which is called wide content or broad content. Wide content is not wholly “in the head” and has a set of truth-conditions. The notion of narrow content is based on Putnam’s distinction between narrow states and wide states. It is useful for providing psychological explanations of behaviour and explaining the privileged access we seem to have to our own mental states.

“The narrow content of a mental state is supposed to be a kind of content that is wholly internal to the mind of the person in the mental state.” — Stalnaker, “Narrow content”, in Anderson and Owen (eds.), *Propositional Attitudes*, 1990, p. 131.

### Narrow state

A term introduced by Putnam for the mental states which do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. This is in contrast to wide states, such as being jealous of somebody,

### 叙述句子

是历史学家通过把事件或人物与随后发生的事情联结起来而将历史的意义归结为这些人物和事件的一种句子。例如，“当彼特拉克登上文都山时，他开辟了文艺复兴时期”。对叙述句子真值的估价问题，反映了历史知识的一个显著特性。一个看到彼特拉克登上文都山的人并不知道彼特拉克开辟了文艺复兴时期，因为当时没人知道将会会有一个文艺复兴时期。作为一种推断，当时的目击者无法知道这一叙述句子的真。可是，历史学家通过了解后来所发生的事情而知道它是真的。一般说来，叙述句子的真值只能为那些经历了包括所有相关时期在内的整个时代的人所认识。

“我将把它们称为‘叙述句子’。它们的最主要的特征是：虽然它们仅仅“描述”（仅仅是“关于”）它们所涉及的最早的事件，但它们至少涉及的是两个在时间上分开的事件。”——丹托：《分析的历史哲学》，1965年，第43页。

### 狭内容

是指一种纯粹“在头脑中”的心的状态的内容。它不与世界相关联，依因果力而分类。它不隶属于存在概括，也不能轻易地由共存术语所取代。狭内容相对于呈现思维和命题态度的普通属性。后者被称为广内容或宽内容。宽内容不完全“在头脑中”并有一系列的真值条件。狭内容概念乃是基于普特南关于狭状态与广状态的区分。它有助于提供关于行为的心理学解释并解释我们对自己的心的状态所具有的优先获知。

“一个心的状态的狭内容被认为是一种完全在具有这个心的状态的人的心的内部的内容。”——斯托奈克：《狭内容》，见安德森和欧文（编）：《命题态度》，1990年，第131页。

### 狭状态

由普特南引进的术语，指不预设任何处于这一状态的主体以外的任何个体的心的状态。这与像忌妒某人这样的广状态相对，后者具有指涉主体以外的世界这样的宽内容。方法论的

which have wide content referring to the world outside the subject. Methodological solipsism is a doctrine which holds that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states. What is characteristic of narrow states is narrow content, which is constituted simply by what is "in the head". Fodor uses the notion of a narrow state for those mental states which can be individuated by content without regard to truth or reference. These states are solely determined by the intrinsic properties of an individual, without presupposing that anything other than that individual exists. Other philosophers use the term for mental states shared by molecule-for-molecule duplicates. Different thinkers use different criteria for narrowness, but all agree that a narrow state cannot be a belief that is individuated by particular objects in the believer's environment.

"We shall... refer to the states which are permitted by methodological solipsism as 'psychological states in the narrow sense'." —Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, p. 220.

**Nash equilibrium**, see game theory

### National character

The pattern of thought, feeling and action that is peculiar to a society and its people and forms their particular identity. A national character is cultivated from historical and cultural traditions. Although the explanatory role of national character is disputed, society is claimed to inherit its character from its earlier states, and its character is claimed to form its subsequent states. National character is embodied in public sentiment and social custom, and it greatly influences a society's laws and form of government. J. S. Mill claimed that by analogy to political economy, the social sciences should have a branch, which he called political ethnology, to study national character. Some advocates of the importance of national character, represented by Vico and Herder, emphasise that there is no common measurement of worth for different cultures or characters. This position is echoed by contemporary communitarians. Major problems facing this view are how to avoid relativism and how to make inter-cultural criticism possible. This approach to national character contrasts with liberal universalism, which holds that a set of universal values and rights applies to human beings irrespective of the national communities to which they belong.

"The laws of national (or collective) character are by far the most important class of sociological laws." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 905.

### Nationalism

In its positive aspect, adherence to a national identity formed by the distinctive characteristics typically derived

唯我论认为心理学只应当关心“狭的”心的状态或心理状态。狭状态的特点在于“狭内容”，后者仅由头脑中的东西所组成。福多使用狭状态概念来指那些不考虑真和指称而可以由内容加以区分的心的状态。这些状态仅仅由个体的内在特性所决定，而不预设任何这一个体以外的东西的存在。另外一些哲学家采用这一概念来指与完全复制品共有的心的状态。不同的人可能使用不同的狭义标准，但所有的人都认为狭状态是一个不由相信者的环境中的特定对象来区分的信念。

“我们应当……将方法论的唯我论所容许的状态称为‘狭义的心理状态’。”——普特南：《心智、语言与实在》，1975年，第220页。

### 纳西均衡

见“游戏理论”条。

### 民族特性

民族特性是一个社会及其人民特有的并构成他们独特个性的思想、情感和行为的方式。民族特性是由历史和文化传统培养而成的。虽然对民族特性的解释作用有争议，但人们认为社会继承了它以前状况的特性，它的特性又会构成它后来的状况。民族特性体现在舆论和社会习惯中，对社会的法律和政府的形式有着重大影响。J. S. 密尔主张，社会科学应有一门类似政治经济学那样的研究民族特性的学科，他把这一学科称为政治性格学。以维柯和赫尔德为代表的一些鼓吹民族特性的重要性的人强调，对不同的文化或特性而言，不存在共同的价值尺度。这一见解得到了当代共同体主义者的附和。这一观点面临的主要问题是避免相对主义和如何使各种文化之间的批评成为可能。对民族特性的这一看法是与自由主义的普遍主义相对立的，后者认为一组普遍的价值和权利适用于人类，而无须考虑他们从属的民族共同体。

“民族（或集体的）特性的规律是最重要的社会学规律。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第七卷，第905页。

### 民族主义

就其积极方面而言，它坚持一个民族的特性，这种特性是由那些典型地起源于一个民族

from one's national history, culture, language, and religion. Nationalism emphasises the nation's rights to self-determination and sovereignty and demands the preservation of its culture. Nationalists often claim that the nation's values and interests, at least in times of danger or crisis, override the individual rights of its citizens. Citizens are required to display patriotism by being loyal to the nation and by serving its collective aims.

Negatively, nationalism attaches unreasonable importance to one's national moral, cultural and political values. An exclusive concern for the interests of one's own nation leads to blindness and belligerence in assessing the values and interests of other nations or minorities within one's own nation. In this sense, nationalism is nearly indistinguishable from chauvinism.

"Nationalism, if we extended the sense of the word 'nation' somewhat, could include the self-centred pursuit of the interest of any individual group." —Hare, *Essays on Political Authority*, 1989, p. 37.

### Natura naturans

[Latin: literally nature naturing, that is generating or active nature, in contrast to *natura naturata*, literally nature natured, that is generated or passive nature] These two terms derive from scholastic philosophy, in which *natura naturans* refers to God and *natura naturata* refers to the created world. Spinoza introduced them in his *Ethics*, where *natura naturans* is used for substance and attributes, because they are self-explanatory. *Natura naturata* is used for modes, which follow from substances and attributes and must be explained by them. Accordingly, God and the world are one, but are not absolutely identical.

"From what has gone before, I think it is plain that by *natura naturans* we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, prop. 29.

*Natura naturata*, see *natura naturans*

*Natura non facit saltum*, see contiguity

### Natural deduction

The method which constructs a logical system merely on the basis of a set of rules of inference without employing any logical truths as axioms. It contrasts with the standard axiomatic method of forming a logical system which requires both a set of axiom-like logical truths and a set of rules of inference. The method of natural deduction was developed independently in 1934 by the Polish logician S. Jaskowski and

的历史、文化、语言和宗教的独具特色的特征构成的。民族主义强调民族的自决权和主权,并要求保存它的文化。民族主义者常常声称,民族的价值和利益,至少在危险或危机的时候,是压倒其公民的个人权利的。公民被要求以对民族的忠诚和为民族集体的目标服务来显示爱国主义。

就其消极方面而言,民族主义热衷于对一个民族的道德、文化和政治价值的过度重视。对一个民族自身利益的孤傲的关注,会导致在评价其他民族或自己国家中的少数民族的价值和利益时的盲目无知和好战。从这种意义上讲,民族主义与沙文主义几乎难以区分。

"如果我们将'民族'这个词的意思扩展一点,民族主义就可以包括以自我为中心的对个别集团利益的追求。"——黑尔:《政治权威论文集》,1989年,第37页。

### 产生自然的自然

[拉丁词,字面意思是"能自然化的自然",即能产生的或能动的自然。与它相对的词是 *natura naturata*,字面意思是"被自然产生的自然",即被产生的或被动的自然]这两个词都来自经院哲学,前者指上帝,后者指被造的世界。斯宾诺莎在他的《伦理学》中引入了这两个词。根据他的观点,*natura naturans*指实体和属性,因为它们是由自己来说明的。而 *natura naturata*指样式,它们是从实体和属性来的,必须由后者来说明。相应地,上帝和世界两者为一,但不是绝对的等同。

"从前面所说的看,我想很明显,我们把 *natura naturans* 理解为在自身内,并通过自身被构想的东西,或理解为实体的表示永恒无限本质的那些属性。"——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第一部分,命题 29。

### 被自然产生的自然

见"产生自然的自然"条。

### 自然从不飞跃

见"接近性"条。

### 自然演绎

仅仅基于一组推理规则而不使用任何逻辑真理作为公理来构造逻辑系统的方法。它与构造逻辑系统的标准的公理化方法形成对照,后者既要求一组似公理的逻辑真理,又需要一组推理规则。自然演绎方法是由波兰逻辑学家 S. 雅斯科夫斯基和德国逻辑学家 G. 根岑于 1934 年各自独立发展的。标准的公理式形式化使便

the German logician G. Gentzen. While standard axiomatic formalisation makes logic concentrate on the choice and justification of logical truths, the axiomless formalisation of natural deduction focuses on logical consequence, that is on the move from premises to conclusions. For example, from a pair of sentences as premises one infers their conjunction, and from a conjunction one infers either conjunct. With natural deduction, a premise can be introduced at any stage of deduction without need of justification, and a hypothesis can also serve as a premise. In this way, logic not only gets rid of the most troublesome task of justifying its choice of logical truths, but also conforms more properly to its original task, that is, the study of inference.

"The methods of proof so far assembled (techniques for 'natural deduction', as they are sometimes called) permits the demonstration of all logically true propositions constructed out of truth-functional connectives and the quantification of individual variable." —Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, 1967, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., p. 129.

### Natural kinds

Things which are naturally distinguished, including the species of things such as whales and apples and elements or mass items such as water and gold. These things occur naturally, in contrast to things such as televisions and tables which are invented by human beings. Traditionally, terms naming natural kinds, that is natural kind terms, are taken to be general names that should be defined by giving a connotative meaning or by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of their application.

In the 1970s, Kripke and Putnam, arguing against the traditional theory, suggest that natural kind terms, like proper names, are not connotative. While proper names are rigid designators of an individual, natural kind terms are rigid designators of a kind. They have an essential property, namely, the underlying structure discovered through empirical investigation. Water is H<sub>2</sub>O in all possible worlds, so anything that is not H<sub>2</sub>O is not water, even if it satisfies some list of superficial features that we think characterise water. Accordingly, it is a necessary truth that water is H<sub>2</sub>O, although this truth is *a posteriori*, that is empirically known. A natural kind term is ascribed historically, and the justification for its use is passed on through a causal chain.

"What really distinguishes the classes we count as natural kinds is itself a matter of (high level and very abstract) scientific investigation and not just meaning analysis." —Putnam, in Schwartz (ed.), *Names, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, p. 104.

Natural language, see ordinary language

辑集中关注逻辑真理的选择和辩护,而无公理的自然演绎形式化则重点关注逻辑后承,即从前提到结论的步骤。例如,从一对作为前提的语句人们可以推出它们的合取,并且从一合取人们可以推出任意一个合取支。对于自然演绎来说,一前提可以在演绎的任何步骤引入而不需要辩护,假设也可以用作前提。这样一来,逻辑不仅摆脱了下述最烦难的任务,即证明它对逻辑真理的选择是合理的,而且更恰切地适合它本来的任务,即研究推理。

"迄今所列集的证明方法(它们有时被称作'自然演绎'技巧)使我们能够证明所有那些由真值函项联结词和个体变元量化构造出来的逻辑真命题。"——柯比:《符号逻辑》,1967年,第3版,第129页。

### 自然种类

自然地区别开来的事物,包括事物的种类如"鲸"和"苹果",以及元素或物质名词如"水"和"金"。与人们发明的"电视机"、"桌子"等等相反,这些事物是自然地出现的。传统理论宣称,命名自然种类的词项即自然种类词是通名,应该通过给出其内涵意义或刻画其应用的充分必要条件来给它们下定义。

在20世纪70年代,克里普克和普特南反对传统的理论,提出自然种类词像专名一样,不是内涵性的。若专名是个体的固定指示词,则自然种类词就是种类的固定指示词。它们具有一本质属性,即通过经验研究所发现的底层结构。水在所有可能世界中都是H<sub>2</sub>O,因此任何不是H<sub>2</sub>O的东西就不是水,即使它满足我们认为是水的特征的某些表面特性。相应地,水是H<sub>2</sub>O是一必然真理,尽管这是后天地也就是经验地知道的。自然种类词历史地归属于一个因果链条,对其用法的辩护也通过这个链条而传递。

"真正把我们称之为自然种类的种类区分开来的,是(高层次和非常抽象的)科学研究工作,而不只是意义分析。"——普特南,见施瓦茨(编):《命名,必然性和自然种类》,第104页。

### 自然语言

见"日常语言"条。

**Natural law**, another expression for law of nature

### Natural law theory

A position holding that there is a system of natural laws which guides political and legal authority, and sets the moral standards for human conduct. It argues that law is essentially normative and that an unjust law is not a law. Natural law theory has two major forms. Classical natural law theory is based on the distinction between nature and convention and considers natural law to be a conception of justice. It is universal and everlasting, grounded either in God's will or human nature and discovered by human reason. This form can be traced to Aristotle's teleological ethics and Stoicism and was developed by Medieval philosophers in combination with Christian thought. It was revived in this century, especially by John Finnis and Robert Nozick. Modern natural law theory claims that natural laws grant natural rights to each individual. These include rights to freedom, life and equality. Political rights and obligations are derived through the social contract of individuals who hold these natural rights. This theory was developed by Grotius, Locke and Rousseau and was revived in this century especially by John Rawls. Natural law theory forms a major tradition in legal philosophy in virtue of its claim that law is necessarily connected with morality. Human law derives its binding force from natural law and is null if it does not conform with natural law. The chief motive for originating legal positivism was to reject natural law theory.

"A 'natural law' theorist... would insist that all valid moral standards are tacitly incorporated by the Constitution, so that any interpretation that ascribes to it moral stands of an inferior or defective kind must be mistaken." —J. Feinberg, *Offense to Others*, 1985, p. 167.

### Natural light

[Latin: *lumen naturale*, also called *lux rationis*, the light of reason] Generally regarded by seventeenth century philosophers as a universal faculty shared by all human beings that could be expected to reach the same view about certain basic issues. Descartes in particular favoured this term, using it to refer to the transparent clarity of cognition. Truths which are presented to the intellect by the natural light allow no room for denial and are not open to doubt. Descartes used it as an authority whenever he wished to introduce some fundamental premises as a basis for further argument. He associated this notion with intuition by defining intuition as what the mind clearly and indubitably conceives from the natural light. According to this view, the natural light could be developed through the study of sciences, but could also be obscured if we are not capable of heeding rea-

### 自然法

“自然法 (law of nature)”的另一英文表述。

### 自然法理论

这一主张认为,存在一种指导政治权力和法律权力,并为人们的行为制定道德标准的自然法体系。它论证道,法在本质上是规范性的,恶法不是法。自然法理论有两种主要形式。古典的自然法理论以自然和约定的区分为基础,认为自然法是正义的观念。自然法是普遍的和永恒的,它或者基于神意,或者基于人的本性,并且是为人的理性所发现的。这种自然法理论可以追溯到亚里士多德的目的论伦理学和斯多亚哲学,并通过与基督教思想的结合为中世纪的哲学家所发展。它在本世纪又得以复兴,这主要是得益于J. 芬尼斯和R. 诺齐克。现代自然法理论认为自然法赋予每一个人以自然权利。这些权利包括自由权、生存权和平等权。政治权利和义务起源于拥有这些自然权利的个人之间的社会契约。这一理论为格劳修斯、洛克和卢梭所发展,它在本世纪的复兴主要得益于J. 罗尔斯。由于认为法律与道德有必然的联系,自然法理论构成了法哲学中一个主要传统。人定法是从自然法获得其约束力的,如果不与自然法相一致它就等于零。法律实证主义起因的主旨就是反对自然法理论。

“一个‘自然法’理论家会坚持认为,所有有效的道德标准不言而喻都为宪法所体现,以至任何把差的或有缺陷的道德标准归结于它的解释都肯定是错误的。”——芬柏格:《对他人的伤害》,1985年,第167页。

### 自然之光

[拉丁文 *lumen naturale*, 亦称“理性之光” (*lux rationis*)] 17世纪的哲学家一般把它看做有望能在某些基本问题上达成共识的全体人类共同享有的普遍官能。笛卡尔特别喜欢用这个词指认识的清晰透彻状态。以这种方式出现于理智面前的真理是不容否认、不可怀疑的。每当笛卡尔希望为进一步的证明提出某些基本前提作为基础时,他都把理性之光当做权威。他把直觉界定为心灵通过自然之光清楚无疑构想的东西,从而将自然之光这个概念同“直觉”联系起来。根据这个观点,自然之光可以通过科学研究而得到发展,但如果我们不能对理性加以关注,自然之光也可以变得昏暗。

“认识的自然之光或官能是上帝给我们的,就一个对象的确被这个官能所包含,即就一个

son.

“The light of nature or faculty of knowledge which God gave us never encompass any object which is not true in so far as it is indeed encompassed by this faculty; that is, in so far as it is clearly and distinctly perceived.”—Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al), 1985, Vol. 1, p. 203.

### Natural philosophers

[Greek: *phusikoi* or *phusiologi*, literally the men who talk about nature; also translated as physicists, referring to the pre-Socratic philosophers who attempted to explain the world by appeal to natural causes, in contrast to the *theologi* who explained the generation and structure of the world in terms of myth and supernatural forces] Aristotle claimed that the founder of the natural philosophy is Thales. Natural philosophy is concerned with the question “What is the world made of?” and natural philosophers usually answer the question by appeal to a single material substratum, something equivalent to Aristotle’s material cause. Historians of philosophy, however, generally believe that Aristotle’s account is not very accurate, for natural philosophers did not have the concept of matter, and their keyword was “nature”, the principle of a thing’s growth and present organisation. Most of them wrote books entitled “On Nature”.

“Natural philosophers have two modes of explanation. The first set make the underlying body one, . . . The second set assert that the contrarities are contained in the one and emerge from it by segregation.”—Aristotle, *Physics*, 187a11-20.

**Natural philosophy**, another name for philosophy of nature

**Natural religion**, another expression for natural theology

### Natural rights

Rights which belong to us simply because of our humanity and not because of any special legal, political or social institutions. According to many writers of the Enlightenment, natural rights, which are held in the state of nature in virtue of natural law, cannot be transferred to the government through a social contract. According to Hobbes, with no government in the state of nature, an individual has a right to take everything necessary to preserve his life or to promote his survival. The supreme natural right to defend and preserve oneself also establishes one of the basic natural laws. But because everyone has natural rights which can conflict with the natural rights of everyone else, Hobbes depicted the state of nature as a state of war of all against all. Ac-

对象被清楚明晰地知觉而言, 它决不会把任何不真实的对象包含进来。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译), 1985年, 第一卷, 第203页。

### 自然哲学家

[原文为希腊语 *phusikoi* 或者 *phusiologi*, 意指“谈论自然的人”, 也被译为“物理学家”, 表示苏格拉底以前的那些试图通过研究自然因进而解释世界的哲学家, 他们有别于那些依据神话和超自然力量来解释世界生成与结构的神学家] 亚里士多德声称自然哲学家的创始人是泰勒斯。自然哲学家关注的是“世界由什么构成的?” 这个问题, 他们通常在回答这个问题时主要凭借一种单一的物质基质, 等同于亚里士多德所说的质料因。然而, 哲学史家一般认为亚里士多德的阐述并不怎么精确, 因为自然哲学家并非接受“质料”这个概念, 他们的主词是“自然”, 而“自然”则是事物生长与现有组织的原理。许多自然哲学家的著作标题是“论自然”。

“自然哲学家有两套解释方式。第一套是将潜在的物体统一为太一, 第二套断言对立因素包含在太一之中, 但又是从太一中分离出来的。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》, 187a11-20。

### 自然的哲学

“自然哲学 (philosophy of nature)” 的另一名称。

### 自然宗教

“自然神学” 的另一种表述。

### 自然权利

是指属于我们只是因为我們的人性而不是因为特殊的法律、政治或社会制度的那些权利。根据启蒙运动时期许多著作家的看法, 自然权利是在自然状态下凭借自然法而持有的, 它不可能通过社会契约而转移到政府那里。按照霍布斯观点, 由于自然状态下没有政府, 个人有权取得所需的东西以维持他的生命或促进他的生存。保护和维持自身的最高的自然权利, 还确立了一个基本的自然法。不过, 由于每个人拥有的自然权利会与其他人拥有的自然权利发生冲突, 霍布斯把自然状态描绘为一切人反对一切人的战争状态。按照 J. 洛克的见解, 自然权利包括生存权、自由权和财产权。边沁公然反对自

ording to John Locke, natural rights include the rights to life, liberty and property. Bentham notoriously rejected the possibility of natural rights on the grounds that nature does not provide rights and that rights can only be created by law. In spite of his objections, the notion of natural rights remains influential in moral, social and political thought. Natural rights are considered to be basic rights at the core of human rights. Writers are divided over the need to associate natural rights with natural law.

“The right of nature, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”—Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, 14.

### Natural selection

A central term of Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory. Organisms have features with functions that are adapted to the natural world and that help them survive and reproduce. Christianity claims that this is due to God's design, but Darwin showed that this functional adaptation for survival can be explained by a causal mechanism, natural selection. Adaptations are selected because they aid the survival of individuals or species and are transmitted to succeeding generations. Natural selection gives rise not only to the often striking forms and functions of living creatures but also to their enormous diversity. Those organisms which fail to develop suitable features lose in the struggle for survival and reproduction. The basic spirit of natural selection is summarised in Spencer's phrase survival of the fittest. Natural selection is still at the centre of the dominant accounts of evolution.

“Drawing on the analogy of the animal and plant breeders' skill at transforming through picking desired forms, Darwin christened his new mechanism ‘natural selection’.”—Ruse, *Taking Darwin Seriously*, 1986, p. 16.

### Natural theology

Also called natural religion or rational theology, a theological discipline which tries to prove truths about the existence and attributes of God through the employment of natural human reason. From this viewpoint, reason unaided by revelation can provide a firm basis for religion and shows that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God who created the world. It does not propose a supernatural communication with God through revelation and grace, because such revelation is not rationally justifiable. Rather, it makes use of data available to all rational beings. It intends to prove that theistic beliefs are not only true for believers, but for all rational human beings. It also tries to understand the action of divine providence regarding human beings and to

然权利的可能性,其根据是自然不提供权利,权利只能是由法律造成的。不管边沁如何反对,自然权利的看法仍对道德、社会和政治理论有影响。自然权利被视为人权的核心的基本权利。著作家在是否需要将自然权利和自然法联系起来的问题上存在分歧。

“著作家通常称为 *jus naturale* 的自然权利,就是每一个人拥有的按照自己的意愿运用自身的力量保全自己的天性——也就是保全他本人的生命力的自由;因此,这种自由就是用他自己的判断和理性认为是最适合的手段去做任何事情的自由。”——霍布斯:《利维坦》,第一部,第14章。

### 自然选择

C. 达尔文进化论的中心术语。有机体具有适应于自然界、从而有助于它们的生存和繁衍的功能特征。基督教宣称这是出自于上帝的设计,但达尔文证明这种适者生存的作用可以解释为一种因果机制,即“自然选择”。适者得以选择是由于它们有助于个体的生存或种类的生存并被遗传给后代。自然选择不仅经常导致生物的令人吃惊的形式和功能,而且导致它们大量的多样性。那些不能发展出这些合适特征的有机体是这种生存和繁殖斗争中的失败者。自然选择的基本精神被概括在斯宾塞的“适者生存”的警句中心。“自然选择”一词仍然处在进化思想的主导图景的中心。

“达尔文利用类比于动物和植物养育者通过挑选想要的形式来改良物种的技艺,把他的新机制命名为‘自然选择’。”——罗斯:《慎思达尔文》,1986年,第16页。

### 自然神学

也称作“自然宗教”或“理性神学”。神学的一个学科,即力图通过运用自然的人类理智来证明关于上帝存在及其属性的真理。根据这种观点,不靠启示相助的理智,能够为宗教提供坚实的基础,也能表明存在着一位全能的、全知的、全善的创世者上帝。它不提倡通过启示和恩典达到与上帝的超自然的沟通,因为这样的启示是理性不可证明的。它宁愿把一切理性存在物作为有效的证据材料来使用。它试图证明,有神论的信念不仅对于信仰者,而且对于一切有理性的人都是真实的。它也企图理解关于人类的神意行为,并力图处理邪恶问题。因此,自然神学是与超自然神学对应的,后者把关于上帝

deal with the problem of evil. Natural theology is thus contrasted with supernatural theology, which locates the source of truths about God in revelation. In this sense, natural religion is rational, while supernatural theology is not based on reason. This contrast is associated with the contrast between rational and revealed theology. For this reason, natural theology is a branch of metaphysics dealing with divine being. Many traditional arguments for God's existence, such as the ontological argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument and argument from design, are examples of natural theology. Aquinas's five ways are its paradigm. Natural theology was criticised by Hume and Kant. Hume provided especially important criticism of the argument from design. For Kant, natural theology cannot be right because the object whose existence it aims to prove is outside possible human experience where reason inevitably falls into conflict with itself, although he claimed that belief can be maintained not as knowledge but as a matter of faith and hope. Much of natural theology has been assimilated into contemporary philosophical theology.

"The fourth branch of metaphysics is natural or rational theology. The notion of God, or God as a possible being, the proofs of his existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch."—Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 36.

### Natural virtue

For Hume, virtue is the moral quality in ourselves or others which is approved of by our moral sentiments. He distinguished between natural virtue and artificial virtue. Natural virtues are virtuous tendencies and characteristics which arise from the fundamental propensities of human nature itself and are not cultivated deliberately. These characteristics include charity, benevolence, generosity, the love of one's children, clemency and so on. Artificial virtues, such as justice, allegiance and fidelity, in contrast, are effects of artifice and education and are obtained over a long period of time. They are artificial and invented, but not arbitrary. Hume claimed that natural virtues provide the basis for family life and intimate friendship, while artificial virtue is required for our broader social life.

"When I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial."—Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, III, 2, 1.

### Naturalism

The claim that everything is a part of the world of nature and can be explained using the methodology of the natural sciences. Naturalism accepts explanatory monism rather than dualism or pluralism, is committed to science and is opposed to mysticism. In different areas, naturalism has different forms. In metaphysics, it rejects the postulation of any unnatural theoretical entities, faculties or causes, and it re-

的真理来源设定在启示中。在这种意义上,自然宗教是理性的,超自然神学则不以理性为基础。这个对立与理性神学和启示神学之间的对立相关联。正因如此,自然神学是形而上学的一个分支,处理神圣存在问题。关于上帝存在的许多传统论证,如本体论论证、宇宙论论证、目的论论证、道德论证、设计论证等等,都是自然神学的例证。阿奎那的“五法”是它的范例。自然神学受到了休谟和康德的批判。休谟尤其提出了对设计论证的重要批判。在康德看来,自然神学不可能正确,因为它意欲证明其存在的那个对象是处于人类可能的经验范围之外的,在那里理性必然与自己相矛盾,尽管康德自己也宣称信仰必须被维持,但不是作为知识,而是作为信念和希望。自然神学大多已被同化进当代哲学神学中。

“形而上学的第四个分支是自然神学或理性神学。上帝的观念,或作为一种可能存在的上帝、关于他存在的证明、他的特性,构成了这个分支的研究课题。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第36节。

### 自然的德

在休谟看来,德是在我们自己或他人身上被我们的道德情感所赞许的道德品质。他区分了自然的德和人为的德。自然的德是从人性自身的根本倾向中产生出来的道德趋向和特征,不是刻意培植出来的。这些特征包括博爱、慈善、慷慨、对子女的爱、宽厚等。而人为的德,诸如正义、忠实、真诚之类,是设计和教育的结果,是经过很长一段时期才得到的。它们是为人为的和发明出来的,但不是任意的。休谟声称,自然的德为家庭生活和亲密友谊提供了基础,而人为的德是我们广泛的社会生活所需要的。

“当我否认正义是自然的德时,我所用自然的一词,仅仅是与人为的一词对立的。”——休谟:《人性论》,第三卷,第2章,第1节。

### 自然主义

认为每一事物都是自然世界的一部分,都可以用自然科学的方法加以解释。自然主义承认解释上的一元论,不承认解释上的二元论或多元论。它赞成科学,反对神秘主义。在不同的领域,自然主义有不同的形式。从形而上学方面来看,它反对假设任何非自然的从理论上推出的实体、官能或原因,反对科学探究无法接近的

jects supernatural beings and processes which are inaccessible to scientific inquiry. It also contests the claim that first philosophy is prior to natural science. In epistemology, naturalism holds that epistemological justification and explanation are continuous with natural science and argues that scientific method is the only way to secure our knowledge. According to nineteenth century psychologism and twentieth century naturalised epistemology, epistemology should be assimilated to empirical psychology. Ethical naturalism rejects the is-ought or fact-value distinction and explains ethical terms in terms of natural properties. This position was characterised by Moore as the "naturalistic fallacy", but it is uncertain whether it is a real fallacy. In aesthetics, naturalism holds that artwork should represent the world as it is. In philosophy of mind, naturalism holds that mental phenomena are, or are caused by, brain processes. Recent naturalistic interpretations of Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein place emphasis on unavoidable natural human tendencies rather than on the priority of science. For any form of naturalism, there is a corresponding form of anti-naturalism.

"Naturalism has a representative already in 1830 in the antimetaphysician Auguste Comte, who declared that positive philosophy does not differ in method from the special sciences."—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 72.

### Naturalistic epistemology

A term from Quine's paper, "Epistemology naturalised", although Quine himself does not offer an explicit definition of it. Quine takes it as an epistemological project which suggests that in order to discover the grounds for construing knowledge and its acquisition, we must appeal to behavioural psychology and to the historical study of science. The proper questions to ask about knowledge are not about the justification of claims to knowledge, but about how the formation of knowledge is to be explained. We need to reconstruct the notion of evidence so that it refers to the sensory stimulations that cause us to have the scientific beliefs which we possess. The main question that epistemology asks is how one's output of a theory of nature which transcends one's input of evidence is generated in a human subject. Naturalised epistemology was established partly by criticising the traditional epistemology started by Descartes, which believes that epistemology asks how we ought to arrive at our beliefs prior to any scientific reasoning. Quine argues that epistemology should be a branch of natural science, especially a chapter of psychology. Epistemology is contained in the natural sciences and the natural sciences are contained in epistemology. Quine believes that the approach of naturalised epistemology can diminish scepticism and free epistemology from the labour of refuting scepticism.

Quine's controversial project has been followed by many other philosophers who explicitly consider themselves to be

超自然的存在物和过程。它还批驳了第一哲学优于自然科学的主张。从认识论方面来看,自然主义认为认识论上的证明和解释是与自然科学相伴随的持续过程,并论证说科学的方法是我们获得知识的惟一方法。按照 19 世纪的心理主义和 20 世纪自然科学化的认识论,认识论应比作经验的心理学。伦理自然主义反对对是与应该,或事实与价值的区分,并用自然的特性来解释伦理学的术语。这一主张被密尔描述为“自然主义的谬误”,但它是否真是谬误还不能肯定。从美学方面来看,自然主义认为艺术作品应体现世界的本来面目。在心的哲学方面,自然主义认为精神现象是大脑活动的过程,或是由大脑活动过程所引起的。近代自然主义的阐述者休谟、康德和维特根斯坦强调的是不可避免的自然人的倾向而不是科学的优越性。对任何形式的自然主义而言,都存在相应形式的反自然主义。

“自然主义早在 1830 年反形而上学的学者中就有了代表人物 A. 孔德,他宣称实证哲学在方法上与特殊的科学没有区别。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981 年,第 72 页。

### 自然主义认识论

这一术语来自奎因的论文《自然化的认识论》,尽管奎因本人并没有提供它的清晰定义。奎因把这作为一种认识论方案,即提出为了发现构成知识及其获得的基础,我们必须诉诸行为主义心理学以及对科学的历史探究。关于知识可以问及的适当问题,不是有关知识主张的辩护问题,而是关于如何解释知识的形成问题。我们需要重建“证据”的概念,使它指涉那些感官刺激,正是它们导致我们具有我们所拥有的科学信念。认识论所问的主要问题是,人们的超越“证据”(输入)的自然理论(输出)是如何在人类主体中产生的。自然化认识论的确立,部分是通过批判始于笛卡尔的传统认识论,后者认为认识论问的是在任何科学推理之前,我们应如何得出我们的信念。奎因论认为,认识论应当是自然科学的一个分支,尤其是心理学的一章。认识论包含在自然科学中,而自然科学也包含在认识论中。奎因相信,自然化认识论的方法可以消除怀疑论,把认识论从反驳怀疑论的努力中解脱出来。

奎因的这一有争议的方案,为其他许多明确认为自己做的是规范认识论的哲学家所追随。他们认为,人类及他们的认知官能是自然中的实体,并主张自然科学、尤其是生物学和经验心理学的成果对认识论是至关重要的。

“对于知识主张的系统评价是认识论的中

pursuing normative epistemology. They see human beings and their cognitive faculties are entities in nature and hold that the results of natural sciences, particularly biology and empirical psychology, are crucial to epistemology.

“The systematic assessment of claims to knowledge is the central task of epistemology. According to naturalistic epistemologists, this task cannot be well performed unless proper attention is paid to the place of the knowing subject in nature.”—Shimony and Nails (eds.), *Naturalistic Epistemology*, 1987, p. 1.

### Naturalistic ethics

Also called ethical naturalism. In a broad sense, the view that ethical statements are empirical or positive and must be understood in terms of natural propensities of human beings, without mysterious intuitions or divine help. As attacked by Moore, it is the view held, for example, by Utilitarianism and evolutionary ethics, according to which there is no sharp demarcation between statements of fact and statements of value. As a consequence, ethical properties are natural properties and we may derive “ought” from “is”. Moore accuses this view of committing the naturalistic fallacy, but proponents of naturalistic ethics have tried to show that this is not a fallacy at all.

“... Theories which owe their prevalence to the supposition that good can be defined by reference to a natural object... are what I mean by the name, ... ‘Naturalistic Ethics’.”—Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 39.

### Naturalistic fallacy

Moore claims that philosophers traditionally define the conception of good in terms of natural properties or attributes, such as pleasure, the desirable, progress in evolution; in so doing they confuse the ethical conception of “good” with a natural object, and ignore the distinction between what good means and what things are good. This, according to Moore, is the “naturalistic fallacy”. Instead of seeking a naturalistic definition, Moore argued that we should see “good” as a simple indefinable non-natural quality to which we have access through a kind of intuition. Moore argues that all philosophers who derive ethics from metaphysics committed this fallacy. Consequently, ethics was said not to be based on metaphysics, and could not be reduced to any natural or social science. This idea echoes Hume’s view that “ought” is different from and cannot be derived from “is”. But it is disputable whether this is really a genuine fallacy. In particular, there have been recent attempts to justify the derivation of “ought” statements from “is” statements. Moore’s influential *Principia Ethica* attempted to dispose of the naturalistic fallacy, but his arguments against naturalism and for his own account have both been challenged.

心任务。按照自然主义认识论,除非适当注意到认识主体在自然中的地位,否则这一任务就不可能很好地执行。”——西莫尼和奈耳斯(编)《自然主义认识论》,1987年,第1页。

### 自然主义伦理学

也叫伦理的自然主义。在宽泛的意义上,它主张伦理陈述是经验的或实证的,必须根据人类的自然倾向来理解,无需神秘的直觉或神灵的帮助。正如摩尔所批评的那样,这是由(例如说)功利主义和进化论伦理学主张的观点,它认为在事实陈述和价值陈述之间没有分明的分界线。结果,伦理性质就是自然性质,我们可以从“是”推出“应当”。摩尔谴责这种观点犯了自然主义谬误,但自然主义伦理学的支持者力图证明这根本不是什么谬误。

“……认为善可以靠指称自然对象来定义,由于这种看法而得以流行的理论……就是我用这名称所指的……‘自然主义伦理学’。”——摩尔:《伦理学原理》,1903年,第39页。

### 自然主义谬误

摩尔认为,哲学家以传统方式用自然性质或属性,诸如快乐,可欲的事物,进化过程中的进步来定义善这个概念。在这么做的时候,他们混淆了“善”这个伦理概念和自然对象,忽视了善的意思和事物很好的意思之间的区别。在摩尔看来,这就是“自然主义的谬误”。摩尔不寻求自然主义的定义,而主张我们应把“善”视为简单的、不可定义的、非自然的性质,我们是通过一种直觉来得到它的。摩尔认为,所有从形而上学得到伦理学的哲学家都犯有这种错误。因此,伦理学被说成是并非基于形而上学,不能还原为任何一种自然科学或社会科学。这种看法是呼应了休谟的观点:“应当”与“是”不同,“应当”也不能从“是”中推导出来。但对于这是否确为一种真正的谬误,是有争议的。特别是最近有人要证明从“是”这样的陈述推导出“应当”这样的陈述是有理由的。摩尔有影响的著作《伦理学原理》力图清除自然主义谬误,但他反对自然主义和支持自己说明的论证都受到了挑战。

“我曾说明过,那种[自然主义的]谬误在于这样的意图:善不过是意味着某种简单的或复杂的概念,可以用自然的性质来定义。”——摩

“That [naturalistic] fallacy, I explained, consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion, that can be defined in terms of natural qualities.”—Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 73.

## Nature

[Greek: *phusis*, from the verb *phuein*, to grow or to give birth to; Aristotle's book *Physics* is “On Nature”] Nature stands in contrast to things made by men, such as conventional things or artefacts. Aristotle defines nature as the inner origin of the change or stability of a thing. Such a source comprises (1) the material from which a thing is made, and (2) the structure of the thing. Both matter and form are thus nature, although Aristotle held that form is more a nature than matter. Pre-Socratic philosophy is generally called the philosophy of nature because it seeks for the ultimate material stuff out of which the world is constructed. For Aristotle, a discussion of matter as nature leads to a discussion of necessity. His discussion of form as nature leads to teleology, and eventually to the theory of the unmoved mover as the final cause of nature, for Aristotle claims that a formal cause coincides with an efficient cause and a final cause. Aristotle requires those who study nature to know both matter and form, but the latter is more important. In Aristotle's ethics, nature means (1) the original constitution or tendency that a man has without involving human intervention, in contrast to what results in him from law and education, and (2) a man's function or the end to which he tends. The task of ethics is to develop this natural tendency in order to achieve the appropriate natural end.

Nature is also used to refer to the totality of things in the universe. Our knowledge of this natural world changes with the development of sciences. Nature in this sense is sometimes contrasted with man, with nature seen as exploitable by human rationality, but this attitude has been recently challenged by some aspects of environmental philosophy, according to which humans must be seen only as part of nature.

“The word nature has two principal meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be, apart from human intervention.”—J. S. Mill, *Collected Works of J. S. Mill*, 1969, X, p. 401.

## Naturphilosophie

[German: nature-philosophy] A view of nature which flourished in the Romantic criticism of science in Germany at the beginning of nineteenth century and which was fully elaborated by the German philosopher Schelling. It criticised the Newtonian scientific view of nature which treated nature as mechanistic and meaningless and suggested that nature undergoes a process of self-development culminating in a state

尔:《伦理学原理》,1903年,第73页。

## 自然

[源自希腊语中的动词 *phuein*(意指“生长”或“化育”);亚里士多德的著作《物理学》就是“论自然”]自然与人为的事物(诸如习俗或人工制品)截然不同。亚里士多德把自然定义为事物变化或稳定的内在起源或本源。这一本源包括(1)一物形成的物质材料和(2)此物的结构。因此,质料与形式便是自然,尽管亚里士多德认为形式与其说是质料不如说是自然。前苏格拉底哲学一般被称为自然哲学,因为它探寻的是构成世界的终极物质材料。在亚里士多德看来,讨论质料即自然的结果是讨论必然性。他本人对形式即自然的论述导向了目的论,最终又导向了作为自然之终极因的不动的动者理论,因为他认为形式因与动力因和终极因是一致的。亚里士多德要求研究自然的人应当熟悉质料与形式,但又认为后者更为重要。在亚里士多德的伦理学里,自然意指(1)人在未受人类干扰时所具有的本性或倾向,这与法律和教育在他身上所形成的东西是截然不同的;(2)人所习惯的职能或追求的目的。伦理学的任务在于发展这种自然本性以便获取适当的自然目的。

“自然”也被用来表示宇宙万物的整体。人们对这个自然界的认识是随着科学的发展而变化的。自然在此意义上有时与人形成对立,因为自然被视为人类理性掠夺的对象,但是,这种态度最近遇到环境哲学某些方面的挑战,根据环境哲学的某些观点,人应当被看成是自然的一部分。

“自然一词的基本含义有二:一是表示事物的整个系统,即所有事物特性的集合体;二是表示事物成其所然,不受人类干预。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,1969年,第十卷,第401页。

## 自然的哲学

[“自然的哲学”的德语词]19世纪初在德国浪漫主义对科学的批评中兴盛起来的自然观。它由德国哲学家谢林充分地加以详细阐发。它批判牛顿的自然科学观,后者把自然视为机械的和无意义的,而前者认为,自然经历了自我发展的过程,在自我呈现的状态中达到顶点。它强调主观和客观、理想和现实的统一。与那通过

of self-presentation. It emphasised unities between the subjective and objective and between the ideal and real. In opposition to the scientific method of exploring nature through external observation and experiment, it sought to understand nature's own language through intuition and contemplation on the grounds that natural phenomena are expressions of life. It also rejected the dichotomy of subject and object, according to which the thinking subject is simply opposed to nature as a world of objects. Instead it claimed that the subject is itself part of nature.

"If you recall what was said about the *Naturphilosophie*, what in humankind is conscious of itself and has come to itself is what has gone through the whole of nature, which has, as it were, carried everything, experienced everything, it is that which has brought everything back into itself, into its essence, from self-alienation."—Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, 1994, p. 179.

### Nausea

For Sartre, an existentialist feeling of disgust for the facticity and contingency of our bodies in analogy to our physical disgust at our bodies. According to Sartre, awareness of my own body is the basic means by which I have contact with the external world, and nausea becomes my primitive and original feeling about the world and my pure apprehension of myself as factual experience. This basic nausea produces vomiting and provides the ground for various concrete and empirical nauseas, such as those caused by spoiled meat or fresh blood. Nausea is an inescapable concomitant of physical existence and is a disclosure that one's existence is contingent. Nausea is nihilated by active transcendence. The title of one of Sartre's novels is *Nausea*.

"This perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an *insipid* taste which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is *my* taste—this is what we have described elsewhere under the name of *Nausea*. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness."—Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 338.

**Necessarily false**, see logical truth

**Necessarily true**, see logical truth

### Necessary condition

Suppose  $p$  and  $q$  are related so that  $q$  only if  $p$ . Consequently, if  $p$  is not the case, then  $q$  is not the case, and if  $p$  is the case, then  $q$  is not necessarily the case.  $p$  is then a necessary condition of  $q$ .

In contrast, suppose  $p$  and  $q$  are related so that if  $p$  then

外部观察和实验而探索自然的科学方法相对立,它努力通过直观和沉思去理解自然自身的语言,因为它认为自然现象就是生命的表达。它也反对主体和客体的二分法,按此二分法,思维主体只是对立于作为对象世界的自然。反之,它主张主体自身是自然的部分。

"如果你回想对自然的哲学所说的话,人类对自身所意识到的和已达到自身的的东西就是经历了整个自然的东西,自然似乎携带一切事物,经验一切事物,那么,正是自然使一切事物从自我异化返回自身,达到它的本质。"——谢林:《论现代哲学史》,1994年,第179页。

### 厌恶(或译“恶心”)

在萨特看来,这是一种对于我们身体的实际状态和暂时状态的生存主义厌恶感,类似于我们对于自己身体的感官厌恶。据萨特看,对于我自己身体的意识是我与外在世界接触的基本手段,而厌恶则成为我对于世界的原初的和天然的感觉,成为我对于作为事实经验的我自己的纯领受。这种基本的厌恶引起呕吐,并为各种具体和经验中的厌恶,比如那些由腐肉和鲜血引起的厌恶,提供了基础。厌恶是肉体生存不可避免的生物,并透露出人的生存是暂时的。厌恶被主动的超越性消除掉。萨特的一部小说的名字就叫做《厌恶》。

"在我的‘为自身’(自为之我)里,总有对于一种无味(*insipid*)之味的不断领受。对于这种无味之味,我不能左右;它甚至在我企图摆脱它的努力之中也伴随着我;它就是我的味道。这就是我在其他地方用‘厌恶’这个名字来描述的东西。一种沉闷的和无法逃脱的厌恶不断地将我的身体透露给我的意识。"——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译),1957年,第338页。

### 必然假

见“逻辑真”条。

### 必然真

见“逻辑真”条。

### 必要条件

如果  $p$  和  $q$  具有这样的关系:只有  $p$  才  $q$ ; 于是,如果  $p$  不出现则  $q$  不出现,但是  $p$  出现  $q$  不必然出现,那么,  $p$  是  $q$  的必要条件。

相反,如果  $p$  和  $q$  具有下述关系:如果  $p$  则  $q$ ; 于是,如果  $p$  出现  $q$  就出现,但  $p$  不出现时  $q$

q. Consequently, if p is the case, then q is the case, but if p is not the case, then q is not necessarily the case. p is then a sufficient condition of q. If p is a necessary condition of q, then q is a sufficient condition of p, and if p is a sufficient condition of q, then q is a necessary condition of p.

If p and q are related so that p if and only if q and q if and only if p, then p is both a necessary and sufficient condition of q. If p is a necessary and sufficient condition of q, then q is a necessary and sufficient condition of p. p and q are then logically equivalent statements. Logicians use "iff" as a shorthand for "if and only if".

"When one statement entails another, the truth of the first is a sufficient condition of the truth of the second, and the truth of the second is a necessary condition of the truth of the first."—P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 25.

**Necessary/contingent**, see contingent / necessary

### Necessary truth

The distinction between necessary truth and contingent truth is a version of Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. A necessary truth must be true and could not be false, whatever way the world is. It is true in itself. A contingent truth, on the other hand, depends upon the empirical world and might have been false, had the world been different. Logically necessary truths are based on the principle of contradiction, having negations which are logically impossible. Necessary truths are not established on the basis of sense-experience. They are either intuitively analytic or deduced from intuitively acceptable premises. Logical and mathematical truths are generally regarded as the paradigms of necessary truths. For rationalism, necessary truth is truth of reason and is based on the insight into real connections between facts. For empiricism, knowledge of the world must be based on sense-perception. Hence either there are no necessary truths, or there are necessary truths, but they have no direct reference to the factual world. The necessary / contingent distinction is closely related to the *a priori* / *a posteriori* distinction and the analytic / synthetic distinction. It is difficult to get an adequate grasp of any one of these without understanding the others. A crucial question is whether Kant was justified in claiming that some fundamental necessary truths are synthetic and *a priori*. Kripke has argued that some necessary truths are *a posteriori*.

If there are other kinds of necessity and possibility, such as metaphysical or natural necessity and possibility, they could also be used to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths, and necessary truth would become relative to the sort of necessity in question. We could then ask about the relations among the various kinds of necessary truths. In

不必然出现,那么,p是q的充分条件。如果p是q的必要条件,则q是p的充分条件;并且如果p是q的充分条件,则q是p的必要条件。

如果p和q具有下述关系:p当且仅当q,并且q当且仅当p,则p是q的充分必要条件。如果p是q的充分必要条件,则q是p的充分必要条件。p和q因此就是逻辑等值的陈述。逻辑学家使用"iff"作为"if and only if"(当且仅当)的缩写。

"当一个陈述衍推另一个陈述时,前者真是后者真的充分条件,并且后者真是前者真的必要条件。"——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》,1952年,第25页。

### 必然/偶然

见"偶然/必然"条。

### 必然真理

必然真理和偶然真理之分是莱布尼茨的理性真理和事实真理之分的翻版。不论世界取何种方式,一个必然真理必定真不可能假。它自身就是真的。反之,一个偶然真理依赖于经验世界,如果世界有了不同,它就会成为假的。必然真理在逻辑上依据矛盾律,它的否定在逻辑上是不可能的。必然真理不是建立在感觉经验的基础上的。它们要么是直觉分析的,要么是从直觉上认可的前提推演出来的。一般把逻辑的和数学的真理看做必然真理的样板。对于理性主义来说,必然真理是理性的真理,它依据于对事实的真正联系的洞见。对于经验主义来说,有关世界的知识应当建立在感性知觉的基础上。因此,不论有没有必然真理存在,它们同事实世界都没有直接关系。必然和偶然之分同先天和后天之分、分析和综合之分是密切联系的。如果不理解其中一个,就很难恰当把握另一个。一个重要的问题是,当康德说某些根本的必然真理是先天综合真理时,他是否正确。克里普克论证说,有些必然真理是后天的。

如果有其他种类的必然性和可能性,诸如形而上学的或自然的必然性和可能性,那么,它们也可以用于区分必然真理和偶然真理,而且必然真理会变成与此处所说的这类必然性有关。于是,我们就可以提出关于各种不同必然真理之间的关系问题。在此意义上,"必然真理"一词就变得不明确了,而且随关于必然性的不同叙述而异。

"看起来,像我们在纯数学,特别是算术和几何中发现的那类必然真理,必定有一些原则是不依靠实例来证明,因而也不依靠感觉的见

this sense, the term “necessary truth” becomes ambiguous and varies with different accounts of necessity.

“It appears that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics and particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor, consequently, on the testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur to us to think of them.”—Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, preface, p. 50.

### Necessitarianism

The doctrine that what happens in the world is determined or necessitated by the essence of things or by general laws and hence that necessity and possibility are objective notions. The world has different modes of necessity, such as logical, nomic and metaphysical necessity. Objectively necessary relations in the natural world are the subject-matter of scientific inquiry. The clearest expression of necessitarianism is physical determinism, which claims that nature is determined by universal laws. Necessitarianism is opposed by philosophers who reject all necessity, reject non-logical necessity or consider necessity to be a matter of expectation, a degree of epistemic commitment or a verbal feature, rather than as an objective property. This opposing view can be termed anti-necessitarianism. Another contrasting theory is contingentism, which holds that nature and mind are not completely predetermined and that the world contains irreducible elements of the unpredictable. As necessitarianism is associated with determinism, contingentism is related to indeterminism and accepts the existence of free will.

“Peirce gave the name ‘necessitarianism’ to the belief in the principle of universal lawfulness.”—Bunge, *Causality*, 1959, p. 23.

### Necessity

Necessity is ascribed to a state which must occur or is always the same, irrespective of changing circumstances or of our interventions. Necessity is distinguished from contingency or possibility, which is ascribed to a state that may or may not occur and that varies with circumstances. If necessity is unconditional, it is absolute necessity, but if it is based on certain premises, it is relative necessity. Logical necessity is ascribed to a statement or proposition which could not have been false and which is guaranteed to be true by the laws of logic. In contrast, a contingent statement is one whose contradiction is possible. Necessity attached to a whole proposition (in the form “it is necessarily true that. . .”) is necessity *de dicto*, in contrast to necessity *de re*, in which necessity belongs to an object. Necessary knowledge is true under all circumstances and is hence universal. Traditionally, a necessary truth is thought to be analytical and to be known *a priori*, although Kant introduced synthetic *a priori* judgements

证的, 尽管没有感觉我们决不会想到它们。”——莱布尼茨:《人类理智新论》, 序言, 第50页。

### 必然论

指这么一种观点, 认为世界上的事实都为其实质或为一般规律所决定或必需, 因此必然性与可能性是客观的概念。世界上有着不同的必然性模式, 例如“逻辑的”、“规则的”、“形而上学的”等。自然界中的客观必然关系是科学探究的主题。必然论的最清楚的表达为“物理决定论”, 它认为自然为普遍规律所决定。必然论为一些哲学家所反对, 他们反对一切必然性, 反对非逻辑的必然性, 或认为必然性是一种预期问题, 或是一种认识论承诺的程度, 抑或一种语词特征, 而不是一种客观性质。后一种观点可以用术语“反必然论”来表示。另一种与此相对立的理论称为“偶然论”, 它主张自然和精神都非完全预先决定的, 世界上存在着不可预言事件的不可还原因素。由于必然论与决定论相关联, 因此偶然论与非决定论相联系, 承认自由意志的存在。

“皮尔士给予普遍合法性原理的信念以‘必然论’的名称。”——邦格:《因果性》, 1959年, 第23页。

### 必然性

必然性被描述为一种必定发生或总是相同的状态, 无论情况是否发生变化还是我们有否干预, 莫不如此。必然性区别于偶然性或可能性, 后者指可能发生或可能不发生的状态, 也指随情况变化而变化的状态。如果必然性是无条件的, 就是绝对的必然性; 但如果它以某些前提为基础, 则是相对的必然性。逻辑必然性被归结为不能虚假, 且其真实性靠逻辑规则确保的陈述或命题。与此相对, 偶然陈述指其矛盾陈述可能成立的陈述。必然性附到整个命题上(即以“……必然真实”的形式出现), 就叫做关于命题的必然性, 和必然性属于对象的关于事物的必然性相对应。必然的知识在一切情形下都真, 因此是普遍的。在传统上, 必然真理被认为是分析的, 并且是先天得知的, 虽然康德引入先天综合判断和先验必然性观念来形容判断, 为经验的可能性提供条件。克里普克引入了后天必然真

and the notion of transcendental necessity to characterise judgements giving the conditions for the possibility of experience. Kripke introduced the notion of necessary *a posteriori* truth, for truths concerning the essence of a thing which are known through empirical inquiry. This is also called metaphysical necessity. Some philosophers hold that nature is governed by laws of natural necessity, but Hume argued that what appear to be necessary connections in the world are associations of ideas in mind and involve psychological necessity, which is not objective necessity.

“A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing itself or from a given efficient cause.”—Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, Prop 33.

### Necessity, absolute

For Leibniz, the contrast between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity is basic. Absolute necessity, also called logical, metaphysical or mathematical necessity, is necessary in itself. It is the necessity possessed by a truth whose denial would involve a contradiction, as in the case of the truths of arithmetic and geometry. Absolute necessity is universally and unconditionally the case. The truth of such necessity is the truth of reason. Hypothetical necessity, also called moral, consequential or physical necessity, is necessary, given that such and such antecedents occur. The term “hypothetical necessity” is derived from Aristotle’s *Physics* 200a13-14. According to Leibniz, the present state of the world is not absolutely necessary, but is only hypothetically necessary. All laws of nature are only hypothetical, for they depend on God’s will to create the best possible world. The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is an attempt to avoid Spinozistic rigid determinism and to establish the possibility of freedom of the will. It also plays an important role in Leibniz’s metaphysics of possible worlds. For other philosophers, hypothetical necessity is also called relative necessity because it is relative to underlying premises.

“There are necessities, which ought to be admitted. For we must distinguish between an absolute and a hypothetical necessity.”—Leibniz, *Fifth Paper to Clarke*, Paragraph 4.

**Necessity, hypothetical**, see necessity, absolute

### Necessity, natural

Also called physical necessity. The necessary connection existing between distinct events in the natural world. This sort of necessity is not logical, for it is not guaranteed by the laws of logic, but is based on the laws of nature. It exists, according to some philosophers, because objects are endowed

with concepts, i.e. through empirical inquiry and the discovery of the truth about the nature of things. This is also called metaphysical necessity. Some philosophers hold that nature is governed by laws of natural necessity, but Hume argued that what appear to be necessary connections in the world are associations of ideas in mind and involve psychological necessity, which is not objective necessity.

“一物之被称为必然的,或因其本质,或由其原因。因为一物的存在,或必出于该物自身的本质及定义,或必出于一个给定的动力因。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, I, 命题 33。

### 绝对的必然性

在莱布尼茨那里,绝对的必然性和假说的必然性的对立是一个基本的对立。绝对的必然性也称“逻辑的”、“形而上学的”或“数学的”必然性,它自身就是必然的。绝对的必然性是由那样一种真理所具有的必然性,这种真理的否定包含着矛盾,就像算术或几何的真理那样。绝对的必然性普遍而无条件地都是如此。这样一个必然性的真理是理性的真理。假说的必然性也称“道德的”、“后果的”或“物理的”必然性,它是这样的必然性:假定此前有这样那样的事情发生,那么,它是必然的。“假说的必然性”一词出自亚里士多德的《物理学》200a13-14。根据莱布尼茨的观点,世界的现状不是绝对必然的,只是假说必然的。一切自然规律都只是假说的,因为它们依赖于上帝要创造最好的可能世界的意志。绝对的必然性和假说的必然性的区分是为了避免斯宾诺莎的严格决定论,确立意志自由的可能性所做的一个尝试。它对莱布尼茨关于可能世界的形而上学也起了重要作用。其他一些哲学家也把“假说的必然性”称作“相对的必然性”,因为它是相对于它的基础性前提而言的必然性。

“应当承认有各种必然性存在。我们必须区分绝对的必然性和假说的必然性。”——莱布尼茨:《致克拉克的第五封信》,第4节。

### 假说的必然性

见“绝对的必然性”条。

### 自然的必然性

亦称“物理的必然性”,指存在于自然界各不同事件之间的必然联系。这类必然性因为没有逻辑规律的保证,所以不是逻辑的必然性,它是建立在自然规律的基础上的。根据某些哲学家所说,因为各种对象具有一种力量,它在一定

with a force which compels, under certain circumstances, the occurrence of such and such effects. Materialism generally holds that there is such a natural necessity which serves as the basis of induction and scientific knowledge. But Hume and his followers object to its existence, for no such force is observable. For them, the necessity between matters of facts is psychological, arising from the constant conjunction of states of affairs of given kinds.

“Some necessity is itself necessary; other necessity is contingent. It is, moreover, feasible to think that logical necessity is of the formal type, but that natural or physical necessity is of the latter.”—G. H. von Wright, *Truth, Knowledge and Modality*, 1984, p. 69.

**Necessity, physical**, another name for natural necessity

### **Necessity, psychological**

A form of necessity first discussed by Hume. According to rationalists, logical necessity was the sole valid form of necessity and was confined to the sphere of ideas. Hume claimed that in our knowledge of the natural world, we connect one idea with another through the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causality. There is a sort of necessary connection between the idea of a cause and the idea of its effect, but that is not logical necessity. The causal relation is simply a regulatory relation. This sort of necessity is brought about by the constant conjunction of the two ideas in our minds. Hence it is subjective and psychological rather than objective and logical.

“Psychological necessity, in Hume’s view, marks some of our knowledge of matter of fact.”—Walsh, *Reason and Experience*, 1947, p. 44.

**Necessity, relative**, see necessity, absolute

### **Needs**

Anything required to lead a normal human life. It is widely claimed that fundamental and universal needs for a rational agent include the physical conditions for survival and freedom. Further, it is held that a central task of any government is to arrange for the satisfaction of the basic needs of its members, either by itself or through non-governmental institutions. There are various other kinds of human needs, some of which are culturally relative. Philosophers dispute the weight that should be given to the claims of needs in considering how to treat the members of society and how to distribute resources. These disputes are important in discussing justice and in determining the relation between equality and equity.

“The thought we have now arrived at is that a person

情况下,迫使这样那样的结果发生,所以,自然的必然性是存在的。唯物主义一般认为,这样一种作为归纳和科学知识的基础的必然性是存在的。但是,休谟和他的追随者反对这种必然性的存在,因为我们不能观察到任何这样的力量。在他们看来,事实之间的必然性是心理上的,是从既定种类的两个事态的恒常会合中产生出来的。

“有些必然性本身是必然的,有些必然性是偶然的。而且,可以认为逻辑的必然性是前一种必然性,自然的或物理的必然性是后一种必然性。”——冯·赖特:《真理、知识和模态》,1984年,第69页。

### **物理的必然性**

“自然的必然性”的另一名称。

### **心理的必然性**

休谟首先加以讨论的必然性的一种形式。根据理性主义的观点,逻辑的必然性是必然性的惟一有效形式,而且仅限于观念的范围内。而休谟则声称,在我们关于自然界的知识中,我们通过类似、接近和因果性关系将一个观念和另一个观念联系起来。在原因的观念和它的结果的观念之间有一种必然联系,但它不是逻辑的必然性。因果关系只不过是规则性关系。这种必然性是由于我们心中的两个观念的恒常会合而造成的。因此,它是主观的和心理的,而不是客观的和逻辑的。

“按照休谟观点,心理的必然性是我们的某些事实知识的标志。”——瓦尔西:《理性和经验》,1947年,第44页。

### **相对的必然性**

见“绝对的必然性”条。

### **需要**

过正常人的生活所需的东西。人们广泛认为,对于一个理性的人而言,基本的和普通的需要包括生存的物质条件和自由。进而言之,这种看法认为,任何一个政府的中心任务都是安排满足其成员的基本需要,无论这种安排是由政府本身来进行还是通过非政府的机构来进行。人类还有其他各种需要,其中有些是与文化相关的。哲学家们在考虑如何对待社会成员和如何分配资源时,在应给予需要的要求以重视的问题上有争议。这些争议在讨论正义和确定平等与公平的关系时有重要作用。

“我们现在得出的思想是,假如而且只是假如一个人需要X[绝对地],那(在经济、技术、政治、历史等方面)就有可能设想,无论什么在

needs X [absolutely] if and only if, whatever morally and socially acceptable variation it is (economically, technologically, politically, historically, etc.) possible to envisage occurring within the relevant time-span, he will be harmed if he goes without X.”—Wiggins, *Needs, Values, Truth*, 1991, p. 10.

## Negation

[from Latin: *negare*, to say no] As a logical term, negation is contrasted to affirmation and the positive and denies either a proposition as a whole or a predicate within a proposition. The standard sign of negation is  $\neg$ . A proposition and its negation form a contradiction; both cannot be true and the truth of one implies the falsehood of the other. If a proposition is true, its negation must be false, and *vice versa*. A predicate and its negation are also contradictory. Negation is thus a truth-functional operator, so that we can know the truth value of a proposition formed by an initial proposition and negation if we know the truth value of the initial proposition.

In Hegel's philosophy, negation is mainly a feature of concepts or things. Following Spinoza's idea that all determination is negation, Hegel claimed that negation is also a way of determining what it negates and hence has a positive result.

“Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but as a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form of such being—it is as otherness.”—Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 91.

## Negation of the negation

Also called double negation. In formal logic, the negation of the negation of a proposition returns to the original starting-point of the original and unnegated proposition. The negation of “this is red” is “this is not red”, but the negation of “this is not red” once again becomes “this is red”.

Hegel supposed that a negation of the negation does not return to its original affirmative state, but reaches a higher degree of affirmation than the initial state and represents a greater development of the thing itself. Any finite affirmative contains its contrary or its negation and, according to Hegel, will develop into the latter. This is the first negation. The negation of the negation overcomes the opposition between the original affirmation and its negation. The negation of the negation will itself be negated as the process of negation proceeds. The process of “affirmation-negation-negation of the negation” is equivalent to the process of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”. It provides the architectonic of Hegel's philosophy and is omnipresent in his system. In this process, the first stage is a simple or natural unity; the second stage is one of separation; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, repairs the separation and restores unity on the higher level of a harmonious whole. Hegel also took this pat-

道德方面和社会方面可以接受的变化都会出现在相关的时间跨度中,如果他没有 X,他将受到伤害。”——威金斯:《需要、价值与真理》,1991年,第10页。

## 否定

[源自拉丁词: *negare*, 说不是]作为逻辑术语,否定相对于肯定和确定而言,它或者否定整个命题,或者否定命题的谓项。否定的规范符号是  $\neg$ 。一命题和它的否定形成了矛盾,它们不能同真,其一的真蕴涵了另一命题的假。如一命题为真,它的否定必为假,反之亦然。一谓项和它的否定也是矛盾的。这样,否定就是真值函项的算子,因此,如果我们知道了原初命题的真值,就会知道通过原初命题和它的否定而形成的命题的真值。

在黑格尔哲学中,否定主要指概念或事物的特性。按斯宾诺莎的观点,一切规定即否定,黑格尔主张,否定也是规定它所否定的东西的方式,因而有肯定的结果。

“否定不再是抽象的虚无,而是一种定在和某物,它只是这种存在的形式——它就是作为他物存在。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,91节。

## 否定之否定

也称为双重否定。在形式逻辑中,一命题的否定之否定返回到原来的、未否定的命题的原来起点。“这是红的”的否定是“这不是红的”,但“这不是红的”的否定又变为“这是红的”。

黑格尔提出,否定之否定没有返回到原来的肯定状态,而是达到了比原初状态更高层次的肯定,并表现了事物自身的更大的发展。任何有限的肯定都包含它的对立或它的否定,并且按黑格尔的观点,前者会发展为后者。这是第一个否定。否定之否定克服了原初的肯定和它的否定之间的对立。否定之否定将自身否定作为否定进行的过程。“肯定—否定—否定之否定”的过程等值于“正题—反题—合题”的过程。它提供黑格尔哲学的建筑术,在其体系中无所不在。在此过程中,第一阶段是单纯的或自然的统一;第二阶段是一种分离;第三阶段,否定之否定,纠正了分离,在更高水平的和谐整体基础上回复统一。黑格尔也把这种发展模型用来描述认识过程。认识的第一阶段是抽象的,相应于知性;第二阶段相应于否定的理性;第三阶段,否定之否定,相应于肯定的理性。

否定之否定以后特别由恩格斯在《反杜林

tern of development to characterise the process of cognition. The first stage of cognition is abstract and corresponds to understanding; the second stage corresponds to negative reason; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, corresponds to positive reason.

The negation of the negation was later adopted to become a basic feature of dialectical materialism, especially by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. He claimed that the negation of the negation is also a law of the natural world and a law in the history of philosophy. Critics have questioned the alleged ubiquity of the dialectic pattern and its capacity to explain the development of consciousness, nature, cognition or history. They question Hegel's understanding of negation and, more generally, logic.

“The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublation of the contradiction.”—Hegel, *Science of Logic*, II, iii, 3.

### Negative facts

A negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs, that is “something is not the case”, in contrast to a positive fact, the existence of a state of affairs, that is “something is the case”. There has been a debate about the nature of negative facts. Russell believes that negative facts exist and are represented by negative propositions. Wittgenstein claims that all elementary propositions depict positive facts and that negative facts, rather than really existing, merely indicate that there is no such combination between objects or things. Hence, what corresponds to a negative fact is a false elementary proposition.

“I think you will find that it is simpler to take negative facts as facts, to assume that ‘Socrates is not alive’ is really an objective fact in the same sense in which ‘Socrates is human’ is a fact.”—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 214.

### Negative liberty

The Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin distinguished between positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the “liberty or freedom to”, while negative liberty is the “liberty or freedom from”. Negative liberty is characterised by an absence of coercive force. With negative liberty, one is protected from the constraints of moral, legal, political and social requirements, but such constraints seem needed to achieve any sort of positive freedom. Different political philosophies give different priorities to these two kinds of freedom, with proponents of each seeing the rival conception as frustrating its own notion of liberty. Berlin, himself, supports the liberalism associated with negative liberty, while others from a Hegelian or idealist perspective emphasise positive liberty. The soundness of this distinction has been contested, but rich debate has contributed much to contemporary discus-

论》中用来作为辩证唯物主义的基本特征。他主张,否定之否定也是自然界的规律和哲学史的规律。批评家怀疑辩证模型所断定的普遍存在和它解释意识、自然、认识或历史的发展的能力。他们也质疑黑格尔对否定,乃至更一般地对逻辑的理解。

“第二个否定,我们已达到的否定之否定,是这种矛盾的扬弃。”——黑格尔:《逻辑学》, I, iii, 3.

### 否定事实

否定事实是事态的不存在,即是“没有这种情况”,它与肯定事实即事态的存在相反,那是“有这种情况”。关于否定事实的性质一直存在争论。罗素认为存在否定事实,并以否定命题来表示。维特根斯坦认为,所有的基本命题描绘了肯定事实,而否定事实实际上并不存在,仅仅是指明没有这种对象或事物间的结合。因此,对应于否定事实的是假的基本命题。

“我想你会发现,把否定事实当做事实更简单,即假定‘苏格拉底没有活着’确实是一客观事实,其含义和‘苏格拉底是人’为一事实相同。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第214页。

### 消极自由

牛津大学哲学家 I. 柏林区分了积极自由和消极自由。积极自由是“做什么的自由”,而消极自由是“免受什么束缚的自由”。消极自由以不受强制为特征。在消极自由的情况下,一个人得到不受道德、法律、政治和社会要求强制的保护,但这样的强制似乎需要取得任何一种积极自由。不同的政治哲学家对这两种自由给予不同的优先权,每一方的支持者都把对方的看法视为对己方自由概念的阻挠。柏林本人支持与消极自由相联系的自由主义,而其他以黑格尔主义或唯心主义观点为根据的人则强调积极自由。对这种区分的合理性一直有争论,但这一有意义的争论对当代有关自由的讨论做出了很大的贡献。

“(遵循大量的先例)我将把自由(freedom

sions of liberty.

“The first of these senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the ‘negative’ sense, is involved in the answer to the question ‘What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons.’—Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, pp. 121-2.

### Negative responsibility

The responsibility for something which is not caused directly by the agent but which the agent fails to prevent from happening. The notion is derived from the distinction between action and omission or between intervening and letting things take their own course. Moral agents must bear positive responsibility for their actions or intervenings, but should they be responsible for their omissions or for letting things happen? It is a matter of dispute whether we can have negative responsibility. Utilitarianism claims that we should bring about the best consequences, and this implies that we all have negative responsibility. But its critics point out that by accepting this claim we would have boundless responsibilities.

“[T]he notion of negative responsibility; that if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself, in the more everyday restricted sense, bring about.”—Williams, in *Utilitarianism For and Against*, 1973, p. 95.

### Negative theology

Also called apophatic theology, theism based on the method of the *via negativa*. It describes God by saying what he is not, rather than what he is because as finite beings we cannot recognise God's attributes in any real and full sense and because God is beyond what our language can positively describe. Negative theology claims that religious language is noncognitive and equivocal. The ultimate thing is beyond all human concepts, and so what is affirmed of it must also be denied. Hence, all predicates—not only the negative ones such as evil and false, but also the positive ones such as good and true—should be subtracted from God. Such a negation of description does not lead to scepticism or unbelief, but leads instead to the truth that God is beyond all such words. It is only by removing from God all the imperfections of his creatures that his transcendence and otherness can be safeguarded. Negative theology enables us to maintain the radical distinction between God and his creatures. The Scriptures are full of paradoxical descriptions of God because they try to show something inexpressible which cannot be stated positively. This type of theology is rooted in Platonic thought as

or liberty) (我将在同一含义使用这两个词)的这些意思中的首要的意思称为消极的自由,它包含在对这样一个问题的回答中,这一问题就是:让或应当让主体——一个人或人的群体去做什么的范围是什么?或者说,在不受其他人干预的情况下,什么是他能做的或应当能做的?——柏林:《自由四论》,1969年,第121—122页。

### 消极责任

这种责任指的是某事不是由某人直接造成的,但此人却没有阻止其发生。这一概念来源于对行动与缺乏行动二者间,或对于干预事情和让事情自己发生二者间的区分。道德的人必须对他们的行动或干预负有积极责任,但他们应当对缺乏行动或让事情发生负责任吗?对我们是否能负消极责任人们是有争议的。功利主义认为我们应当造成最好的结果,这含有我们所有的人都负有消极责任的意思。但它的批评者指出,如果接受这一主张,我们将负有无限的责任。

“消极责任这一概念指的是:如果我的一切事情都负有责任,那我就必须对我让其发生的和没有阻止其发生的事情都负有同样大的责任,因为我要对我本人造成的从更为普通意义上讲的事情负责。”——威廉姆斯,见《功利主义:赞成与反对》,1973年,第95页。

### 否定神学

亦称“阿波发神学”,以否定方法为基础的有神论。它通过断言上帝不是什么,而不是他是什么来描述他。这是因为,我们作为有限的存在,不能认知上帝在任何实在和完全意义上的属性,而且也因为,上帝超越我们的语言所能正面描述的范围。否定神学认为,宗教语言是非认知性的、多含义的。终极事物非一切人类概念所能及,所以,对它的断定必定也是否定的。因此,一切述语(不仅邪恶、虚假之类的否定述语,而且善、真之类的肯定述语)都应从上帝那里抹去。这种否定描述不导致怀疑论或无信仰,相反,会向上帝超越一切此类语词的真理。只有把他的造物的一切缺陷从上帝那里清除掉,才能确保他的超验性和他性。否定神学使我们能够在上帝和他的造物之间保持根本的区别。《圣经》充满着对上帝自相矛盾的描述,因为它们企图表示不能被肯定说明的不可表述的东西。这种类型的神学,植根于柏拉图的思想中,在新柏拉图主义那里得到发展。它的创立者被认为是亚历山大里亚的克莱门德,主要倡导者

developed in Neo-platonism. Clement of Alexandria is thought to be its founder, and its main proponents were the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides and the German theologian Eckhart.

“When the negative theology says that no conceptions apply to God, it is, in a perhaps still subtler way, making a comparable mistake. For where there are no definite common aspects there are no definite contrasts either.”—Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method*, 1970, p. 139.

**Neo-Darwinism**, see Darwinism

### Neo-Hegelianism

Also called British idealism. A Hegelian school developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the British philosophers F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, John McTaggart, and the American philosopher Josiah Royce. This school sought to build an idealistic metaphysical system in which all internally connected particulars are absorbed into a single reality. It ignored the dialectical and historical dimension of Hegel's thought and instead emphasised the relations between time and eternity, between matter and mind and between the many and the one. It claimed that “what is” is the manifestation of spirit and in principle can be known by the human spirit. Subject and object are correlative because they are both rooted in one ultimate spiritual principle. Neo-Hegelianism was a form of absolute idealism which opposed the British empirical tradition and dominated British philosophy for nearly half a century. The interpretation of Hegel in the English-speaking world has been greatly influenced by this school. The analytic philosophy of Russell and Moore grew out of their criticisms of neo-Hegelianism.

“It is not altogether unreasonable to describe British idealism, as is often done, as a Neo-Hegelian movement, provided at least that it is understood that it was a question of receiving stimulus from Hegel rather than of following him in the relation of pupil to master.”—Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. vii, 1963, p. 150.

### Neo-Kantianism

A philosophical movement prevailing in late nineteenth and early twentieth century German philosophy, with a motto “back to Kant” from Liebman's manifesto, *Kant and the Epigoni*. Precursors of the movement included H. von Helmholtz, Liebman, A. Lange, E. Zeller and Kuno Fischer. Common features of the movement were the repudiation of speculative naturalism and materialism, irrationalism, and the authority of natural science, and its emphasis on the central status of Kant's epistemology in philosophy. More loosely, Neo-Kantianism comprised a variety of schools which have different directions and which debated with one another

是犹太哲学家 M. 迈蒙尼德和德国神学家艾克哈特。

“当否定神学断言没有一个概念适于上帝时,在某种或许更加微妙的意义上,它正在犯一种相同的错误。因为凡不存在确定的共同方面的地方,也就根本不存在确定的对比。”——哈特肖恩:《创造性综合与哲学的方法》,1970年,第139页。

### 新达尔文主义

见“达尔文主义”条。

### 新黑格尔主义

也称为“英国唯心主义”,在19世纪后期由英国哲学家 F. H. 布拉德雷, B. 鲍桑葵, J. 麦克塔加特和美国哲学家 J. 罗伊斯所发展的黑格尔学派。这个学派企图建立唯心主义的形而上学体系,在此体系中,一切内在联系的特殊性都吸收到单一的实在中。它忽略了黑格尔思想的辩证法和历史方面,而强调时间和永恒,物 and 心,多和一之间的关系。它主张:“存在者”是精神的表现,原则上可由人类精神来认识。主体和客体是相关的,因为它们都根源于一个最高的精神原理。新黑格尔主义是绝对唯心主义的一种形式,它对立于英国的经验主义传统,并支配着英国哲学几乎半个世纪。在说英语的世界中对黑格尔的解释受到该学派的巨大影响。罗素和摩尔的分析哲学生长自对新黑格尔主义的批判中。

“人们常常把英国唯心主义描述为新黑格尔主义的运动,这种做法不是全无道理的,只要它被理解为:它是一种从黑格尔那里得到启发因素的问题,而不是像师生关系那样追随他。”——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》,第七卷,1963年,第150页。

### 新康德主义

盛行于19世纪晚期和20世纪初德国哲学中的一场哲学运动,以“回到康德”的口号为旗帜(这个口号出自李普曼的宣言《康德与模仿者》)。这个运动的先驱包括 H. 冯·赫尔姆霍茨、李普曼、A. 朗格、E. 策勒和 K. 费舍。其共同特征是抛弃思辨的自然主义和唯物主义,抛弃非理性主义以及自然科学的权威,并强调康德认识论在哲学中的核心地位。更宽泛地说,新康德主义包含许多不同方向的、相互争论的各种学派,其中以马堡学派和海德堡学派影响最大。马堡学派强调康德的理论哲学,特别是他对

er. Among these, the Marburg and Heidelberg schools were the most influential. The logico-methodological Marburg school emphasised Kant's theoretical philosophy, especially his idealism in relation to natural science. Its major representatives were H. Cohen, P. Natorp and E. Cassirer. The axiological Heidelberg school, also called the Baden or South-east German school, was more interested in applying Kant's transcendental method to specifying universal cultural value. Its major representatives were W. Windelband and H. Rickert. Outside these schools, A. Riehl's realistic neo-Kantianism argued for the reality of Kant's thing-in-itself. In Göttingen, L. Nelson developed a psychological neo-Kantianism, which holds that introspection plays a central role in discovering *a priori* principles.

"Neo-Kantians ... announced that they had had enough of the airy metaphysical speculations of the idealists and that it was time to return to the spirit of Kant himself."—Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. vii, 1963, p. 8.

### Neo-platonism

The philosophical tradition founded by Plotinus, developed through his disciple Porphyry, the Syrian School of Iamblichus, the school of Athens, represented by Plutarch, Proclus and Simplicius, and the Alexandrian school until the fall of Alexandria in 642. Plotinus's *Enneads* (edited by Porphyry) was the source of this tradition, and Proclus's *Elements of Theology* was the systematic exposition of its doctrines. Neo-platonism, which was the last philosophical system of the classical world, explained the origin of the world in terms of Plotinus' three *hypostases* (the one, *nous* and the soul) and the process of emanation. Neo-platonism attempted to reconcile the two supposedly incompatible systems of Plato and Aristotle, by considering Aristotle's philosophy as an introduction to Plato's higher wisdom. This attitude led many Neo-platonists to comment extensively on both Plato and Aristotle and thus contributed greatly to the history of philosophy. Neo-platonism advocated polytheism and mysticism and had a favourable attitude towards theology. Hence it became the main opposition of early Christianity, which it directly attacked. The school of Athens, which was based on Plato's academy, was closed by the emperor Justinian in 529 precisely because of its conflict with Christianity. This event is usually regarded as marking the end of Hellenistic philosophy. However, Neo-platonism exerted great influence upon the development of Christian philosophy because it sought to explain the world by appeal to one ultimate principle. Neo-Platonism was revived in the Renaissance by Ficino in Florence, and there was another resurgence by the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century.

"Neo-platonism emphasised that aspect of Plato's thought that stressed the transcendence of the One (or the Good), and the way the One is beyond all categorical lan-

自然科学的唯心论观点,以逻辑—方法论为特征。它的主要代表人物是H. 柯亨、P. 纳托普和E. 卡西尔。海德堡学派(也称为“巴登学派”或“东南德国学派”)更感兴趣于把康德的先验方法应用于详细研究普遍的文化价值,以价值论为特征。它的主要代表人物是文德尔班和H. 李凯尔特。除这两个学派之外,A. 里尔论证康德物自身的实在性,这种立场被称为实在论的新康德主义;L. 内尔森在哥廷根发展了心理学康德主义;它主张,内省在发现先天原理过程中起着核心的作用。

“新康德主义者宣称:他们已经忍受够了唯心论者的虚无缥缈的形而上学思辨,现在是回到康德自身的精神的时候了。”——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》,第七卷,1963年,第8页。

### 新柏拉图主义

由普罗提诺创立的哲学传统,经由他的弟子波菲利、扬布里柯的叙利亚学派,普鲁泰克、普罗克洛和辛普里丘为代表的雅典学派以及亚历山大里亚学派发展,一直持续到公元642年亚历山大里亚城陷落为止。普罗提诺的《九章集》(由波菲利编纂)是该传统的源头,普罗克洛的《神学要旨》是对其学说的系统阐释。新柏拉图主义是古典世界的最后一个哲学体系。它用普罗提诺的三个本在(太一、心智和灵魂)和流溢过程来解释世界的起源。新柏拉图主义通过把亚里士多德哲学视为柏拉图更高智慧的入门,试图调和柏拉图与亚里士多德这两个被认为是相容的体系。这种态度,使得不少新柏拉图主义者广泛注释柏拉图和亚里士多德,并因而对哲学史作出了重大贡献。新柏拉图主义倡导多神论和神秘主义,甚至对神学也持友好态度。因此,它成为早期基督教的主要竞争对手,甚至直接攻击基督教。以柏拉图的学园为基础的雅典学派之所以在529年被查士丁尼皇帝下令关闭,正是由于它与基督教的冲突。这个事件通常被看做是希腊化哲学终结的一个标志。但是,由于新柏拉图主义通过诉诸一个终极本原来寻求对世界的解释,它对基督教哲学的发展产生了很大影响。在文艺复兴时期,新柏拉图主义被费其诺在佛罗伦萨复活,它的另一次复兴是由剑桥柏拉图派的学者们在17世纪实现的。

“新柏拉图主义强化了柏拉图思想的一个方面,即强调太一(或善)的超验,以及太一处于一切范畴化的语言或思想之外。”——史蒂威尔:《宗教语言哲学》,1996年,第16页。

guage or thought.”—Stiver, *The Philosophy of Religious Language*, 1996, p. 16.

### Neo-Pragmatism

A postmodern version of pragmatism developed by the American philosopher Richard Rorty and drawing inspiration from authors such as Dewey, Heidegger, Sellars, Quine and Derrida. It repudiates the notion of universal truth, epistemological foundationalism, representationalism and the notion of epistemic objectivity. It is a nominalist approach which denies that natural kinds and linguistic entities have substantive ontological implications. While traditional pragmatism focuses on experience, Rorty centres on language. Language is contingent on use, and meaning is produced by using words in familiar manners. The self is seen as a “centerless web of beliefs and desires”, and Rorty denies that the subject-matter of the human sciences can be studied in the same ways as we study the subject matter of the natural sciences. Neo-pragmatism, which focuses on social practice and political experimentation, claims that there is no objective and transcendental standpoint from which to pass judgement and that truth must be relative to specific social contexts and practices.

“The sense in which the new pragmatism differs from the old are, first, with regard to the shift from experience to language and, second, with regard to an acquired suspicion of ‘scientific method’ deriving from the historicising of science in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn and P. F. Feyerabend.”—Hall, *Richard Rorty*, 1994, p. 101.

### Neo-Pythagoreanism

A philosophical and religious tendency that flourished from the first century B C to the third century A D It regarded Pythagoras as the revealer of religious truth, but it actually mixed early Pythagorean material, Plato's doctrines and the views of the Peripatetics and Stoicism. It stressed the necessity of purification and represented the change of soul according to moral progress. It advocated abandoning all theoretical research and living in union with both superior and inferior gods. It popularised the notion of moral retribution in a future life. Major proponents of neo-Pythagoreanism include Figulus, Apollonius of Tyana and Philo of Alexandria. Neo-Pythagoreanism deeply influenced Neo-platonism and early Christianity.

“For the neo-Pythagorians, philosophy became the art of curing, or a devotional guide. Men were no longer seeking to understand.”—Sheen, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1952, p. 364.

### Neo-realism

Also called new realism. An American philosophical movement of the early twentieth century which originated

### 新实用主义

一种对于实用主义的后现代观点,由美国哲学家 R. 罗蒂阐发。这种观点受到像杜威、海德格尔、塞拉斯、奎因和德里达这样的作者的影响。它拒绝接受普遍真理观、认识论的基础主义、表象主义和认知客观性。这是一种唯名论的方法,否定自然种类和语言存在物具有实体意义上的存在论含义。传统实用主义关注经验,罗蒂则以语言为中心。语言依靠使用,意义来自以熟悉的方式使用词语。自我被看做一张“无中心可言的信念和欲望之网”。罗蒂还否认我们能够以研究自然科学问题的方式来研究人文科学的问题。新实用主义的注意力集中在社会实践和政治实验;它声称并没有一种规范我们判断的客观和先验的立场,真理总是相对于特殊的社会境况和实践而言的。

“新实用主义与老实用主义的区别在于,首先,它经历了从经验到语言的转变;其次,它对‘科学方法’表示怀疑,而这种怀疑来自像 T. 库恩和 P. E. 费耶阿本德这些思想家著作中使科学历史化的努力。”——霍尔:《罗蒂》,1994年,第 101 页。

### 新毕达戈拉斯主义

盛行于公元前 1 世纪到公元 3 世纪的一种哲学和宗教倾向。它把毕达戈拉斯认作宗教真理的揭示者,但实际上,它是早期毕达戈拉斯学派材料、柏拉图学说、漫步学派和斯多亚派观点的混合物。它强调净化的必然性,并根据道德进步展现灵魂的变化。它鼓吹放弃一切理论研究,要求与诸神和合而生活,无论这些神炼是高等的还是低等的。它散布未来生命中的道德报应观念。新毕达戈拉斯主义的主要人物包括费古鲁、提亚那的阿波隆尼和亚历山大里亚的斐洛。新毕达戈拉斯主义深深地影响了新柏拉图主义和早期基督教。

“在新毕达戈拉斯主义者那里,哲学成了治疗术或皈依向导。人们不再寻求理解。”——谢恩:《宗教哲学》,1952年,第 364 页。

### 新实在论

也称作“新的实在论”,出现在 20 世纪初美国的一场哲学运动。它开始于《哲学杂志》

with a common manifesto published in the *Journal of Philosophy* (1910), entitled "A Program and First Platform of Six Realists". The six philosophers were Ralph Barton Perry, William P. Montague, E. B. Holt, Walter Pitkin, Edward Spaulding and Walter Marvin. In 1912, they published a cooperative volume *The New Realism* which gave the movement its name. New realism rejected idealism, in particular that of Royce. It claimed that idealism argues fallaciously from the premise that everything known is known to the conclusion that for every thing to be is to be known. It rejected the egocentric predicament, which moves from our being at the centre of what we know to the claim that this placement affects the nature of what we know. The nature of reality cannot be inferred merely from the nature of knowledge. The entities which are the objects of scientific studies are not conditioned by their being known, although they are presented to consciousness and have cognitive relations. As a version of direct realism, neo-realism emphasised a direct acquaintance with physical objects and claimed that what is known is independent of the knowing relation. Reality is a datum, given independently of whatever ideas may be formed about it. The perceived object is identical in substance with a part or aspect of the physical object. The movement was replaced by critical realism as a result of its failure to provide a satisfactory account of error, illusion, doubt, hypothesis, and the progress of knowledge. Occasionally, the term new realism is also used to refer to the refutation of idealism of Russell and Moore and to their attempt to establish a logical method by which legitimate conclusions can be derived from any body of data.

"Neo-realism arose as a protest against Roycean absolutism in particular, and idealism in general."—Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 407.

### Neo-Scholasticism

Also called Neo-Thomism, a Roman Catholic philosophical and theological movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is a revival of Thomism and seeks to demonstrate that medieval scholasticism, especially the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, is consistent with the development of modern science. The movement assumes that Aquinas' doctrines can be reappropriated to solve modern philosophical problems such as those arising from Cartesian dualism. Neo-Scholasticism attempts to bring Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics into a modern intellectual setting in order to deal with contemporary issues. In 1879 Pope Leo XIII sent his letter *Aeterni Patris* to all bishops of the Church, making Thomas Aquinas the leading Doctor of the Church, and thus sanctioning Thomism as the authoritative and orthodox Catholic theology. It proposed to consider Thomism as the exclusive response in Catholic philosophy and theology to

(1910)上发表的一篇普通的宣言,题目是“六位实在论者的方案与初步纲领”。这六位哲学家是 R. B. 佩里、W. P. 蒙塔古、E. B. 霍尔特、W. 皮特金、E. 斯鲍尔丁和 W. 马文。1912年,他们出版了一本合集《新实在论》,随后这场运动就以此命名。新实在论反对唯心论,特别是罗伊斯的唯心论。它声称,唯心论错误地从已知事物被知的前提推出存在即被知的结论。它反对自我中心论的困境,不再相信我们的存在位于我们所知事物的中心,而是认为这种地位影响着我们所知事物的性质。实在的性质无法简单地从知识的性质中推论出来。作为科学研究对象的实体并不是由于它们已被认识而决定的,尽管它们出现在意识中并有认知关系。作为“直接实在论”的一种形式,新实在论强调直接熟知物理对象,认为所知的东西独立于认知关系。实在是一个素材,它独立于任何关于它的可能形成的观念。已知的对象实质上就是物理对象的某个部分或方面。这场运动后来被“批判的实在论”所取代,因为它没能满意地描述错误、幻象、怀疑、假设以及知识的进步。有时,“新的实在论”一词也指罗素和摩尔对唯心论的反叛,他们试图确立逻辑的方法,认为用这种方法可以从任何素材中推出合理的结论。

“新实在论提出的抗议就具体而言是针对罗伊斯的绝对论,而一般来说是针对唯心论的。”——韦克美斯特:《美国哲学观念史》,1949年,第407页。

### 新经院学派

亦称“新托马斯主义”,在19至20世纪发展起来的一场罗马天主教哲学和神学运动。它是托马斯主义的复活,力图证明中世纪经院学派,尤其是 T. 阿奎那哲学,与现代科学的发展是一致的。该运动假定,阿奎那的学说能够再一次恰当地解决现代哲学问题,譬如从笛卡尔的二元论生发出来的问题。新经院学派企图把亚里士多德和托马斯的形而上学引入现代的思想背景,以处理当代问题争端。1879年,教皇列奥十三世向教会的所有主教发送出他的通谕《永恒之父》(*Aeterni Patris*),确定 T. 阿奎那“教会博士”头衔,并批准托马斯主义作为官方的、正统的天主教神学。它提出把托马斯主义认作天主教哲学和神学与现代哲学体系打交道的唯一路径。这极大地刺激了新经院学派的发展,起初是在天主教的教育圈内,后来在更广泛的公

modern philosophical systems. This greatly stimulated the development of Neo-Scholasticism, first in Catholic educated circles and then for a wider public. Scholars produced intensive examinations and interpretations of Aquinas' works and established a variety of Thomistic systems. There is not a unified set of doctrines in Neo-Thomism, because different philosophers have adopted different versions of Thomism. Some have even resisted the description Neo-Thomist, although Aquinas' five ways for demonstrating God's existence were regarded as vital for all Neo-Thomist thinkers. The Institute Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier has been an influential centre for Neo-Thomism. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson established an Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto where the influential scholar Joseph Owens applied Thomism to reconstruct Aristotle's metaphysics. Another important representative was Jacques Maritain, whose work has had wide public influence.

"Neo-Scholasticism, a new-realism once more, a doctrine that refuses to fall in with the method foreshadowed by Descartes, or at least if it does so tries hard to avoid its conclusion."—Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 1936, p. 229.

**Network theory of meaning**, an alternative term for conceptual role theory

**Neural network modelling**, see connectionism

### Neurath's ship

A metaphor invented by the Austrian sociologist and philosopher Otto Neurath. Neurath was a leading member of the Vienna Circle, but disagreed with the epistemological foundationalism of another important member, Rudolf Carnap. Carnap believed that there is a set of incorrigible protocol statements which directly report sense experience. All other valid complex statements are constructed out of these protocol statements. In criticising this picture, Neurath compared our body of knowledge to a ship, and said: "We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismount it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components". Accordingly, knowledge is historically conditioned and is maintained if a sufficient range of its claims is acceptable at any given time. Nevertheless, any piece of knowledge can be replaced to keep the whole project of knowledge going. Nothing can claim to be the foundation of knowledge. This metaphor was adopted by Quine and is widely cited as a powerful image of anti-foundationalism.

"The philosopher's task was well-compared by Neurath

共社会中。许多学者对阿奎那著作进行了大量的考察和阐释,也建立起不同的托马斯主义体系。在新托马斯主义中,没有一套统一的学说,因为不同的哲学家采纳的是托马斯主义的不同说法。有些人甚至反对被称作新托马斯主义者,虽然托马斯证明上帝存在的“五法”被所有的新托马斯主义思想家认作富有活力。由C. 梅西尔创办的、设在卢汶大学的哲学高级研究所是新托马斯主义的一个很有影响的中心。法国哲学家E. 吉尔松参与创办了设在多伦多的中世纪研究所,正是在这里,产生出那位影响极大的学者J. 欧文斯,他运用托马斯主义来重构亚里士多德的形而上学。另一位重要代表人物是J. 马里旦,他的著作具有广泛的公众影响。

“新经院学派是一种新实在论,是这样的学说:避免遭遇笛卡尔所预示的那种方法,或者至少,如果那样做了,也竭力避免它的结论。”——吉尔松:《中世纪哲学精神》,1936年,第229页。

### 意义的网络理论

“概念作用理论”的别名。

### 神经网络模拟

见“联结主义”条。

### 纽拉特之船

由奥地利社会学家和哲学家O. 纽拉特发明的隐喻。纽拉特是维也纳学派的主导成员之一,但他不同意这一学派的另一中心人物卡尔纳普认识论的基础论。卡尔纳普认为,有一系列的基本句子直接报告感觉经验,它们是不可纠正的。所有其他可靠的复杂陈述都由这些基本句子结构而成。在批评这一图画时,纽拉特将我们的知识体比作一只船。他说:“我们像水手一样,不得不在大海上重造我们的船,从未能将它卸下并用最好的元件来重建它。”因此,知识是以历史为条件的,并且在任意时期,只要其足够的声称是可接受的,它就得到坚持。然而,知识的任意一部分都可以被代替,以保持整个知识体系的运行。没有什么可以声称是知识的基础。这一隐喻为奎因所采用,并被作为反基础论的有力比喻。

“纽拉特很好地将哲学家的任务比作一个必须在大海上重建他的船的水手的任务。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953,第79页。

to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea.”—Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 79.

**Neuro-philosophy**, see connectionism

### Neustic/phrastic

Different sentences may have the same content but different moods. For example, “Shut the door!” and “You will shut the door”. The content of these two sentences — your shutting the door in the immediate future — is the same, but the sentences differ because one is a command and the other is a statement. In *The Language of Morals*, R. M. Hare called the common content of such sentences the phrastic [from Greek: *phrazein*, literally what is said, to indicate or to show] and called their different moods the neustic [from Greek: *neuein*, to nod, to assent]. With this distinction, he claims that phrastics allow imperatives to stand in logical relations.

“I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to both moods (your shutting the door in the immediate future) the phrastic, and the part that is different in the case of commands and statements (yes or please), the neustic.”—Hare, *Language of Morals*, 1952, p. 18.

### Neutral monism

A theory formulated by the American Pragmatist William James and developed by American realism, but propounded independently by the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mach. In contrast both to idealistic monism (that mind is the real existent) and materialistic monism (that matter is the real existent), the theory holds that both mental things and physical things are constructed out of the same primary stuff which is neither mental nor physical, but neutral between them. Both mind and matter are logical functions of the same stuff. Thus there is no real distinction between mind and matter. Russell in one period accepted this view by claiming that the world is composed of neutral events. This position proposed a solution to the mind-body problem, but there are difficulties with the neutral status of that which constitutes minds and bodies and with how arrangements of what is neutral can issue in minds and bodies. If experiences are proposed as the neutral entities, it is not clear whether neutral monism clarifies or obscures the nature of experience.

“‘Neutral monism’... is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical don’t differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context.”—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 15.

### 神经哲学

见“联结主义”条。

### 语调/内含

不同的句子可有相同的内容但有不同的语气。例如，“关上门！”和“你将关上门”。这两个句子的内容——你将很快关上门——是相同的，但句子却不同，因为前一个是命令，后一个是陈述。在《道德语言》一书中，R. M. 黑尔把这类句子中的共同内容称作内含[源自希腊文 *phrazein*，字面的意思是所说、所指出或所表明东西]，把它们不同的语气称作语调[源自希腊文 *neuein*，字面的意思是点头表示同意，表示赞同]。通过这一区分，他认为内含允许祈使句出现在逻辑关系中。

“我将把句子中对于两种语气(你将很快关上门)而言是共同的那部分称作内含，把句子中在命令情况和陈述情况(是或请)方面的不同的部分称作语调。”——黑尔：《道德语言》，1952年，第18页。

### 中立一元论

由美国实用主义者 W. 詹姆斯阐明，由美国实在论所发挥，但由奥地利哲学家 E. 马赫独立提出的一种理论。与唯心主义一元论(认为心是真实的存在)和唯物主义一元论(认为物是真实的存在)相反，这种理论认为心的东西和物的东西都由同样的基本材料构成，这材料既非心的又非物的，而是在二者之间的中立之物。心和物是同一材料的逻辑函项。因此，在心与物之间并无真正的区别。罗素有一段时间接受了这种观点，认为世界由中立的事件构成。这种主张对于心身问题提出了一种解决办法，但对于构成心与身的东西的中立性，对于中立的东西的排列何以能产生于心与身之中的问题，还有一些困难。如果认为经验是中立实体，不清楚中立一元论究竟是澄清了还是模糊了经验的性质。

“‘中立一元论’……是这样的理论：通常被认为是心的事物和通常被认为是物的事物就其内在性质而言并无差异，通常认为一方具有此属性而另一方不具有该属性，差异仅在于排列和前后关系方面。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第七卷，第15页。

### New criticism

A school of literary criticism developed by J. C. Ransom, A. Tate, C. Brooks, among others, in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. It rejected the historical method in literary study which emphasised the influence of history upon literature. Instead it suggested that a literary work is not an historical object, but should be treated merely as a text. It embraced the idea of art for art's sake and emphasised the autonomy of art. The central task of literary criticism should be to focus on the literary devices present in a work, such as harmony, structure of discourse, imagery, figurative use of language and rhythm. Facts external to the work itself were claimed to be irrelevant to the appreciation or criticism of that work. The movement has affinities with Derrida's more recent theory of deconstruction.

"This doctrine (of the new criticism) holds that in trying to understand a work of art we cannot make use of facts external to the work itself—facts of biography, convention and (perhaps) intention."—Casey, "The autonomy of art", in *Philosophy and the Arts* (Royal Institute of Philosophy), 1973, p. 66.

**New England transcendentalism**, see transcendentalism

### New organon

The title of Francis Bacon's major book and also a technical term in his philosophy. The book, titled *Novum Organum* in Latin, was published in 1620, as the second part of an uncompleted project called the Great Instauration. The subtitle of *Novum Organum* is "true directions concerning the interpretation of nature". It was intended as a guide to the correct use of human understanding in the investigation of nature. The central idea is that we should interpret rather than anticipate nature. We can only know on the basis of what has been observed in fact or in thought. Hence, the traditional syllogistic deductive logic which starts from abstract notions and principles is not adequate. Bacon called his own logic new in order to distinguish it from Aristotle's *Organon*, in which syllogistic logic is systematically elaborated. The correct logic should be inductive, although it is not the method of induction in general which he favours, but induction by elimination. What, then, does Bacon mean by a new organon? He claims that there are three basic differences between the old logic and his new logic. (1) While the old logic is aimed at inventing arguments and overcoming an opponent's argument, the new logic aimed to discover the principles of nature itself and to command nature in action. (2) While the old logic focuses mainly on syllogism, new logic rejects it and claims that induction is the form of demonstration which upholds sense and mirrors nature. (3) While in the old logic the starting point of inquiry is princi-

### 新批评

20世纪30—40年代在美国兴起的一种文学批评学派,倡导者主要有J.C. 兰萨姆、A. 塔特和C. 布鲁克斯等人。新批评摒弃文学研究中的历史方法,因为后者侧重历史对文学的影响。相反,新批评认为文学作品并非历史对象,而只能被当做文本。新批评拥护为艺术而艺术的思想,并且强调艺术的自律性。文学批评的中心任务应当注重分析作品中的文学表现手法,譬如和谐、话语结构、想像、语言修辞与节奏等等。对作品欣赏和批评来讲,外在于作品本身的事实是无关紧要的。新批评运动与德里达新近提出的解构理论密切相关。

"(新批评)学说认为,在理解艺术作品的过程中,不可借用外在于作品本身的事实——譬如传记资料、社会习俗、(或许)意向等等。"——卡西:《艺术的自律性》,见皇家哲学研究所编《哲学与艺术》,1973年,第66页。

### 新英国先验论

见“超验主义”条。

### 新工具

F. 培根主要著作的标题,也是他哲学的一个专门术语。这本拉丁名为 *Novum Organum* 的著作发表于1620年,是一部未完成的被称作“伟大复兴”的写作计划的第二部分。它的副标题是“关于自然解释的真正指导”。培根打算把它用作探索自然时正确运用人类理智的一个指导。它的中心思想是:我们应当解释而不是预测自然。我们只能在事实或思想中已经观察到的东西的基础上来认识。因此,从抽象概念和原则出发的传统三段论演绎逻辑是不恰当的。培根称自己的逻辑是“新的”,以区别于亚里士多德的《工具论》,在后者,三段论逻辑得到系统的阐述。正确的逻辑应当是归纳,尽管他所赞成的不是完全归纳法,而是淘汰归纳法。那么,培根用“新工具”指的是什么呢?他声称,在旧逻辑和他的新逻辑之间有三个基本的区别:(1)旧逻辑的目的是发明论证和驳倒对方的证明,而新逻辑的目的是发现自然本身的原理,在行动中命令自然。(2)旧逻辑主要关注于三段论,而新逻辑拒绝三段论,声称归纳是拥护感觉、反映自然的证明形式。(3)旧逻辑的研究起点是原则,而新逻辑要求我们从对信息的判断开始,这些信息是通过感官获得的。

“至于合法的[归纳]形式,我认为它是新工具。”——培根:《著作集》,1905年,第515页。

ple, new logic requires that we start with a judgement about the information obtained through the senses.

“As for the legitimate form [of induction] I refer it to the new organon.”—F. Bacon, *The Works*, 1905, p. 515.

**New realism**, another name for neo-realism

### New riddle of induction

A problem which has provoked heated debate about the nature of induction. Induction is normally characterised in terms of inference to the continuation of previously observed regularities on the assumption of the uniformity of nature. But Nelson Goodman argued that this analysis itself depends on an unjustifiable assumption. Suppose that so far all observed emeralds have been green. The classical analysis of induction will lead us to believe that future emeralds will be green. But suppose there is another predicate *grue*, such that *x* is *grue* if and only if it is green when observed before time *T* (in the future) and blue thereafter. Given this, all our evidence for the hypothesis that emeralds are green equally supports the hypothesis that emeralds are *grue*. The evidence which we naturally take as confirming a given hypothesis always confirms some contrary hypothesis to an equal degree. Thus correct induction cannot be defined in terms of inferences to events similar to those observed. There are no language-independent similarities in nature. Induction can only apply to projectible properties, but the paradox shows that it is unclear what these properties are. This new riddle of induction is also called Goodman's paradox or the *grue* paradox.

“We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory of confirmation. It is this problem that I call the new riddle of induction.”—Goodman, *Problems and Projects*, 1972, p. 386.

### Newcomb's problem

A paradox about choice formulated by the American physicist William Newcomb in the early 1960s, and published by Robert Nozick in his paper “Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice” (1969). Suppose that a Supreme Being who has a successful record of prediction offers you two boxes A and B. You can choose to have either both boxes or the Box B alone. He puts a thousand pounds in Box A, and puts either a million pounds in B if he has predicted that you will choose B alone, or nothing if he has predicated that you will choose both boxes. Now which alternative should you choose? One line of reasoning suggests that you should trust

### 新的实在论

“新实在论”的另一个名称。

### 新归纳之谜

一个引发了有关归纳本性的热烈争论的问题。归纳的特征表述,通常是依据对于既往所观察到的规则性的持续,亦即依据自然的齐一性的推理。但 N. 古德曼论证说这一分析其本身依赖于一个未得到辩护的论定。假设迄今所观察到的所有绿宝石都是绿色的。经典的归纳分析将导致我们相信未来的绿宝石也是绿色的。但是设想有另一谓词“绿蓝”,使得 *x* 是绿蓝的当且仅当在(未来的)时间 *T* 之前观察它是绿色的,而在这时间之后是蓝色的。假定如此,则我们所有对于假说“绿宝石是绿色的”的证据也同样支持“它们是绿蓝的”这一假说。我们自然地看做确证了一给定假说的证据,总是同等程度地确证某些相反的假说。这样,正确的归纳就不能按照对于已观察到事件的类似事件的推理来定义。自然界中没有独立于语言的相似性。归纳仅能应用于可投射的性质,但是这一悖论表明并不清楚这些性质是什么。这一新归纳之谜也称作“古德曼悖论”或“绿蓝悖论”。

“迄今我们对这个问题既没有答案,也没有有希望的思路,这问题就是什么使类似规律的或可确证的假说区别于偶然的或不可确证的假说;起初似乎仅是较小的技术上的难题的东西,已成为令人满意的的确证理论发展的主要障碍。正是这一问题我称之为新归纳之谜。”——古德曼:《问题与投射》,1972年,第386页。

### 纽康问题

一个有关选择的悖论,由美国物理学家 W. 纽康于 20 世纪 60 年代早期提出,并为 R. 诺齐克在其论文《纽康问题和两条选择原理》(1969 年)中发表。假设一个有着成功的预言纪录的至上存在者提供给你两个盒子 A 和 B。你可以选择或是两个盒子全要,或是仅要盒 B。他在盒 A 中放一千镑,然后在盒 B 中或是放入一百万镑,如果他预测你会仅选盒 B;或是什么也不放,如果他预测你将选两只盒全要的话。现在你应作出何种选择?一种推理思路建议你应相信这个至上存在者的预见能力,因而选择仅要

the demonstrated predictive capacity of the Supreme Being and choose B alone; so you will end up rich. The other reasoning suggests that you should take both, for you can get at least one thousand pounds in this way. If you choose B alone and the Supreme Being has predicted that you would take both boxes, you will end up with nothing. Both ways of reasoning are sound, but they are incompatible. If the Supreme Being's prediction were based on the assumption of your rationality and one option were more rational than the other, you would know what to choose, but any attempt to predict your choice on the basis of rationality will not produce a determinate result.

"Newcomb's problem presents a conflict between dominance reasoning and expected utility reasoning, both of which seem to have great intuitive appeal."—Campbell and Snowdon (eds.), *Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation*, 1985, p. 24.

### Nicod's criterion

A test of the relevance of evidence for confirmation put forward by the French philosopher Jean Nicod, saying that for a generalisation "All As are Bs", an instance A is B provides confirming evidence; an instance A is not B disconfirms the generalisation and justifies its rejection, and evidence of something which is neither A nor B is irrelevant, that is, it neither confirms nor disconfirms. This criterion is plausible in its own right, but when it is put together with other principles of confirmation, "Hempel's paradox" of confirmation arises.

"Nicod's criterion, ... states that ' $\phi_a, \phi_a$ ' always confirms, ' $\phi_a, \sim\phi_a$ ' always disconfirms, while ' $\sim\phi_a, \phi_a$ ' and ' $\sim\phi_a, \sim\phi_a$ ' are always irrelevant to, 'of physical necessity all  $\phi$ 's are  $\phi$ 's'."—Swinburne, *An Introduction to Confirmation Theory*, 1973, p. 152.

### Nihilism

[from Latin: *nihil*, nothing] A theory which advocates that nothing is believable and that no distinction is significant. Metaphysical nihilism claims that the world and human life do not have the value and meaning we suppose them to have. Epistemological nihilism holds that no knowledge is possible. Ethical nihilism supposes that there is no ground to justify any absolute moral value. Political nihilism suggests that any political organisation must be corrupt. Nietzsche claimed that he is a nihilist. But his nihilism holds that the world lacks value and meaning if value and meaning are conceived in a traditional way. His nihilism is the devaluation of all values and provides a motive to seek new values.

"Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies—in losing our fear of man we have also lost our love for him, our respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be

B, 由此你最终富起来了; 另一种推理建议你选择两个盒子都要, 这样你至少可以得到一千镑。如果你选择了仅要 B 而那个存在者却预言你会选择二者都要, 你将一无所获。两种推理方式都是正确的, 但它们是不相容的。如果至上存在者的预测是基于对于你的理性的假定, 你的一种选择比另一种更为合理, 则你应能知道选择什么; 可是任何基于理性去预测你的选择的尝试都不会产生一个确定的结果。

"纽康问题表现出优势推理与预期效用推理之间的冲突, 这两种推理看上去都有着直观上极大的吸引力。"——坎贝尔和斯诺敦(编): 《理性的悖谬与合作》, 1985年, 第24页。

### 尼柯德标准

由法国哲学家 J. 尼柯德提出的关于确证的证据相干性检验, 说的是对于一个概括"所有的 A 是 B", 一个事例"A 是 B"提供了确证证据, 一个事例"A 不是 B"产生了一个反驳或否认, 而关于某物既不是 A 也不是 B 的证据则是不相干的, 即它既没有确证也没有否认。这个标准就其自身而言似乎是合理的, 但当与其他确证原理结合起来, 就产生了关于确证的"亨佩尔悖论"。

"尼柯德标准……说的是对于'所有的  $\phi$  是  $\varphi$ ' 的物理必然性而言, ' $\phi_a, \phi_a$ ' 总是确证它, ' $\phi_a, \sim\phi_a$ ' 总是否认它, 而 ' $\sim\phi_a, \phi_a$ ' 和 ' $\sim\phi_a, \sim\phi_a$ ' 总是无关的。"——斯文布勒: 《确证理论导论》, 1973年, 第152页。

### 虚无主义

[源自拉丁文 *nihil* (虚无, 什么也没有)] 一种主张没有可信的东西和没有有意义的区分的理论。形而上学的虚无主义认为世界和人生没有我们假定它们具有的价值和意义。认识论的虚无主义坚持没有任何知识是可能的。伦理的虚无主义提出, 不存在任何能为绝对的道德价值辩护的基础。政治上的虚无主义则建议, 任何政治组织必是腐败的。尼采声称他是一个虚无主义者, 但他的虚无主义所坚持的是: 如果价值和意义以传统的方式来看待, 那么这世界就是无价值和无意义的。他的虚无主义使所有〔传统〕价值贬值, 并提供去寻求新价值的动机。

"欧洲的命运就在这里: 由于丧失了对人的恐惧, 我们也丧失了我们对他的爱、尊敬和希望, 甚至还丧失了要成为人的意愿。今天, 人的

man. The sight of man now makes us tired—what is nihilism today if it is not that?”—Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, sect. 12.

### No ownership theory

A theory which maintains that states of consciousness do not belong to anything, although they may be causally dependent on the body in a contingent way. If something is owned, its ownership is logically transferable, but this is not the case with experience. Strawson ascribed this theory to Wittgenstein at one period and to Schlick, and criticises it in his own discussion of persons. He accepts that the theory correctly claims that the unique role of a single body in one's experience is not sufficient for ascribing experience to it, but argues that the theory itself is incoherent. For the experience or consciousness to be causally dependent on states of the body, it must be owned by something. We could not refer to an independent particular experience. We refer to mental states by way of their owners, and therefore experience must be owned.

“The [no-ownership] theorist could maintain his position only by denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences at all; and his position is ridiculous.”—Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 98.

### Noble lie

A falsehood uttered for the interest of the state. The term was introduced by Plato in *Republic* 414-5 for a myth used to safeguard social harmony by persuading a population to accept class distinctions. According to the myth, God made human beings from the earth. For the rulers, he added gold to the composition; for the auxiliaries, he added silver; and for the farmers and other workers, he added iron and bronze. For this reason, rulers should enjoy the greatest prestige. The distinction is not firmly fixed, for a golden child might be born of silver parents. It is the duty of the rulers to ensure that only a golden person can become a ruler. Plato believed that the myth can make the citizens happy with their current status and can thus promote social stability. Other Western political thinkers have accepted the legitimacy of political lies for the sake of public or party interest, and some theorists have examined related questions about the role of myth, ideology or false consciousness in political life.

“How then... might we contrive one of those opportune falsehoods of which we were just now speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city.”—Plato, *Republic*, 414C.

### Noble savage

A term introduced by J-J Rousseau, for human beings before the appearance of civilisation and government. In con-

形象使我们厌倦——这不正是今天的虚无主义吗？”——尼采：《论道德的谱系》，第12节。

### 无所属论

这种理论认为，意识状态尽管可能以偶然的方式因果地依赖于身体，但却不属于任何事物。如果某物是有所属的，其所属关系就是在逻辑上可传递的；但经验并不是这样。斯特劳森将这一理论归于石里克和某一个时期的维特根斯坦，并在他自己关于人的讨论中对之作出批评。他承认这一理论正确地主张一个单一的身体在一个经验中的独特作用不足以将经验归结于它，但他论辩说，这一理论本身是自相矛盾的。因为经验或意识要因果地依赖于身体的状态，它就必须属于某物。我们不能指称一个独立的特定经验。我们通过其所有者来指称心的状态。因此经验一定是有所属的。

“[无所属]论者若要坚持其立场就必须否认我们曾经指称特定的状态或经验；而这一立场是荒谬的。”——斯特劳森：《个别物》，第98页。

### 高贵的谎言

为了国家的利益而说的假话。这个词是柏拉图在《国家篇》414—415段讲到一个神话时提出的，这个神话被用来通过劝说全体居民接受阶级的划分来维护社会的和谐。根据这个神话，神用土来造人。对于统治者，神在他们身上加了黄金；对于辅助者，神在他们身上加了白银；对于农民和其他技工，神在他们身上加了铁和铜。由于这一原因，统治者应享有最高的威望。这种区分不是固定不变的，因为统治者的孩子可以出生于辅助者的父母。统治者的责任是保证只有含有黄金成分的人才能成为统治者。柏拉图认为，这个神话可以使平民对他们当前的地位感到愉快，因而可以有益于社会的稳定。其他西方政治思想家承认为了公众或政党利益的政治谎言的合理性，一些思想家还考察了与此相关的神话、意识形态或虚假意识在政治生活中的作用问题。

“不久前，……现在我们或许可以说一个我们刚刚谈过的那些适宜的假话，以便如有可能的话，以一个高贵的谎言使统治者自己相信，或至少使城邦里其他人相信。”——柏拉图：《国家篇》，414C。

### 高尚的野蛮人

卢梭提出的一个术语，指的是文明与政府出现之前的人类。与霍布斯的处于自然状态下

trast to Hobbes' view that men in the state of nature are savage, Rousseau claims that if they are savages, they are noble savages. He held that human beings in the state of nature are free, peaceful, innocent, independent and happy. They are faithful to human nature and are free from the disease of our civilisation. It is the establishment of society that deforms human nature and makes humans subject to the conditions of domestic slavery. But it is argued that Rousseau held this view only in the early stage of his thought and that in general he did not think that men in the natural state are capable of virtue and moral relationships.

"Except possibly in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, written before his theories had been properly thought out, Rousseau was no believer in the 'noble savage', though that expression is often wrongly associated with his name."—Hall, *Rousseau*, 1973, p. 76.

### Noema

[from Greek: *noema*, what is thought about; in contrast to a correlative term: *noesis*, the act of thinking. The terms are related to *nous*, reason] Husserl distinguished two aspects of intentional experience, the material and the formal. While the material aspect comprises the sensory stuffs passively received by consciousness, the formal aspect, or *noesis*, bestows sense on the material stuffs and generates unity among multiplicity by means of its synthetic activities. This account is deeply influenced by Kant's discussion of apperception. *Noema*, in contrast, is what is unified and synthesised by *noetic* activity. For Husserl, a major task for phenomenology is to reveal the *noetic-noematic* structure of intentional experience. The interpretation of *noema* is a difficult and has been subject to dispute. Generally, it is neither an object nor a part of an object, but is an entity corresponding to Frege's sense (in his distinction between sense and reference). *Noema* is a complex which includes every factor determining the meaning of *noetic* activity. It is the crucial notion for Husserl's theory of intentionality, for he claims that *noema*, rather than objects, are directed by a mental act.

"Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure intuition, and is a correlative 'noematic content', or briefly, 'noema'—terms which we shall henceforth be continually using."—Husserl, *Ideas* (tr. Kersten), 1982, sect. 88.

### Noesis

[Greek; variously translated as intellection, intelligence and understanding; it is cognate with the verb *noein* and its object *noeton*] In a wider sense *noesis* is thought, in contrast to perception (Greek: *aisthesis*). In its narrow sense, *noesis* is identified with *nous* (immediate or intuitive thinking)

的人是野蛮的观点不同,卢梭声称,即使他们是野蛮人,他们也是高尚的野蛮人。他认为,在自然状态下的人是自由的、爱好和平的、单纯的、独立的和快乐的。他们忠于人性,没有我们的文明造成的那种弊病。正是社会的建立才扭曲了人性并使人屈从于国内的奴隶制状态。不过有人争论说,卢梭只是在他思想的早期阶段持这种观点,一般说来他不认为自然状态下的人能具有美德和道德关系。

"可能除了在他的理论完全成熟以前写的《关于艺术和科学的演说》外,卢梭并不是'高尚的野蛮人'的信徒,虽然这一说法常常被错误地与他的名字联系在一起。"——霍尔:《卢梭》,1973年,第76页。

### 意向对象

[源自希腊文 *noema*,意思是“那被想到的东西”;与之相对相关的希腊词是 *noesis*,指“思想的行为”。这两个词都与 *nous*(努斯,理性,心灵)有关]胡塞尔将意向经验区别为两个方面:质料的方面和形式的方面。质料的方面由意识被动接受的感觉材料组成,而形式的方面,或意向作用,则给予这物质材料以意义,并凭借其综合行为在复合多样中产生出统一。这种讲法受到康德对于统觉讨论的深刻影响。与之相对,意向对象是那被意向作用的行为统一和综合的东西。对于胡塞尔来说,现象学的一项主要任务就是去揭示意向经验中的意向作用—意向对象结构。对于意向对象的解释是困难的,已经引起争论。一般说来,它既不是对象,又不是对象的一部分,而是相应于弗雷格所讲的意义(在其对意义和所指的区分中所讲的)那样一种存在者。意向对象是一个复合体,包括决定意向作用行为意义的每一个因素。它是胡塞尔意向性理论中的关键概念,因为他认为心的行为所指向的是意向对象而非对象。

“在每一点上,对应于意向作用的实项内容的多样化材料,都有一种材料复合体可显示在现实的纯直观中,都有一种相关的‘意向对象内容’,或简言之,‘意向对象’。这些术语我们从此将经常使用。”——胡塞尔:《观念》(克尔斯滕英译),1982年,第88节。

### 理解

[希腊词,有多种译法,如才智、通晓、理解等;它与动词 *noein* 同词根,它的对象是 *to noeton*]在广义上,*noesis* 意指思想,与感觉(希腊词 *aisthesis*)相对应。在狭义上,*noesis* 与直接或直觉思维意义上的 *nous* 一致,和 *dianoia*(推论思

and contrasted to *dianoia* (discursive thinking). It is the thought which constitutes the being of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and is pure intuitive apprehension in Neo-platonism. In Plato's simile of the Line, *noesis* is beyond *dianoia*, and while *dianoia* is concerned with mathematical entities, *noesis* is the highest state of the mind which reasons from Forms to Forms, reaches first principles, and then deduces from them. It is dialectical or philosophical reason. For Husserl's account of *noesis*, see *noema*.

"Life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by the power of perception or *noesis*."—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1170a16.

*Noesis*, see *noema*

### Nomic necessity

The regularity and uniformity existing amongst contingent natural phenomena. "Spring follows winter" and "Ice melts at a certain temperature" are statements that express empirical laws. They are not logically or mathematically necessary, but appear to be necessary in some sense. This sort of necessity is often called nomic or lawlike necessity. Such a necessity reveals that things will at least generally happen in that way or, in a stronger form, that they must happen in that way or that it is inevitable that they will so happen. Lawlike necessity is often expressed in a hypothetical supposition: if anything had the characteristics  $c_1 \dots c_n$ , then it would have the characteristic  $x$ . Different philosophers have offered various interpretations of this sort of necessity. Hume denied its objectivity by claiming that it is nothing more than our habitual expectation. Among those who have admitted it, medieval thinkers considered it to be due to God's force, while Kant suggested that it results from the imposition of our categories of understanding upon experience.

"The nomic necessity—anything characterised by  $pqr$  would be characterised by  $x$ —implies the factual universal that 'everything that is  $pqr$  is actually  $x$ '."—Johnson, *Logic*, III, 1964, p. 9.

**Nominal definition**, see real definition

### Nominal essence

The distinction between real essence and nominal essence, drawn by Locke, roughly corresponds to the traditional metaphysical division between substance and quality or between essence and appearance. A nominal essence is the quality or qualities by which we recognise an item and which justifies on any given occasion applying the item's name to it.

维)相对应。在亚里士多德的《形而上学》中,它是构成“不动的动者”存在的思想,在新柏拉图主义那里,它是纯直觉的领悟。在柏拉图的“线段之喻”中,*noesis* 超越于 *dianoia* 之外,*dianoia* 关涉的是数理实体,而 *noesis* 则是心的最高状态,即从形式出发推论到形式,到达第一原理,然后从它们下降。它是辩证的或哲学的理智。关于胡塞尔对 *noesis* 的主张见“意向对象”条。

“生命是有限定的,对动物而言,为感觉能力所限,对人而言,为感觉或理解的能力所限。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1170a16。

### 意向作用

见“意向对象”条。

### 规则必然性

存在于偶然的自然现象之间的规则性和齐一性。“冬去春来”和“冰雪在某一温度下消融”都是表述经验规律的陈述,它们既非逻辑上也非数学上必然的,而只是看上去在某种意义上必然的,这种必然性经常被称作“规则”必然性或拟规律必然性。这种必然性揭示出事情至少一般地将以这种方式发生,其较强的形式则为它们必然以这种方式发生,或是不可避免它们会如此发生。拟规律必然性经常表述于一种假设推测的语境中:如果一事物具有特性  $c_1 \dots c_n$ ,则它将具有特性  $x$ 。不同的哲学家对这种必然性提出了各种解释。休谟否认它的客观性,认为它不过是我们的习惯性预期。而在那些承认它的人中,中世纪思想家认为它是出自上帝的力量,康德则提出它来自于我们加在经验上的知性范畴。

“规则必然性——任何为  $pqr$  所表征的事物将为  $x$  所表征——意味着事实上普遍有‘每一个是  $pqr$  的东西实际上都是  $x$ ’。”——约翰逊:《逻辑学》,第三卷,1964年,第9页。

### 名义定义

见“真实定义”条。

### 名义的本质

洛克大致根据实体(或译本体)和性质或者本质和现象的传统形而上学的划分,区分了实在的本质和名义的本质。名义的本质指性质或一组性质,我们依靠它们来辨认一个事项,依靠它们在任何给定的情况下,证明一个人对一个事项名称的使用是正当的。在洛克看来,名义的

For Locke, it is the abstract ideas for which a general or sortal name stands. For example, according to its nominal essence gold is a metal which is malleable, heavy and yellow. Because gold has these properties, we can recognise it as such and can apply the name "gold" to it. A thing's real essence is its internal but unknown constitution. While the qualities which constitute the nominal essence depend on the real essence, only the nominal essence serves to distinguish one thing from another. Traditional metaphysics emphasised real essences, but Locke's philosophy shifted the emphasis to nominal essences. This distinction made essence *qua* unknown real essence superfluous. Berkeley and his followers therefore rejected the notion of real essence, and this leads to phenomenalism.

"[Real essence] is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c, which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to name, which is therefore its nominal essence."—Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III, iii, 18.

### Nominalism

[from Latin: *nomen*, name] The view that the only feature that particulars falling under the same general term have in common is that they are covered by the same term. Hence, universals are only names rather than entities in their own right, although there are universal elements in knowledge. Nominalism is opposed to realism, according to which universals are real entities which are required to explain how general terms apply to different particulars. For nominalism, language, rather than independent reality, underlies perceived similarity. Everything that exists is particular, and universals are terms invented by the mind to talk about similarities. Talk about properties and abstract entities is legitimate only if it can be reduced to talk about particulars. Nominalism follows the spirit of Ockham's razor, that is by avoiding positing the existence of unnecessary entities. Nominalism is the traditional empiricist theory of universals, and its major advocates include Ockham, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and in this century Carnap and Quine, although different philosophers in the tradition have different reasons for rejecting universals and ways of eliminating them. Many philosophers are attracted to the ontological austerity of nominalism, but problems remain concerning how language, especially predication, works on nominalist principles.

"Nominalism maintains that universals are names only, corresponding to no reality."—Walsh, *Reason and Knowledge*, 1947, p. 99.

本质是用通名或类名称来代表的抽象观念。例如,根据金子的名义本质,金子是可延展的、沉重的、黄色的金属,因为金子有这些性质,所以我们可以依此来辨认它,我们可以将“金子”一词用在它之上。一个东西的实在的本质是它的内在的未知的结构。虽然构成名义的本质的各种性质依赖于实在的本质,但只有名义的本质适于将一个东西同另一个东西区分开来。传统的形而上学强调“实在的本质”,而洛克的哲学转而强调名义的本质。这个区分使作为未知的实在的本质这个本质变成多余的。因此巴克莱及其追随者拒绝实在的本质的概念,这导致了现象论。

“黄金的[实在的本质]是黄金的颜色、重量、可溶性、确定性等所有这些性质所依靠的不可感部分的实在结构,这个结构使那团物质成为黄金,或使它有使用黄金之名,因此这个名称就是黄金的名义本质。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第三卷,第三章,第18节。

### 唯名论

[源自拉丁文 *nomen*, 名称]指如下观点:被归入同一普遍词之下的各个殊相所共同具有的惟一特征,是它们都为这同一个词所指称。因此,共相只是名称,不是独自的存在物,尽管在知识中有共相的成分。唯名论与唯实论相反,根据唯实论,共相是实在的实体,它们被用来说明普遍词如何应用于不同的殊相。对于唯名论来说,语言而非独立的实在,成为已知相似性的基础。每一存在物都是殊相,共相是为谈论相似物而由心灵发明的词。对性质和抽象实体的谈论,只有当它们可还原为对殊相的谈论时,才是合法的。唯名论遵循奥康剃刀的精神,即避免假定不必要的实体的存在。唯名论是传统的经验主义共相论,它的主要拥护者包括奥康、霍布斯、洛克、巴克莱和本世纪的卡尔纳普、奎因,尽管该传统中的不同哲学家对拒斥共相和消除共相的方法有不同的理由。许多哲学家注意到唯名论的本体严肃性,但是,关于语言,尤其是主谓关系怎样根据唯名论的原则来运作的问题仍然存在。

“唯名论坚持认为,共相仅仅是名称,没有相对应的实在。”——瓦尔西:《理性和知识》,1947年,第99页。

### Nomological dangler

A term introduced by Feigl in his 1958 article "The mental and the physical", referring to the lawlike relations which connect intersubjectively confirmable events with events that are in principle not intersubjectively and independently confirmable. It means in particular the laws which relate non-physical conscious experience to their associated brain processes. We accept these relations or laws but they cannot be accounted for in scientific formulations. They are quite outside normal scientific conceptions, that is, they dangle from the nomological net of science. The identity theory of mind attempts to rule out these danglers.

In his 1960 paper "Sensations and brain processes.", Smart used this term for the physical entity that is supposed to dangle from the psychological law rather than to the psychophysical law itself. But he later reverted to Feigl's use, although he viewed such laws with great suspicion.

"At best a nomological dangler would merely subsume a lot of As that are associated with Bs under the generalization 'All As are Bs'. The reason for this is that the nomological danglers would be laws purporting to connect physical events, in fact, neurophysiological ones, with allegedly non-physical ones, conscious experiences."—Smart, *Essays Metaphysical and Moral*, 1987, p. 215.

### Nomos

Law or convention, and used to refer to written or customary laws and rules, custom, habits and conventions. Because all of these are men-made and can be changed and modified by men, in Greek philosophy *nomos* is contrasted to *phusis* (nature). Democritus claims that such things as colour and taste are conventions, while only atoms and the void are real (natural). In the fourth-fifth century BC, philosophers disputed whether human nature or human morality is *nomos* or *phusis*. The defenders of *nomos*, e. g. Protagoras, insist that human nature or morality is affected by the beliefs of different societies. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all attack this relativism, and attempt to base human morality on objective grounds.

"What is fine and what is just, the topics of inquiry in political science, differ and vary so much that they seem to rest on *nomos* only, not on nature."—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094b15-6.

### Noncognitivism

Also called non-descriptivism, a type of meta-ethical theory which denies that we can have moral knowledge by intuition, and also denies that ethical statements can be construed as scientific statements, confirmable by observation or inductive reasoning. It claims that ethical terms do not refer to properties and that ethical judgements are not used to convey what is the case and are neither true nor false. Thus, it

### 法则学关联

由费格尔在他 1958 年的论文《心的与物的》中引入的一个术语,指把主体间可确证事件与原则上不能主体间及独立确证的事件相联系的拟规律关系。它特别意味着那些联系非物理的意识经验与和它们相关的脑过程的规律。我们承认这些关系或规律,但它们不能用科学公式来说明。它们完全在常规科学观念之外,即它们在科学的法则学网络上关联着。“心的同一论”试图罗列出我们的这些关联。

斯马特在他 1960 年的论文《感觉与脑过程》中用这个术语指那些被看做关联于心理学定律而不是心理物理学定律自身的物理实体。但后来他又回到费格尔的用法,尽管在他看来这些规律很有疑问。

“法则学关联充其量不过是把许多与 B 相联系的 A 归属于概括‘所有的 A 都是 B’之中。这么做的理由是,法则学关联是意在将物理事件、事实上是神经生理事件与据说是非物理的事件、即意识经验相联系的规律。”——斯马特:《形而上学与道德文集》,1987 年,第 215 页。

### 规范

指法律或惯例,也用来表示成文法或不成文法,以及习俗、习惯与惯例等等。因为所有这些东西是人为的,而且是由人来改变或修正的,因此在古希腊哲学中规范(*nomos*)有别于自然(*phusis*)。德漠克利特认为,诸如色彩和趣味之类的东西就属惯例,而只有原子和真空属于实在(自然)。公元前 4 至 5 世纪,哲学家对人性或人类道德属于规范还是属于自然的问题争论不休。规范的辩护者有普罗泰戈拉等人,他们坚持认为人性或人类道德是受不同社会之信仰的影响。而苏格拉底、柏拉图和亚里士多德都批评这种相对主义,并且试图把人类道德建立在客观的基础之上。

“美好与公正的东西,作为政治学探讨的话题,是彼此截然不同的,它们看来只是有赖于规范而非自然。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1094b15—16。

### 非认知主义

也称“非规定主义”,一种元伦理理论,它否定我们能够通过直觉而得到道德知识,也否定伦理陈述能够解释为可为观察或归纳推理证实的科学陈述。它主张伦理词汇不指涉属性,伦理判断不被用来表达事态,因而既不真也不假。因此,它是与许多传统的伦理理论相对立的,这些理论认为,有伦理知识以及规范伦理判断能够

is opposed to the many traditional ethical theories which hold that there is ethical knowledge and that normative ethical judgements can be said to be true or false. These rival theories are therefore termed cognitivism and include both naturalist and nonnaturalist varieties.

The positive thesis of noncognitivism is that in ethical thinking we should concentrate on the non-fact-stating functions of ethical expressions. Exactly what these functions are is an issue dividing many forms of noncognitivism. For some, ethical expressions express attitude; for some, they issue commands; for some, they express exclamations; for some, they are prescriptions; and so on. The most influential noncognitive theories are emotivism, developed by Stevenson, and prescriptivism, developed by Hare.

“Noncognitivism: the job of ethical sentences is not to state facts.”—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 203.

**Non-consequentialism**, see consequentialism

**Non-descriptivism**, see noncognitivism, descriptivism

**Non-doxastic theory**, see doxastic theory

### Non-Euclidean geometry

We can informally render Euclid's fifth ‘parallels’ postulate (or Axiom XI) as follows: ‘through a given point P not on a line L, there is one and only one line in the plane of P and L that does not meet L’. This axiom turns out to be independent of the other axioms of Euclid. The exploration of the consequences of this fact led to the development of various non-Euclidean geometries. They develop systems in which two different denials of this postulate are used: Lobachevskian geometry contains an infinite number of parallels through P; Riemannian geometry contains no parallels through P. Riemannian geometry has played a crucial role in the development of the General Theory of Relativity.

“If the parallel axiom is independent of the other axioms of Euclid, then a statement incompatible with the parallels axiom can be substituted for it without logically contradicting the other axioms. By trying different alternatives, new axiom systems, called non-Euclidean geometries, were created”—Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, 1966, p. 130.

### Non-monotonic logics

In logic, an inference is monotonic if a conclusion C, which can be inferred validly from a set of premises, can also

是真或假的。这些匹敌的理论因此也被命名为认知主义,它们包括自然主义和非自然主义。

非认知主义的积极论点是,在伦理思考中,我们应该集中于伦理表达的非事实陈述的功能。正是在说明这些功能的问题上,区分了非认知主义的许多不同形式。在某些人看来,伦理述词表达态度;对于另一些来说,它们发布命令;对于其他一些来说,则表达感叹;而对其他人而言,它们是规定等等。最有影响的非认知主义理论有斯蒂文森发展的情感主义,以及黑尔所发展的规定主义。

“非认知主义:伦理句子的作用不是描述事实。”——布兰特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第203页。

### 非效果论

见“效果论”条。

### 非规定主义

见“非认知主义”、“描述主义”条。

### 非信念论

见“信念论”条。

### 非欧几何

我们可以把欧几里德的第五条“平行”公设(或第十一条公理)非正式地表述如下:“经过不在直线L上的一给定点P,在平面P和L上有且仅有一条直线不与L相交。”这一公理证明为独立于欧几里德的其他公理。对这一事实的后果的探索导致了各种非欧几何的发展,它们探讨运用了对这公设的两种不同否定形式的系统:罗巴切夫斯基几何学包含经过P的无穷条平行线,黎曼几何学则不包含经过P的平行线。黎曼几何学在广义相对论的发展中起到了关键作用。

“如果平行公理独立于其他欧几里德公理,则一个与平行公理不相容的陈述可用以取代它,而不与其他公理相矛盾。通过尝试不同的选择,新的称作非欧几何的公理系统就创造出来了。”——卡尔纳普:《物理学的哲学基础》,1966年,第130页。

### 非单调的逻辑

在逻辑中,当一结论C能永真地从一组前提推论出来,也能在无论什么更多的前提被增

be inferred validly no matter what further premises are added to the originally valid argument. It is non-monotonic if the addition of further information leads to a different conclusion. Non-monotonic logics, used in artificial intelligence research, explore logical systems in which monotonicity does not hold.

“Non-monotonic inferences are inferences of the form:  $a$ ; there is no reason to suppose otherwise; so  $b$ .”—Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, 1995, p. 48.

### Non-natural property

According to G. E. Moore, ethical terms such as “good” refer to objective properties which are the basis of truth-values of ethical statements. However, these ethical properties are not natural, that is they are not observable or subject to scientific explanation. Instead they can only be known through moral intuition. According to Moore, any attempt to define ethical terms by appeal to natural terms commits the naturalistic fallacy. However, critics deny the existence of such properties or qualities, and claim that the appeal to a special kind of intuition is not convincing. In addition, it is hard to say how non-natural moral properties could guide our actions.

“The alleged concept of a nonnatural property is not connected with experience, does not function to guide expectations, is not part of a theoretical system with consequences predicative of observation, in the way in which this is true of the concepts of empirical science.”—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 190.

### Nonnaturalism (ethical)

In opposition to ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism claims that ethical terms cannot be defined by appeal to natural terms. Ethical properties are presented as non-natural properties that are not observable and not subject to scientific explanation. There is a firm distinction between ought and is, or between value and fact, so that ethical statements (value statements or “ought” statements) cannot be derived from statements of facts. To attempt to do so is to commit the so called naturalistic fallacy. Distinct from non-cognitivism, non-naturalism argues that ethical statements have objective meanings and truth-values because they refer to non-natural ethical properties, but they can only be known by intuition, rather than by observation or experiment, as naturalism holds. In this century, the main proponent of non-naturalism is G. E. Moore.

“The most vulnerable point of nonnaturalist doctrine, however, is the epistemology, the theory of how we know or are justified in believing ethical statements.”—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 183.

加到原来永真的主目上都会永真地推论出来,那么这个推理就是单调的。当所增加的信息导致了不同的结论,那么它就是非单调的。非单调的逻辑被用于人工智能的研究,它探索单调性所没有把握的逻辑体系。

“非单调的推理是这种形式的推理: $a$ ;没有理由假定其他方面;因此 $b$ 。”——普里斯特:《超出思想的界限》,1995年,第48页。

### 非自然的特性

依据 G. E. 摩尔的观点,伦理词汇诸如“善”,指的是作为伦理陈述真值基础的客观特性。不过,这些伦理特性不是自然的,即它们不是可观察的或可为科学解释的,它们只能通过“道德直觉”而被认识。据摩尔看来,任何以自然词汇来为伦理词汇下定义的企图都要犯自然主义的谬误。不过,批评家否定这样的特性或性质的存在,宣称诉诸一种特别的直觉不是令人信服的。此外,很难说这些非自然的特性怎样指导我们的行动。

“所谓的非自然特性的概念不与经验相联,没有指导期望的作用,不是有着可观察的效果理论系统的一部分。而经验科学的概念具有这些特性。”——布朗特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第190页。

### 非自然主义(伦理学的)

与伦理学的自然主义相对,伦理学的非自然主义主张,伦理词汇不能诉诸自然词汇而下定义,伦理特性是非自然特性,是不可观察和不可为科学解释的。在“应当”与“是”或“价值”与“事实”之间有着确定的区分,所以伦理陈述(即价值陈述或“应当”陈述)不能从对事实的陈述中得出。企图这样做就犯了所谓自然主义的谬误。与非认知主义相区分,非自然主义相信伦理陈述有客观意义和真值,因为它们指非自然的伦理特性,但它们只有靠直觉才可认识到,而不是通过观察或实验,如同自然主义所认为的那样。在20世纪,非自然主义的主要提倡者是 G. E. 摩尔。

“不过,非自然主义最脆弱的地方是认识论,即关于我们怎样知道或怎样证明我们相信伦理陈述为合理的理论。”——布朗特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第183页。

**Non-reflexive**, see irreflexive

### Nonsense

Inspired by Kant's description of reason's inevitably failed attempt to extend beyond the limits of knowledge, Wittgenstein draws a demarcation between meaningful propositions and meaningless propositions. While meaningful propositions are bipolar, that is, either true or false, meaningless propositions are not bipolar and are hence nonsensical. Such propositions are not obviously false or pointless, but simply lack sense. Most questions asked in philosophy and the propositions with which we attempt to answer them are nonsense (German *Unsinn*), and one cannot say that they are true or false. These propositions fail in their attempt to say something about the world, due to our failure to understand the logical syntax of language which is obscured by grammar. Nonsense can be divided into overt nonsense and covert nonsense. Overt nonsense can be seen intuitively to be nonsense, such as the question "Is the good more or less identical than the beautiful?", but covert nonsense has to be discovered by analysis. For Wittgenstein, the task of proper philosophy is to clarify good sense. What is nonsensical cannot be said, but can be shown. In this sense, even his own theory of logical syntax is nonsensical, for it tries to say what can only be shown. In the Vienna Circle, all statements which are not capable of scientific treatment or are not verifiable are nonsense, and "nonsense" accordingly becomes a label for metaphysical statements. Nonsense should be distinguished from what is senseless.

"It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be shown, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, preface.

**Non-teleological ethics**, see consequentialism

### Non-tuism

A term coined by the economist Wicksteed in *The Common Sense of Political Economy and Selected Papers and Reviews on Economic Theory* (1933), originally referring to the specific character of economic relations. Non-tuists are not interested in the interests of those with whom they interact. This sort of motivation is neither egoistic nor altruistic. Some philosophers extend this term to the moral area to offer a rationale for morality, suggesting that people are neither egoists nor altruists. We need moral constraints, but morality is merely a device rather than a fundamental concern for others.

"The market requires only that persons be conceived as not taking an interest in the interests of those with whom they exchange. This is Wicksteed's requirement of non-

### 非自返

见“反自返的”条。

### 无意义

康德认为,如果理性企图超越知识的界线就不可避免地会失败,受此激励,维特根斯坦在有意义的命题和无意义的命题间划出一条界线。有意义的命题是两极性的,即是说要么真,要么假,而无意义的命题不是两极性的,因此是无意义的。这样的命题不是明显地错或不得要领,而只是没有意义。哲学中提出的大部分问题和用来回答这些问题的命题是无意义(德文为 *Unsinn*),我们不能说,它们是真还是假。这些命题在力图对世界有所述说时失败了,是因为未能懂得语言的逻辑句法,它被语法弄得模糊不清。无意义可以分为明显的和不明显的两种。明显的无意义可以被直观地看到是无意义,例如这样的问题:“善或多或少等同于美吗?”但不明显的无意义需要用分析来发现。对维特根斯坦而言,哲学的专门任务是澄清适当的涵义。无意义的东西不能说出,而只能显示。在此含义上,甚至他自己关于逻辑句法的理论也是无意义的,因为它试图说出只能显示的东西。在维也纳小组中,一切不能够科学处理或不可证实的陈述都是无意义,因此“无意义”成了形而上学陈述的标签。应将无意义与没有意义的东西相区别。

“因此,只是在语言中,界限才能显示,而处于界限另一边的只会是无意义。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,序言。

### 非目的论的伦理学

见“效果论”条。

### 非亲密性

经济学家威克德在他的《政治经济学常识和经济理论论文及评论选》(1933年)中所造的一个词,最初是指经济关系的特殊性质。非亲密者对于他们所接触的那些人的利益不感兴趣。这种动机既不是利己主义也不是利他主义。某些哲学家把这个词引入道德领域,来论证道德的合理性,认为人们既不是利己主义的,也不是利他主义的,我们需要道德束缚,但道德仅是一种工具,而非对他人的根本性的关注。

“市场所需要的仅仅是,不对与他们交换的人的利益感兴趣的那些人。这是威克德对于非亲密性的要求。”——高塞:《约定的道德》,1986年,第87页。

tuism"—Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement*, 1986, p. 87.

### Normative

From norm, which means standard or rule and it is associated with evaluation. A theory is normative if it involves norm-prescription and is descriptive if it simply describes the facts but does not prescribe what one ought to do. Normative ethics is the subject of inquiring about the principles or rules of correct moral behaviour and is contrasted to meta-ethics, which analyses the meaning and logical relations of evaluative terms. To define a normative term in terms of non-moral properties is called by Moore the defnifist fallacy. Sociologists as well as moral philosophers have pictures our lives as governed by complex hierarchies of norms.

"Theories that prescribe standards are normative."—Glymour, *Thinking Things Through*, 1992, p. 110.

**Normative egoism**, see egoism, ethical

### Notation

The abbreviation for a notational system or notational scheme, which consists of certain characters or symbols. Notation is the mark of identification distinguishing one type of art from another and determining whether two works belong to the same form of art. It also determines whether two performances are the instances of the same work or whether different inscriptions are copies of the same score. Notation indicates the constitutive properties of a work and distinguishes them from its contingent properties. Establishing this distinction generally relies on boundaries drawn in the antecedent practices. Some forms of art, such as music, have traditional notation, while other, like painting, do not. For other forms of art, like dance, attempts to provide a notation have lacked total success. Since notation is a system of characters, it should be syntactically disjoint so that all marks belonging to the same character are interchangeable without syntactic effects. It should also be finitely differentiated, that is to say, by using the notation we can tell whether or not two marks belong to the same character. Moreover, a notation should also be semantically unambiguous, so that, for example, performances of different works cannot conform to the same score.

"In sum, the properties required of a notational system are unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation. These are in no sense merely recommended for a good and useful notation but are features that distinguish notational systems—good or bad—from non-notational systems."—Nelson Goodman, *Language of Art*, 1968, p. 156.

### 规范的

源自名词“规范”，意为“标准”或“规则”，与“评价”相联。一个理论如果涉及到规范规定，它就是规范的，如果只是叙述事实而不规定一个人应当做什么，就是描述的。规范伦理学是研究正确道德行为的原则和规则的科学，是与元伦理学相对的，元伦理学分析评价词的意义和逻辑关系。依据非道德的特性为一个规范词汇下定义，被摩尔称为定义主义的谬误。社会学家和道德哲学家把我们的生活描画为被复杂的规范等级体系所支配的图画。

“规定标准的理论是规范的。”——格里摩尔：《透彻思考问题》，1992年，第110页。

### 规范利己主义

见“伦理利己主义”条。

### 标志法

“标志系统”或“标志图式”的缩写形式，由某些特征或符号构成。标志法是一种识别的标志，表示一种艺术与另一种艺术的区别，同时还决定两件作品是否属于同类艺术。另外，标志法还决定两台演出是否是同一作品的实例，或者不同的题词是否是同一总谱的拷贝。标志法表明作品的构成特性，同时又使其有别于作品的偶然特性。建立这种区别一般取决于在先前实践中所划定的界限。有些艺术形式，譬如音乐，具有传统的标志法，而其他一些艺术形式，譬如绘画，则没有这种方法。另外一些艺术形式，譬如舞蹈，虽然试图提供一种标志法，但却未能取得完全的成功。由于标志法是一种特征系统，因此应当在句法结构上予以拆解，从而使所有属于相同特征的标志在没有句法作用的情况下能够彼此变通。标志法的区分也应当是有限的，也就是说，人们凭借标志法便可辨别出两个标志是否属于同一特征。另外，一种标志法也应当在语义上是非歧义性的，如此一来，不同作品的演出就不会遵从同一总谱。

“总而言之，标志系统所需要具备的特性包括非歧义性、句法与语义的拆解性与差异性。这些特性绝非是为一套优秀的和有用的标志法所设定的条件，而是区别标志系统（无论好坏）与非标志系统的特征使然。”——古德曼：《艺术语言》，1968年，第156页。

**Notational scheme**, see notation

### Not-being

That which is not. Parmenides claimed that not-being can be neither spoken nor thought, for everything that can be spoken or thought is being. He also believed that Heraclitus's position that everything is always in change amounts to saying that a thing is both being and not-being, and this is an account which can only lead to opinion rather than truth. Plato argues that Forms or Ideas are truly beings and that the sensible world as appearance is both being and not-being. According to Plato's analysis in the *Sophist*, not-being is neither absolutely nothing nor a kind of thing. Instead it is the absence of being, and is "other than" or "being different from" a positive determination or being. In Plotinus, "not being" refers to matter, which is at the bottom of the hierarchy of reality, and is identified with pure passivity, evil and darkness. Modern discussion tends to follow Plato and characterise not-being as a negative event, which is expressed by negative propositions. But there has been debate concerning how to avoid a commitment to non-existents through negative propositions. If not-being is a negative property, then we must find a way to distinguish negative properties from positive properties. Non-being is generally taken to be identical with nothingness.

"When we speaks of 'not being', it seems that we do not means something contrary to what exists but only something that is different."—Plato, *Sophist*, 257b.

### Nothingness

Also called negation, not-being, or nihilation. Nothing is an abbreviated form of "not-anything". The nature of negation has been a difficult puzzle from the Pre-Socratic philosophers. Through nominalisation, negation seems to become an entity, "the not", and the ontological status of nothing becomes a problem. Parmenides claimed that not-being is unsayable. Plato suggested that not-being exists and means "other-than-being". Aristotle believed that not-being is what lacks any and every property. The dispute continued through medieval philosophy, which tried to connect nothingness, privation and evil. At the beginning of his *Logic*, Hegel proposed a dialectic of Being and Nothingness.

In contemporary philosophy, there are two quite different usages. Heidegger took "nothingness" (German: *das Nichts*) as a referring expression, denoting a special kind of subject-matter. We can experience nothingness, that is the experience that human existence has no ground and is meaningless. This experience is revealed in anxiety and culminates in the experience of death. Sartre distinguished between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The former is conscious being, especially human being, and the latter is the being of

### 标志图式

见“标志法”条。

### 不是

即那不是(不存在)的事物。巴门尼德认为,“不是”既不能被说,也不能被想,因为一切能说说能想都是“是”。他也相信赫拉克利特的观点,即一切事物都处于变化之中,等于是说一切事物即“是”又“不是”。这种说法只能产生意见,而不能产生真理。柏拉图论证说,形式或形相是真实的“是”,而可感世界作为现象则既“是”又“不是”。根据柏拉图在《智者篇》中的分析,“不是”既非绝对的无又非一类事物。事实上,它是“是”(存在)的缺乏,是“异于”或“不同于”——正面的规定或“是”。在普罗提诺的哲学中,“不是”乃指质料,处于现实等级的底层,并等同于纯被动、邪恶与黑暗。近代讨论倾向于跟随柏拉图,把“不是”看做是一否定事件,由否定命题表示。但如何避免由否定命题引起的对不存在的承诺,一直是一个争论不休的问题。如果“不是”是一个否定属性,难道我们不是得设法区分否定属性与肯定属性吗?“不是”一般当做是“无”的同义词。

“当我们说‘不是’时,我们似乎不是指那与存在物相反的东西,而是指与其不同的东西。”——柏拉图:《智者篇》,257b。

### 无

也叫作否定、不是或虚无。“无”是“并非任何东西”的缩写形式。自前苏格拉底的哲学家们以来,否定的性质就成了一个令人困惑的难题。通过命名或名词化,否定似乎成为了一个存在者,即“这个并非”;而无的存在论身份也就成了一个难题。巴门尼德声称,“不是”是不可说的。柏拉图则提议说,“不是”也存在着(exists),并且意味着“在存在之外”。亚里士多德相信“不是”缺少任何性质。这类争论贯穿了中世纪哲学,那时的人们试图将无、缺乏与邪恶联系起来。黑格尔在他的《小逻辑》开端,提出了一种是与无的辩证法。

在当代哲学中,对这个词有两种很不同的用法。海德格尔将“无”(德文为:*das Nichts*)当做一个指示一种特殊主题的指称表达式。我们能体验到无,即体验到人类生存的无根基和无〔现成〕意义的状态。这种体验在畏惧中透露出来,并在对死亡的体验中达到高峰。萨特区别了“为自身的存在”〔自为存在〕和“在自身中的存在”〔自在存在〕。前者是有意识的存在,特别是人类存在;后者则是世界中事物的存在,受制于

things in the world that are causally determined. Consciousness as being-for-itself is directed upon some object, but is also aware of itself as conscious of some object. Hence it presents a vacancy or gap between itself and its object, by which consciousness detaches itself from the rest of the world or being-in-itself and identifies itself by reference to the things which are other than itself. For Sartre, this gap is precisely what nothingness is, as an awareness of he-is-not-what-he-is or he-is-what-he-is-not. Hence, nothingness is the separation between itself and its object and is an implicit awareness of not-being-the-object. Sartre holds that this separation is the source of human freedom by causing human beings to choose what they will be rather than simply being. Consciousness is negation in itself because it cannot exist without a separation from its object. Human being, as the agent of consciousness, is the only being that can bring nothingness into the world. It takes a different view of being-in-the-world and modifies it. The awareness of nothingness results in feeling anguish, and an escape from anguish leads one to fall into bad faith. The conception of nothingness lies at the foundation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

On the other hand, Carnap rejects Heidegger's use of "nothing" as typical metaphysical nonsense. Nothing does not refer to anything, but simply marks the absence of an expected existent. For Carnap, Heidegger's question about nothing is a violation of logical syntax. It is generally held in analytic philosophy that nothingness is a pseudo-object which is invoked to fill the gap produced by insisting that every mental state is intentional in form. In modern logic, "nothing" is interpreted in terms of quantified sentences rather than as a designator of an object.

"We perceived then that Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of Being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called *négatités*."—Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr, Barnes), 1957, p. 22.

## Noumenon

[from Greek: *noein*, to think, hence the thing thought or the intelligible thing; plural: *noumena*] A thing as intelligible object or ultimate reality, in contrast to a *phenomenon*, which is a thing as it appears or is sensed. This ancient distinction was carefully explored in Plato's theory of ideas, But the term *noumenon* is especially associated with Kant. In his philosophy, *noumenon* is mainly used in a negative sense, as something which is beyond the limits of sensibility, intuition or experience, that is beyond the world of appearance. Hence, a *noumenon* is an unknown thing, employed to show the limits of possible knowledge, which is postulated by pure reason as a starting point for all scientific inquiries. Kant

因果律。作为“为了自身的存在”的意识指向某个对象,但也意识到自身乃是对某对象的认识。因此,这意识在它自身与其对象之间造成了一个空档,凭借此空档而使自身脱离开世界的其余部分或“在自身中的存在”,并在与那些不是其自身的东西的关联中得到自己的身份。对于萨特,这个空档正是“无”所意味的,也就是对于“他不是他所是”或“他是其所不是”的状态的意识。所以,无是自身与其对象的分离,并且是对于“不是此对象”状态的模糊意识。萨特认为这种分离是人类自由之源,迫使人类存在者们去选择他们将成为的状态,而不仅仅是一种〔现成的〕存在状态。意识是在自身中的否定,因为它不能不以其对象分离的方式生存。人类有意识,因而是能将无带入此世界的惟一存在者。萨特在此采取一种与〔海德格尔的〕“在此世界之中存在”不同的观点并修改了它。对于无的意识导致焦虑感,而逃避焦虑则导致自欺〔bad faith, 伪劣信念〕。无这个概念是萨特《有与无》〔或《存在与虚无》〕一书的基础。

另一方面,卡尔纳普将海德格尔对于“无”的使用当做典型的形而上学胡说来拒斥。无并不指涉任何东西,而只标志着某个被期待存在者的缺失。在卡尔纳普看来,海德格尔关于无的探求违反了逻辑语法。分析哲学中的普遍看法是:无是一种伪对象,来自要填充一种空档的企图;此空档则出自这样一种主张,即认定每个心的状态在形式上都是意向性的。在当代逻辑中,“无”通过量词化的语句而得到解释,并不被当做某个对象的指称者。

“我们于是知道,无既不能被视为外在于存在,又不是一个补充性的和抽象的观念,也不是一个存在被悬置起来后的无限背景。无必须在存在的中心处被给出,以使得我们能够理解那被我们称之为‘否定’的真实性所具有的特殊类型。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译),1957年,第22页。

## 本体

[源自希腊文 *noein*(思维),其意为“被思想的事物”,或“理智的事物”,复数是: *noumena*] 作为可理解对象或终极实在的事物,相对于现象,即“显现的或可感的事物”。这个区别古已有之,并在柏拉图的形式论中得到充分的讨论。但是“本体”( *noumenon* )一词特别与康德有关。在他的哲学中,本体主要用于消极的意义,即某种超越于感性、直观或经验界限的东西,即超越现象世界的东西。因此,本体是不可知之物,用于表明可能知识的界限。它只是纯粹理性设定以作为一切科学探究的起点。在康德看来,这样的设定作为人类自由的条件尤为必要。而且,我们

held that such a postulation is necessary as a condition of a human freedom. Also, if we attribute objectivity to the *noumenon*, we proceed from a logical form without content to an object necessarily existing in itself as an object of positive knowledge. For Kant, this is a dialectical error which leads inevitably to the errors of traditional metaphysics. *Noumenon* is sometimes used interchangeably with thing-in-itself, although each has its own emphasis.

“The concept of a noumenon—that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding—is not in any way contradictory.”—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B310.

### Nous

[Greek; intellect in general or in some aspect] Anaxagoras took *nous* to be a cosmic force separating elements from the primitive mixture and setting up the order of the world. Although not satisfied with the detailed explanation given by Anaxagoras, Socrates was inspired by this account. In his simile of the line, Plato took *nous* to be the highest level of intellect. In contrast to *dianoia* (discursive reasoning) which is concerned with mathematical reality and proceeds from hypotheses to a conclusion, *nous* is concerned with Forms and proceeds from hypotheses to the first principle from which everything else is deduced. Aristotle used *nous* in various senses: (1) general rational thought and understanding which is not distinguished from *dianoia*; (2) intuitive reasoning which grasps the first principles of demonstrative sciences, principles which are necessary and admit of no further justification; (3) practical *nous* which grasps the relevant features of particular cases, and is an element of practical reason; (4) active reason, which immediately grasps pure forms and is an eternal, divine intellect altogether separable from body, an account which conflicts with Aristotle's other views about soul.

“No other kind of thought except nous is more accurate than scientific knowledge.”—Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 100b8.

**Nuclear deterrence**, see deterrence

### Null class

A class or set of which nothing is a member. It is often symbolized by “ $\emptyset$ ” and is also called the null set or empty class. This is the smallest set possible. Logically, since sets are distinguished from one another by their members, only one null-class is possible. Since we tend to think of a set or class as a heap, the existence of the null class seems puzzling, but if we think of classes more abstractly the puzzle disappears.

“One of these concerns the null-class, i. e. the class

如果把客观性归于它,那么,我们就从一个没有内容的逻辑形式进展到一个必然地自在存在的对象,一个实证知识的对象。在康德看来,这是一种辩证的谬误,是不可避免地导致传统形而上学错误的根源。本体有时可与“物自体”交替使用,尽管它们分别有不同的侧重点。

“本体之概念——它关涉于不应被思考作是感性对象,而是只通过纯理智认作是物自身的东西——是绝无矛盾的概念。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B310。

### 努斯

[希腊文,指理智一般,或在某些方面的理智]阿那克萨戈拉把努斯当做一种宇宙力量,它从原初浑沌中将元素分离出来,并建立世界秩序。苏格拉底虽然对阿那克萨戈拉所提供的详细解释不甚满意,但却从中受到了启发。在其线段之喻中,柏拉图把努斯看做是理智的最高阶段,与 *dianoia*(推论理性)相对。*Dianoia* 关涉数学实在,从假设推至结论;而努斯则关注形式,从假设进展到第一原则,再从第一原则推出其他一切。亚里士多德在许多意义上使用努斯一词:(1)一般理性思想和理解,与 *dianoia* 不加区别;(2)直观推理,它把握证明科学的第一原则,即那些必然的,不必需要进一步说明的原则;(3)实践努斯,它把握特殊情形的相关特征,是实践理性的一个因素;(4)主动理性,它直接领悟纯形式,是一种可与肉体相分离的永恒的神圣的理智。不过,这一学说很难与亚里士多德关于灵魂的其他学说相调和。

“除了努斯外,没有其他思维比科学知识更精确。”——亚里士多德:《后分析》,100b8。

### 核威慑

见“威慑”条。

### 零类

没有元素的类或集合。常常以符号“ $\emptyset$ ”来表示,也常常称为零集或空类。这是可能的最小的集合。从逻辑上说,因为集合是以元素的数量而相互区别的,所以只能有一个零类。因为我们倾向于认为一个集合或类是一些东西的堆积,所以零类的存在似乎令人困惑,但如果我们更为抽象地想像类,则困惑就会消失。

“这些关心之一是零类,即没有元素组成的类,它是很难在纯外延的基础上处理的。”——

consisting of no members, which is difficult to deal with on a purely extensional basis.”—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 267.

### Nulla poena sine lege

[Latin; no punishment without law making it so] A principle that requires any determination of offence to be justified by appeal to clearly defined and preannounced laws. The grounds for imposing punishment on wrongdoers cannot be a discretionary matter, but must be according to expressed or expressible legal forms. Statutes must be clear in what they enjoin and forbid, so that the citizens have clear knowledge about how they should behave. An associate principle is *nullum crimen sine lege* (Latin: no crime without law making it so).

“*Nulla poena sine lege* is the battlecry (and translated with strict accuracy, let us not forget, it means ‘No punishment without a statute’).”—N. MacCormick, *H. L. A. Hart*, 1981, p. 132.

### Nullum crimen sine lege

[Latin, no crime without law making it so] A principle that conduct does not constitute a crime unless it has previously been declared to be criminal by the law. Anything that is not forbidden within a certain normative rule or system is permitted within that rule or system. Whatever is not prohibited is thereby *ipso facto* permitted. It is a rule about people’s freedom to act, which is also called the principle of legality. If a judge creates new offences in order to punish morally objectionable or harmful acts, he violates this principle. The principle is associated with the rule *nulla poena sine lege* (Latin: no punishment without law making it so).

“A *nullum crimen* [*sine lege*] rule permitting all not-forbidden acts and forbearances may or may not occur within a given normative order.”—von Wright, *Norm and Action*, 1963, p. 87.

### Number

Philosophical issues arise over the ontological status of numbers. The Greek Pythagoreans discovered relationships of ratio and proportion among natural numbers and even considered number to be the first principle which determines the structure of the world. The tendency of contemporary philosophy of mathematics to identify numbers with sets has led to the revival of Platonism in mathematics. The traditional position holds that numbers are used to answer questions of the form “How many X’s are there?” and, hence, that a number is a property ascribed to an object or group of objects. This view was rejected by Frege who argued that a number-statement ascribes a property to concepts rather than to objects. Hence a number is a second-level predicate rather

罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第267页。

### 非根据法律不得惩罚

[拉丁文,从字义上讲就是“不是法律认可的犯罪就不得惩罚”]它指的是这样一条原则,即要求对任何犯罪行为的判决都要通过诉诸明确规定的并且是事先宣布的法律而被证明是公正的。对犯罪之人施加惩罚的根据不能是任意的事,而必须依据表达出的或可表达的法律形式。法规对其所禁止的事情必须是明确的,以使公民清楚地知道他们应怎样行为。与此相关的原则是 *nullum crimen sine lege* (拉丁文:不是法律认可的犯罪就不是犯罪)。

“非根据法律不得惩罚是这样口号(将其严格准确地翻译过来,我们不要忘记,它的意思就是‘没有法规不能惩罚’)。”——麦考密克:《H. L. A. 哈特》,1981年,第132页。

### 非根据法律不得判罪

[拉丁文,不是法律认可的犯罪就不是犯罪]它指的是这样一条原则,即一个行为除非以前已被法律宣布为犯罪,否则它不构成犯罪。任何事情,只要不是在某一规范的法律规则或法律制度中被禁止,它就是为那种法律规则或法律制度所允许的。不禁止的也就是实际上允许的。这是有关人的行动自由的一条准则,它也被称作合法性原则。如果一个法官为了惩罚道德上的有害或伤害行为而提出新的违法行为,他就违背了这一原则。与此相关的原则是 *nulla poena sine lege* (拉丁文:非根据法律不得惩罚)。

“在一个既定的规范的制度中,[非根据法律]不得判罪的准则允许所有非禁止的行为,宽容也许会发生,也许不会发生。”——冯·赖特:《规范与行为》,1963年,第87页。

### 数

有关数的本体论地位引起许多哲学问题。希腊毕达哥拉斯学派发现了自然数中的比率和比例间的联系,甚至认为数是决定世界结构的第一原则。当代数学哲学把数与集合相等同的趋向导致了柏拉图主义在数学中的复兴。传统的观点认为,数是用来回答“有多少X存在”这类问题的,因此,数是归属于一个对象或一组对象的特性。弗雷格反对这一观点,认为一个数陈述是将特性归属于概念,而不是归属于对象。因此,数是二阶谓词,而不是一阶谓词。在这一基础上,弗雷格推论说,存在像数一样,也是概念的特性而不是对象的特性。

“一个数的陈述内容乃是一种关于一个概

than a first-level predicate. On this basis, Frege inferred that existence, like number, is a property of concepts rather than of objects.

“The content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept.”—Frege, *The Foundation of Arithmetic*, Sec. 54.

### Numinous

[from Latin: *numin*, a spirit inhabiting a natural object or phenomenon, filling it with a sense of divine presence] A term introduced by the German philosopher of religion Rudolf Otto. Otto claimed that the term holy is used both in a religious and an ethical sense and suggested that we need a term simply for the part of the meaning of holy which is distinct from absolute moral goodness. He put forward the numinous as term to designate the awe-inspiring and overpowering object of human religious experience. The numinous has been understood as a distinguishing feature of religion. Although the experience of the numinous is meant to characterise religion in isolation from moral sense, it is a matter of dispute whether a distinction between the numinous and other aspects of the holy is tenable. In a related secular sense, the numinous appeals to the high emotions or aesthetic sense.

“For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin *numen*. Omen has given us ‘ominous’, and there is no reason why from *numen* we should not similarly form a word ‘numinous’.”—Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, 1950, p. 7.

念的断定。”——弗雷格：《算术的基础》，54节。

### 圣秘

[源自拉丁词, *numin*, 居于一自然对象或现象中的精灵, 赋予事物或现象以神圣呈现的意义] 这个术语是由德国宗教哲学家鲁道夫·奥托引入的。奥托认为, “神圣”一词既用于它的宗教意义, 也用于它的伦理意义, 他提议, 我们应该用一个新词, 单纯指称与绝对的道德善区别的“神圣”一词的那部分意义。他提出“圣秘”一词, 用于指人类宗教体验的庄严和超力量的对象。圣秘被理解为宗教的一个特殊特征。虽然圣秘的体验意味着排除道德含义, 仅具宗教特征, 但圣秘和其他方面的神圣之间的区分是否站得住脚, 是个有争议的问题。在相对世俗的意义上, 圣秘求助于高尚情感和美学含义。

“为此目的, 我采用一个由拉丁语 *numen* 造出的词。既然 *omen* (预兆) 给了我们 ‘ominous’ (预兆的), 我们为什么没有理由从 *numen* 同样地构成 ‘numinous’ 一词呢。”——奥托:《神圣观念》, 1950年, 第7页。

## O

*Obiter dictum*, see *ratio decidendi*

## Object

[German: *Gegenstand*] A generic term for whatever is the bearer of a proper name, or whatever can be referred to or designated, approximately identical with "thing". Objects can be distinguished from their properties and relations and also from subjects. Physical objects are real, but there are also unreal objects such as phantoms or images. Unlike physical objects, abstract objects are not spatiotemporal. Intentional objects are objects of mental states, like desire or hope, and need not exist. Objects are often recognised in ontology as the most basic entities, although some recent arguments have rejected the priority of objects in favour of events.

For Wittgenstein objects are the constituents of states of affairs or atomic facts, and thus form the substance of the world. Every object contains in its nature all the possibilities of combining with other objects. In themselves, objects are simple and unchanging. What changes is the combination or separation of objects (the complex objects). In this way objects are related to the atoms of ancient atomism. Objects are correlated to the simple names which constitute propositions. The simple names are discovered through logical analysis and are the terminus of such analysis.

"A name means an object. The object is its meaning."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3. 203.

## Object language

Russell developed the notion of a hierarchy of languages. The language of the lowest order, in which symbol and vocabulary are not determined by the logical conditions, is called the object language or primary language. This is the language with which we talk about extra-linguistic things and objects. It applies object-words and studying it involves the relation between sentences and non-linguistic occurrences. Any given ordinary language is an object language. It is so called, in contrast to higher order languages which deal not with objects, but with the lower order languages. Tarski takes the notion of an object language and contrasts it with metalanguage, in which we talk about an object language.

"I call this the 'object language', or the 'primary language'. In this language, every word 'denotes' or

## 附带意见

见“判决理由”条

## 对象

[德文 *Gegenstand*] 对任何作为专名的承担者, 或可以被指称、被命名的东西的一般称呼, 与“事物”十分相近。对象可以区别于其特性和关系, 也可以区别于主体。物理对象是实在的, 但也有不实在的对象, 例如幽灵或心象。抽象对象与物理对象不同, 不具有时空性。意向对象是心的状态的对象, 如欲望或希望, 是不需存在的。对象常常被认为是在本体论中最基本的实体, 虽然近来有些论证否认对象的优先性而宁守要事件。

对维特根斯坦而言, 对象是事态或原子事实的组成部分, 从而成为世界的实体。每个对象在其本性中包含与其他对象结合的全部可能性。就其自身而言, 对象是简单的、不变的。变化的是对象的结合或分离(复合对象)。这样, 对象与古代原子论中的原子有关。对象与构成命题的简单名称相关。简单名称通过逻辑分析而发现, 是分析的最终产物。

“名称意指对象。对象是其意义。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》, 3. 203。

## 对象语言

罗素提出了语言分层的观念。最底层的语言, 其中的符号和词汇并不由逻辑条件所决定, 叫做对象语言或初阶语言。这是我们用以谈论语言之外的事物和对象的语言。它应用对象语词, 对它的研究涉及到语句和非语言事件之间的关系。任何给定的日常语言都是对象语言。之所以如此称呼它, 是为了与不处理对象、而处理较低阶语言的更高阶语言相对照。塔斯基提出了对象语言的概念, 并将其与元语言(我们用其谈论对象语言)相比较。

“我把这叫做‘对象语言’或‘初阶语言’。在这一语言内, 每一个词都‘指示’或‘意谓’某个可感知的对象或此类对象的集合; 并且当单独使用时, 每一个词都断定了它所指示或意谓的

'means' a sensible object or set of such objects; and when used alone, asserts the sensible presence of the object, or of one of the set of objects, which it denotes or means."—Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 20.

**Object sentence**, see pseudo-object sentence

### Object words

Object words indicate the presence of what they mean through indicating something that one can point to, such as "cat", "France", and so on. In contrast, syntax words are words such as "or", "not", "than", "but", which do not indicate anything one can point to, but can only be defined verbally in terms of other syntax words.

"Some words denote objects, others express characteristics of our belief attitude; the former are object-words, the latter syntax-words."—Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 521.

### Objective knowledge

Popper's term for linguistically formulated theories which form the constituents of his "World 3". Knowledge in this sense is man-made but transcends its origins and has various properties and relationships independent of any subject's awareness of them. In Popper's view, it contrasts with subjective knowledge, which is a dispositional expectation or anticipation of relevant impending events and is a kind of adaptation to the environment. The study of subjective knowledge belongs to psychology. Popper claimed that this distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is ignored in traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology views knowledge as justified true belief or as perception, and hence limits knowledge to the utterances or expressions of the knowing subject. This is the source of many difficulties in traditional epistemology, especially its justificationism.

"The traditional theories of knowledge (from Plato's *Theaetetus* to Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*) fail to make a clear distinction between objective and subjective knowledge."—Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (ed. Schilpp), 1974, p. 1028.

### Objective particulars

Strawson's term for particulars which are not the private occurrences or states or conditions of oneself or anyone else, but rather are the actual or possible public objects of experience or states of consciousness. These particulars are reidentifiable in speaker-hearer identification. Objective particulars, which Strawson also calls public particulars, contrast to private particulars, that is sensations, mental events or sense-data in general.

"I shall henceforth use the phrase, 'objective

某个对象或对象集合中某个元素的可感知的出现。"——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第20页。

### 对象语句

见“伪对象语句”条。

### 对象词

对象词通过指示人们可以指向的某物,例如“猫”、“法国”等等而指出它们所意味的东西的存在。与之相对的是句法词,如“或”、“并非”、“比之于”、“但是”,它们不指任何人可以指向的东西,而只能通过其他句法词作字面上的定义。

“有些词指对象,其他的词表示我们信念态度的特征,前者为对象词,后者为句法词。”——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第521页。

### 客观知识

波普的术语,指用语言系统表述的理论,它们构成他的“世界3”的成分。这种意义上的知识是人创造的,但却超越其起源,具有各种独立于主体对它们的认识的性质和关系。在波普看来,与之对立的“主观知识”是一种对于相关的即将发生事件的倾向性期望或预期,是一种对于环境的适应。主观知识的研究属于心理学。波普认为客观知识和主观知识之间的区别在传统认识论中被忽视了,因为传统认识论把知识看做是得到证明的真的信念或感知,因而把知识仅限于认识主体的表达或表述。这是传统认识论、尤其是其证明主义中许多困难的根源。

“传统的知识论(从柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》到维特根斯坦的《论确定性》)未能在客观知识和主观知识间作出明确区分。”——波普:《K.波普的哲学》(希耳普编),1974年,第1028页。

### 客观殊相

斯特劳森以此术语指称这样一类殊相,它们不是自己或其他某人的私人的事件或状态或条件,而是现实的或可能的公共经验对象或意识状态。这些殊相是可以在说者—听者的认同中得到再辨认的。客观殊相相对于私人殊相,即一般性的感觉、心的事件或感觉资料。斯特劳森也把它们叫做公共殊相。

“我将以‘客观殊相’这一术语作为‘为思想者所区分的殊相’这一术语的缩写。”——斯特

particulars' as an abbreviation of the entire phrase, 'particulars distinguished by the thinker, etc.'—Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 61.

## Objectivism

The contrast between objectivism and subjectivism is a central and recurring feature of philosophy. Objectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are determined by external objects and their relations independent of our minds, while subjectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are relative to our minds. The contrast between these two positions is presented differently in different areas of philosophy. Objectivist metaphysics claims that the external world exists without regard to our minds, while subjectivist metaphysics claims that the world exists only insofar as it exists for us. Objectivist epistemology holds that the source and validity of knowledge are derived from external objects, while subjectivist epistemology claims that the source and validity of knowledge are derived primarily from our sensibility and our ability to form conceptions. Both naturalist and anti-naturalist varieties of objectivist ethics suggest that ethical properties and values exist independent of our belief and desires, while subjectivist ethics proposes that ethical judgements cannot be judged true or false according to an objective standard, but are rather the expression of our emotions or feelings. Objectivist aesthetics holds that aesthetic properties are inherent in things, while subjectivist aesthetics claims that they are projected by us upon the objects. Subjectivism is associated with anti-realism and idealism, while objectivism is associated with realism. However, objectivism is not identical with materialism, for it can be held in either materialist or idealist form.

“[T]he objectivism of the natural sciences tries to view them [social complexes] from the outside; it treats social phenomena not as something of which the human mind is a part and the principles of whose organisation we can reconstruct from the familiar parts, but as if they were objects directly perceived by us as a whole.”—Hayek, in O'Neill, *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, 1973, p. 44.

## Objectivity

Belonging to objects and not to ourselves as subjects; also, beliefs or perceptions which are not limited or distorted by the bias or partiality. Objectivity can be contrasted with subjectivity and with a lack of objectivity. We can be objective in determining beliefs, and our judgements themselves can be objective. In spite of the dangers, we often use our assessment of the person judging to guide our determination of the objectivity of the judgement. A commitment to objectivity is a general mark of intellectual integrity, according to which one respects the virtue of truth and seeks valid and unbiased theories, explanations and judgements. A theory or

劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第61页。

## 客观主义

客观主义和主观主义的对立是哲学的一个主要的和反复出现的特征。客观主义的理论认为,真理和谬误是由独立于我们的心的外在对象及其关系决定的;而主观主义的理论则认为,真理和谬误是同我们的心相关的。这两种观点的对立在哲学的不同领域有不同的表现。客观主义的形而上学主张外在世界的存在与我们的心的无关,主观主义的形而上学则主张世界仅仅是为我们而存在的。客观主义的认识论认为知识的源泉和正确性来自外部对象,而主观主义的认识论则认为知识的源泉和正确性主要是来自我们的感觉和我们形成概念的能力。各种客观主义的伦理学,无论是自然主义的还是反自然主义的,都提出道德的特性和价值的存在不依赖于我们的信念和愿望;主观主义的伦理学则提出,道德判断不能根据客观标准来判定对错,而只能根据我们感情或感觉的表达来判定对错。客观主义的美学认为,美的特性是事物固有的;主观主义的美学则认为,美的特性是我们赋予对象的。主观主义是与反实在论和观念主义相联系的,客观主义则是与实在论相联系的。不过,客观主义并不等同于唯物主义,因为它既有唯物主义的形式,又有唯心主义的形式。

“自然科学的客观主义试图从外部来观察它们[社会复杂现象];它不是把社会现象看做在某种意义上是这样一种现象,即人的心是其中一个部分,其组织原则我们可以从熟知的部分加以重构,而是把它们看做仿佛是我们直接看到的作为一个整体的对象。”——海耶克,载于奥尼尔编辑的《个人主义的模式和集体主义的模式》,1973年,第44页。

## 客观性

客观性从属于对象,而不从属于作为主体的我们自身。客观性也从属于不受偏见或偏好的限制或歪曲的信念或感觉。客观性可与主观性和缺少客观性相对照。我们对信念的确定可以是客观的,我们的判断本身也可以是客观的。我们常常是不顾危险而用我们对人的判断的评价去指导我们对判断的客观性的确定。对客观性的赞成是诚实的智力活动的一般标志,为此,人们尊重真理的功效,追求正确公正的理论、解释和判断。一个理论或一个判断,如果与外部事实相符或能够通过合理的方式被确定为真或

judgement is objective if it corresponds to external facts or can be determined to be true or false by rational means. Sometimes these two senses are related because a theory can be rationally judged because it conforms to facts, but more often a theory is abstract and idealised and does not correspond directly or sensibly to any facts. In this case, a theory is regarded as objective if it can be justified rationally, with agreement available or expected from all reasonable persons. The primary task of a theory should be to explain the sort of objectivity which is possible for it and to state the conditions which would justify its rational acceptance. Moreover, a sound account of rationality is required to enable us to achieve the objectivity of theories and judgements through overcoming partiality, arbitrariness, relativity and bias and to assess the objectivity of people. Because personal and social intention and prejudice are indispensably involved in many fields, the possibility of objectivity in history and ethics, for example, has been an issue of dispute.

"We might explain the objectivity of a judgement that  $p$  as follows. There exists knowledge  $k$  such that everyone with this knowledge agrees that  $p$  is true (and expects that anyone else with this knowledge would agree that  $p$  is true and would have this very same expectation), while there is no further knowledge which, when added to  $k$ , undercuts the agreement that  $p$ ."—R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 728.

### Objectual quantifier

Quine distinguishes two interpretations of the quantifier, the objectual quantifier and the substitutional quantifier. He, along with Davidson, endorses the objectual quantifier interpretation, according to which one should interpret a quantifier in terms of the values of the variables and the objects over which the variables range. For example,  $(x)Fx$  is interpreted as "For all objects  $x$  in the domain  $D$ ,  $Fx$ ". According to the substitutional quantifier interpretation one should interpret a quantifier by appealing to substituends rather than values of the variables, that is, the expressions that can be substituted for the variables. On this view,  $(x)Fx$  is interpreted to be "All substitution instances of  $F\dots$  are true". These two interpretations involve some different consequences. For example, the substitutional interpretation of the quantifier says that the truth of quantified formulae can be directly defined by the truth of their substituted atomic formulae, but this is not admitted by the objectual interpretation.

"The Q-quantifiers are called 'objectual'. The reason is that whether or not a quantification is true upon an interpretation depends on how things are with the objects in the domain of interpretation."—Sainsbury, *Logical Form*, 1991, p. 197.

伪,就是客观的。有时这两种意义上的客观性是相联系的,因为一种理论可被合理地判断是由于它与事实相符,但更多的情况是,一种理论是抽象的和观念化的,不与任何事实直接地或明显地相符。在后一种情况下,一种理论,如果它能合理地证明为正确的,并可得到或期望得到所有有理性的人的同意,它就被视为是客观的。一种理论的首要任务应是说明那种对其是可能的客观性,并阐明那些可以证明它在理性上可被接受的条件。此外,对合理性的正确说明也是需要的,从而使我们能够通过克服不公正、专断、相对性和偏见而取得理论和判断的客观性,并能对人们的客观性做出评价。由于个人及社会的意向和偏见不可避免地卷入许多领域,客观性是否可能一直是一个争论的问题,例如,在历史学和伦理学中就是如此。

"我们可以对一个判断  $p$  的客观性解释如下:存在着知识  $k$ ,以致每一具有这一知识的人都同意  $p$  这一判断是真的(而且期望其他具有这一知识的人也会同意  $p$  这一判断是真的并会有与这极为相同的期望),同时也不存在进一步的、在对  $k$  做出补充时会从根本上损害同意判断  $p$  的知识。"——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第728页。

### 对象量词

奎因区分了关于量词的解释:对象量词和替换量词。他与戴维森一道,赞成对象量词解释,根据这一解释,人们应该根据变元的值和变元值域中的那些对象来解释量词。例如,  $(x)Fx$  被解释为"对论域  $D$  中的所有对象  $x$ ,  $Fx$ "。根据替换量词解释,人们应该通过诉诸替换例而不是变元的值,也就是凭借能够用来替换变元的那些表达式来解释量词。按这种观点,  $(x)Fx$  被解释为" $F\dots\dots$ 的所有替换例是真的"。这两种解释包含某些不同的后果。例如,量词的替换解释说:量化公式的真能够直接用其被替换的原子公式的真来定义,而量词的对象解释则不允许这样做。

"Q-量词叫做'对象的',其理由是:量化命题根据一解释是否为真,取决于事物是如何与解释域中的对象相关的。"——塞斯伯里:《逻辑形式》,1991年,第197页。

## Obligation

[from Latin: *obligare*, to bind one to something] Generally, something we are required to do arising from some circumstance, such as having signed a contract or having made a promise. Duty is also something we are required to do, but generally because of some social or other role that we occupy. In Kant's ethics, an obligation is the general dependence of the human will upon the moral law, while duty is the necessity of acting from obligation. Obligation informs not only duty but also rights. Many philosophers, however, use obligation and duty interchangeably as a determination of what ought to be done.

"The connexion between duties and the demands of others comes out clearly in the fact that we use the word 'obligation' as a synonym for 'duty'."—Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 200.

## Obligationes

[Latin: the conditions under which the parties to a dispute agree to proceed] A form of disputation adopted in medieval universities from the early thirteenth century. It involved a respondent and an opponent. The opponent was obliged to make the respondent concede or deny his initial propositions. On the basis of Aristotle's discussion of form of debate in *Topics* and *De Sophistic Elenchis*, medieval logicians engaged in various studies concerning the rules of *obligationes*. Normally, the rules were characterised in terms of the feature of constructive counterfactual reasoning.

"Obligationes are obligations assumed by a party to a disputation, or conditions within which such a discussion must be conducted."—Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 1962, p. 234.

**Oblique intention**, see direct intention

## Observation language

Many philosophers divide the language of each branch of the sciences into observation language and theoretical language. Observation language is directly related to sense-impressions and can be analysed in the standard empirical way. It is characterised by observability, explicit definability and extensionality. Theoretical language, on the other hand, is not directly related to sense experience, but talks about unobservable properties and events (e. g. atoms, electrons) which are also called theoretical constructs or hypothetical constructs. The terms an observation language employs are called observational terms, and those employed by theoretical language are called theoretical terms. One major issue in the methodology of science is about the relationship between the two kinds of languages. Should theoretical language be translated and replaced by observation language? How can it

## 义务

[源自拉丁文 *obligare*, 把某人与某物捆在一起]它一般意指某种我们在某些情况下被要求去做的事情, 诸如对已签订的合同, 已作出的诺言要履行。职责也是某种我们被要求去做的事情, 但一般是出于人们所担任的某种社会的或其他的角色。在康德伦理学中, 义务是指人类意志对道德法则的一般性依赖, 而职责是出于义务的行为必然性。义务不仅表示职责也表示权利。然而, 对大多数哲学家来说, 义务和职责可交替使用, 都是指对应该做的事情的规定。

"职责和他人的要求之间的联系清楚地表现于这种事实: 我们把'义务'用作'职责'的同义词。"——诺威尔-史密斯:《伦理学》, 1954年, 第200页。

## 尽责

[拉丁词, 争辩的双方同意按此进行的条件]中世纪的大学所采用的一种辩论形式, 始于13世纪早期。它包括一位应答者和一位反对者。反对者迫使应答者赞成或反对他最初提出的命题。以亚里士多德在《正位篇》和《驳诡辩》中提出的对辩论形式的讨论为基础, 中世纪逻辑学家们致力于尽责规则的多种研究。通常来说, 这些规则具有建构反事实推理的特征。

"所谓尽责, 是参加辩论的一方所承担的责任, 或者是这种讨论必须得以在其中进行的条件。"——W. 涅尔和 M. 涅尔:《逻辑学的发展》, 1962年, 第234页。

## 间接意图

见"直接意图"条。

## 观察语言

许多哲学家都把每一科学分支的语言分为观察语言和理论语言。观察语言直接与感觉印象相联系, 可以用标准的经验方法加以分析。它通常被刻画为可观察性、明确的可定义性和可扩延性。另一方面, 理论语言则不是直接与感觉经验相联, 而是谈论不可观察的特性和事件(例如原子, 电子), 这些也被称作"理论构造物"或"假设的构造物"。观察语言使用的术语被称作"观察术语", 而理论语言使用的术语则被称作"理论术语"。科学方法论的一个主要问题就是讨论这两种语言之间的关系。理论语言应该翻译和替代为观察语言吗? 这如何能够做到? 我们怎能知道理论语言是有意义的? 理论术语所指称的东西的本体论地位是什么? 对这些问题一直存在各种讨论。参见"双语模型"、"克雷格定

be done? How can we know that theoretical language is meaningful? What is the ontological status of an item to which a theoretical expression refers? Various discussions have taken place about these issues. See also double language model, Craig's theorem, Ramsey sentence, correspondence rules.

"The observation language uses terms designating observable properties and relations for the description of observable things or events."—Carnap, in *Minnesota Studies of the Philosophy Of Science*, I, 1956, p. 65.

**Observation proposition**, see basic proposition or protocol sentence

### Observation sentence

Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. An occasion sentence is a report about observation, sense-data or stimulations, but its acceptance relies on the circumstances of its utterance. If an occasion sentence is assented to or dissented from consistently in response to the same stimulation, it is an observation sentence. The verdict of its truth and falsity depends only on present sensory stimulation, although certain stored information which is implied in the expression of the sentence itself is inevitably relevant to determining whether it is true. Hence, an observation sentence is not private, but must be acceptable by the speech community. All speakers of a language give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation. Observation sentences correspond to the protocol sentences of logical positivism, which offered an influential account of the foundations of empirical knowledge. Critics deny that protocol sentences are the basis of empirical knowledge, either because they lack the possibility of being true or false or because empirical knowledge does not need foundations.

"A sentence . . . is an observation sentence if all verdicts on it depend on present sensory stimulation and on no stored information beyond what goes into understanding the sentence."—Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 77.

### Observation term

Empiricist philosophy of science has commonly divides the language of science into theoretical language, concerning unobservable entities, properties and relations, and observation language, concerning items, like sense impressions, which are claimed to be observable, although "observation" in this sense covers perception, sensation and even introspection. Observation terms are employed in this observation language to refer to observable items. Each observation term has an explicit and determinate extension and can be displayed in a limited model. According to proponents of this

理”、“拉姆塞语句”、“对应规则”。

“观察语言使用术语指称可观察的特性和关系,用于描述可观察的事物或事件。”——卡尔纳普,载《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第一卷,1956年,第65页。

### 观察命题

见“基本命题”或“记录语句”条。

### 观察句子

观察句子是“场合句子”的子集。一个场合句子是对观察、感觉材料或刺激的报道,但对它的接受则依赖于说出它的环境。如果一个场合句子在对相同刺激的反应中前后一致地得到赞同或反对,那么它就是一个观察句子。对其真假的裁决完全取决于眼下的感觉刺激,尽管蕴涵在这个句子自身表达式中的某个储存的信息不可避免地与其确定它是否为真有关。因此,观察句子不是私人的,而必须是可以为言语共同体所接受的。当同时出现了相同的刺激,所有使用这个语言的人都会做出相同的裁决。观察句子对应于逻辑实证主义的“记录语句”,而逻辑实证主义则提出了对经验知识基础的有力论述。批评者们否认记录语句是经验知识的基础,或是因为这些句子欠缺被判定为真假的可能性,或是因为经验知识不需要基础。

“一个句子……是一个观察句子,是由于对它的所有裁决都依赖于眼下的感觉刺激,而任何储存的信息都没有超出对这个句子的理解。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性及其他论文》,1969年,第77页。

### 观察术语

经验主义的科学哲学通常把科学的语言划分为理论语言和观察语言,前者涉及观察不到的存在物、特性和关系,后者涉及的是像感觉印象这样的被认为是可观察得到的东西,虽然这种意义上的“观察”包括感觉、知觉甚至内省。在这种观察语言中,观察术语被用来指可观察得到的东西。每一观察术语都有清晰确定的扩展范围,并可在一个限定的模式中展现。在这一观点的支持者看来,观察术语大多是通过实指获得的,它们的意义是由于它们的对象的出现而

view, observation terms are learned mostly by ostension, with their meaning reinforced by the presence of their objects, with any questions of context or definition irrelevant to understanding them. Observation terms are widely applied to publicly observable bodies as well as to private sensory states. Observation terms can be directly analysed empirically. In contrast to observation terms, theoretical terms are employed by theoretical language to refer to unobservable or theoretical entities and their features. Philosophers of science disagree whether all theoretical terms can be eliminated from a theory, that is, whether they can be translated into or replaced by observation terms. Some philosophers claim that the distinction between observation terms and theoretical terms cannot be maintained because all terms are theory-laden.

“In regard to an observational term it is possible, under suitable circumstances, to decide by means of direct observation whether the term does or does not apply to a given situation.”—Hempel, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. I, 1958, p. 42.

## Obversion

In traditional logic, an immediate inference which derives a conclusion from another proposition by negating its predicate term and changing its quality either from affirmative to negative or from negative to affirmative. The conclusion, called the obverse, is a logical equivalent of the premise, called the obvertend. All four forms of proposition in traditional logic can be validly obversed: “All *s* are *p*” is obversed into “No *s* are non-*p*”; “No *s* are *p*” into “All *s* are non-*p*”; “Some *s* are *p*” into “Some *s* are not non-*p*”; and “Some *s* are not *p*” into “Some *s* are non-*p*”.

“Obversion is a process of immediate inference in which the inferred proposition (or obverse), while retaining the original subject, has for its predicate the contradictory of the predicate of the original proposition (or obvertend).”—Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 133.

## Occasion sentence

Quine's term, for sentences whose meanings are relative to their context and which contain indexical words, for example, “It is snowing” or “It is Thursday”. They are true on some occasions of utterance, and false on others. Whether such a sentence is acceptable depends on the background. We should only assent to these sentences when it is indeed snowing or Thursday. The sentence “It is snowing” is more observational than “It is Thursday”. Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. If all speakers assent to an occasion sentence in response to the same stimulations, then it is an observation sentence. Occasion sentences are directly connected with sensory stimulations and are contrasted to standing sentences which are not relative to context and

得到加强,以及有关语境的问题或与理解它们无关的定义获得的。观察术语被广泛地应用于明显可观察得到的物体以及个人的感觉状况。观察术语可直接做经验的分析。相对观察术语而言,理论术语被理论语言用来指观察不到的或假设的存在物及其特征。科学哲学家对是否所有的理论术语都能被从理论中清除,即它们是否能被转化为观察术语或被观察术语所取代,持有不同意见。一些哲学家认为,观察术语和理论术语之间的区分不能维持,因为所有的术语都充满理论。

“就一个观察术语而言,有可能在适当的情况下,通过直接观察的方法来决定这一术语是否适用于一个给定的条件。”——亨佩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第二卷,1958年,第42页。

## 换质

传统逻辑中从另一命题导出结论命题的直接推理,其办法是否定原命题的谓词,并将其性质由肯定变为否定或者由否定变为肯定。结论(叫做“换质命题”)是前提(叫做“被换质命题”)的逻辑等值命题。传统逻辑中所有四种命题形式都可以有效地换质:“所有 *s* 是 *p*”被换质为“没有 *s* 是非 *p*”;“没有 *s* 是 *p*”换质为“所有 *s* 是非 *p*”;“有些 *s* 是 *p*”换质为“有些 *s* 不是非 *p*”;“有些 *s* 不是 *p*”换质为“有些 *s* 是非 *p*”。

“换质是一直接推理过程,其中推出命题(或换质命题)仍保留原有主词,而以原命题(或被换质命题)谓词的矛盾作为它的谓词。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第133页。

## 场合句子

奎因的术语,是指其意义与语境有关并带有索引词的句子。例如,“下雪了”或“今天是星期二”。它们在某些被说出的场合是真的,而在另一些场合则是假的。是否能够接受这种句子取决于背景。当的确下雪了或是星期二时,我们才能同意这些句子。“下雪了”这个句子比“今天是星期二”更具有观察性。“观察句子”是场合句子的一个子集。如果所有的说者对相同的刺激都赞同某个场合句子,那么它就是一个观察句子。场合句子直接关系到感觉刺激,它与“标准句子”相反,而标准句子则与语境无关,是经常并永远会得到赞同的。标准句子是对常识说法的分析或陈述,例如“雪是白的”。

which have assent always and all the time. Standing sentences are either analytic or statements of a common-sense truism, for example, "Snow is white".

"We must concentrate on occasion sentences. These, as opposed to standing sentences, are sentences whose truth value changes from occasion to occasion, so that a fresh verdict has to be promoted each time."—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 25.

### Occasionalism

A doctrine developed by Descartes' disciple Malebranche as a solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem. He claimed that the two completely distinct substances, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, can causally interact with each other because of the miraculous intervention of God. God regulates the world so that our volitions are followed by bodily movements, and conversely that certain patterns of bodily movements give rise to appropriate emotions and sensations in the mind. The so-called natural causes are actually occasions on which God acts to produce the effects which usually accompany the natural causes. There is no real causation in the finite created world, no real efficacy of finite causes. Only an infinite substance can be a genuine cause of anything at all. Occasionalism maintained mechanical explanation by grounding it outside the limits of physics proper. This provided a new metaphysical framework. This theory was criticised by its contemporary critic Leibniz who replaced it with his own theory of pre-established harmony.

"The occasionalists were a group of 17th century philosophers who maintained that human volitions never really cause bodily movements but are only the occasions for divine intervention in the physical world."—Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 277.

### Ockham's razor

A methodological principle in theory construction associated with the medieval philosopher William of Ockham, although Aristotle suggested it in his criticism of Plato's theory of ideas. The principle states that one should not posit the existence of more entities than are absolutely necessary for adequate philosophical explanation. Accordingly, if two or more theories have the same explanatory force, the one which makes use of the fewest assumptions and explanatory principles should be chosen, other things being equal. Common formulations of this principle are "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" or "Plurality is never to be posited without need" (Latin: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitate*). But this is the invention of the seventeenth century rather than Ockham's own formulation, which was "It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer". Simplicity is the spirit of this principle. The term Ockham's razor was introduced by Sir William Hamil-

"我们必须关注场合句子。与标准句子相反,这些句子的真值是随场合而变化的,因而每次都要求一种新的裁决。"——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第25页。

### 偶因论

由笛卡尔的信徒马勒伯朗士发展出的一个学说,用作解决笛卡尔的心—身问题的一个办法。马勒伯朗士主张,两个完全不同的实体,思维的东西和广延的东西,可以因上帝的奇异干预而互相发生因果作用。上帝对世界进行调节,使得我们的意志有肉体活动跟随,而且反过来,某种方式的肉体活动也在心中引起适当的情绪和感觉。所谓自然的原因实际上是上帝对之发生作用以产生出结果来的偶因,这些结果通常伴随着自然的原因。在有限的被造世界上没有真正的因果关系,没有有限原因的真正效应。只有一个无限的实体才能完全成为任何事物的真正原因。偶因论坚持机械论的说明方式,而将它的根据建立在物理学自身界限之外。这样就提供了一个新的形而上学框架。这个理论遭到了同时代的批评家莱布尼茨的批判,莱布尼茨用自己的前定和谐理论来取代它。

"偶因论者是一批17世纪的哲学家,他们坚持认为,人类意志从未实际引起身体的运动,它们只是神干预物理世界的偶然原因。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第277页。

### 奥康剃刀

理论构造中的一条方法论原则,与中世纪哲学家奥康的威廉的名字连在一起,尽管亚里士多德在批评柏拉图的形相论时提到过它。这一原则陈述说,人们不应设定比合适的哲学解释所绝对必需的实体更多的实体。相应地,在具有同等解释力的两个或多个理论中,人们应该选择使用了最少的假定和解释原则的那个理论,假如其他情况都相同的话。这一原则的通行表述是"除非必要,勿增实体"或"若无必要,绝不设定多样性"(拉丁语: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitate*)。但这是17世纪的发明,而不是奥康本人的表述。他只是说:"用较多的东西去做用较少的东西能够做的事情,是无意义的。"简单性是这一原则的精髓。"奥康剃刀"一词是由威廉·汉密尔顿爵士引入的,他把它等同于所谓的节俭原则("自然从不用比所需要的更复杂的工具去工作")。奥康剃刀亦称"简

ton, who identified it with the so-called principle of parsimony; nature never works by more complex instruments than are necessary. Ockham's razor is also called the principle of simplicity or the principle of economy, and has wide application in metaphysical debates.

"Ockham's razor counsels us against an unnecessary luxuriance of principles or laws or statements of existence."—Smart, *Essays Metaphysical and Moral*, 1987, p. 38.

### Oedipus complex

In Greek myth, Oedipus, acting according to his destiny, killed his father and married his mother. Freud claimed that in the mental life of a male child there is desire for his mother as a sexual object and hatred for his father as a rival. He calls this pattern the "Oedipus Complex" and claims that it is a central factor in the child's experience of his relations to his parents and in his later sexual development. Because the Oedipus Complex can lead to later neuroses, Freud sought access to the feelings, images and relations characterising the complex in dealing with later problems. The complex itself presents a fundamental tension between sexual drive and the submission to the parental authority. It is also claimed to be a source of religion, society, morals and arts. In girls, the complex is allegedly manifested is a wish to take the mother's place. Moving beyond the complex in a child is meant to allow acceptance of the value of one's parents. The dissolution of the complex in society provides defence of authority.

"In the very earliest years of childhood (approximately between the ages of two and five) a convergence of the sexual impulses occurs of which, in the case of boys, the object is the mother. This choice of an object, in conjunction with a corresponding attitude of rivalry and hostility towards the father, provides the content of what is known as the Oedipus Complex, which is of the greatest importance in determining the final shape of his erotic life."—Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 18, p. 245.

**Offence**, see harm

### Oligarchy

[from Greek: *oligos*, few or small] Literally, rule by the few, but for Plato a state ruled by the rich, maybe because the rich are the few most likely to dominate a state. In the *Republic*, oligarchy is the second stage in the degeneration of the Ideal State, the first stage being timocracy or rule by the spirited rather than the rational element. Oligarchy is dominated by the appetite for money-making, and the unity of the state is fragile because of conflict between the poor and

单性原则"或"经济原则",并且在形而上学论战中有广泛应用。

"奥康剃刀忠告我们勿在使用原则或规律或存在陈述方面不必要的奢侈。"——斯马特:《形而上学与道德文集》,1987年,第38页。

### 俄狄浦斯情结

在古希腊神话中,俄狄浦斯在其命运支配下,杀父娶母。弗洛伊德声称在男孩子的心灵生活中,有以其母亲为性对象的欲望,并将其父当做情敌来憎恨。他将这种心态样式叫做"俄狄浦斯情结",认为它是孩子与其父母的关系以及他后来的性发展中的一个中心事实。由于俄狄浦斯情结会导致后来发生的精神病,弗洛伊德在对付这些问题时寻求了解这情结特有的感情、形象和关系。这情结本身造成了性冲动和屈从父母权威之间的基本张力。它也被认为是宗教、社会、伦理和艺术的一个来源。在女孩子中,这种情结被说成是表现于要取代其母亲的位置的愿望。一个孩子超出这情结就意味着承认其家长的重要性。在社会中,此情结的消解就意味着对于权威的护持。

"在儿童期的最少年头(大约2岁至5岁),出现了性冲动的会聚。就男孩子说来,其对象是母亲。这种对象的选择,加上相应的对父亲的竞争敌意态度,提供了所谓俄狄浦斯情结的内容。它在决定这个孩子性生活的最后形态上是最重要的。"——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第十八卷,第245页。

### 冒犯

见"伤害"条。

### 寡头政制

[源自希腊文,*oligos*,少或小]从字面上讲,寡头政制就是少数人的统治,但在柏拉图看来,它指的是富人统治的国家,这也许是因为统治一个国家的富人最可能是少数人。在柏拉图的《国家篇》中,寡头政制是理想国家退化中的第二阶段,第一阶段是尊荣政制,或者说是被情绪的而不是被合理的因素所统治的阶级。寡头政制被发财的欲望所支配,而且由于穷人和富人

the rich. Parallel to this state, the oligarchic man also lacks internal harmony. He is dominated by the desire for money, and his reason and spirits are forced to work only in the interests of money. Oligarchy is more unjust and more miserable than timocracy and will further degenerate into democracy and tyranny.

“Oligarchy is of necessity not one city but two, one of the poor and the other of the rich, living in the same place and always plotting against each other.”—Plato, *Republic*, 551d.

### Omnipotence

[from Latin: *omnis*, all + *potens*, powerful] One of the chief divine attributes. By being all powerful, God has infinite or maximal power and is the ruler of everything. The notion of an all powerful being has given rise to many logical impossibilities, called the paradoxes of omnipotence. Can God create a rock so large that he cannot move it? If he cannot, he is not omnipotent because there are limits on what he can create. If he can, he is not omnipotent, because there are limits on what he can move. Other questions leading to paradox include “Can God’s deny God’s essence?”, “Can God lie?”, “Can God sin?”. Some philosophers try to redefine the notion of omnipotence in order to avoid such problems. A deeper philosophical problem emerges from combining divine omnipotence, omniscience and goodness. How are the claims that God is all powerful, all knowing and perfectly good compatible with the existence of evil? None of the many responses to this question, such as the claim that evil is due to the fall of the first man or the claim that God permits evil as a means of purifying the soul, has won general approval, but belief in God is often enhanced rather than diminished through experience of evil in the world.

“Theists have often wished to claim that God is omnipotent, that is, literally, can do anything.”—R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 149.

### Omniscience

[from Latin: *omnis*, all + *sciens*, present participle of *scire*, to know] One of the chief divine attributes, according to which God is all knowing or has unlimited knowledge. This attribute gives rise to the paradox of God’s omniscience, a perennial problem concerning freedom of the will. This paradox has two versions. The first concerns God’s omniscience and human freedom. If every future thing happens exactly as God knows it will happen, how is there room for human freedom of the will? This version of the paradox has led philosophers to examine whether God’s foreknowledge of a future human act implies that the human agent lacks control over the act or is not responsible for it. Another version of the paradox concerns God’s omniscience and his own free will. If everything occurs according to complete divine fore-

的冲突,国家的统一很脆弱。与这一情况相伴,寡头统治者也缺少内在的和谐。他为金钱的欲望所支配,他的理性和情绪被驱使着只是为金钱去工作。寡头政制比尊崇政制更不公正、更悲惨,它将进而退化到民主政制,然后是僭主政制。

“寡头政制的城邦必然不是一个而是两个,一个是富人的城邦,一个是穷人的城邦,它们生活在同一个地方,总是在互相阴谋反对对方。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》,551d.

### 全能

[源自拉丁语 *omnis*(全部)和 *potens*(力量的)]主要的神性之一。所谓全能,指上帝具有无限的或最大的力量,是万物的统治者。全能存在的观念引起了许多逻辑上的不可能性,即所谓的全能悖论。上帝能够创造出一块大得他不能移动的岩石吗?如果不能,他就不是全能的,因为他能创造的东西有限;如果能,他也不是全能的,因为他能移动的东西有限。导致悖论的其他问题包括“上帝能否否定上帝的本质吗?”“上帝能躺卧吗?”“上帝能犯罪吗?”有些哲学家企图重新界定全能观念,以便避开这样的问题。一个更深层次的哲学问题源于神的全能、全知和善的结合。上帝全能、全知和全善的断言如何与邪恶的存在不矛盾?对这个问题,有许多种回答,譬如认为邪恶是由于第一个人的堕落,或认为上帝容许邪恶作为净化灵魂的一种手段,但是,没有一种回答赢得普遍赞同,不过,人们在世上经验到恶,只是增进而不是减少对上帝的信仰。

“有神论者经常愿意主张上帝全能,从字面上讲,即上帝能做任何事情。”——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第149页。

### 全知

[源自拉丁语, *omnis*(全部)和 *sciens*(*scire*的现在分词,知道)]主要的神性之一。根据这个属性,上帝知道一切,或有无限的知识。这个属性引出了上帝的全知悖论,关于意志自由的一个永恒的问题。这个悖论有两种形式。其一是关于上帝的全知与人类的自由。如果每个将来的事物都恰好好像上帝知道它将发生的那样发生,人类的意志自由如何有存在的空间?悖论的这个形式导致哲学家们考察上帝对未来的人类行为的预知是否意味着人类行为者缺乏对行为的控制力或不应对它负责任。这个悖论的另一种形式是关于上帝的全知与他自己的自由意志。如果每物都按照完全的神圣预知发生,上帝怎么能够行使他自己的自由意志?如果上帝被认

knowledge, how can God exercise his own free will? Another problem concerning the scope of divine foreknowledge arises if God is held to have no sensory organs and to exist outside time. It is difficult to understand how God in these circumstances could have knowledge of material and temporal things.

“Traditionally, God is said to be omniscient, to know all things.”—R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 162.

**On**, Greek: the participle of being

## One

[Greek: *hen*] Many Greek philosophers argued that their first principles, no matter whether they are one or many, must be at one with themselves and form a unity. Aristotle discussed various meanings of the term one in *Metaphysics*, book 5. Things might be called one because of accidental features or by their own nature. Of things that are called one in terms of their nature, they might be continuous, have the same substratum, have the same genus or share the same definition. Things can also be one in number, in species or in genus. Plotinus called his absolute transcendent first principle the One, and identified it with the Good or God. It is the power behind everything, the source of the Divine Mind and Souls (Forms), although the One itself is neither Mind nor Soul. It is beyond being, for if it is a being, it must be describable by a predicate, and that would involve duality and compromise its unity. Therefore, the One can only be understood negatively and is beyond the reach of our thought or language. It is the simple object of intuitive knowledge. Plotinus' One is based on the Good in Plato's *Republic*, and prepared the way for the development of negative theology.

“Everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind.”—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1016b23.

## One over many

We can apply one predicate to many different things. How can they be related in this way? According to Plato, a common description suggests that there is a common intrinsic feature of nature shared by these different things which determines their real existence. This common nature is one and the same and stands over many particular things. This is Plato's “one over many principle”. He called the one common nature Form or Idea and declared that Ideas are objects independent of our minds and that each of the many particulars imitates or participates in their Idea. Ideas are objects of knowledge, while particulars are objects of opinion. The central aim of Plato's Theory of Ideas is to argue for this principle and to deal with various difficulties arising from it.

为是无感官的,存在于时间之外的,则产生了神圣预知的范围的问题。很难理解上帝在这些情况中如何能够具有关于物质的和时间性事物的知识。

“在传统上,上帝被说成全知的,即知道一切东西。”——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第162页。

## 是

希腊词,“是(being)”的分词。

## 一

[希腊语是 *hen*]许多希腊哲学家都认为,他们的第一原则必定是自身一致的、统一的,无论它们是一还是多。亚里士多德在《形而上学》第五卷中讨论了“一”这个词的不同含义。事物由于偶性或由于自身本性都可被称为一。由于自身本性而被称为一的事物,原因又有多种,可能因其是连续的,或有相同的载体,或有相同的属,或分有相同的定义等等。事物也能在数目上、种上或属上是一。普罗提诺把他那个绝对超验的第一本原称为“太一”,并将它与善或神同一。它是万物背后的力量,是“神圣心智”和“灵魂”(“形式”)的根源,虽然“太一”自身既不是“心智”,也不是“灵魂”。它是超存在的,因为如果它是一个存在,就必定可被术语描述,而这会陷入二元性,损害它的元一性。所以,“太一”只能被否定地理解,并超越于我们的思想或语言所能达到的范围。它是直觉知识的单一对象。普罗提诺的“太一”,以柏拉图《国家篇》中的“善”为基础,为否定神学的发展开辟了道路。

“无论在何处,一在数量上或种类上都是不可分的。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1016b23。

## 多上之一

我们可以把同一谓词应用于许多不同的事物。它们如何能以这一方式相连?根据柏拉图的解释,一个共同的解释表明有一个共同的自然特征存在;这一特征为许多事物所分有,并决定了它们的真实存在。这一共同本性是单一的,居于许多特殊事物之上。这便是柏拉图的“多上之一”的原则”。他把这一共同性质叫做“形式”或“形相”,并认为它们是独立于我们心灵的对象,而许多殊相中的每一个则模仿或分有形相。形相是知识的对象,而殊相是意见的对象。柏拉图“形相论”的中心目的是要论证这一原则,并处理由此而引起的种种困难。这些困难后来变成了争论不已的“殊相与共相关系问题”。关于这

These difficulties have become the problem of the relation between universals and particulars. The discussion of this problem forms one of the chief issues in Western metaphysics, although it is closely linked to logical questions about meaning and predication. The one over many problem is also called the one-many problem, but this latter expression is also used to ask whether the substance of the world is one or many in the debate between monism and pluralism.

“Those who say that the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form.”—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1040b28-30.

**One-many problem**, see one over many

### Ontico-ontological distinction

Heidegger's distinction, concerning two levels of analysis of *Dasein*. The ontic level is concerned with the concrete, specific and local matter of *Dasein*, i. e. the factual matter open to observation, which Heidegger calls *existentiell*. The ontological level is, on the other hand, concerned with the deep structure that underlies and instantialises the ontical or *existentiell* matter and provides a phenomenological description. This deep structure is called by Heidegger *existentiale*. *Dasein* has three main *existentiales*, i. e. existentiality, facticity and fallingness. The problems of traditional metaphysics confuse these two levels by taking Being as entity. Heidegger's own fundamental ontology is both ontical, that is the analysis of the actual existence of *Dasein*, and ontological, that is the analysis of the general conditions of possibility for existence. This is because *Dasein* itself is both ontical (as an entity), and ontological (the only entity that can ask the question of Being). In these terms, his thought contrasts with Husserl's phenomenology, which brackets the phenomenon.

“By indicating *Dasein's* ontico-ontological priority in this provisional manner, we have grounded our demonstration that the question of Being is ontico-ontologically distinctive.”—Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, pp. 34-5.

### Ontological argument

One of the most celebrated arguments attempting to prove the existence of God. It was first formulated in the eleventh century by Anselm of Canterbury in *Proslogion*. The argument assumes that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. If he is thus, God must exist in our understanding. But if he exists in the understanding only and does not exist in reality, a being which is greater than

一问题的讨论构成了西方形而上学的一个主要议题,而且它与关于意义和谓词的逻辑问题密切相关。“多上之一”的问题也叫“——多问题”。不过后一表述还用于在一元论与多元论之间的辩论中询问世界的本体是一还是多。

“那些说形式存在的人,在一方面是对的,即认为形式是分离的存在,如果它们是本体的话;可在另一方面则不对了,因为他们说形式是多上之一。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1040b28-30。

### ——多问题

见“多上之一”条。

**存在者的与存在论的区别**〔或译“本体的与本体论的区别”〕

海德格尔对于缘在(*Dasein*)分析的两个层次的区别。存在者的(ontic)层次涉及缘在的具体的、特殊的和局部的方面,即可观察到的事实的方面。海德格尔称之为“生存者的”(Existenziell, 英文为 existentiell)。另一方面,存在论的层次涉及位于存在者或生存者方面之下的深层结构,提供现象学的描述,这个深层结构被海德格尔称为“生存论性质”(Existenzial, 英译为 existenziale)。缘在有三种主要的生存论性质:生存性、实际性和沉沦性。传统形而上学的问题在于混淆了这两个层次,将存在当做了存在者。海德格尔自己的基础存在论既是存在者的,即对于缘在实际生存的分析,也是存在论的,即对于生存可能性的一般条件的分析。这是因为缘在本身既是存在者的(作为一个存在者),又是存在论的(能追问存在问题的惟一存在者)。因此,他的主张与胡塞尔的将〔存在〕现象置入括弧之内〔即悬置掉存在问题〕的现象学相反。

“以这种先行引导的方式,我们显示出了缘在在存在者与存在论上的优先地位;因此从根本上支持了这样一个证明,即存在问题在存在者与存在论上是有区别的。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第34-35页。

### 本体论论证

试图证明上帝存在的最有名的论证之一。它是11世纪时,由坎特伯雷的安瑟尔谟在他的《宣讲》中第一次系统讲述的。该论证假定,上帝是一个能被设想的无与伦比的伟大存在。如果上帝果真如此,就必定存在于我们的理解中。但如果他仅存在于我们的理解中而不存在于现实中,就可设想出一个比上帝还伟大的存在,即既

God is conceivable, namely a being which exists both in our understanding and in reality. But since it is a premise of the argument that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is contradictory and logically impossible for us to conceive a being which is greater than God. Therefore, God must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality.

Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm, and later figures such as Descartes sought to reject the ontological argument by asserting that similar arguments could prove the existence of absurd things, such as the greatest possible island. Anselm replied that in talking about a thing so great that nothing greater could be conceived, he was making a logical point about greatness rather than a factual point about different kinds of things.

Kant proposed the most important objection to the ontological argument with his claim that existence is not a predicate. His view is a major topic of discussion in contemporary philosophical logic.

Few philosophers are convinced by the ontological argument, but many find it difficult to overcome. Today there are both opponents and defenders of the argument, and many new versions have been elaborated, with some relying on recent developments in modal logic. The American philosopher A. Plantinga argues in this way. It is possible for there to be a being that has maximal greatness. Therefore, a possible being in some world  $w$  has maximal greatness. A being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence in every world. A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in that world. If a being has maximal excellence in every world, it has maximal excellence in this world. If a being has maximal excellence in this world, then it has omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection in this world. But these are the attributes of God, and if a being has these attributes in this world, then that being is God.

The ontological argument is so fascinating because it leads into many significant philosophical questions, such as "Is existence a property?", "Can there be existential propositions that are necessarily true?" and "In what sense of 'is' can we say that something does not exist?". The modern versions are more plausible if entities retain their identity across worlds, but are less persuasive if terms designate counterparts from one world to another or if possible worlds and their contents are understood as descriptions rather than as real objects of reference. If these and many other problems are not solved, a proper analysis of the ontological argument will continue to elude us.

"Because of the crucial role which the concept of existence or being plays in this argument it has been called the Ontological Argument."—C. J. F. Williams, *What is Existence*, p. 17.

存在于我们的理解中又存在于现实中的一个存在。但是,既然论证的前提是上帝乃能被设想的无与伦比的一个伟大存在,那么,我们设想一个比上帝还伟大的存在就是矛盾的,在逻辑上是不可能的。所以,上帝必定不仅存在于理解中,而且也存在于现实中。

安瑟尔谟的当代人高尼罗,以及后来的笛卡尔等人,通过断定同样的论证也能证明荒唐事物的存在(譬如最大可能的岛屿),力图反驳本体论论证。安瑟尔谟回答说,在谈论一物如此之大,以至于无能能被设想为与之伦比时,他指的是关于大的逻辑点,而不是关于不同种类事物的事实点。

康德以他存在不是一个谓词的主张提出了对本体论论证的最为重要的反驳。他的观点是当代哲学逻辑讨论的一个主要论题。

很少有哲学家信服本体论论证,但许多哲学家发现,克服它却不容易。在当今,既有该论证的反对者,也有辩护者,而且,又出现了不少新的表述,有些表述以模态逻辑的新近发展为依靠。美国哲学家 A. 普兰汀格就是以这种方式论证的。一个极度伟大的存在是有可能的。所以,在某个世界  $w$  中,有一个可能的极度伟大的存在。在一个给定世界中具有极度伟大的存在,仅当它在每一世界中都极度优秀。一个在给定世界中具有极度优秀的存在,仅当它在那个世界具有全知、全能和道德的完美。如果一个存在在每个世界都极度优秀,它在这个世界也极度优秀。如果一个存在在这个世界极度优秀,那么,它在这个世界就具有全知、全能和道德的完美。但是,这些都是上帝的属性,而且,如果一个存在在这个世界具有这些属性,那么,那个存在就是上帝。

本体论论证之所以如此具有魅力,是因为它引入了许多有意义的哲学问题,譬如,"存在是一种特性吗?" "能有必然真的存在命题吗?" "在'是'的什么意义上,我们能够说某物不存在?" 现代的各种说法更具可能性,如果实体在不同世界中能保持同一的话,但却更不令人信服,如果术语指称从一个世界到另一个世界的摹本,或如果可能世界及其内容被理解作是描绘而非指称的实在对象的话。如果这些以及许多的其他问题得不到解决,我们将依然达不到对于本体论论证的真切分析。

"由于存在概念在这个论证中所起的决定性作用,它被称为本体论论证。"——威廉姆斯:《什么是存在》,第 17 页。

## Ontological commitment

The use of language commits us to the existence of external objects, for example saying "Pegasus has wings", carries a commitment to the existence of Pegasus. A person's ontology consists of the set of objects which he takes to exist, that is, which he takes to make up the furniture of the world. Theories differ according to what objects they posit as existing in the world. Ontology is the answer to the question "what is there?" Determining which answer is right amounts to determining what ontological commitments are acceptable. We are thus faced with the problem of finding a criterion for ontological commitment. The famous criterion put forward by Quine, is that a theory is committed to those objects which must exist if it is true. A theory is committed to the existence of entities of a certain kind if and only if they must be counted among the values of its bound variables of quantification in order for the theory to be true. This criterion is a development of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Its major significance is to show that when a singular term occurs in a true statement, it does not automatically warrant an assertion that the term refers to something real or existent.

"If what we want is a standard for our own guidance in appraising the ontological commitments of one or another of our theories, and in altering those commitments by revision of our theory, then the criterion at hand well suits our purpose."—Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 105.

**Ontological guilt**, another expression for anguish

## Ontological relativity

One of Quine's main doctrines, which holds that there are no absolute facts according to which we may determine the ontological commitments of a theory. There is no determinate answer either to the question "what is there?" or to the question "what objects is one really talking about?". The ontological imports of a theory can only make sense relative to a translation or an interpretation of some background theory or language; and this background theory is itself relative to some further translation of it into another theory. An ontological question, if taken absolutely, is meaningless. To answer "what is F", we have to say "An F is a G". But then we can ask: "what is G?". We always need further terms in relation to which we can again ask or answer questions. The regress can only be stopped when we ultimately accept some background theory at face value. Hence, a full interpretation of a theory is nothing more than a complete translation of the theory into another theory, using our manual of translation which is essentially inscrutable and indeterminate. This relativity thesis is a radical departure from a basic assumption

## 本体论的承诺

使用了语言我们就承诺了外在对象的存在。例如,当我们说“柏伽索斯有双翼”时,我们就会相信存在一个柏伽索斯。某人的本体论是由他视为存在的一些对象构成的,就是说,他把它们看做是组成世界的内容。各种理论正是根据它们认为存在于世界上的对象而千差万别的。本体论是对“何物存在?”这个问题的回答。决定哪一种回答是正确的,也就是决定可以接受什么样的本体论承诺。我们因而面临着发现本体论承诺标准的问题。由奎因提出的著名标准是,如果一个理论是真的,那么它就承诺了必定存在某些对象,也就是说,一个理论承诺了某种实体的存在,当且仅当在使这个理论为真的量化的约束变项值中,这些实体必须是可数的。这个标准是对罗素限定摹状词理论的发展,其主要意义在于,它表明,当单个词出现在真的陈述中时,它并不自动地保证它指称了某个实在的或存在的东西。

“如果我们需要的是一种标准,它能引导我们评价我们这个或那个理论的本体论承诺,并通过修正我们的理论而改变这些承诺,那么这里的标准就非常适合我们的目的。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第105页。

## 存在论之罪感

“焦虑”的另一种表达。

## 本体论的相对性

奎因的主要理论之一,它认为不存在这样的绝对事实,根据这一事实我们可以决定一个理论的本体论承诺。对“何物存在”或“人们实际上谈论的对象是什么”这种问题,不存在任何决定性的答案。一种理论的本体论地位只有相对于对某种背景理论或语言的解释或翻译才有意义;而背景理论本身也是相对于把它进一步翻译为另一种理论。绝对地谈论本体论问题是无意义的。如果要回答“F是什么?”我们就得说“一个F是一个G”。但我们于是就会问“G是什么?”我们总是需要对能够再次提出或回答的问题做出进一步的说明。而只有当我们最终接受了某种背景理论作为价值取向时,这种无穷后退才会停止。因而,对一种理论的完整解释,不过是使用我们基本上无法理解的和不确定的翻译手册,把这种理论全部翻译为另一种理论。这种相对性论题完全背离了包括卡尔纳普和维特根斯坦等许多分析哲学家所持的一种基本假定,他们认为,我们从一开始就可以绝对地谈论

which many analytic philosophers, including Carnap and the early Wittgenstein, held, namely that we can start with absolute talk about the structure, meaning, or content of linguistic expressions. Ontological relativity implies not only that reality itself is indeterminate, but also that the conceptual import of our language in talking about reality is similarly incomplete and indeterminate. Carnap's distinction between external questions which deal with linguistic structures and internal questions which deal with facts, collapses over this thesis, for external questions themselves become relative and factual.

"Paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary, then, is our only recourse; and such is ontological relativity."—Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 54.

## Ontology

[from Greek: *logos*, theory + *ont*, being] The Latin term *ontologia* was introduced in the seventeenth century for a branch of metaphysics to be distinguished from other branches, namely rational theology, rational cosmology and rational psychology. Christian Wolff did much to gain acceptance for the term. As the theoretical or general part of metaphysics and as the general theory of being, ontology is often used for metaphysics as a whole. Ontology deals with the essential characteristics of being itself (of Aristotle's being *qua* being), and asks the questions such as "What is or what exists?", "What kind of thing exists primarily?" and "How are different kinds of being related to one another?". The investigation of the meaning of being began with Parmenides and received a systematic discussion in Aristotle. In this century, Heidegger and Quine have taken completely different approaches to ontology. Heidegger asks what character Being must have if human consciousness is to be what it is. Quine proposes his maxim "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" to determine what things a theory claims to exist. His doctrine of ontological relativity suggests that what we can take to exist is relative to the theory and language that we bring to the situation.

"... the general thought of an intimate connection between logic and ontology or metaphysics has run like a thread, one of many threads, right through the history of philosophy, from Aristotle to the present."—Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics*, 1992, p. 37.

**Open concept**, see open-texture

## Open sentence

A formula which has one or more free variables, in contrast to a closed sentence which is a formula that has no free variable. When the variables in an open sentence are replaced

结构、意义或语言表达式的内容。本体论的相对性不仅表明实在本身是不确定的,而且表明我们的语言在谈论实在时的概念意义同样是不完整的、不确定的。这个论题推翻了卡尔纳普对涉及语言结构的“外部问题”和涉及事实的“内部问题”的区分,因为外部问题本身也是相对的、有关事实的。

“于是,某些先前熟悉的词汇中的词义,就成了我们的惟一依靠;这就是本体论的相对性。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性及其他论文》1969年,第54页。

## 本体论

[源自希腊文:*logos*(理论)和 *ont*(是,或存在)] [严格地说,应译做“是论”或“存在论”。]在17世纪,学者们创造了拉丁词“*ontologia*”,指称形而上学的一分支,以区别于其他分支,即理性神学,理性宇宙论和理性心理学。C. 沃尔夫为这一术语的盛行作了不少贡献。作为形而上学的一般性的或理论性的部分,作为关于“是”的一般理论,本体论常常用以指整个形而上学。本体论关注“是”自身(即亚里士多德的作为“是”的“是”)的本质特性,其主要的问题包括“什么是‘是’或什么存在?”“什么样的事物在第一意义上存在?”以及“不同种类的‘是’如何互相联系?”对“是”的意义的研究始于巴门尼德,在亚里士多德哲学中得到了系统的讨论。在本世纪,海德格尔和奎因采取了极不相同的本体论研究方式。海德格尔问如果人类意识具有所“是”的本质,“是”必须具有什么特征。奎因提出其格言“‘是’即一约束变项的值”来决定一个理论可确定其存在的是何事物。他的本体相对性主张表明,我们可以认为存在的事物相对于我们引入当下环境中的理论和语言。

“关于逻辑与本体论或形而上学之间密切关系的普遍思想,就像千丝聚一线,横穿从亚里士多德至今的整个哲学史。”——斯特劳森:《分析与形而上学》,1992年,第37页。

## 开放概念

见“开放性”条。

## 开语句

开语句是含一个或多个自由变元的公式,与作为不含自由变元的公式的闭语句形成对照。当开语句中的这些变元被普通表达式所替

by ordinary expressions, it becomes a genuine or closed sentence. For instance, "X is mortal" is an open sentence. If we replace "X" with "Socrates", we have a closed sentence "Socrates is mortal". Open sentences are sentential or propositional functions rather than sentences or propositions themselves, and hence are neither true nor false. An open sentence is true or false according to the values of its variables. The extension of an open sentence is the class of all the objects of which the open sentences is true. A closed sentence, on the other hand, has a truth-value and is actually a statement.

"Expressions such as 'X is a book', 'X=X', 'X is a man'  $\supset$  'X is mortal', which are like statements except for containing 'X' without a quantifier, are called 'open sentences'."—Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1952, p. 90.

### Open society

The distinction between an open society and a closed society was first proposed by Bergson, but Popper gave the term its current importance. Member of an open society are autonomous individuals who can decide on the basis of their own intelligence what to do. Members compete fairly for social positions. In contrast, a closed society is authoritarian or totalitarian, and its members do not have a free choice over what to do. A closed society is supported by an ideology which functions like a magical taboo, while an open society is rational and critical. Liberal democratic society is an example of an open society, while the Platonic ideal state is a typical closed society.

"The magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society; the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society."—Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 1, 1945, p. 173.

### Open-question argument

Moore's argument against naturalism in *Principia Ethica*. Naturalism, in his understanding, defines "good" or other ethical terms by reference to natural or non-ethical qualities. If such a procedure were right, he argues, then the statement that what is F (some natural property) is good would be identical with the statement that whatever F is F. But this is not the case. For whatever F is F is a tautology and its denial involves self-contradiction. That what is F is good, on the other hand, remains open to question. Whatever natural properties a naturalist uses to define "good", we can still ask, "Are these natural properties good?". A negative answer to such a question will not involve self-contradiction. Hence this kind of statement is not really a definition of "good", and naturalism is wrong. Moore claims that "good" is indefinable. This argument is a subject of controversy, for it is not generally accepted that the definition of an ethical term must be analytic. The nature of definition more general-

代时,它就成为一个真正的语句或闭语句。举例来说,"X是有死的"是一开语句。如果我们用"苏格拉底"替换X,我们就得到一闭语句"苏格拉底是有死的"。开语句是语句或命题函项,而不是语句或命题本身,所以既不真也不假。开语句根据它的变元的值为真或为假,并且它的外延是使该开语句为真的所有那些对象的类。另一方面,闭语句有真值并且实际上是一陈述。

"像'X是一本书', 'X=X', 'X是人' $\supset$ 'X是有死的'这样的表达式,除含有'X'而不含量词外,它们类似于陈述,叫做'开语句'。"——奎因:《逻辑方法》,1952年,第90页。

### 开放社会

对开放社会和封闭社会的区分首先是由柏格森提出的,但波普赋予开放社会这一术语以现时的重要性。一个开放社会的成员是自主的个人,他们可以基于自己的理智决定做什么。成员们公平地竞争社会地位。与此相反,封闭社会是独裁主义的或极权主义的,它的成员不能自由选择做什么。封闭社会靠意识形态支持,后者的作用类似巫术的禁忌,而开放社会则是理性的和批判的。自由民主社会是开放社会的样板,而柏拉图的理想国则是典型的封闭社会。

"神秘的或部族的或集体主义的社会也可称为封闭社会;而每个人都面临个人决定的社会则称为开放社会。"——波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》,第一卷,1945年,第173页。

### 未决问题论证

摩尔在他的《伦理学原理》中反对自然主义的论证。摩尔理解的自然主义是参照自然或非伦理的性质来定义"善"和其他伦理概念的。他认为,如果这样一种方法是正确的,那称作F(F代表自然特性)的东西是善这样一种陈述就与"不论什么F都是F"的陈述相等。但情形并不是如此。因为"不论什么F是F"是一同义反复,它的否定涉及到自我矛盾。另一方面,那什么F是善,仍然是未决问题。一个自然主义者不论用什么自然特性来定义"善",我们仍然可以问,"这些自然特性是善吗?"对于这种问题的否定回答并不涉及到自相矛盾。因此,这种陈述并不真正回答是"善"的定义,因此自然主义是错的。摩尔宣称"善"是不可定义的。这个论证引起不少争论,因为一个伦理词的定义必须是可分析的这样一种观点并不被普遍接受。更普遍的是,在评论这个论证中,对这种定义的性质产

ly can be called into question in assessing the argument.

“Moore’s most important suggestion was the proposal of what has been called the ‘open question’ test or criterion for sameness of meaning.”—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 164.

### Open-texture

A term introduced by Friedrich Waismann in his paper “Verifiability” (1945) for an unavoidable feature of empirical terms or statements. An empirical term, no matter how precise its core meaning, faces unlimited uncertainties of meaning when its dominant reference is extended or when it is employed in different contexts. The number of possible conditions in which it may be used is infinite. In the face of such open-texture, Waismann concluded that no final verifiability is available for empirical statements. Open-texture is the possibility of vagueness, because vagueness arises when a word is actually used in a fluctuating way while open texture exists because there are always possible gaps in determining the meaning of a term. The term is used widely in legal philosophy for the particular cases in which a legal rule, although having a core of settled meaning, is unclear regarding what it prescribes or prohibits. No clean-cut conceptual boundary is provided in these cases, and consequently general legal rules are limited in their capacity to determine decisions and must be supplemented by judicial discretion. H. L. A. Hart took this feature of legal rules as an instrument for the criticism of legal formalism.

The notion of an open concept, which is derived from open texture, is a concept which has an incomplete intension and needs to be modified in order to deal with unforeseen situations. It does not admit of a precise definition. The necessary and sufficient conditions of its application are not fixed. An open concept is not a vague concept but is the basis of the possibility of vagueness. Such concepts can be extended or modified, but they cannot be replaced by concepts that are not open. All concepts displaying what Wittgenstein called family resemblance are open concepts.

“Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness.”—Waismann, in Flew (ed.), *Logic and Language* (first series), 1963, p. 120.

### Operational definition

A definition of a theoretical terms formed by constructing a set of performable operations or activities. A conception of an object is the sum of our ideas of the observable consequences of this object disclosed by operations. This idea can be traced back to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and is a type of definition articulated by Bridgman as the central doctrine of operationism. A scientific term can be meaningful only when it can be defined operationally. The claim, to a certain extent, is a generalisation of the working practice of scien-

生了疑问。

“摩尔的最重要的意见是提出被称作‘未决问题’的检验标准或意义相同的标准。”——布朗特：*伦理理论*，1959年，第164页。

### 开放性

F. 魏斯曼在他的《可证实性》(1945)一文中提出的一个术语，以表示经验术语或陈述的一个不可避免的特征。一个经验术语，无论它的核心意思是多么准确，在它的主要指称被扩大时，或在它被用于不同的语境中时，都会面临无限的意义不确定。它被用于的可能的条件是无数的。面对这一开放性特征，魏斯曼断定，对经验陈述而言，最终的可证实性是得不到的。开放性就是含糊性的可能性，因为含糊性是在一个词实际上是以一种不确定的方式使用时出现的，而开放性的存在是由于在确定一个术语的意义时总存在可能的空白。这一术语在法哲学中被广泛用来指称这样的特殊情况，即一条法规尽管具有意义确定的核心内容，但就它规定的东西或禁止的东西而言又是不清楚的。在这些情况下不能提供明晰的概念界定，因而，一般的法规在确定判决的能力上受到限制，必须为法官的斟酌处理所补充。H. L. A. 哈特把法规的这一特征作为批判法律形式主义的一个武器。

对开放概念的见解来自开放性，它指的是一个概念其意义是不完整的，为了处理意料不到的情况就需要对它做修改。它不承认精确的定义。它适用的必要的和充分的条件是不固定的。一个开放的概念不是一个含混的概念，但却是可能造成含混的基础。这样的概念可以被扩展或修改，但不能被非开放的概念所取代。所有展示维特根斯坦所说的家族相似的概念都是开放的概念。

“开放性是与含混的可能性相类似的东西。”——魏斯曼，见弗留(编)：*逻辑和语言》*第一辑，1963年，第120页。

### 操作定义

通过构造一组可实行的操作或活动所形成的理论术语的定义。一个对象的概念，是我们通过操作所揭示的关于这个对象的可观察结果观念之和。这一观念可以追溯到皮尔士的实用主义格言，而作为一类定义，则由布里奇曼把它表述为其操作主义的核心主张。一个科学术语仅当它被操作地定义时才是有意义的，这一观念在某种程度上是对科学家工作实践的概括。

“操作定义是借助于观察术语以限定理论

tists.

“[O]perational definitions [are] statements specifying the meanings of theoretical terms with the help of observational ones.”—Hempel, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. ii, 1958, p. 49.

**Operationalism**, another term for operationism

### Operationism

[from Latin: *operari*, work] Also called operationalism, a theory first proposed in physics by P. W. Bridgman, and then applied to other fields. It holds that things and their properties, powers and interactions, as the subject-matter of science, should be understood in terms of operations that scientists perform. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of operations, and the meaning of scientific terms is established in terms of a description of a set of operations, that is in terms of operational definitions. To be operationally meaningful, a statement must be confirmable at least in principle. This theory denies the distinction between theory and evidence. In the final analysis, a scientific theory is connected to operations that are empirically rooted. As a movement within the philosophy of science it is closely linked with logical positivism. The application of this theory to the field of psychology led to the emergence of behaviourism. A major difficulty is that it cannot guarantee that the experiments or selected operations are scientifically valuable or that the meaning of a term remains the same if it is approached from more than one experimental directions.

“The principle of operationism says that a term is empirically meaningful only if an operational definition can be given for it.”—Carnap, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. i, 1956, p. 65.

**Operator**, see logical constant

**O-proposition**, see A-proposition

### Optimism

[From Latin: *optimus*, the best] A French term (*optimisme*) referring to Leibniz's claim in *Theodicy* that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds because God who created it is the most perfect being. More generally, optimism is a positive and hopeful attitude towards things and the future, involving the claim that in the long run things are getting better. Optimism is contrasted to pessimism, which holds that this world is radically imperfect or that the future will be worse than the present. Schopenhauer's thought is

术语的意义的陈述。”——亨佩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第二卷,1958年,第49页。

### 操作主义

“操作主义(operationism)”的另一英文表述。

### 操作主义

[源自拉丁文 *operari*, 意思是“劳作”]其另一种英文表述为 operationalism。这个理论首先为 P. W. 布里奇曼在物理学中提出,然后应用于其他领域。它主张事物及其特性、能力和相互作用作为科学的主题,应按照科学家实施的操作来理解。科学知识是操作的知识,科学术语的意义应按照对一组操作的描述,即按照操作定义来确定。一个陈述必须至少原则上是可确证的,才是操作上有意义的。这个理论否认理论和证据之间的区别,归根结底,一个科学理论与植根于经验的操作相联系。作为科学哲学中的一种倾向,它与逻辑实证主义密切相关。这个理论对心理学领域的应用导致了行为主义的出现。其主要困难是不能保证实验或操作在科学上是有价值的,也不能保证一个术语的意义在从不同的实验方向来探索时,仍然会是一样的。

“操作主义原理认为一个术语是经验上有意义的,仅当能给它一个操作定义时。”——卡尔纳普,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第一卷,1956年,第65页。

### 算子

见“逻辑常项”条。

### O命题

见“A命题”条。

### 乐观主义

[源自拉丁词: *optimus*, 最佳]法语词(*optimisme*)指莱布尼茨在《神正论》中的主张:现实世界是一切可能世界中最好的世界,因为创造它的上帝是最完善的存在。更一般地说,乐观主义是一种对待事物和未来的积极的和充满希望的态度,它声称,从长远来看,事情会越来越越好。乐观主义对比于悲观主义,后者认为这个世界从根本上是不完善的,未来将比现在更糟。叔本华的思想是哲学中悲观主义的最重要的例子。

the most important example of pessimism in philosophy.

"I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, whether it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbour nothing but words under their absurd, but also a really wicked, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind."—Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* (tr. Payne), I, p. 326.

### Ordinary language

Everyday and non-technical language as an object of philosophical investigation. It can be distinguished from natural language, a term for actual human languages as studied in the philosophy of language and linguistics. Language has been a central concern of twentieth century philosophy. Some philosophers believe that ordinary language is defective and must be replaced by a rigorously reconstructed language or grammatical system (an ideal language), while others argue that we should rather seek to understand the logical diversity and complexity of ordinary language and its correct use to deal with philosophical problems. They hold that a replacement for ordinary language is unnecessary and impossible. This difference in attitude has led to a major division in analytical philosophy between ideal language philosophy represented by Russell and Carnap and ordinary language philosophy represented by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin.

"Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word."—Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, 1970, p. 133.

### Ordinary language philosophy

A kind of linguistic philosophy, originating with criticism of the ideal language philosophy of Russell, certain interpretations of Wittgenstein's early philosophy and Logic Positivism. Ideal language philosophy claims that we need an artificial language to be a suitable vehicle for philosophical reasoning, with a view to solving the philosophical perplexities caused by the unsystematic, irregular and imperfect nature of ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophy believes that the creation of an ideal language to replace ordinary language is unnecessary and also impossible. Rather, we must pay close attention to the meanings, categories, implications, grammatical or logical forms, functions, uses and distinctions in ordinary language. This approach to philosophy was pioneered by Moore and practised in varying ways by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hare, Austin and Strawson. Because this approach to philosophy was fully developed in Oxford, it also became known as Oxford philosophy. According to Strawson, we must uncover the nature of linguistic structure as it has traditionally been presented. Ordinary language presupposes a structure of reality and hence an in-

"我在这里不能阻止那种乐观主义的陈述,不论它是那些无头脑的人们独一无二的一派胡言,还是一种实在恶劣的思维方式,对人类的难言之苦的辛酸的嘲笑。"——叔本华:《作为意志和表象的世界》(佩尼译),第一卷,第326页。

### 日常语言

作为哲学研究对象的每天使用的非专业语言,可以区别于自然语言,后者是指语言哲学和语言学研究的人类现实语言。语言一直是20世纪哲学关心的中心内容。某些哲学家相信,日常语言是有缺陷的,必须用严格构造起来的语言体系或语法体系(一种理想语言)取而代之;而另外的哲学家则认为,我们更应当去理解日常语言的逻辑多样性和复杂性,正确地使用它讨论哲学问题。这种看法认为,对日常语言的替换不仅是不必要的,而且是不可能的。这种不同的态度导致了分析哲学中以罗素、卡尔纳普等人为代表的理想语言哲学和以后期维特根斯坦、赖尔和奥斯汀等人为代表的日常语言哲学之间的主要分歧。

"当然,日常语言的确不是最后的语言:它在原则上是可以随处补充、改进和替换的。只是要记住,它是最初的语言。"——奥斯汀:《哲学论文集》,1970年,第133页。

### 日常语言哲学

一种语言哲学,开始于批评罗素的理想语言哲学,以及对维特根斯坦前期哲学和逻辑实证主义的某些解释。理想语言哲学声称,我们需要创造一种人工语言作为哲学推理的恰当工具,并认为可以解决由于日常语言的没有体系、无规则和不完善而造成的哲学困惑。日常语言哲学相信,创造一种理想语言来取代日常语言,这不仅是没有必要的,而且是不可能的。相反,我们必须更加关注日常语言中的意义、范畴、蕴涵、语法形式或逻辑形式、功能、用法和区别。摩尔是这种哲学方法的先驱,而后期维特根斯坦、赖尔、黑尔、奥斯汀和斯特劳森则以各种方式运用这种方法。由于这种哲学方法完全是在牛津得到发展的,因而它也被看做是"牛津哲学"。根据斯特劳森的看法,我们必须像传统所做的那样揭示语言结构的性质。日常语言预设了实在的结构,因而研究这种语言也就是理解可能存在的语言之外的世界的有效方式。这就是他"描述的形而上学"的核心。日常语言哲学特别强调从使用语言表达式中提出的问题。奥斯汀的言

vestigation of that language is a fruitful means of understanding what the extralinguistic world may really be like. This is the essence of his descriptive metaphysics. Ordinary language philosophy emphasises in particular the problems that have arisen from the use of linguistic expressions. This dimension was developed in Austin's speech-act theory.

"Ordinary language philosophers saw the task of linguistic philosophy to lie in the clarification of the ordinary concepts that give rise to philosophical puzzles."—Katz, *Linguistic Philosophy*, 1971, p. 177.

### Organon

[Greek: instrument or tool] The title given to the collection of Aristotle's logical works by sixth century commentators rather than by Aristotle himself. These logical works include the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistic Elenchi*. These works do not form an organic whole and were composed at different dates. The reason for naming them collectively derived from Aristotle's view that logic is not a part of science, but is rather an instrument of thought.

"Logical matters have the place of a tool (Organon) in philosophy."—Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Topics*, 74. 29.

**Original apperception**, see transcendental apperception

**Original choice** an alternative expression for fundamental project

### Original position

A hypothetical bargaining situation postulated by Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*, in which the basic structure of just society can be rationally chosen. Each participant in the original position acts under two conditions. The first condition limits their knowledge through a veil of ignorance. Participants are ignorant of the circumstances of their society and their position in them, their particular talents and their special interests. The second condition is motivational, participants are rational and mutually self-interested. They are not altruistic and do not have substantive moral sentiments. In addition, there are some formal constraints upon the principles to be chosen. They must be formulated in general terms which avoid proper names and hold for a well-ordered society in perpetuity; they must be universal and hold for everyone in the society throughout their lives; they must be open to public knowledge; they must be capable of ordering competing claims; and they must provide the highest and final court of appeal for claims. According to Rawls, the principles chosen in the original position will be the principles of justice, partly because the original position is intended to achieve ideal impartiality and partly because the principles selected will

语行为理论推进了这个方面的研究。

"日常语言哲学家把语言哲学的任务看做是对产生哲学困惑的日常概念的澄清。"——卡兹:《语言哲学》,1971年,第177页。

### 《工具论》

[希腊文,“工具”]6世纪的注释家而非亚里士多德本人将该名作为题目给予亚里士多德的逻辑著作。这些逻辑著作包括《范畴》,《解释》,《前分析》,《后分析》,《正位篇》和《驳诡辩》。这些著作并不构成一个有机整体。它们是在不同时期写成的。把它们集在一起的根据是亚里士多德的观点,即逻辑不是科学的一部分,而是一种思想的工具。

"逻辑问题在哲学中具有工具的地位。"——阿弗罗迪西的亚历山大:《正位篇》,74. 29。

### 本源的统觉

见“先验统觉”条。

### 原初的选择

“基本谋划”的另一种表达。

### 原初状态

罗尔斯在《正义论》中要求的一种假设的达成协议情况,在这种情况下,正义社会的基本结构可以合理地选择。原初状态的每一参加者都在两个条件下行事。第一个条件以无知之幕后限制他们的知识。参加者不知道他们的社会环境及他们在其中的地位,也不知道他们的才能和特殊利益。第二个条件是动机方面的,参加者是理性的和相互冷淡的。他们不是利他主义的,没有真实存在的道德情操。此外,还存在一些对所选原则的形式限制。它们必须以一般概念提出,这些概念不能是专有名称并始终适合一个组织良好的社会;它们必须是普遍的并适合社会中每一个人的终身;它们对公众的知识必须是公开的;它们必须能够安排冲突的要求,它们必须为那些要求提供最高和最终的上诉法庭。根据罗尔斯的论述,在原初状态下选择的原则将是正义的原则,这部分地是因为原初状态试图实现理想的公正,部分是因为所选择的原则与我们直觉的正义概念相符合。原初状态可以被看成是对康德的自律和绝对命令观念的一个程序性解释。这一状态下所有的人都是自由、平等和

cohere with our intuitive notion of justice. The original position can be viewed a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the Categorical Imperative. All agents in that position are free, equal and rational beings who are autonomous because they choose the law themselves. The original position differs from the state of nature in classical social contract theory because it is a device to give us insight into our moral and political thinking rather than an exercise in historical speculation. If an agreement on principles is not reached in the original position, we remain in our imperfect and imperfectly understood society. In classical social contract theory, the participants would return to the state of nature.

“The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principle agreed to will be just.”—Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 136.

### Original sin

A Judeo-Christian doctrine. According to the *Bible*, the common ancestors of all human beings, Adam and Eve, could not resist the temptation of the Devil and broke the divine injunction not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Hence they committed original sin and lost the favour God. PS. 51. 5 says: “I was brought forth in inequity, and in sin did my mother conceive me” (cf. Genesis, 3, Romans, 5. 21). This sin has been transmitted to all the descendants of Adam and Eve and is therefore shared by them all, although the precise method of this transmission has been a subject of dispute among theologians. This official doctrine of original sin is essential for the Catholic Church, for it justifies the need to have Grace for redemption, the need for the sacrament of Baptism, and the justification of eternal punishment for those who are not saved. It is, however, unclear whether this is a personal guilt on the part of each individual or each individual's share of a defective human nature. The doctrine is criticised as being inconsistent with God's omnipotence, omniscience and his absolute goodness, for it must be God who created the Devil, and God must have had foreknowledge that Adam would be tempted. Critics ask why God did not help Adam to overcome this temptation. It is also cruel for God to multiply Adam's sin throughout humanity. Philosophically, the doctrine might be regarded as a confession of the natural inadequacy of human beings and our inability to lead perfectly virtuous lives. The enduring power of the account of original sin lies more in the Biblical narrative and in our recognition of our own imperfection than with the philosophical argument.

“Original sin consists in human nature being left to itself by the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God has bestowed on men's creation.”—Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia2, 17, 9.

理性的人,他们是自主的,因为他们自己选择法律。原初状态不同于古典的社会契约论中的自然状态,因为它是给我们洞察我们的道德和政治思想的一种手段,而不是一种历史推测中的运用。如果对原则的一致同意在原初状态下没有达成,那我们就仍然是有缺陷的,我们对社会的理解仍然是有缺陷的。在古典的社会契约理论中,参加者应返回到自然状态。

“原初状态的观念旨在建立一种公平的程序,以便任何被一致同意的原则都将是正义的。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第136页。

### 原罪

犹太基督教的一种学说。根据《圣经》,所有人的共同祖先亚当和夏娃没能抵挡住恶魔的诱惑,破了不得偷食智慧之树果实的戒律。因此,他们犯下了原罪,失去了上帝的宠爱。《诗篇》51. 5说:“我是在罪孽里生的,在我母亲怀我的时候就有罪。”(也参见《创世纪》3,《罗马书》5. 21)这种罪被遗传给了亚当和夏娃的所有后裔,所以,被他们大家所分有,虽然此种遗传的恰当方法是神学家们争论的问题。这种官方的原罪学说对天主教教会来说,是至关重要的,因为它证明了恩典对于救赎的必需,洗礼圣礼的必需,对没获救的人进行永久惩罚的正当。但不清楚的是,它是每一个人都有罪,还是每个人分有有缺陷的人类本性。这个学说被人批评为与上帝的全能、全知和绝对善不一致,因为创造了那个恶魔的必定是上帝,而上帝又必定预知了亚当会受诱惑。批评者们问,为什么上帝没有帮助亚当战胜这个诱惑。上帝通过人性来增大亚当的原罪也是残忍的。从哲学上说,这个学说可被看做是人类本性不完善以及我们不能过完美的有德性的生活的自白。这一原罪学说的持续力量并非在于哲学论证,而是在于圣经的叙述,在于我们对我们自身不完美性的认识。

“原罪存在于人类本性中,是被遗留给它自身的,通过上帝赐予人的超自然馈赠才得以解脱。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia2, 17, 9.

### Ostensive definition

The term, introduced by W. E. Johnson in his *Logic* in 1921, was discussed in detail by Russell, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists. An ostensive definition proceeds by simply pointing to something or showing actual examples of the thing being defined, as we usually do when we teach a child. For example, we point to a house and say, "The word 'house' means this". There are three factors in this kind of definition: a demonstrative term, a deictic (pointing) gesture and a sample of what the word designates. For Wittgenstein, an ostensive definition only answers the question "What is that called?" and does not settle how a term will be used in the future. It therefore does not fix the meaning of a term at all. For a private ostensive definition, I seemingly could concentrate my attention on a particular sensation and associate it with a particular sign. The problem is that the sign must be defined in terms of our public language, but in a private ostensive definition it can only be used to name the sensation for myself alone. Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a private ostensive definition as part of his rejection of the possibility of a private language.

"It is obvious that an ostensive definition must depend upon experience."—Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 368.

### Ostensive proposition

Ayer's term for a kind of proposition which other logical positivists held to be the direct record of an immediate experience and therefore to have self-evident validity. These propositions are taken to be purely demonstrative in character and cannot be refuted by further evidence. Instead they are the ultimate foundation for determining the validity of other empirical propositions. Ayer himself denies the existence of ostensive propositions, for if a proposition is ostensive, it must consist of purely demonstrative symbols. As a consequence, it would merely name a situation without describing anything about it. Such a sentence cannot be a genuine proposition and cannot even be expressed.

"But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced, without referring in any way beyond."—Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1948, p. 91.

### Other, the

In phenomenological philosophy since Husserl, humans other than the subject, self or ego. The self's relation to the Other gives rise to the problem of one's knowledge of other minds that is also discussed in analytical philosophy, but issues concerning the Other in ontology, ethics and political philosophy have come to be considered more fundamental. Emmanuel Levinas argued that the possibility of ethics rests on respecting the absolute alterity or otherness of the Other

### 实指定义

这个术语由 W. E. 约翰逊于 1921 年在其《逻辑学》一书中提出,罗素、维特根斯坦和逻辑实证主义者对之做了详细讨论。实指定义的给出是仅指着某物,或出示被定义事物的实例,就像我们平常教小孩时那样。例如,我们指着一栋房子说:“‘房子’这个词指的是这个东西。”这种定义有三个要素:指示词、直指(指着)的姿势,以及语词所指示的样本。对维特根斯坦而言,实指定义只回答这个问题:“那个东西叫什么?”而不解决语词在将来如何使用的问题。因此,这完全没有确定语词的意义。对于私人的实指定义而言,我似乎可以把我的注意力集中于某一特定感觉,将其与一特定符号相联系。问题在于,这符号必须以我们的公共语言来定义,但在私人的实指定义中,这只能用来称呼我一个人的感觉。维特根斯坦否认私人实指定义的可能性,作为他拒斥私人语言可能性的部分内容。

“显而易见,实指定义必须依靠经验。”——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第368页。

### 实指命题

艾耶尔对一类命题的称呼,其他逻辑实证主义者认为这类命题是对当下经验的直接记录,因此具有自明的有效性。人们认为这些命题的特征是纯粹指示性的,不能被将来的证据驳斥。相反,它们倒是决定其他经验命题的有效性的最终基础。艾耶尔本人否认存在实指命题,因为一个命题如果是实指的,它就必须由纯指示性符号构成。其结果是,它仅仅命名了一种情况,而没有描述有关它的任何事情。这样的语句不可能是真正的命题,甚至不能表达出来。

“但是,一命题是实指的,仅当它记录了直接经验到的东西,而决不指称除此之外的东西。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1948年,第91页。

### 他人

在胡塞尔以来的现象学哲学中,这是指不同于主体、自己或自我的人。自我对他人的关系产生了对他心的认识问题,该问题也在分析哲学中讨论,但关于他人在本体论、伦理学和政治哲学的争论问题已逐渐被认为是更基本的问题。E. 莱维纳斯证明,伦理学的可能性依赖于对绝对的他在性或他人的他在的尊重,而不是把他人还原为意识的对象。我们满足这种根本

rather than reducing the Other to an object of consciousness. Our ability to satisfy this radical demand depends on our understanding of how we can think an alterity which transcends our categories of thought. The Other presents problems of separation, opposition and alienation. In broader cultural terms, death, madness and the unconscious have been called the Other because they fall outside the model of rational self-consciousness. The notion of the Other has been embraced in anthropology, post-colonial philosophy and feminism in an attempt to undermine the entrenched conceptual priority of the metropolitan culture and the male.

“The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the ‘I’.”—Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 39.

### Other minds

If one can have direct knowledge only of one's own mental states, it is a serious philosophical question how and what we can know about other minds, that is whether other persons have minds and what other persons are thinking and feeling. Descartes saw free and intelligent action, especially in the use of language, inexplicable without the actor having a mind. A prominent traditional account relies on an argument by analogy. We may find correlations between our own physical behaviour and our own psychological or mental states. The knowledge of these correlations can be used as inductive evidence, so that if we observe similar physical behaviour exhibited by another person, we can infer ultimately by appeal to our own experience, that he has a certain kind of mental state. The conclusion thus inferred is not secure, for physical resemblance does not logically entail mental resemblance, the inductive base is very small and we can never check to see if our inference is sound. This argument is criticised for example by behaviourists who argue that if psychophysical relationships are contingent, then one can not even establish a correlation between bodily states and mental states. Wittgenstein's rejection of the possibility of a private language has challenged the basis of the analogy response, but for many it has also undermined the problem of other minds itself.

“Let's us begin with the problem of other minds. How can we know another person is in pain, or thrilled, or overcome with emotion, or thinking about philosophy?”—R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1984, p. 218.

**Other-regarding**, see self-regarding

### Ought

[related to owe, suggesting that something that is not being done should be done.] A general word used in moral

要求的能力取决于我们对如何能思维一个超越我们的思想范畴的他在的理解。他人产生了分离、对立和异化的问题。在更广泛的文化意义上,死亡、疯狂和无意识一直被称为他在,因为它们处于理性的自我意识的模式之外。他人的概念一直在人类学、后殖民地哲学和女性主义运动中被加以研究,企图破坏或削弱宗主国文化和男性的根深蒂固的概念优先性。

“绝对的他在是他人。他和我相加并不构成数目。在其中我说‘你们’或‘我们’的集体不是‘我’的复数。”——莱维纳斯:《整体与无限》,第39页。

### 他心

如果我们只具有关于自己的心的状态的直接知识,那么就有这样一个重大的哲学问题:我们是如何了解他心的?关于他心我们知道些什么?亦即,他人是否具有心以及他人的思维和感觉是什么?笛卡尔认为行为者若没有心,我们就不能解释他何以具有自由的智能行为,特别是语言使用中的这种行为。对于他心知识的传统描述是借助于类比论证。我们可能发现我们自己的物理或身体状态与我们自己的心理的或心的状态之间的关联。关于这些关联的知识可以被用作归纳证据,所以如果我们观察到另一个人表现出某种物理状态,我们就可以最终借助于我们自己的经验、通过归纳来推断他具有某种心的状态。这样推断出的结论显然是不牢固的,因为物理的相似并不在逻辑上推断心的相似。归纳的根据十分微弱,而且我们永远不能检验我们的推断是否正确。这一论证为(例如)行为主义者所批评,他们认为,如果心物关系是偶然的,那么一个人就不能在身的状态与心的状态之间建立关联。维特根斯坦对私人语言可能性的拒斥对类推反应的基础提出了挑战,可对许多人来说,它也削弱了他心问题本身。

“让我们从他心问题开始。我们怎么能够知道另一个人是处于疼痛中、感到激动、被情绪压倒还是在进行哲学思维?”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1984年,第218页。

### 他人相关

见“自我相关”条。

### 应当

[与“拖欠”有关,说明某事未做而该做]在道德话语中作为义务和职责的主要表述的一个

discourse as the principal expression of obligation and duty. Many moral philosophers consider "I ought to" to be identical in meaning to "I am obligated". Many major issues surround the notion of ought. Is there a kind of "ought" which is specifically moral and, if so, how does it relate to other kinds of "ought"? What is the relation between ought and is, in particular can evaluative claims about what we ought to do be derived solely from factual claims? Does ought imply can or are there things which we ought to attempt to do even if we know that we shall fail? Is the moral "ought" independent of other motives to action, such as sympathy or self-interest, and is the moral worth of what we do spoiled if we act on these other motives rather than through a recognition of the authority of this "ought"? The analysis of ought-statement is one of the main topics in Prescriptivism.

"If the analysis of 'ought' which I have just sketched bears any close relation to the use of 'ought' in ordinary language, it shows how it is that moral judgements provide reasons for acting in one way rather than another."—R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, pp. 196-7.

### Ought implies can

A formula in Kant's ethics, meaning that correctly judging that a given agent is morally obliged to perform a certain action logically presupposes that the agent can perform it. He can perform it not just if he wants, prefers, or wills to, but in some absolute sense. This capacity is a categorical freedom in contrast to the hypothetical freedom defended by Hume and others, for it is freedom both to do and to forbear doing a certain action under the same set of conditions.

"Perhaps all that the formula 'ought implies can' means is that it would be pointless to issue an imperative if it were impossible that the imperative should be obeyed."—Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 63.

### Ousia

[Greek: substance, essence, entity, reality, from *ousa*, the singular feminine participle of *einai*, to be; the term is closely linked to *on*, the neutral participle of *einai*] Although Plato used *on* and *ousia* synonymously, Aristotle classified different kinds of being and used *ousia* for *on* (being) in its first sense, namely, ultimate reality. In the *Categories*, Aristotle defined *ousia* as the ultimate subject which underlies everything else. According to this test, a sensible individual is primary *ousia*, while species and genus are secondary *ousia*. In the *Metaphysics*, *ousia* is the focal meaning of being, but it is divided into form, matter and the composite of matter and form. If *ousia* were still determined by the subject criterion, matter would be the primary subject and hence primary *ousia*. But Aristotle held this to be impossible, and presented the separation (independent existence) of

广义词。许多道德哲学家认为“我应当”在意思上等同于“我有责任”。围绕着“应当”这个概念有许多重大问题。是否有一种“应当”特别具有道德性,若如此,它与其他种类的“应当”关系如何?“应当”和“是”的关系如何,特别是,关于我们应当做什么的评价性论断能够仅从事实性论断中得到吗?应当是否蕴涵能够,或者说是否有我们应当尽力去做的事,即便我们知道我们做不成?道德的“应当”独立于其他行动的动机,诸如同情或自私吗,如果我们遵从这些其他的动机而不是通过服从这个“应当”的权威性而行动,我们所做事情道德价值会受到污损吗?对应当陈述的分析是规定主义的主要话题之一。

“如果我刚才概述的对‘应当’的分析与在日常语言中对‘应当’的使用有任何密切关系,它表明道德判断何以对这样行动而不是那样行动提供了理由。”——黑尔:《道德语言》,1952年,第196—197页。

### 应该隐含能够

康德伦理学的一个公式,意思是对一个既定的人在道德上应该履行某一行为的正确判断,在逻辑上就预先假定了这个人能够履行它。他能履行它不仅仅是假如他想要、喜欢或愿意履行就能履行,而是在绝对意义上的能履行。这一能力是一种绝对自由,它与休谟及他人人为之辩护的假设的自由相反,因为它既是在同一条件下进行某一行为的自由,也是在同一条件下克制进行某一行为的自由。

“也许‘应该隐含能够’这一公式的全部含义就是:如果一个命令应被遵守是不可能的,那发布这个命令就是无意义的。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第63页。

### 本是

[希腊词,本体,本质,实体,实在,源自 *ousa*,希腊动词 *einai* (是)的阴性单数分词;故它与 *einai* 的中性分词“是”或“存在”[希腊词 *on*] 紧密相连]柏拉图将 *on* 和 *ousia* 作同义词使用。亚里士多德区分了不同种类的“是”,并把 *ousia* 用作“是”的第一含义,即终极实在。在《范畴》中,亚里士多德把 *ousia* 定义作是承载其他一切事物的终极主体。根据这种规定,可感的个别事物是第一 *ousia*,而属和种乃是第二 *ousia*。在《形而上学》中,*ousia* 是“是”的中心含义。但它被划分成形式、质料和形式与质料的复合物。如果 *ousia* 仍是由主体标准确定的,则质料就会是第一主体,也因而成为第一 *ousia*。但亚里士多德认为这是不可能的,他引入本体与其地位的分离(独立存在),作为“这一个”(tode ti),成为

substance and its status as a this (*tode ti*) as more important criteria for deciding what is *ousia*. According to these new criteria, form is *ousia* in the primary sense, with composites being *ousia* in a derivative sense. Species and genus, which are secondary *ousia* in the *Categories*, are rejected as *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*. This has given rise to the problem of explaining the relation between form and the universal.

To search for primary *ousia* is tantamount to searching for primary being. Aristotle emphasised the central position of *ousia* in the network of categories. All other categories depend on *ousia* for their existence, and *ousia* is prior to them in time, knowledge and definition. Thus, Aristotle claimed in the *Metaphysics Z* that the study of being can be reduced to the study of *ousia* (ousiology). Ousiology has come to be used for describing Aristotle's mature view of ontology.

*Ousia* is generally translated as substance as a consequence of Boethius' influential medieval commentary on the *Categories* in which *ousia* and subject coincide. But this translation is unsatisfactory because substance has no etymological connection with *ousia*. Moreover, the translation does not really fit with the doctrine of *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*. Alternative English translations of *ousia* include essence, entity and reality.

"It follows, then, that 'ousia' has two senses, (a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (b) that which, being a 'this', is also separated—and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing."—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017b23-25.

**Ousiology**, see *ousia*

**Outer sense**, see inner sense

**Overman**, an English translation of *Übermensch*

**Owl of Minerva**

Minerva was the Roman goddess of wisdom, and her companion the owl was traditionally regarded as being wise. In his preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel used the owl of Minerva, which flies only at dusk, as a metaphor for the nature of philosophy. It implies that philosophy is essentially retrospective and can provide understanding of a stage of reality only after it has occurred. This claim challenges the view that we have a universal capacity to know independent of our context as subjects of knowledge.

"When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it can-

决定什么是 *ousia* 的更重要的标准。根据这些新标准,形式是第一意义的 *ousia*,而复合物则是派生意义上的。种和属在《范畴》中被看做是第二 *ousia* (本体),而在《形而上学》中不被承认是 *ousia* (本体)。这引起了如何解释形式与共相的关系这一问题。

寻求第一 *ousia* 即等于寻求第一“是”。亚里士多德强调 *ousia* 在范畴网络中的中心地位。一切其他范畴都依靠 *ousia* 而存在,而 *ousia* 在时间、知识和定义上都是在先的。所以,亚里士多德在《形而上学》第七卷认为,对“是”的研究可以归结为对 *ousia* 的研究(本是论)。本是论变成了一个专门描绘亚里士多德成熟的本体论观点的术语。

*Ousia* 一般译作“本体”(substance)。历史上这是由于中世纪哲学家波埃修斯关于《范畴》的极有影响的注释,而在《范畴》中 *ousia* 与主体是重合的。但这种翻译并不令人满意,因为 substance 与 *ousia* 并无字根上的联系。此外,这一译法也并不符合《形而上学》中的 *ousia* 学说。其他关于 *ousia* 的英译包括 essence, entity 和 reality。〔中文按 substance 译作“本体”,甚至“实体”。但根据该词与“是”的关系,最精确的译法当为“本是”。〕

“*Ousia* 因而有两义:(a)最终的基质,它不再述说其他任何事物,(b)那作为‘这一个’,也是分离的事物——这一本性乃是每一事物的形状或形式。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1017b23-25。

**本是论**

见“本是”条。

**外感**

见“内感”条。

**超人**

对“超人”〔一般英译为“superman”〕的另一种英文翻译。

**密纳发的猫头鹰**

密纳发是罗马智慧女神,她的同伴猫头鹰传统上被视为具有聪明智慧。黑格尔在《法哲学》序言中把在黄昏起飞的密纳发的猫头鹰作为对哲学本性的比喻。意思是,哲学本质上是反思的,它只能理解某个已经发生而成为过去的实在阶段。这个主张向以下观点提出了挑战:我们作为认识主体具有不依赖于我们的前后关系的普遍的认识能力。

“当哲学把它的灰色描绘成灰色之时,这一生活形态就老化了。把哲学的灰色描绘成灰色,不能使生活形态返老还童,而只能对之加以理

not be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only within the falling of the dusk.”—Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, preface.

## Ownership

In political and legal philosophy, a relationship of absolute or limited control between persons and property. We can ask about the origin of ownership and about its legitimacy. We can argue that ownership should be governed by rules of licit acquisition and transmission or by rules of fair distribution. As part of a general exploration of rights, we can examine whether ownership rights are absolute or relative to other social concerns. We can explore the claim that some things should not be owned or the claim that persons, if they may be owned at all, should be the subject of self-ownership. We can examine whether other social relations, including relations between parents and children or between persons and social or political institutions, can be understood in terms of ownership. We can ask whether we own our actions and the actions of those whom we authorise to represent us in institutions.

Ownership has been extended to examine our relations, as persons or bodies, to our mental states and to explore the claim that our bodies are our own. An investigation of ownership in this domain leads to questions about the nature of persons and about the mind-body relationship. Different accounts of causal relations between mental events and bodily events carry different justifications for our ownership of our mental states. Although in the following views ownership of our mental states is ascribed to ourselves as bodies, the mind-body relations that are discussed can also offer a necessary basis for ascribing ownership to ourselves as persons.

According to interactionism, a body owns mental states if there is a particular sort of interaction between them. For epiphenomenalism, a body owns mental states if events in the body are the main or only cause of events in the mind. For double-aspect theory, mental states are owned by a body because a mind and a body are different aspects of the same basic entity and are not causally distinct from one another. For parallelism, there is a parallel relationship between mental and bodily states, with ownership related to this association rather than to causal priority. According to the identity theory of mind, mental states are owned by the body which has brain states that are identical to those mental states.

All of these theories, which link mental states to bodies, conflict with a no ownership theory, which denies that mental phenomena must belong to a certain person or to a certain body. Hume's bundle theory implies that mental items are not necessarily owned by the mind to which they belong because the mind is an accidental collection or bundle of such items, but other philosophers reject the possibility of mental states which do not belong to a subject or person.

解。密纳发的猫头鹰只有在黄昏来临之际,才会展翅飞翔。”——黑格尔:《法哲学》,序言。

## 所有权

所有权在政治哲学和法哲学中是指人和财产之间的绝对的或有限的控制关系。我们可以询问所有权的起源及其合法性。我们可以争论所有权应由合法获得和遗传的规则所决定,还是由公平分配规则所决定。作为对权利的一般性探究,我们可以考察所有权对其他社会事物是绝对的还是相对的。我们可以探究那种认为某些东西不应成为所有物的说法,或那种认为如果人们也可以被所有,他们就应是自我所有的主体的说法。我们可以考察其他社会关系,包括父母和孩子的关系,或人们和社会或政治机构的关系,是否可以从所有权方面来理解。我们可以询问我们是否拥有我们的行为,是否拥有那些我们授权在公共机构中代表我们的人的行为。

所有权已被扩展到考察我们作为人或身体与我们心的状态的关系,探究那种认为我们的身体是我们自己的说法。在这一领域对所有权问题的研究导致了有关人的本质和身心关系的问题。对心身活动因果关系的不同说明包含着对我们心的状态所有权的不同辩护。虽然在下面的观点中,对我们心的状态的所有权被归为作为肉体的我们自身,但所讨论的这些身心关系仍可为把所有权归于作为人的我们自身提供一个必要的基础。

按照交互作用论,如果在身和心的状态之间存在一种特殊的相互作用,那么身就拥有心的状态。对附随现象论而言,如果身的活动是心的活动的主要或惟一的原因,身就拥有心的状态。根据两面理论,心的状态是为身拥有的,因为心和身是同一基本实体的不同方面,它们在因果上是区分不开的。平行论认为,在心的状态和身的状态之间存在一种平行的关系,所有权与这种联系相关,而不是与原因的首要性相关。根据心的同一论,心的状态为身所拥有,身的大脑的状态与那些心的状态是同一的。

所有这些将心的状态与身相连的理论都同非所有权理论相冲突,后者否认心的现象必须属于某一个人或某一身体。休谟的捆束理论意味着心的成分不必为它们从属的心所拥有,因为心是这些成分的偶然集合或捆束,但其他哲学家拒绝心的状态不属于一个主体或人这种可能性。

是什么使我的身体成为我的,以及我如何知道我的身体是我的,这些问题要求对我们的身体在我们作为主体和相关者中的位置有一个了解。

The questions of what makes my body mine and how I know that my body is mine require an understanding of the place of our bodies in our being subjects and agents.

“Let us name the relation which everybody speaks of in this way by calling a certain body his own, the relation of ownership.”—John Wisdom, *Problems of Mind and Matter*, 1934, p. 37.

### Oxford philosophy

Philosophy has been studied and taught at Oxford since the thirteenth century, and from as early as the fourteenth century, Oxford has contributed eminent philosophers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Hobbes, Locke and Bentham were students of Oxford. From the nineteenth century to the first part of this century, Oxford has contributed J. H. Newman, B. Butler, Cook Wilson, H. A. Prichard, and R. G. Collingwood, among others. However, “Oxford philosophy” as a technical term refers to a distinct approach to analytical philosophy that flourished at Oxford after the Second World War. It places emphasis on clarifying perennial philosophical problems in terms of the analysis of ordinary language, and is in contrast to Logical Positivism and the Russellian strand of philosophy in Cambridge. This approach started with H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle, although it is related to the work of G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein’s later work in Cambridge. It was further articulated in distinctive ways by J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It made Oxford the dominant centre of analytical philosophy from the 1940s to the 1960s, and is also called “Ordinary Language Philosophy”. Other contemporary Oxford philosophers include H. L. A. Hart, A. J. Ayer, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, G. E. L. Owen, Michael Dummett, Bernard Williams, David Pears, R. M. Hare, Charles Taylor and Ronald Dworkin. But these philosophers have different approaches, and some would vigorously reject being classes as Oxford philosophers in the above sense. Oxford is still a major centre of philosophy today and is the birth place of this dictionary.

“During the last quarter of a century Oxford has occupied, or reoccupied, a position it last held, perhaps, six hundreds years ago: that of a great centre of philosophy in the Western world.”—Strawson, “Meaning and Truth”, in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, 1971, p. 170.

“让我们把每一个人以这种方式谈及的,即称某一肉体是他自己这种关系,称为所有权关系。”——威斯顿:《心与物的问题》,1934年,第37页。

### 牛津哲学

从13世纪开始牛津一直在研究和教授哲学,而且早在14世纪,牛津就产生了杰出的哲学家,例如D. 司各脱和奥康的威廉。霍布斯、洛克和边沁都是牛津的学生。从19世纪到本世纪初,牛津产生了J. H. 纽曼、B. 巴特勒、C. 威尔逊、H. A. 普里查德和R. G. 柯林伍德等人。然而,“牛津哲学”作为一个专门术语,是指第二次世界大战以后在牛津逐渐形成的一种分析哲学的独特方法。它强调通过分析日常语言澄清历史遗留下来的哲学问题,这与罗素风格的剑桥哲学和逻辑实证主义相对。这种方法开始于H. H. 普赖斯和G. 赖尔,这虽然与G. E. 摩尔的工作和后期维特根斯坦在剑桥的工作有关,但最后是由J. L. 奥斯汀和P. F. 斯特劳森以不同的方式充分阐明的。它使牛津从40年代到60年代成为分析哲学的主要核心,这也被称作“日常语言哲学”。其他的当代牛津哲学家包括H. L. A. 哈特、A. J. 艾耶尔、E. 安斯康、P. 福特、G. E. L. 欧文、M. 达米特、B. 威廉姆斯、D. 皮尔斯、R. M. 黑尔、C. 泰勒、R. 德沃金等人。但这些哲学家有着不同的方法,其中某些人就坚决反对被称作上述意义上的“牛津哲学家”。牛津至今仍然是哲学的一个主要中心,也是本词典的诞生地。

“在本世纪过去的15年期间,牛津一直占据着或先前就占据着它在(也许)600年前就占据着的地位:这就是西方世界伟大的哲学中心。”——斯特劳森:《意义与真理》,载《逻辑—语言学论集》,1971年,第170页。

## P

**Pacifism**

[from Latin: *pacificare*, to make be at peace] A position that objects to war as a means to achieve national aims or to solve disputes. More broadly, it objects to any sort of killing and violence. It claims that even the use of force to meet force is wrong and that nobody may use force without specific overriding justification. Pacifism advocates co-operation and negotiation and actively encourages activities promoting peace. Absolute pacifism holds that war and violence are intrinsically wrong and cannot possibly be justified. Critics argue that pacifists fail to distinguish between aggression and legitimate national defence in a just war and fail to distinguish between intentional harming or killing and legitimate individual self-defence. Many forms of pacifism are conditional, in that they claim that war and violence are *prima facie* wrong, but allow that wrong to be overridden. In this respect, they approach their rival theory of a just war.

“A. J. P. Taylor coined the word pacifism as a general descriptive term designed to cover all the different attempts made (for any reason) to abolish war, and we can contrast this idea with that of pacifism proper, which involves being against a war on more than merely pragmatic grounds. Pacifism proper involves a moral judgement and a personal commitment.” —Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 1986, p. 3.

**Paideia**

[Greek; education, from *pais*, child] In ancient Greece, *paideia* included *mousike* (mainly literature and song) and *gymnastics*. Moral education trained a youth by habituation until he acquired the right habits, that is the right patterns of action. Education was not confined to children and youth, for adults were held to need it as well to become as virtuous as possible.

“What will this *paideia* be? ... It is in part physical training for the body and training in the arts for the soul.” —Plato, *Republic*, 376e.

**Pain**

Either physical or mental suffering which is generally regarded to be a negative feeling. The main tenet of hedonism is that it is human nature to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain. However, philosophers have been puzzled by the nature of this feeling. Wittgenstein sought to show that pain is

**和平主义**

[源自拉丁文: *pacificare*, 使处于和平状态] 一种反对把战争作为达到国家的目的或解决争端的手段的主张。更广义地讲,它反对任何形式的杀害和暴力。它甚至认为用武力反对武力是错误的,没有特别的、压倒一切的正当地理由任何人都不能使用武力。和平主义提倡合作和协商,并积极鼓励促进和平的活动。绝对的和平主义认为战争和暴力从本质上就是错误的,是不可能为之辩护的。批评家们争论说,和平主义者没有区分侵略与正义战争中正当的国家的防卫,也没有区分有意的伤害或杀害与合法的个人自卫。很多形式的和平主义是有条件的,因为它们认为战争和暴力不言而喻是错误的,但又允许制服这种错误。就这方面而言,它们与其对立面正义战争的理论又是相近的。

“A. J. P. 泰勒创造了和平主义这个一般描述性的概念,用来涵盖所有不同的取消战争的企图(不论是出于什么理由),我们可以将这一概念与严格意义上的和平主义做比较,后者包含的反对战争不仅是基于实用主义的理由。严格意义的和平主义包含道德判断和个人的信奉。”——泰西曼:《和平主义和正义战争》,1986年,第3页。

**教育**

[希腊词,意为“教育”,源自 *pais* (孩子)] 在古希腊,教育包括文艺修养(主要是文学和歌曲)和体育锻炼。道德教育通过习俗来培养一个青年,直到他获得适当的习性,也就是正确的行为方式。教育也不仅仅局限于青少年,因成年人也需要它,以尽可能地变为有德性的。

“这种教育是什么?……它部分是关于身体的体育锻炼,部分是关于灵魂的文艺方面的训练。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》,376e。

**疼痛**

物理的或心的痛苦,通常被认为是一种负面的感觉。享乐主义的主要原则是:人的本性就是追求快感逃避痛苦。但哲学家一直对这种感觉的性质感到困扰。维特根斯坦试图表明疼痛不是用只有自己能懂的私人语言来表达的私人

not a private sensation expressed by a private language which can only be understood by oneself. In order to be used in a public language, expressions for pain must have meanings for which there are public criteria given in the outward expression of pain. Other philosophers reject the criterial account in favour of reducing pain to pain behaviour. This behaviourist move is rejected by the identity theory which identifies pain with neurological processes. On the basis of his account of meaning and identity, Kripke argues that because we can describe a world in which pain states and accompanying physical state are not identical, they are not identical in the actual world. Some philosophers ask why we would wish to avoid pain on accounts which do not give central consideration to its raw qualitative feel. Scholars also debate over whether there is a common and intrinsic quality shared by all token feelings of pain.

“The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain, but not to say it about myself.” —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 246.

### Panentheism

[from Greek: *pan*, all + *en*, in + *theos*, god] The view that all things are imbued with God's being through being parts of God or Absolute Being. Because on this view God extends beyond all that there is in the world, panentheism rejects the pantheist claim that God is identical with the totality of things. Rather, God is consciousness and the highest possible unity. This position was developed by the German philosopher Karl Christian Krause by combining Spinoza's notion of substance and Fichte's notion of self-consciousness. Whitehead also used this term in his process theology.

“Panentheism is the view that all is God, while panentheism occupies a position midway between theism and pantheism. For panentheists, while it is not strictly true that everything is God, everything is lodged or embedded within God, making the two interdependent.” —C. Taliaferro, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds), *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 447.

**Panosomatism**, another term for reism

### Panpsychism

[from Greek: *pan*, all + *psyche*, soul] The view that everything in the universe, including things which we ordinarily regard as not living, possesses a mental aspect or level of consciousness, although this does not imply that each thing has a mind or soul like our own. The universe as a whole is considered to be alive, with the character of an animated organism. God is described as being completely immanent in all things as a psychic force or spirit. Panpsychism is

感觉。疼痛表述要在公共语言中使用,对于其意义就一定有一个由疼痛的外部表达所给定的公共标准。其他哲学家拒斥标准论,而主张将疼痛还原为疼痛行为。这种行为主义的解释也被同一论所拒斥,后者将疼痛同一于神经过程。克里普克根据其对意义及同一性的解释,认为我们可以描述一个世界,其中疼痛状态与所附随的物理状态不同一,所以它们在现实世界中也不同一。由于不给疼痛的原初性质感觉以中心地位,有的哲学家就问为什么我们会希望逃避疼痛。学者们还就是否有一个为所有的痛觉例证所共有的普通的、内在的性质展开争论。

“真实的情况是:说别人怀疑我是否处于疼痛中是有意义的,而这样来说我自己就是没有意义的。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第246节。

### 万物在神论

[源自希腊语, *pan* (一切) 和 *en* (在……之中) 及 *theos* (神)] 指这种观点:万物因其是上帝或绝对存在者的一部分而受上帝存在的影响。因为按这种观点,上帝延伸的范围在世上存在的一切东西之外,所以,万物在神论否认泛神论者主张的上帝与事物总体的同一。他们宁愿认为上帝是意识,是最高可能统一体。这种见解被德国哲学家 K.C. 克劳斯所发展,他把斯宾诺莎的实体观念和费希特的自我意识观念结合了起来。怀特海在他的过程神学中,也使用了这个术语。

“万物在神论是这样的观点:一切都是神。它占据的是一神论和泛神论之间的中间位置。在万物在神论者看来,即使万物是神的说法不严格真切,但为了使两者相互依赖,万物也寄宿或置留于神之中。”——塔里亚斐洛,见布宁和崔·詹姆斯编的《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》,1996年,第447页。

### 泛体论

“实有论”的另一个名称。

### 泛心论

[源自希腊语, *pan* (一切) 和 *psyche* (灵魂)] 指这种观点:宇宙中的每一事物,包括我们通常认为没有生命的事物,都具有心的方面或意识水平,尽管这并不意味着每物都有像我们自己一样的心或灵魂。作为整体的宇宙被认作是活生生的,具有生物有机体的特征。上帝被描述为作为一种灵魂力量或精神完全内在于万物之中。泛心论也被称作“活力论”、“物活论”

also called animism, hylozoism [from Greek: *hule*, matter + *zoe*, life] or mentalism.

In spite of the difficulty of accepting panpsychism's explanation of mental aspects, the theory has been endorsed by some thinkers who find greater difficulty in alternative explanations of how mental phenomena can be caused by non-mental things. Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Schelling and Whitehead offer different forms of panpsychism.

"By panpsychism I mean the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms." —Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, 1979, p. 181.

### Pantheism

[from Greek: *pan*, all + *theos*, god] A term originated by John Toland for the belief that God is identical with the universe, that is with the totality of all there is, rather than being a supernatural power above or alongside the universe. Because God is the universe taken as a whole, no divine act of creation is required and the distinction between God and his creatures, sharply drawn in Christianity, is denied. All is God, and God is all. Everything in the universe is a mode or element of God. The claim that the divine is all-inclusive distinguishes pantheism from panentheism, which holds that God includes all things but is greater than their totality. The most important pantheist was Spinoza who offered sophisticated arguments to support the claim that there is only one substance which can be understood as God or nature. Hegel was also a pantheist in virtue of his identification of God with the whole of Being.

"Pantheism applies the term 'God' in such a way that nothing positive can be distinct from him. God is considered wholly immanent within the universe, and the universe—in so far as its has being—is identical with God."—Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 303.

### Paradigm

[from Greek: *paradeigma*, model, pattern] Plato describes Forms as paradigms to which particular objects have a likeness or resemblance, and to which we must look in order to acquire knowledge. In the *Republic* it is said that the ideal state might be a paradigm laid up in the heaven; in another dialogue, the *Timaeus*, Forms are paradigms by reference to which the divine craftsman constructs the sensible world.

In this century, the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn in his classic *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), employs the word "paradigm" to refer to a framework of concepts, assumptions and approaches within which members of a scientific community conduct their research. When a paradigm has to be changed or shifted, there comes a scientific revolution.

"Close historical investigation of a given speciality at a

[hylozoism, 源自希腊语 *hule* (质料、物质) 和 *zoe* (生命)] 或“心灵论”。

虽然难以接受泛心论对心的方面的解释,但还是有些思想家承认了这种理论,因为他们发现另一种选择解释起来难度更大,即心的现象如何能被非心的事物引起。莱布尼茨、叔本华、谢林和怀特海都提出过不同形式的泛心论。

“所谓泛心论,我意指这种观点:宇宙的基本物理要素具有心的特性,无论它们是否是生命有机体的部分。”——内格尔:《人的主要问题》,1979年,第181页。

### 泛神论

[源自希腊语 *pan* (一切) 和 *theos* (神)] J. 托兰德发明的一个术语,用以指称这种信念:神与宇宙同一,即与存在的一切之总和同一,而不是在宇宙之上和之侧的超自然力量。由于神是当做整体的宇宙,因而无需任何神圣的创造行为,基督教中严格坚持的神与他的创造物之间的区别也被否定了。一切是神,神也是一切。宇宙中的每物都是神的样式或成分。神是所包括的一切这个主张把泛神论和万物在神论区别开来,后者认为神包括万物但比它们的总和更大。最重要的泛神论者是斯宾诺莎,他提出了一些复杂的论证来支持这样的主张:只存在着一个实体,它能被理解为神或自然。由于把神和整个存在视为同一,黑格尔也是一位泛神论者。

“泛神论在这种意义上应用‘神’这个词,没有任何确实的东西能与他不同。神被认为完全地内在于宇宙之中,而宇宙——仅就它具有存在而言——是与神同一的。”——费勒:《现代宗教哲学基础》,1968年,第303页。

### 范式

[源自希腊词 *paradeigma*, 意指“模范”或“模型”] 柏拉图把形式描写为范式——即具有相似性的特殊对象的范式,认为人们审视范式是为了获取知识。柏拉图在《国家篇》里谈到,理想国或许是建立在天国的范式;在另一篇题为《蒂迈欧篇》的对话里,形式即范式,具有神性的工匠凭借范式建构了感觉世界。

在本世纪,美国哲学家 T. 库恩在其经典著作《科学革命的结构》(1962年)中,使用“范式”一词来表示一种由诸多概念、假设与方法构成的框架,在此框架中科学共同体的成员从事着他们的研究。当某一范式需要变化或转型时,就会发生一场科学革命。

“在特定时间对特定专业进行仔细的历史研究,就会发现一套重现的、半标准的展示方

given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community's paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises." —Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, p. 43.

### Paradigm case argument

A challenge to scepticism regarding the existence of such things as the external world, free will, valid inductive arguments, certainty or time. The paradigm case argument claims that if we have learned to use a referring expression for which typical or paradigmatic referents have become the meaning of that expression, then such an expression refers in standard cases to genuine existents. Our ability to employ a certain type of expression in ordinary speech is the proof that it has application. Accordingly, if a words such as "table" and "chair" are in common use, there must be physical objects. Similarly, the fact that words such as "choose" and "decide" are in common use shows the existence of free will. This argument, influenced by Wittgenstein's theory of language games, had wide appeal in the 1950s and 1960s. The argument was criticised because different ways of teaching an expression might involve different, and perhaps conflicting, paradigms. Many philosophers are dissatisfied with conformity to linguistic norms as the mark of truth. Accordingly, the argument is currently little used.

"The paradigm case argument held that some situations were the very type of situation wherein was taught the application of a term, 'free will' for example, the term must refer to that type of situation." —R. Nozick *Philosophical Explanations*, 1984, p. 168.

### Paradigm shift

In contrast to the traditional view that science is cumulative in the gradual increase of its empirical content within a stable framework, Kuhn explained scientific change in terms of revolutionary shifts in scientific paradigms as well as in terms of work carried out within a paradigm in periods of normal science. A paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, has two dimensions. First, it is a set of beliefs, values, techniques, practices and examples of explanatory success shared by a scientific community within a social and institutional context. Secondly, a paradigm is the model or explanatory framework which normal sciences apply to solve problems. However, the scope of any given paradigm is limited. Once there is an accumulation of outstanding problems which cannot be solved within a paradigm, a scientific community go into crisis. In response to the crisis, a new paradigm will emerge. The new paradigm is better than its predecessor because it can formulate new problems and set procedures for solving the existing accumulation of outstanding problems. Scientific revolutions

式,即一套表明其概念、观察与工具运用方面的各种理论的方式。这些便是该共同体的范式,大多体现于教材、讲座与实验工作之中。”——库恩:《科学革命的结构》,1962年,第43页。

### 范例论证

对关于外部世界、自由意志、有效归纳论证、确定性或时间的怀疑论的一种挑战。范例论证断定,如果我们已经学会用一指称表达式,而这一表达式已经具有典型的或范例性的指称作为其意义,则这一表达式在标准的情形中就会指称真正的存在物。我们在日常语言中使用某一特定表达式的能力就证明了它是可以使用的。因此,如果一个像“桌子”和“椅子”这样的词汇是大家共同使用的,则一定有物理对象存在。同样地,如果“选择”和“决定”这样的词汇是大家共同使用的,那就一定存在有自由意志。受维特根斯坦语言游戏理论的影响,这一论证在50年代及60年代具有十分广泛的影响。这一论证也受到批评,因为教授一种表达式的不同方式可能牵涉到不同乃至相冲突的范例。许多哲学家也对把遵从语言规范作为真理的标志表示不满。因此,这一论证现在很少使用。

“范例论证认为某些情境是教会一个术语的使用的情境类型,例如‘自由意志’这一术语一定是指那样一类情境。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1984年,第168页。

### 范式转换

传统观点认为,在一个稳定的框架内,科学的经验内容的逐渐增加是累积的,与此相对立,库恩以科学范式的革命性转换,以在规范科学时期内范式所进行的工作,来说明科学的变化。库恩意义上的范式有两个层面。在第一层面上,它是一组为一个科学共同体在一个社会和体制情境中所共有的成功说明的信念、价值、技术、实践和范例。在第二层面上,范式是常规科学用以解决问题的模型或说明框架。然而,任何给定范式的范围都是有限的。当在一个范式中不能解决的突出问题累积起来,这个科学共同体就面临着危机。作为对危机的反应,一个新的范式将会出现。这个新范式要优于旧范式,因为它能形成新的问题,并能设定程序以解决现存累积的未解决问题。当科学家舍弃旧范式并代之以新范式时,科学革命就发生了。因为一个新范式涉及到概念、理论结构及科学实践的根本性转换,新旧范式之间是不可通约的。因此科学革命

happen when scientists reject an old paradigm and replace it with a new one. Because a new paradigm involves fundamental shifts in concepts, theoretical structures and scientific practices, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable. Hence scientific revolution is equivalent to paradigm shift. The replacement of a paradigm by another is also informed by political and social development.

“What seems to have been involved was the exploitation by genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval paradigm shift.” —Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, p. 118.

## Paradox

[from Greek: *para*, beyond + *doxa*, belief] Literally, something which is against the generally accepted view or something which looks implausible but implies a philosophical challenge. In logic, a paradox is a contradictory position arising from sound premises or sound proof. In this sense, it is a synonym for an antinomy. Medieval logicians called paradoxes *insolubilia*. In ancient Greece, Zeno of Elea and the Megarians invented a number of interesting paradoxes, but paradoxes became the focus of serious philosophical concern after the discovery of Russell's paradox, which posed fundamental issues of philosophical method and principles. Russell's paradox gave rise to a crisis in Frege's logicist programme, and the intellectual advance of the programme depended upon overcoming this paradox.

Generally, following Peano and Ramsey, paradoxes are divided into two main types: semantic paradoxes and logical paradoxes (or set-theoretical paradoxes). Semantic paradoxes, such as the liar paradox, Berry's paradox, Richard's paradox and Grelling's paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of semantic concepts, such as truth, falsity and definability. Logical paradoxes, such as Russell's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, and Cantor's paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of set-theoretical concepts and due to faulty logic and mathematics. Such a distinction is not without controversy. Russell, for instance, claimed that all paradoxes arise because of violations of the vicious circle principle. The general solution of semantic paradoxes involves replacing ordinary language with artificially constructed language. The general procedure for solving logical paradoxes involves restricting set-existence principles. But both of these types of solutions have been contested. Various paradoxes are recorded in this dictionary under their particular names.

“A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises.” —Sainsbury, *Paradoxes*, 1995, 2nd ed., p. 1.

**Paradox of confirmation**, another expression for Hempel's paradox

等同于范式转换。一个范式为另一个范式所取代，也是在政治和社会发展中所得来的。

“看起来是天才对知觉可能性的探索，其实是建立在一个中世纪的范式转换的基础上的。”——库恩：《科学革命的结构》，1962年，第118页。

## 悖论

[源自希腊语 *para* (超越, 在……之上) 和 *doxa* (信念)] 从字面上说, 它意指某种与通常接受的观点相反的东西, 某种看起来不合理但意味着哲学挑战的东西。在逻辑中, 悖论是从可靠的前提或可靠的证明中产生的矛盾立场。在这种意义上, 它是二律背反 (antinomy) 的同义语。中世纪逻辑学家把悖论叫做不可解问题 (*insolubilia*)。在古希腊, 埃利亚的芝诺和麦加拉学派发明了大量有意思的悖论, 但只是在发现了罗素悖论之后, 悖论才开始在哲学上受到严肃关注, 并引出了许多有关哲学方法和原则的根本问题。罗素悖论引发了弗雷格逻辑主义纲领中的危机, 这一纲领的思想发展取决于克服这个悖论。

一般遵循皮亚诺和拉姆塞的做法, 把悖论分成两种主要类型: 语义悖论和逻辑悖论 (或集合论悖论)。语义悖论, 像说谎者悖论, 贝里悖论, 理查德悖论和格林林悖论, 产生于真、假、可定义性等语义概念的某些特性。逻辑悖论, 像罗素悖论, 布拉里-福蒂悖论和康托尔悖论, 产生于集合论概念的某些特性以及有缺陷的逻辑和数学。这样一种划分不是没有争议的。举例来说, 罗素认为, 所有悖论都产生于违背了恶性循环原则。对语义悖论的一般解决方案涉及到用人工构造的语言替代日常语言。对逻辑悖论的一般解决方案涉及到给集合存在的原则施加限制。但这两种解决方案都是有争议的。本辞典按它们各自的名称收录了各种悖论。

“悖论可以定义为从明显可接受的前提凭借明显可接受的推理而导出的不可接受的结论。”——塞斯伯里: 《悖论》, 1995年, 第2版, 第1页。

## 确证悖论

“亨佩尔悖论”的另一种表述。

**Paradox of God's omniscience**, see omniscience

**Paradox of self-deception**, see self-deception

**Paradox of size**, see Cantor's paradox

**Paradox of the heap**, see sorites paradox

**Parallel distributed processing**, see connectionism

### Parallelism

Also called psycho-physical parallelism, a theory which is particularly associated with Spinoza. It claims that the mental realm and the physical realm, or thought and extension, do not affect each other in any way. Instead, they are independent of each other, although there is a precise correspondence between them. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, 7). If two items in the physical realm are similar, their counterparts in the mental realm are similar; and vice versa. If two items in thought are related as cause and effect, their corresponding items in extension are also related as cause and effect. However, mental events never cause bodily events, and bodily events never cause mental events. There are physical causal laws and there are psychological laws, but there cannot be any psycho-physical causal laws. Parallelism is a classical response to the Cartesian mind-body problem. Sometimes Spinoza claimed that such a parallelism is a relation of identity on the grounds that each mental mode is a physical mode. This view, together with his claim that thought and extension are different attributes of one and the same substance, has led many scholars to argue that Spinoza's philosophy of mind should be termed a dual-aspect theory.

"Parallelism, in the mild sense, is the proposition that for every mental event there is a bodily event which always accompanies it."—John Wisdom, *Problem of Mind and Matter*, 1934, p. 103.

### Paralogism

[from Greek; *para*, beyond + *logizesthai*, to reason]

Generally, a formally invalid inference. Aristotle in *Poetics* defined a paralogism as the fallacy of inferring from the truth of the consequence to the truth of the premise. For Kant, a paralogism is the inevitable erroneous outcome of reason in rational psychology when it extends beyond the limits of ex-

### 上帝全知悖论

见“全知”条。

### 自欺悖论

见“自欺”条。

### 规模悖论

见“康托尔悖论”条。

### 堆的悖论

见“积累悖论”条。

### 并行分布加工

见“联结主义”条。

### 平行论

也称“心—物平行论”，这个理论特别与斯宾诺莎有关。它主张，心理界和物理界，或思想和广延，在任何情况下都互不影响。它们是互相独立的。不过，在它们之间有精确的相应。“观念的秩序和联系与事物的秩序和联系是一样的”（斯宾诺莎：《伦理学》，第二部分，第7章）。如果物理界中的两个事项是相似的，它们在心理界中的对应者也是相似的，反之亦然。如果思想中的两个事项因果联系着，它们在广延中的对应事项也因果联系着。无论如何，心的事件决不会引起任何物理事件，反之，身体事件也不会引起心的事件。存在着物理的因果律和心理的因果律，但不可能有任何心理—物理的因果律。平行论是对笛卡尔的心—身问题的一个经典回答。有时，斯宾诺莎声称这样的平行论主张的是一种同一性关系，其根据就在于：每个心的样式就是一个物理的样式。这个观点以及他关于思想和广延是同一个实体的不同属性的看法一起，使许多学者认为应当把斯宾诺莎的心的哲学称作“两面理论”。

“在适度的意义上，平行论是这样的命题：对于每一个心的事件都有一个永远与之相伴随的身体事件。”——威斯顿：《心与物的问题》，1934年，第103页。

### 谬误推理

[源自希腊文 *para* (超越) 和 *logizesthai* (推理)] 一般指在形式上无效的推理。亚里士多德在他的《诗学》中把它规定为从结论为真推出前提为真的谬论。对于康德来说，谬误推理是理性在理性心理学中超越经验界限的不可避免的结果。理性从“我思”的先验根据引致四种谬误

perience. Reason leads from the transcendental ground of the "I think" to four kinds of paralogism: (1) the soul is a substance; (2) the soul is simple; (3) the soul is identical over time; (4) the soul is self-conscious only. Kant also called these claims transcendental paralogisms. He held that all of these inferences are invalid because they infer from the formal conditions of thought to a substance of thought. Kant's target in exposing the paralogism is the rational psychology of Descartes and his rationalist successors and the misinterpretation of the *Cogito* which infers from thinking to existence.

"In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, ... This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental paralogism." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B398.

**Paraphrasis**, another term for contextual definition

**Pareto improvement**, see Pareto optimality

### Pareto optimality

A principle, also called Pareto efficiency, named after the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, referring to a state whereby no one can be better off without making someone else worse off. A change makes at least one person better off and no one worse off is called a Pareto improvement. In this case, at least one individual prefers X to Y, and no one else regards Y as better than X. To change from Y to X certainly improves the welfare of the whole society. Pareto optimality and Pareto improvement are widely accepted as criteria for justifying or criticising changes in economic policy. They are also used to evaluate the utilitarian summing of welfare across individuals without the need to compare interpersonal utility. Since each policy change in a social context generates a loser, a Pareto improvement is hard to achieve.

"The familiar economist's concept of Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality) is a very different matter. A distribution or resources is Pareto efficient if no change in that distribution can be made that leaves no one worse off and at least one person better off." —Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 239.

**Parsimony, the principle of**, another term for Ockham's razor

### Partial concept

For Kant, each concept typically contains other concepts, namely, various predicates which can jointly apply to

推理: (1) 灵魂是实体; (2) 灵魂是单纯的; (3) 灵魂在时间流程中同一; (4) 灵魂只是自我意识。康德也把它们称为先验谬误推理。他认为,所有这些推理都是无效的,因为它们从思想的形式条件推论出思想的实体。康德在阐述谬误推理时所对准的靶子是笛卡尔的理性心理学和他的理性主义后继者以及对“我思”的曲解,即从思维推论出存在。

“在第一种三段论中,我从绝不包含杂多的主体的先验概念来推断这个主体自身的绝对统一,……这种辩证推理我命之为先验的谬误推理。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B398。

### 释义

“语境定义”的另一表述。

### 帕累托改良

见“帕累托最佳度”条。

### 帕累托最佳度

以意大利经济学家和社会学家 V. 帕累托命名的一个原则,也称帕累托效率,指这样一种状态:在那样一种状态中,如果不使另一个人更坏,则一个人不能变得更好。一种至少使某人境况更佳,但不使任何一个人更坏的变化,被称作帕累托改良。在这种情形中,至少有一个人偏爱 X 而不是 Y,但没有人把 Y 看做比 X 更好。而从 Y 变到 X 确实改善了整个社会的福利。帕累托最佳度和帕累托改良被广泛地接受为是辩护或批评经济政策变化的标准。它们也被用来评价福利的功利性增长而不需要比较人际间的功利。由于在社会背景中每一次政策改变将产生一类失败者,因而帕累托改良是很难实现的。

“经济学家所熟悉的概念帕累托效率(或帕累托最佳度)这一概念是一种相当不同的事情。如果不使任何人更糟而至少使一个人处境更好,则不能对分配作任何改变,即这种分配或方法合乎帕累托效率。”——德沃金:《原则问题》,1986年,第239页。

### 最经济原则

“奥康剃刀”的另一个名称。

### 部分的概念

在康德看来,每个概念一般都包含其他概念,即各种谓项,它们能共同地应用于这个概念

the object or instance of this concept. A predicate contained in this concept is a partial concept, for it can identify its object only in virtue of being conjoined with other predicates contained in the same concept. All partial concepts are related, either co-ordinately, such as being a man and being rational, or subordinately, such as being a man and being an animal. The process of clarifying all partial concepts and their relationships is conceptual analysis, and the result of this process is an analytic judgement.

“For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with parts and proceed from these to the whole.”—Kant, *Logic*, Introduction, VIII.

## Participation

[Greek: *methexis*, from the verb *metechein*, to participate, to share in and to partake] In Plato's theory of Forms, particular things possess some characteristic because they participate in the relevant Forms; e. g., beautiful things are beautiful because they participate the form “beauty”. So particular things are only the less complete realisation of the form. However, the form is one, and particular things are many, how can one single form be in many things at the same time? In what way do things participate a Form? This is the problem of how universals can be in particulars. Plato formulates it in his self-criticism in the *Parmenides*, and the problem remains today. In his later dialogues Plato talks more about the participation of one Form in other Forms, rather than the participation of particular things in the Forms. Neo-platonism also uses this concept in the sense that the lower orders of beings participate in the higher.

“It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it participates in that absolute beauty, and for no other reason.”—Plato, *Phaedo*, 100c.

## Particular

[from Latin: *pars*, *partis*, part] For Aristotle, particulars cannot be predicated of things, in contrast to a universal, which can be predicated of many things. “Particular” is used an adjective for things that are partial, limited or some, rather than whole, unlimited or all. As a noun, “particular” has various applications, with some of them leading to philosophical dispute. As a single entity of a class or kind, a particular has a unique path through space and time and unlike universals cannot be instantiated by other entities, however similar they are to the initial particular. A particular is a unity, in contrast to an aggregation of things. If we maintain the notion of substance, a particular is a substance which bears attributes, qualities or properties, whilst attributes are universals. Particulars include historical events, material objects, people and their shadows, but do not include qualities and properties, numbers and species. Particulars should be

的对象或事例。包含于这个概念中的谓项就是部分的概念，因为它只有同借助于那些包含于同一概念的谓项结合在一起才能识别其对象。所有的部分的概念都是相关的，或者是同位的（例如，“是一个人”和“是有理性的”），或者是从属的（例如，“是一个人”和“是一个动物”），澄清所有部分概念和它们的关系的过程就是概念分析；它的结果是分析判断。

“如果我制造一个明晰的概念，那么我从部分〔概念〕开始，由这些部分进展到整体。”——康德：《逻辑》，导言，VIII。

## 分有

[希腊词 *methexis*，源自动词 *metechein*，意指“分有”、“共有”、“参与”] 在柏拉图的形式学说里，特殊事物之所以具有某些特征，是因为它们分有了相关的形式，譬如，美的事物之所以是美的，是因为它们分有了“美”的形式。如此说来，特殊的事物只是形式的不完美的实现而已。尽管形式是一，特殊事物是多，但是单一的形式何以能够同时出现在许多事物中呢？事物又是以何种方式分有形式的呢？此乃共相如何成为殊相的问题。柏拉图在《巴门尼德篇》里以自我批评的方式对此做了详细的阐述，然而，这个问题一直延续至今。在后来的对话里，柏拉图谈论更多的是一种形式分有多种形式的问题，而不是特殊事物分有多种形式的问题。新柏拉图主义者也使用这一概念意指低级存在物分有高级存在物。

“在我看来，除了绝对美之外，所有其他美的东西之所以是美的，是因为它分有了那种绝对美，此外别无其他原因。”——柏拉图：《斐多篇》，100c。

## 殊相

[源自拉丁词: *pars*, *partis* (部分)] 在亚里士多德看来，殊相不能用作事物的谓词，与此相对，共相是可以作许多事物的谓词的。“殊相”用作形容词是指部分的、有限的或某些事物，而不是指全部的、无限的或所有的事物。作为一个名词，“殊相”有多种用法，其中有些引起了哲学争论。作为某一类或某一种中的一个单一个体，殊相有着独特的穿越时空的轨迹；与共相不同的是，殊相不能用其他个体说明，而相同的是，它们都是最初的殊相。一个殊相是一个统一体，与此相对的是许多事物的堆积。如果我们保留使用本体这一观念，殊相便是一个承载属性、性质或特性的本体，而属性则是共相。殊相包括历史事件、物质对象、人及他们的影子，但不包括性质、特性、数和属。殊相应当与“个别”相区分，因为虽然一切殊相都是个别，但许

distinguished from individuals, for while all particulars are individuals, many individuals, instead of being particulars, are abstract and general. Philosophers have different opinions about the ontological status of particulars, depending on their account of universals.

“A particular is defined as an entity which can only enter into complexes as the subject of a predication or as one of the terms of a relation, never as itself a predicate or a relation.” —Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 56.

### Particular proposition

In traditional syllogistic logic, propositions of the form “some S are P” or “some S are not P” are called particular propositions. Propositions of the first form, particular affirmative propositions, are symbolised as “I” (SIP), and propositions of the second form, particular negative propositions, are symbolised as “O” (SOP). In the predicate calculus, a particular affirmative proposition is analysed as “there is at least one x such that x is S and x is P”. Particular propositions are generally held to contain referring expressions and therefore to have existential import. Particular propositions are contrasted to universal propositions, that is propositions of the form “all S are P” and “all S are not P”. Together, these are the four basic types of propositions in traditional logic.

“The proposition ‘Some x’s are y’s’ makes an assertion about part of the class x and is, therefore, called a particular proposition.” —Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 1950, p. 46.

**Particularised quality**, another term for abstract particular

### Partition

The division of a class into sub-classes (each of which is called a partition class, and all of which jointly form an exclusive class), or a process of dividing a whole into its parts, as long as the parts are homogeneous with each other and with the whole. For instance, the property “having the same weight as” can divide a class in terms of weight into a sub-class which includes all objects with that weight. An object with that weight belongs to only one sub-class. Partition is closely related to the notion of equivalent class within which each member bears an equivalent relation to every other member. A related concept is resolution which is a process of exhibiting a whole in terms of its components. Both partition and resolution are forms of analysis.

“By partition is meant transforming what is first presented as a mere unit by exhibiting it in the form of a whole consisting of parts.” —Johnson, *Logic*, part II, 1921, p. 110.

多个别是抽象的，一般的，而殊相则不是。哲学家们根据各自对共相的理解，对殊相的本体论地位有不同的观点。

“殊相可定义为这样一个事物，它只是作为主谓关系中的主词或作为一种关系的一端而进入复合体，而其自身则不作谓词或联系。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第七卷，第56页。

### 特称命题

在传统三段论逻辑中，“某些S是P”或“一些S不是P”的命题形式叫做特称命题。第一种命题形式即特称肯定命题，用符号“I” (SIP) 表示，第二种命题形式是特称否定命题，用符号“O” (SOP) 表示。在谓词演算中，特称肯定命题被分析为：“至少存在一个x，以致这个x是S并且x是P”。特称命题一般被认为含有指称表达式，因此具有存在意义。特称命题相对于全称命题，后者的命题形式是“所有S是P”和“所有S不是P”，它们一起构成传统逻辑的四种基本类型的命题。

“命题‘某些x’s是y’s’作出了对某类x的部分的断定，因此被称为特殊命题。”——斯特宾：《现代逻辑导论》，1950年，第46页。

### 特殊化的质

“抽象殊相”的另一表述。

### 划分

把一个类分成子类（每一个子类叫做划分类，所有子类一起构成全类），或把一个整体分成其部分的过程，只要这些部分是相互同质的并且与整体也是同质的。例如，“与……有相同的重量”这个特性能够根据重量从一个类分出一个子类，后者包括有该重量的所有对象。具有该重量的某个对象只属于一个子类。划分与等价类的概念密切相关，在等价类中每一个元素与每一个其他元素有等价关系。一个相关的概念是分解 (resolution)，后者是根据其构成要素来展示一整体的过程。划分和分解都是分析的形式。

“所谓划分，是使初看起来是一纯粹单元的东西变形，其办法是显示它是由各部分组成的一个整体。”——约翰逊：《逻辑学》，第I卷，1921年，第110页。

**Partitive term**, Quine's expression for mass noun

### Pascal's wager

A practical argument to suggest that it is rational to believe in God, formulated by the French thinker Blaise Pascal in his *Pensées* (1670). Pascal initiated the use of practical argumentation as a new line of thought in support of Christian faith. If we cannot use metaphysics to prove decisively whether or not God exists, what then should we do? On the basis of his work on probability, Pascal claimed that belief in God is the soundest bet in face of the uncertainty of an after-life. If we believe, then God either exists or does not exist. If he does not exist, we lose little. If he exists, we will be awarded eternal bliss and avoid the possibility of going to the hell. Hence, the choice to be a believer carries with it the possibility of immense gain, while the choice not to believe carries with it the possibility of a vastly greater loss. This argument has been treated scornfully by critics, but it has been accepted by some as a legitimate theological use of practical reason. It can be placed in a context of examples from rational choice theory, although Pascal's wager concerns the choice of belief rather than action. For this reason, it is related to problems about the will and belief in James' pragmatism.

“Notwithstanding its methodological modernity as a course of argumentation cast in the mold of decision theory, the spirit of Pascal's Wager is thus profoundly conservative in its substantive message.” —Rescher, *Pascal's Wager*, 1985, p. 6.

**Passion**, see feeling

**Passive intellect**, see active intellect

### Past

The past is meant in some sense to contain what happened at an earlier time, but it is not clear that the past is real. Objectivists argue that the past exists independent of human minds and knowledge and provides a basis for historical statements. For sceptics, the past can hardly exist. What actually exists must be present, but if the past were present, it would not be the past. Because it is the past, it cannot exist. For subjectivists and relativists, the past exists merely as a construction of historians.

How, then, would it be possible to establish the truth of a statement about the past? For sceptics, the past does not exist and knowledge of the past is impossible. According to relativists, because the intentions and prejudices of historians

### 部分词

奎因用于指“总量词”的名称。

### 帕斯卡尔的赌博

假定相信上帝合理的一个实用论证，由法国思想家 B. 帕斯卡尔在他的《思想录》(1670)一书中系统表述。帕斯卡尔把实践论证的用途作为新的思想线索加以引入，以支持基督教信仰。如果我们不能运用形而上学来确切地证明上帝是否存在，那么，我们应该做什么呢？以他的或然性理论为基础，帕斯卡尔认为，相信上帝是面对来世不确定性的最为稳妥的赌博。如果我们相信，那么，上帝或者存在或者不存在。如果他不存在，我们没多少损失；如果他存在，我们将被赐予永远的福祉，避免进入地狱的可能性。因此，选择做一名信仰者意味着随之有巨大得益的可能性，而选择不相信则意味着随之有更巨大的受损的可能性。过去，批评家们对这个论证采取了蔑视对待的态度，但近来却被有些人接受，认为这是实践理性的一种合法的神学运用。它可以看做是理性选择理论的一例，虽然帕斯卡尔的赌博关注的是信仰的选择，而不是行为的选择。由于这一原因，它与詹姆斯实用主义关于意志与信念问题相关。

“虽然作为一个论证方向，它的方法论上的现代性具有决定论的性格，但帕斯卡尔赌博的精神就其实质性的使命来说，却是极其保守的。”——雷谢尔：《帕斯卡尔赌博》，1985年，第6页。

### 激情

见“情感”条。

### 被动理智

见“主动理智”条。

### 过去

从某种意义上讲，过去被解释为早些时候发生的事情，但过去是否是真实的并不清楚。客观主义者论证说，过去的存在是不依赖于人的心和知识的，过去为历史陈述提供了一个基础。对怀疑论者来讲，过去简直是不存在的。实际存在的只能是现实的，如果过去是现实的，那它就不是过去。因为它是过去，它不可能存在。在主观主义者和相对主义者看来，过去仅仅作为历史学家的建构而存在。

那么，如何才能确立关于过去的陈述的真实性？对怀疑论者来讲，过去是不存在的，因而关于过去的知识是不可能的。在相对主义者看来，由于历史学家的意志和偏见在历史探究中

are indispensable to historical inquiry, historical knowledge need not be rejected, but it is not objective. For objectivists, historical knowledge represents what really took place, but because historical statements are made on the basis of memory, testimony and evidence rather than on direct observation, we can still ask how it is possible to secure the reliability of statements about the past. Some claim that such statements are about the present rather than about the past, and others claim that they are rules for the prediction of future historical experiences. The existence and intelligibility of the past have been important topics in contemporary analytic philosophy.

“From my own part, I do not find anything excessively paradoxical in the view that propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those ‘historical’ experiences which are commonly said to verify them, and I do not see how else ‘pure knowledge of the past’ is to be analysed.” — Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1967, p. 102.

### Past-referring term

In our conceptual scheme, all expressions or terms describing present objects can be classified into three kinds: past-referring terms, temporally neutral terms and future-referring terms. Past-referring terms apply to present events or objects in a way which entails the existence of an event or object at an earlier time logically related to the present object. For example, to call a woman a mother entails that she gave a birth to a child. Temporally neutral terms apply to present events or objects, but do not imply any reference to past or future items. For example, to call somebody a man does not imply anything about the past or future. Future-referring terms apply to present items in a way which is conditioned by their reference to some future objects or events. For example, to call a woman a mother-to-be entails that she will give birth at some future time. Historical language is rich in past-referring terms, but philosophers and logicians argue over the possibility of determining the truth-value of historical statements which contains past-referring terms.

“By a past-referring term, I shall mean a term, whose correct application to a present object or event, logically involves a reference to some earlier object or event which may or may not be causally related to the object to which the term is applied.” — A. C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 1965, p. 71.

### Paternalism

[from Latin: *pater*, father] Paternalism is derived from parental caring towards one's children. In ethics it means interfering with another person's liberty or freedom in the belief that one is promoting the good of that person, or preventing harm from occurring to that person, even if one's action provokes that person's disagreement or protest. Paternalism is challenged by liberalism and is now often viewed as

是不可避免的,对历史知识虽无需拒绝,但它却不是客观的。对客观主义者而言,历史知识描述的是真实发生的事情,但由于历史陈述是根据记忆、证明和证据而不是根据直接观察做出的,我们还可提出如何才能保证关于过去的陈述的可靠性问题。一些人认为,这样的陈述是关于现在的陈述而不是关于过去的陈述,另一些人则认为,它们是对未来历史经验做出预言的规则。过去的存在和可理解性一直是当代分析哲学的一个重要课题。

“就我个人而言,我没有发现这样一种观点中有什么过多自相矛盾的东西,这种观点就是:有关过去的陈述是对那些‘历史’经验做出预言的规则,这些经验通常被说成是对那些历史陈述的证实。我看不出其他‘纯粹的有关过去的知识’是如何被分析的。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1967年,第102页。

### 指称过去的用语

在我们的概念体系中,所有描述现存物体的语词和术语可分为三类:指称过去的用语,时间中立的用语和指称将来的用语。指称过去的用语是通过使早些时候存在的事件或物体与现存物体在逻辑上相联而应用于现存事件或物体的。例如,叫一个女人“妈妈”,意味着她生过一个小孩。时间中立的用语应用于现存的事件或物体,但不含有与过去或将来的东西的联系。例如,称某人“一个男人”不含有涉及过去或将来的内容。指称将来的用语通过规定现存事件或物体与某些将来的事件或物体的联系而应用于现存的事件或物体。例如,称一个女人“未来的妈妈”,意味着她将来要生小孩。历史语言含有丰富的指称过去的用语,但哲学家和逻辑学家对包含指称过去的用语的历史陈述的真值能否确定存在争议。

“就指称过去的用语而言,我指的是这样一个术语,将其正确地应用于现存的物体或事件,就在逻辑上包含着与某一更早的物体或事件的关系,这更早的物体或事件与这一术语所应用的物体或事件也许有因果联系,也许没有因果联系。”——丹托:《分析的历史哲学》,1965年,第71页。

### 家长主义

[源自拉丁词 *pater*, 意为父亲]家长主义源于父母对自己孩子的关怀。在伦理学中,它意为某人干涉另一个人的自由,而相信他这样做正在促进他所干涉的那人的善,或使他所干扰自由的人免遭伤害,即使这个行动引起了那人的反对或抗议。家长主义受到自由主义的挑战,在现代社会一般被认为是自由、自主和个人权

a violation of liberty, autonomy, and individual rights. It can be justified towards moral patients who do not have a sufficient degree of rationality to choose and act.

“Paternalistic intervention must be justified by the evident failure or absence of reason and will.”—Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 250.

### Pathetic fallacy

The term was introduced by John Ruskin in *Modern Painters*, vol. 3 (1856), referring to the alleged fallacy that projecting or ascribing human emotions, intentions, dispositions and thoughts to inanimate things as if they were really capable of these qualities. For instance, one is committing this fallacy if one says that weather is friendly or that the sea is angry. In general, it means the human tendency to project our subjective feeling caused by the external thing into the external thing itself.

“Pathetic fallacy... is the fallacy of treating a psychological relation as an independently existing property.”—Sorensen, *Thought Experiments*, 1992, p. 128.

### Pathos

[Greek: suffering, feeling or what happens to affect a person; plural, *pathe*; from *paschein*, to suffer, to undergo, to experience] For Aristotle, *paschein* and the contrasting *poiein* (to make, to do) are both categories. *Pathos* has a passive tone. In Greek, *pathos* is a changeable quality, but especially concerns extreme grief, misfortune or distress. As the feeling of an individual, it is also contrasted with *ethos* (communal feeling).

“By *pathe*, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, in general whatever implies pleasure or pain.”—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b22-4.

### Patriarchy

[from Greek: *pater*, father + *arche*, rule] Originally, a social system centred around an extended family with a male as its leader (patriarch). For many feminists, patriarchy is the universally perpetuated male power over women and male aggression toward women. They claim that a patriarchal attitude or prejudice runs through all economic and social institutions. Societies are often patriarchal in the sense that the male half of the population uses various deeply embedded means to control the female half. A main concern of radical feminism is to uncover the roots of patriarchy and to reveal its various representative forms.

“Patriarch is a name was coined to denote the universal domination of women by men.”—Nyre, *Feminist Theory and the Philosophy of Men*, 1988, p. 95.

利的侵犯,但对于“道德被动者”则被看做是合理的。道德被动者即是缺乏足够的理性程度来选择行为的人。

“如有明显的理性或意志的缺失,家长主义的干涉就是合理的。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第250页。

### 感情误置

这个词由J. 拉斯金在其《现代画家》(第3卷,1856年)一书中引入,用来指称这样一种误置,即将人类的感情、意向、脾气和思想投射到或归到无生命的东西上,仿佛它们真的能够具有这些品性似的。例如,如果一个人说“天气友善”或“大海愤怒”,就犯了这种误置的错误。一般说来,这种误置就意味着这样一种人类倾向,它将我们由外物引起的主观感情投射到了外物本身上面。

“感情误置……是将心理关系当做独立的存在特性的错误。”——索尔森:《思想实验》,1992年,第128页。

### 感受

[希腊词,指遭受,情感或一切影响一个人所发生的事。复数是 *pathe*, 它来自动词 *paschein* (遭受,经受,经验)] 在亚里士多德哲学中, *paschein* 与相反的动词 *poiein* (制作,做)都是范畴。感受具有被动的含义。在希腊文中, *pathos* 是一种可变的质,但特别是指极度的悲哀、不幸或痛苦。作为个人情感,它也与 *ethos* (公共情感)相对立。

“所谓感受,我是指欲望,愤怒,恐惧,信心,嫉妒,欢喜,爱,恨,盼望,羡慕,怜悯等一般而言隐含快乐或痛苦的东西。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1105b22—24。

### 父权制

[源自希腊文: *pater* (父亲)和 *arche* (统治)] 最初指的是围绕以一个男人为领导(父权)的扩大的家庭为核心的社会制度。对很多女性主义者来说,父权制是男权对妇女的普遍的永久性的压迫和男人对妇女的侵犯。他们认为父权制的看法或偏见贯穿于所有经济和社会的组织机构及其制度。从占人口半数的男人使用各种深藏的手段控制半数的妇女这种意义上讲,社会常常是父权制的社会。激进的女性主义主要关注的一个问题是揭露父权制的根源和展示其种种有代表性的形式。

“父权制是一个创造出来用以表示男人对妇女的普遍统治的名词。”——尼雷:《女性主义理论和男人的哲学》,1988年,第95页。

### Peirce's thesis

The claim that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the evidence for its truth. In other words, the conditions of semantic evaluation supervene upon confirmation relations or confirmation relations are semantic relations. This is a form of verificationism which equates meaning with evidence. According to this theory, if two theories have different entailments, they differ with respect to what observation statements are true.

"Peirce's thesis just is the claim that confirmation relations constitute semantic relations and are therefore not contingent." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 51.

### Per accidens

[Latin: by accident] A scholastic term for the accidents possessed by a substance or for the non-essential properties which a thing has but which it may lose without changing its nature. A *per accidens* predication is a predication in which an accident is predicated of a substance. A *per accidens* thing is either an accident or a composite of a substance and an accident. *Per accidens* contrasts with *per se* (Latin: by itself), which is a substance itself or is the essential property which a thing possesses and cannot lose without changing its nature. In scholastic philosophy, God alone is a being *per se* in the absolute sense, for anything else will have to depend on God for existence. Sometimes, *per se* means what is directly intended in an action, while *per accidens* is a result which is not directly intended.

"All that exists of another (*quod est per accidens*) comes back to what exists of itself (*quod est per se*)." —Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 49, 3.

*Per se*, see *per accidens*

### Percepta

The term for the properties which an observer actually perceives or observes. *Percepta* contrast with *percipienda*, the properties which we think that an object should appear to have, according to our knowledge of its nature and its position. When I watch a round tower from a distance, it is round according to *percipienda*, but might be square according to *percepta*. There are various forms of discrepancy between the *percepta* and *percipienda* of a given object. One may change while another not. This distinction is useful in discussing the nature of perceptual consciousness.

"I shall use the term 'percepta' or 'actually perceived properties' to refer to how the object actually appears to an observer." —Hirst, *The Problem of Perception*, 1959, p. 246.

### 皮尔士论题

它认为, 一个句子的意义是由证明其为真的证据所确定的, 换句话说, 语义评价的条件伴随着确证关系, 或者确证关系是语义关系。这是把意义等同于证据的一种证实主义形式。根据这种理论, 如果两个理论有着不同的内容, 那么它们在为真的观察陈述方面也是不同的。

"皮尔士论题只是认为, 确证关系构成了语义关系, 因而它们不是偶然的。" ——福多和拉普: 《整体论》, 1992年, 第51页。

### 偶性地

[拉丁语, 偶性地] 经院哲学术语, 指实体具有的偶性, 或指一物具有但如果失去不会改变该物本性的那种非本质特性。*Per accidens* 的术语是实体由偶性陈述的术语。*Per accidens* 的事物或指偶性, 或指实体和偶性的合成物。*Per accidens* 对应于 *per se* (拉丁语, 由自身), 而 *Per se* 指实体本身, 或指一物具有且不能失去, 否则会改变该物本性的那种本质特性。在经院哲学中, 只有上帝能是绝对意义上的 *per se* 的存在, 因为其他的任何事物将不得不依赖上帝才能存在。有时, *per se* 意指在行为中直接企图的东西, *per accidens* 则是不直接企图的结果。

"由偶性而存在的一切, 都背对由自身而存在的东西。" ——阿奎那: 《神学大全》, Ia, 49, 3。

### 由自身

见“偶性地”条。

### 实际知觉特性

指一个知觉者真正知觉或观察到的特性。它与“应当知觉特性”相对, 后者是我们根据我们关于客体的本质和地位的知识认为一个对象应当看起来具有的特性。当我从远处看一个圆形的塔时, 根据应当知觉特性它是圆的, 但根据实际知觉特性它却可能是方的。一个给定对象的“实际知觉特性”与“应当知觉特性”之间有各种不同形式的差异。其中的一个可能发生变化, 而另一个却没有变化。这一区分在关于知觉意识的讨论中是有用的。

"我将使用‘实际知觉特性’或‘实际知觉到的特性’这一术语来指对象对一个观察者所真正呈现的样子。" ——赫斯特: 《知觉问题》, 1959年, 第246页。

## Perception

The faculty of being aware of the world, the contents of sensory experience, and what is perceived. Perception involves both our capacity to be sensorily affected by external objects and our ability to bring these objects under concepts, although other capacities might also have a role to play. The analysis of perception and the attempt to deal with sceptical arguments about perceptual knowledge are central philosophical topics, in particular in epistemology. A major problem is whether we directly perceive sense data or the external physical world. This is related to problems about nature of the external world and our knowledge of it. Perception is the area where scepticism functions actively and where the distinction between phenomenalism and realism is sharply drawn. There are various positions about how to understand perception, such as the causal theory of perception, the representative theory of perception, and various forms of perceptual realism. There are also competing accounts of the relations between perception and belief and between perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge.

“‘Perception’ is a generic term which may be defined disjunctively as either seeing or hearing or touching or ... etc. Perception, in short, is awareness of the external world through the senses.” —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 120.

## Percepts

Sometimes identified with sense-data. Whereas sense-data directly represent particulars and concrete items, percepts are closer to subjective states in an act of perception. Percepts are contrasted with concepts, which are the abstractions in thinking.

“The immediate object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the percept.” —*Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 1933, 4: 538.

## Perceptual consciousness

The consciousness which is presented in the same way in normal perception, illusion and hallucination. The term is introduced by H. H. Price in order to deal with the relation in perception between sense-data and material objects and to uncover the nature of perceiving. However, the nature of perceptual consciousness itself is disputed. Some philosophers believe that it consists in seeing a datum and judging or inferring that the datum belongs to a material object. For others, including Price, perceptual consciousness senses a datum and takes it for granted that it belongs to a material object.

The dispute between “judging” and “taking for granted” in an account of perceiving is characteristic of many philosophical arguments in which slight verbal differences signal important theoretical conflicts.

## 知觉

意识这个世界的官能，感性经验的内容和所感觉到的东西。知觉既是指我们受外界对象感性影响的能力，也是指把这些对象归属于概念的能力，虽然其他的能力也起这种作用。对知觉的分析和解决有关感性知识的怀疑主义论证，是主要的哲学论题，尤其是在认识论中。一个主要的问题是，我们是否可直接感觉到感性材料或外部的客观世界。这是与外部世界和我们对外部世界的知识相关的问题。正是在这个知觉领域，怀疑论极为活跃，现象论和实在论的区分鲜明。关于理解知觉有许多理论，诸如知觉的因果论，知觉的反映论，和各种形式的知觉实在论。关于知觉与信念的关系、感性知识和推理知识的关系也有许多讨论。

“‘知觉’是一个一般性概念，可分别界定为看、听、接触、或……等等。总之，知觉是通过感官对外部世界的意识。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949年，第120页。

## 知觉对象

有时等同于“感觉材料”。感觉材料直接代表殊相和具体的东西，而知觉对象则与知觉活动中的主体状态更为接近。“知觉对象”与概念相对，后者指思维中的抽象物。

“在最终的分析中，所有知识和思维的直接对象是知觉对象。”——《C. S. 皮尔士文集》，1933年，第4卷，第538页。

## 知觉意识

与在正常的知觉、错觉和幻觉中相同的方式呈现的意识。H. H. 普赖斯提出这个术语是为了处理知觉中感觉材料和物质对象之间的关系，发现知觉活动的性质。然而，知觉意识的性质本身引起了争议。有的哲学家认为，它由看见一感觉材料，判断或推论出感觉材料属于物质对象构成。包括普赖斯在内的其他人认为知觉意识感觉到一感觉材料，并认为它属于物质对象是不言而喻的。

在说明知觉行为时，“判断”和“视为不言而喻”之间的争执是许多哲学论证中的典型特征，其中一点微小的言词差别都标志着重大的理论冲突。

“我们必须为我们已经谈论过的意识的非感觉方式找到某个名称。至于现在，我们将简单

“We must find some name for the non-sensuous mode of consciousness of which we have spoken. For the present we shall simply call it ‘perceptual consciousness’.” —H. H. Price, *Perception*, p. 25.

### Perceptual knowledge

Knowledge about the world around us acquired through the activation of our sense organs, especially our eyes. We know that we can cross the street when we see that the traffic light is green. Perceptual knowledge is concerned with perceptual facts, and so must be distinguished from the perception of simple objects. It is not sensation, pure perception or mere acquaintance. Perceptual knowledge is associated with previously acquired ideas. A proposition of the form “S knows that P” reports perceptual knowledge if P is a perceptual proposition. It is controversial whether sense perception itself can lead to justified beliefs. While direct realism insists that experience itself can provide the justification required for this kind of knowledge, many other philosophers believe that such knowledge must involve some background knowledge or assumptions about connecting regularities which might be gained by inductive inference from past observations.

“Perceptual knowledge is knowledge that one sees or hears or smells or tastes or feels some specific sort of non-mental thing (s) or state (s) of affairs or event (s).” —Ginet, *Knowledge, Perception and Memory*, 1995, p. 82.

**Percipienda**, see *percepta*

**Perennial philosophy**, English expression for *philosophia perennis*

**Perfect duty**, see *imperfect duty*

**Perfection, the principle of**, another expression for the principle of the best

### Perfectionism

The ethical position which claims that the good of human actions consists in whether they promote the maximal realisation of human excellence, measured by the ideal standards of perfection in fields such as art, science and culture. This theory presupposes that there are certain kinds of activities or experiences that possess the highest values and the deepest significance and encourages people to pursue these activities and experiences. It supposes that some human beings are intrinsically inferior to other human beings and that some forms of human life are intrinsically inferior to other forms of human life. Hence it endorses an aristocratic view of

地将其称为‘知觉意识’。”——普赖斯：《知觉》，1961年，第25页。

### 知觉知识

通过我们的感官活动特别是眼睛的活动而得到的关于我们周围世界的知识。我们知道，当我们看到交通灯是绿的时候，我们就可以穿越街道。知觉知识关心的是知觉的事实，因此必须把它与关于简单对象的知觉区分开来。它不是感觉、纯粹的知觉或简单的感性认识。知觉知识是与先前获得的观念相联系的。如果P是一个知觉命题的话，那么，一个具有“S知道P”这种形式的命题表达的就是知觉知识。但对感性知觉本身是否能够带来得到辨明的信念，这尚有争论。直接的实在论坚持认为，经验本身就可以产生这种知识所需要的辨明，而其他许多哲学家则相信，这种知识必定包含了有关连接规律的背景知识或假设，这些规律是可以通过对过去观察的归纳推理得到的。

“知觉知识就是人们看到、听到、闻到、尝到或感觉到某种特殊的非心的事物或事态或事件的知识。”——吉内特：《知识、知觉和记忆》，1995年，第82页。

### 应当知觉特性

见“实际知觉特性”条。

### 永恒哲学

“永恒哲学 (*philosophia perennis*)”的英文词。

### 完全职责

见“不完全职责”条。

### 最完善世界原则

“最好世界原理”的另一表述。

### 完美主义

这种伦理立场主张，人类行为的善在于是否有利于人类的卓越的最大实现，其衡量的尺度就是在诸如艺术、科学、文化领域里的完美的理想标准。这个理论的前提条件是，某种活动或经验具有最高的价值和最深的意义，并鼓励人们追求这些活动和经验。它设定某些人是内在地低于其他人的，并认为有些人类生活的方式是内在地低于其他方式的。因此它赞成有关人类社会的贵族观而反对平等主义。它认为一个社会应当安排得可以最大程度地获得人类的卓越。罗尔斯用这个概念指亚里士多德和尼采持

human society and is opposed to egalitarianism. It argues that a society should be so arranged as to maximise the achievement of human excellence. John Rawls employed this term to refer to the position held by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Rawls argues that since the notion of intrinsic value is controversial, perfectionism should be bypassed as a political principle.

“Teleological doctrines differ, pretty clearly, according to how the conception of the good is specified. It is taken as the realisation of human excellence in the various forms of culture, we have what may be called perfectionism.” — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 25.

**Performance and competence**, see competence and performance

### Performative

Austin's term for utterances which are contrasted with ordinary statements, or constatives. The distinction mainly consists in two aspects. First, while a constative merely states an independently existing fact, a performative utterance, such as “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth”, or “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow”, does not describe anything, but constitutes an action. Such sentences actually do something in the appropriate circumstances, that is naming or betting. Secondly, while the truth or falsity of a constative is determined by the distinct fact or state of affairs it describes, a performative is open to assessment according to whether it is a happy or unhappy act, not in terms of truth and falsity. Austin made a great effort to establish a clear-cut distinction between constatives and performatives because he believed that many philosophical problems have arisen because people do not understand the nature of performatives. But Austin was unable to find a satisfactory criterion for performatives, and he gave up this distinction in favour of his theory of illocution in *How to Do Things With Words*.

“The name [performative] is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’; it indicates that the issuing of the utterances is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something.”—Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, pp. 6-7.

### Performative theory of truth

A form of deflationary theory of truth, ascribed to Peter Strawson. It claims that the truth predicate is used not to describe things, but to perform certain speech acts such as agreeing, conceding or endorsing. By saying “That is true” we agree or endorse another speaker's utterance. The primary characteristic of truth is to perform this endorsing or confirmatory speech function. The theory is also called the amen theory of truth.

有的观点。罗尔斯认为,由于内在价值的概念是易于引起争议的,完美主义不应作为一个政治原则。

“很明显,根据怎样说明善的概念,目的论的学说是不同的。它被看做是在不同形式的文化中的人类卓越的实现,这样我们就有了所谓完美主义。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第25页。

### 运用和能力

见“能力和运用”条。

### 完成行为式

奥斯汀的术语,是指与普通陈述或记述式相对而言的话语。这种区别主要有两个方面:首先,记述式只是陈述独立存在的事实,而完成行为式话语,诸如“我命名这条船为伊丽莎白号”或“我向你赌六个便士明天下雨”,它们并没有描述任何东西,而只是构成了一种行为。这种语句实际上是在某种恰当的场合做某个事情,即命名或打赌。其次,记述式的真假是由它所描述的确事实或事态决定的,而对完成行为式的评价则以得体或不得体,而不是以真假为标准的。奥斯汀竭尽全力地确立记述式与完成行为式之间的明确区分,因为他相信,许多哲学问题的出现都是由于人们不了解完成行为式的性质。但奥斯汀无法找到一种令人满意的完成行为式标准,所以他在《如何以言行事》中放弃了这种区分而采取他的以言行事理论。

“这个名称[完成行为式]当然来自‘行动’,即名词‘行为’的普通动词形式:它表明,说出话语就是在完成行为——这并不是通常认为的那种只是说出某些东西。”——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》,1962年,第6—7页。

### 真理履行论

真理紧缩(deflationary)论的一种形式,由P. 斯特劳森提出。它宣称,真谓词不是用来描述事物的,而是用来展示某种言语行为的,如同意、承认、赞成等。通过说“那是真的”,我们就同意或赞成了另一个说话者的话语。真理的首要特征就在于这种赞成或肯定的言语功能。这种理论亦称“真理的阿门(amen)理论”。

“较不熟悉的情形是斯特劳森对真理的履

“A less familiar case is Strawson’s performative account of truth. This turns on ... the fact that by saying ‘That is true’ we can endorse an utterance made by another speaker.” —Price, *Facts and the Functions of Truth*, 1988, p. 26.

### Peripatetics

A term applied to Aristotle and his pupils. According to tradition, the term was derived from *peripatein* (to walk about) because Aristotle and his pupils were said to spend long periods every day walking up and down discussing advanced philosophical questions in the garden of the Lyceum, the school Aristotle founded in 335, BC. But according to another account, the term was derived from *peripatos* (covered walking hall), which was a part of the Lyceum. The Peripatetics whose names are known include Theophrastus of Eresus, Strato of Lampsacus and Eudemus of Rhodes. If the chief characteristic of Plato’s Academy was its mathematical achievement, the Peripatetics contributed greatly to various natural sciences, in particular to botany, biology and medicine. In the Hellenistic period, the Peripatetics, Academics, Stoics and Epicureans were the four major schools in Athens.

“The Peripatetic school, as an institution comparable to the Academy, was probably not founded until after [Aristotle’s] death. But with some distinguished students and associates he collected a natural history museum and library of maps and manuscripts ... and organised a program of research which inter alia laid the foundation for all histories of Greek natural philosophy, mathematics and astronomy, and medicine.” —Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, 1986, p. 151.

### Perlocutionary act

Austin’s term for his third kind of speech act. While illocutionary acts are concerned with meaning, and illocutionary acts are concerned with the way an utterance is taken, perlocutionary acts are linguistic acts which by saying something with design or intention, bring about specific effects on the feelings, thoughts or behaviour of the hearers, for example, persuading or convincing someone to do something. It is essentially a consequential act.

“Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons ... We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution.” —Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, p. 101.

Perseity, see aseity

行式说明。这依赖于……下述事实，即通过说‘那是真的’，我们能够赞成另一个说话者所说的话语。”——普赖斯：《事实和真理的功用》，1988年，第26页。

### 散步学派

此名用以指亚里士多德及其学生〔或译作“逍遥学派”〕。根据传统，该词出自 *peripatein* (散步, 漫步), 据说亚里士多德和他的学生每天花许多时间在里克昂(亚里士多德于公元前335年所创的学校)的花园中边散步边讨论高深的哲学问题。可另一种说法是, 该词出自 *peripatos* (有顶的散步廊)。那是里克昂设施的一部分。著名的散步学派成员包括爱里苏斯的泰奥弗拉斯多、朗伯塞库斯的斯特拉多及罗特的欧德谟斯。如果柏拉图学院派的主要特征是其数学成就, 散步学派则对众多自然科学贡献良多, 尤其是在植物学、生物学和医学方面。在晚期希腊时代, 散步学派与学院派、斯多亚派和伊壁鲁鲁派一起是雅典的四个主要学派。

“散步派学派, 作为一个可与学院相比的机构, 可能是在〔亚里士多德〕死后才建立的。但与他的一些杰出的学生和助手一起, 亚里士多德收集了一个自然史博物馆, 一个藏有地图和手稿的图书馆……还组织了一个研究项目, 这一项目的众多贡献之一是奠定了希腊自然哲学、数学、天文学和医学的历史基础。”——欧文:《逻辑、科学和辩证法》, 1986年, 第151页。

### 以言取效的行为

奥斯汀所说的第三种言语行为。以言表意的行为关心的是意义, 以言行事的行为关心的是说出一句话所用的方式, 而以言取效的行为则是语言行为, 这种行为通过说出带有设想或意图的东西, 对听者的情感、思想或行为产生特别的效果。例如, 敦促或确信某人做某事。这基本上是一种后果性的行为。

“说出什么东西, 通常会或往往会对听众、说者或其他人的情感、思想或行为产生一定的后果……我们把运用这种行为称作运用以言取效的行为或以言取效。”——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》, 1962年, 第101页。

自主

见“自足性”条。

## Person

[from Latin; *persona*, mask or actor, a man's role or dignity in relation to other men] In theological usage, *persona* is the equivalent of the Greek *hypostasis* (standing under) and is closely related to the notion of *ousia* (substance). For Boethius, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature.

Locke argued that consciousness provides the criterion of being the same person over time, although being a person presupposes having a body. Locke in turn identified consciousness with memory. He also held that person is a forensic notion that is related to responsibility and to reward and punishment. Hence in a legal sense, there can be artificial persons, like companies, as well as natural persons, so long as persons have legal responsibility and status. For Descartes and later dualists, a person is a combination of a mind and a body that are essentially distinct. In contrast, Strawson held that "person" is a logically primitive technical term. A person owns both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics, but cannot be reduced either to something mental or to something physical. The concept of a person is presupposed by both physical states and state of consciousness. Strawson's arguments have led to much discussion and have helped to place the nature of a person as a central topic in contemporary metaphysics.

Metaphysics usually discusses persons rather than human beings, partly to leave conceptual room for non-human persons and partly to avoid giving too much emphasis to biological classification in forming the concept of a person. Some forms of species-based naturalism would challenge both of these motives. The notion of a person implies that the central phenomena of personhood, such as thinking, experiencing, acting and having moral worth are related to one another, although many philosophers would defend the status of severely brain-damaged human beings as persons.

"What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type." —Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, pp. 101-2.

### Person-affecting restriction

A position which claims that the evaluation of moral choices should appeal to the outcome produced by the choices for the persons affected. If choice A brings a worse outcome than choice B to at least some specific individuals and if choice B does not bring a worse outcome than choice A to any specific individuals, then choice A is worse than choice B. According to Derek Parfit, such a restriction can be applied universally in moral areas. Many choices, particularly those involving the interests of future generations, cannot be

## 人

[源自拉丁文 *persona* (面具或演员), 一个人在与他人关系中的角色或尊严] 在神学的用法中, *persona* 是希腊词 *hypostasis* (处在……之下) 的对应词, 与 *ousia* (实体或本体) 的概念有密切关系。在波埃修斯看来, 一个人就是一个具有理性本质的单个实体。

洛克论证说, 虽然要成为一个人必须先要有身体, 但是, 意识为某个人在一段时间后仍为同一个人提供了标准。洛克转而又将意识等同于记忆。他还认为人的概念是与责任、赏罚相关的论辩的概念。因此, 在法律的意义上, 既可以有自然人, 也可以有人为的人, 如各种公司, 只要这些“人”有法律责任和地位。对于笛卡尔和后来的二元论者来说, 一个人就是在本质上截然不同的心与身的结合。与此相反, 斯特劳森认为, “人”是一个逻辑上原始的专用词。一个人拥有意识状态和肉体特性两者, 但是他既不能还原为心的东西, 也不能还原为物的东西。人的概念是以物理状态和意识状态两者为先决条件的。斯特劳森的证明引起了许多讨论, 使得人的性质问题被确立为当代形而上学的中心论题。

形而上学通常讨论人而不讨论人类, 部分是为了在概念上给非人类的人 (non-human persons) 留出余地, 部分是为了避免在形成人的概念时过分强调生物学上的分类。某些形式的自然主义是以物种为根据的, 它们会向上述两种动机提出异议。人的概念意味着, 人的主要现象, 诸如思维、经验、行动、具有道德价值等, 都是互相关联的, 尽管许多哲学家会捍卫人类中严重脑损伤者仍具有的人的地位。

“我用人的概念指的是那样一种类型的存在物的概念, 即属于意识状态的谓词和属于肉体特性、物理状态等的谓词, 都可以同样用于那个单独类型[存在物]的一个单一个体上。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》, 1959年, 第101—102页。

### 人的影响的限定

这一见解认为, 道德选择的评价应诉诸于这些选择对受影响的人所产生的结果。如果至少对某些具体的人而言, 选择A产生了一个比选择B更坏的结果; 如果对任何具体的人而言, 选择B没有产生一个比选择A更坏的结果; 那选择A就比选择B更坏。按照D. 帕菲特的看法, 这种限定可被普遍应用于道德领域。很多选择, 特别是那些包含后代人利益的选择, 不能由它们对未来个人的影响来判断, 因为我

judged by their effects on future individuals because we have no way of telling what individuals there will be.

“The Person-affecting Restriction: This part of morality, the part concerned with human well-being, should be explained entirely in terms of what would be good or bad for those people whom our acts affect.” —Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 1984, Set. 134.

### Personal identity

In a popular sense, personal identity is determined by the fundamental values, loyalties, associations and aims of a person's life. In contrast, the philosophical investigation of personal identity seeks to explain the criteria by which an individual is identified as the same person at different times, in spite of having changed characteristics. The problem of personal identity (also called the problem of the self or the problem of self-identity or the problem of self-knowledge) arises from the difficulties in accounting for how the ascription of personal identity is justified. Since the discussion of personal identity concentrates on the necessary and sufficient conditions under which we recognise or re-identify a person, the problem is also called the problem of the criteria of personal identity, although criterial relations can be looser than those set out by necessary and sufficient conditions.

Locke and Hume provided two classic discussions of personal identity. Locke claimed that the criterion of personal identity is consciousness, in particular memory. His position has been attacked as not providing sufficient conditions for personal identity by those who argue that personal identity is impossible without bodily continuity. Moreover, Locke's view seems circular if we distinguish between genuine memory and apparent memory. The memory test of personal identity seems to fail because genuine memory presupposes identity rather than providing an independent test for identity.

According to Hume, we perceive nothing but impressions and ideas and do not have an impression or idea of a unique and simple self. He therefore maintains that the notion of personal identity is a fiction. What we really have is a bundle or collection of particular perceptions, which we ascribe without justification (and perhaps without need of justification) to a continuing self.

Contemporary discussion is characterised by sophisticated testing of the arguments for the bodily criterion and the memory criterion of personal identity. Discussion has been shaped by considerations of the logic of identity, which is an all or nothing relationship and a relationship which blocks two distinct entities at the same time from being identical with one another. In particular, thought experiments about split-brains indicate that an apparent advantage for the bodily criterion is illusory. The English philosopher Derek Parfit argues that attempts to cope with the problem of personal identity fail, but that what is really important to us is conti-

们无法说出将来的个人是什么样的。

“人的影响的限定：道德的这一部分，即涉及人的幸福的部分，应当完全以对受我们影响的那些人将是好是坏来解释。”——帕菲特：《理性与人》，1984年，第134节。

### 人格的同一性

在通常的意义上，人格的同一性是根据一个人生活中的基本价值、忠诚、交际和目标来确定的。与此相对照，哲学对人格同一性的探讨力图对一些标准作出说明，根据这些标准，一个人被认为在不同时间里是同一个人，而不管他的特点已经改变。人格同一性问题（也称作“自我等同问题”、“自我同一性问题”或“自我认识问题”）是在说明人格同一性的归因如何得到证明时所遇到的困难中产生的。既然对人格同一性的讨论集中在我们辨认或再认一个人时所依据的充要条件上，所以，这个问题也被称作人格同一性的标准问题，尽管标准关系可能不如根据充要条件表示的关系那么严格。

洛克和休谟提出了关于人格同一性的两个经典讨论。洛克声称，人格同一性的标准是意识，尤其是记忆。他的主张受到了抨击，因为它没有提供人格同一性的充足条件，那些抨击他的人论证说，没有肉体的持续，人格的同一性是不可能的。而且，如果我们将真正的记忆和表面的记忆区分开来，洛克的观点似乎陷入了循环。对人格同一性的记忆检验似乎是不成功的，因为真正的记忆是以同一性为先决条件的，而不是提供对同一性的独立检验。

根据休谟的观点，我们知觉的只是印象和观念，而且我们没有惟一而简单的自我的印象或观念。因此他坚持认为，人格同一性的概念是一个虚构。我们实际具有的是一把或一束特殊的知觉，我们没有正当理由（或许不需要正当的理由）就将它们归于一个持续的自我。

当代的讨论是以细致地检验对人格同一性的肉体标准和记忆标准的各种证明为特征的。讨论体现为对同一性逻辑的考察。同一性逻辑是一种或者全有或者全无的关系，一种阻止两个截然不同的实体同时互相等同的关系。尤其对裂脑人的思想实验表明，肉体标准的表面优势是虚幻的。英国哲学家D. 帕菲特论证说，解决同一性问题的尝试虽然失败了，但是，对我们真正重要的是在我们的生活中的持续性与关联性和我们作为人的生存。他声称这些事情可以被理解，而同时又避免了人格同一性的僵化。其他一些哲学家认为，对人格同一性的讨论应当更贴近于科学，而不是当前许多讨论中引进的对各种事例的科学虚构。奎因已经证明，人格的

nunity and connectedness in our lives and our survival as a person. He claims that these matters can be understood while avoiding the rigidities of personal identity. Other philosophers hold that the discussion of personal identity should be closer to science than to the science fiction of the examples introduced in many recent discussions. Quine has argued that the problem of personal identity adds nothing important to the more general problem of identity.

Personal identity is intensively discussed in contemporary philosophy for its own sake, but also because it is related to other major issues, such as dualism, survival and immortality, self-knowledge, responsibility, morality and the self.

“Philosophers are continuing the long-standing debate as to whether personal identity should be analysed in terms of the identity of the relevant bodies or in terms of some sort of continuity of memory and character.” —Brody, *Identity and Essence*, 1980, p. 3.

### Personalism

Also called personism, a philosophical movement that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century in the United States, with G. H. Howison, B. P. Bowne and E. S. Brightman as its leading proponents. According to its central doctrines, persons are ontologically ultimate and personality has the highest value. Experience, which discovers meaning, belongs to some self. All hypothetical and inferred entities must be reduced to the experience of a self, with their truth tested by their coherence with the total data of experience. Reality as a whole is an expression of a universal personal consciousness, and characteristics possessed by persons and their personality are the fundamental elements in the explanation of reality. For personalists, God is the external person who constitutes the most coherent value of all interactions.

Personalism, which has developed over the last two centuries, can be traced back to the theological use of the notion of person. The Greeks associated person and *hypothesis* (standing under) with the notion of *ousia* (substance). As a consequence, personalism has been integrally connected with theism, holding that God is the transcendent person and the creator of all other persons. Personalism has had realistic, absolutist, idealistic, pantheistic and other forms, many of which can be viewed as varieties of idealism. The exploration of human existence in existentialism and phenomenology has been influenced by personalism.

In a related use, personalism concerns ideas developed by the French philosophers and theologians E. Mounier, J. Maritain and E. Gilson, who claimed that God is an infinite person in contrast to finite persons like ourselves and that the autonomy and value of the person is of supreme importance.

The term personalism also designates the philosophy of

同一性问题并未给更基本的同一性问题增加任何重要东西。

在当代哲学中,人格的同一性因其本身之故被认真讨论,不过,这也是因为它与其他一些主要论题有关系,诸如二元论、生存和不朽、自我认识、责任、道德和自我等论题。

“哲学家们继续对人格的同一性应当根据有关的身体的同一性来分析,还是应当根据记忆和性格的某种持续性来分析,进行了长期的争论。”——布洛迪:《同一性和本质》,1980年,第3页。

### 人格主义

亦称 personism, 20 世纪上半叶流行于美国的一个哲学运动,主要倡导者有 G. H. 霍维森、B. P. 鲍恩和 E. S. 布赖特曼。根据它的核心学说,人在本体论意义上是第一的,人格具有最高价值。发现意义的经验属于某个自我。因此,一切假设的和推论的实体,连同靠它们与总体的经验材料的一致而被检验的真理,都必定被化归为自我的经验。作为整体的实在是普遍的个人意识的表现,个人具有的性格特征和人格是实在解释中的根本要素。在人格主义者看来,上帝是外在的人格,他构成一切相互作用的最有凝聚力的价值。

在上两个世纪得到了系统发展的人格主义,能被追溯到人之观念的神学运用。希腊人把“人”和本在(*hypothesis*,直译为“站在下面”)与本体(*ousia*)的观念相结合。结果,人格主义内在地与有神论相结合,认为神是超验的人,是一切其他人的创造者。人格主义有实在论、绝对论、观念论、泛神论和其他形式,其中的许多形式能被认作是观念论的不同种类。存在主义和现象学对于人类存在的探究,深受人格主义的影响。

人格主义还有一种相关的用法,指由法国哲学家和神学家 E. 穆尼埃、J. 马里旦和 E. 吉尔松等人发展的观念。他们主张,上帝是无限的人格,对应于像我们自己一样的有限人格,这种人格的自主和价值是最为重要的。

“人格主义”一词也指称由拉姆塞和德·费莱蒂开创,由沙伐奇发展的概率哲学。按照他们的观点,概率不是被发现的某种客观的东西,而是对命题真实性确信程度的一种人格表现。

“人格主义或人格论是这样的哲学理论:一

probability initiated by Ramsey and de Finetti and developed by L. J. Savage, according to which probability is a personal expression of a degree of confidence in the truth of a proposition and not something objective to be discovered.

“Personalism or personism is the philosophical theory that a person is (or many persons are) the supreme reality, i. e. highest in value and dominant in power.” —Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 326.

### Personality

The general character of being a person or the distinctive features of mind and character of an individual person. As a biological concept, personality is related to species membership. Philosophers of mind and philosophers of psychology are interested in personality as a psychological concept dealing with psychological functions, abilities and capacities. Moral philosophers are interested in ethical personality. Political and social philosophers are concerned with persons in relation to political or social entities. The conception of personality thus has different levels.

“Personality is the totality of human potentialities, activities, and habits organized by the person in the active pursuit of his self ideal.” —Arnold, in Mischel (ed), *Human Action*, 1969, p. 196.

### Perspective

The term Russell uses to refer to all the momentary sets of data, both perceived and unperceived, which present the universe from a certain point of view. In doing so he uses the subjective data of psychologists in their classification of particulars which correspond to the “things” used by physicists to classify objects. The actually perceived perspective is called by Russell a “private world”, that is the view of the world which a percipient has at any given moment. The totality of perspectives in an individual's life is that person's “biography”.

“The assemblage of all my present objects of sense, which is what I call a ‘perspective’.” —Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 1918, p. 139.

### Persuasive definition

A term introduced by Stevenson. In defining terms which have both descriptive meaning (referring to qualities in things), and strongly emotive meaning (expressing or arousing affective or emotional states), we alter the descriptive meaning but keep the emotive meaning unchanged in the term's application. The purpose of persuasive definition is, consciously or unconsciously, to secure a change in people's attitudes and interests. The speaker introduces a new sense which the hearer accepts without being aware that he is being influenced. For example, when Hitler claimed that “national

人格(或多个人格)是至上的实在,即在价值上最高,在力量上最具支配性。”——韦克美斯特:《美国哲学观念史》,1949年,第326页。

### 人格

作为一个人的一般性格或心灵的独特特征和个人的性格。作为生物学概念,人格与种族成员相关。心的哲学家和心理学的哲学家乐于把人格作为研究心理学功能、才能和能力的心理学概念。道德哲学家感兴趣于伦理上的人格。政治的和社会的哲学家关注与政治或社会存在体相联系的个人。这样,人格概念具有不同的层次。

“人格是个人在对他自身理想的积极追求中所形成的人的潜能、活动和习惯的全体。”——阿诺德,见米谢尔:《人类活动》,1969年,第196页。

### 视域

罗素用此术语来指一切短暂的感觉材料集合,不管是知觉到的还是未知觉到的,它从某个特定的角度呈现了宇宙。罗素在这样使用此术语时,用到了心理学家在对殊相做分类时用的主观材料,它们对应于物理学家在对对象分类时用到的“事物”。罗素把实际知觉到的视域称为“私人世界”,这是一个知觉者在任意特定时刻所具有的世界观。个人生活中的整个视域就是此人的“传记”。

“我的全部当下感觉对象的集合,就是我称为的‘视域’。”——罗素:《神秘主义和逻辑》,1918年,第139页。

### 劝说定义

斯蒂文森所采用的术语。在定义那些既有描述意义(指一个事物的性质)又有很强的情感意义(表达或唤起情感状态)的术语时,我们可在该词的运用中改变其描述意义但保持其情感意义不变。劝说定义的目的是有意无意地寻求人们的态度和兴趣的改变。说者引入一种新的意义,听者接受了但没有意识到他已经受到了影响。例如,当希特勒宣称“国家社会主义是真正的民主”时,他正在运用一种劝说定义。

“劝说定义,如运用得巧妙,旨在重新引导

socialism is true democracy”, he was employing a persuasive definition.

“A persuasive definition, tacitly employed, is at work in redirecting attitudes.” —Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, 1944, p. 213.

### Pessimism

[from Latin; *pessimus*, the worst] A term originally used for Schopenhauer's world-view in *The World as Will and Representation* (1844). He believed that this world is the worst of all possible worlds because it is determined by blind and irrational will. Hence hope is unreasonable, and life is nothing, empty, meaningless and painful. The term also applies to philosophies which emphasise nihilism, nothingness, anxiety, absurdity, and death, for example those of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. In common use, pessimism is a negative and despondent attitude which focuses on the least hopeful side of situations. In contrast, optimism is a hopeful attitude which sees the world as meaningful. In a form proposed by Leibniz, optimism claims that this world is the best of all possible worlds.

“There are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism.” —William James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 184.

*Petito principii*, The Latin term for begging the question.

### Phantom limb

A phenomenon which was first described and investigated by Descartes. If one's arm is amputated, one may afterwards feel that it is still there and feel pain in the non-existent fingers, wrist and forearm. This is because the nerves which previously connected the arm to the brain and which remain in the untouched part of the limb continue to send impulses like those normally caused by external stimulations. This phenomenon seems to have raised two problems for the philosophy of perception. First, it seems to indicate that sensations occur only in the brain and that the mind is not immediately affected by all parts of body, but only by the brain. Secondly, the mental states of phantom limb patients can be explained by psycho-physical laws. The pain this patient feels is akin to an hallucination. This last point suggests problems for the representative theory of perception.

“The brain—or some part of it—inadvertently played a mechanical trick on the mind. That was Descartes' explanation of phantom-limb hallucinations.” —Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 1991, p. 8.

**Phenomenal property**, see qualia

态度。”——斯蒂文森：《伦理学与语言》，1944年，第213页。

### 悲观主义

[源自拉丁文 *pessimus*, 最坏的] 这一术语最初用来指叔本华在《作为意志和表象的世界》(1844)一书中阐述的世界观。他认为这个世界是所有可能的世界上最坏的世界，因为它是被盲目的和非理性意志所决定的。因此，希望是非理智的，生活是虚无的、空洞的、无意义的和痛苦的。这一术语也被用于那些强调虚无主义、虚幻、焦虑、荒谬和死亡的哲学，例如尼采、海德格尔、萨特的哲学。在通常的用法中，悲观主义是一种只看到事情最无希望一面的消极失望的态度。相比之下，乐观主义是一种把世界看做富有意义的怀有希望的态度。在莱布尼茨提出的一种形式中，乐观主义声称这个世界是所有可能世界之中的最好的。

“一些不幸福的人认为拯救这个世界是不可能的。他们的看法被认为是悲观主义。”——詹姆斯：《实用主义》，1955年，184页。

### 窃取论题

“窃取论题 (begging the question)” 的拉丁词。

### 幻肢

由笛卡尔首先描述和研究的一个现象。如果一个人的手臂由于某种原因被截掉，这个人可能以后还会感到手臂仍在那里并感到不存在的手指、手腕和前臂在疼痛。这是因为保存在肢体未损坏部分的先前联结手臂与大脑的神经仍在传递通常由外部刺激所引起的冲动。这一现象对知觉哲学提出了两个问题。其一，它似乎表明感觉只发生于大脑，亦即，心不是直接受身体所有部分的影响，而只是受大脑的影响。其二，幻肢患者的心的状态可以用心物定律来解释。这个病人所感到的疼痛类似于幻觉。这最后一点对知觉的表征理论提出了一个问题。

“大脑——或它的某一部分——无意地对心玩了一个花招。那就是笛卡尔对幻肢幻觉的解释。”——丹奈特：《解释意识》，1991年，第8页。

### 现象特性

见“感受性”条。

## Phenomenalism

Acceptance of the sense-datum theory, according to which what we are directly aware of in perception is not the material object itself but rather *sensa*, renders problematic the nature and status of material objects as the cause of perception. Phenomenalism is one attempt to elucidate the nature of material objects by reducing them to sense-data. It is derived from Berkeley's immaterialism that holds only phenomena or sense-data can be known. There is no underlying substratum behind appearance. Reality is the totality of all actual and possible conscious experience, and cannot be said to exist independent of these experiences. Berkeley, unlike later phenomenologists, holds that material objects are combinations of actual sense-impressions. As a consequence, he has to introduce God to preserve the continuity of objects and the existence of unobserved objects. Hume's claim that what we know to exist is nothing more than *sensa* occurring in various patterns or sequences raises the problem of what fills the gaps between actual *sensa*. J. S. Mill's position, which is called *factual phenomenism*, is that material objects are permanent possibilities of sensation. Hence a material thing consists of a family of actual and possible sense-data. However, it sounds odd to say that possible sense-data are constituents of material things. Another way of filling the gap between actual *sensa*, called *sensibilism*, was developed by Russell (although he later abandoned it) and Price. On this view, *sensibilia* are unsensed sense-data, while sense-data amount to sensed *sensibilia*. Hence a material thing is described as a family of items with a similar status, except that sense-data are sensed and *sensibilia* are unsensed. The dominant version of phenomenism to appear in this century was developed by the Logical Positivists and Operationalists and is called *linguistic phenomenism* or *analytical phenomenism*. This theory attempts to explain the notion of material object by reducing or translating all statements about material objects into statements about perceptual experience or *sensa*. The main difficulty with linguistic phenomenism is that the equivalence between statements about *sensa* and statements about physical objects is hard to find. Phenomenism is generally considered to be unsuccessful, for to specify the meaning of *sensa* and to distinguish one sense-datum from another always seems to involve reference to material things. Phenomenism gives priority to experience and constructs the world out of it, but experience itself needs to be constructed out of the actual way of the world. Even Ayer, a chief proponent of linguistic phenomenism, disavowed it in his later works.

"The phenomenist is bound to hold that the identity of any physical body is subject to analysis in terms of sense-data." —Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, p. 190.

## 现象主义

是对感觉材料论的接受。根据这种理论,我们在知觉中直接觉知的并非物质对象本身,而是感觉材料,这就使得物质对象作为知觉原因的本质和地位成了问题。现象主义是试图通过将物质对象还原为感觉材料来解释物质对象的本质的一个尝试。它源自巴克莱的非物质论,这个观点认为只有现象或感觉材料才是可知的。在外观的后面没有另外的根基。现实就是所有实际的与可能的意识经验的总和,不能独立于这些经验而存在。与后来的现象主义者不同,巴克莱认为,物质对象就是实际的感觉印象的组合。结果,他不得不引入上帝来保持对象的连续性和未观察到的对象的存在。休谟说道,我们所确知存在的只是以各种模式和顺序出现的感觉材料。这也导致填补实际的感觉材料之间的空缺问题。J. S. 密尔的观点被称为“事实现象主义”,他认为物质对象是“感觉的永久可能性”。因此一个物质的东西是由一族实际的和可能的感觉材料所组成的。然而,说可能的感觉材料是物质的东西的组成部分未免有些离奇。填补实际的感觉材料之间之空缺的另一方法是由罗素(尽管他后来放弃了这一观点)和普赖斯提出的“感觉主义”。这一观点认为,可感觉物是未感觉到的感觉材料,而感觉材料则相当于感觉到的可感觉物。因此一个物质的东西就被描述为一族具有相似地位的项目,只是感觉材料是被感觉到的,而可感觉物是未被感觉到的。出现于本世纪的主导的现象主义形式是逻辑实证主义者和操作主义者所提出的“语言现象主义”或“分析现象主义”。这一理论试图通过将所有关于物质对象的陈述还原或转译为关于知觉经验或感觉材料的陈述来解释物质对象概念。语言现象主义的主要困难在于,我们很难找到感觉陈述与关于物理对象的陈述之间的同义语。通常认为现象主义是不成功的,因为要区分感觉的意义并将一个感觉材料与另一个感觉材料区分开来似乎总是包含着对物质的东西的指称。现象主义给经验以优先地位并由它来建构世界,但经验本身却需要由世界的实际方式来建构。甚至语言现象主义的主要支持者之一艾耶尔也在其后期著作中拒斥它。

“现象主义者注定要认为,任何物理体的确认都要经受借助于感觉材料的分析。”——艾耶尔:《知识问题》,1956年,第190页。

**Phenomenological epoche**, see phenomenological reduction

### Phenomenological reduction

The characteristic methodological procedure of Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenological reduction is a means of detecting the intentional or essential structure of experience. By turning away from the sense-contents of my own stream of experiences, I can concentrate on what is essential, basic and irreducible in experience. The reduction moves from the empirical to the transcendental level and provides access to the intentional structure or *noematic* content of experience, which is the source of our knowledge of the world. The reduction contrasts to the reduction of all knowledge into certain basic or protocol sensory experiences or statements in phenomenalism or logical positivism.

The basic instrument of phenomenological reduction is phenomenological *epoche* (Greek: holding back, hence suspension of judgement). In our cognitive relationship with the world, our natural attitude assumes the existence of the external spatio-temporal world and assumes the existence of ourselves as psycho-physical individuals. Husserl's phenomenological *epoche* "brackets" this natural attitude or puts it out of play. This bracketing does not deny the existence of the fact-world, but refrains from any judgement regarding the world and our own physical being within it. For Husserl, we can thus regard our experience in a different manner and enter the region of transcendently purified experiences. We can consider consciousness strictly as intentional agency, also called "transcendental consciousness", "pure consciousness" or "absolute consciousness". We are in a position to have *eidetic* or essential intuition towards the intentional structures of experience.

Phenomenological *epoche* is also called transcendental reduction. This is what phenomenological reduction normally means, but sometimes Husserl broadens its reference to include *eidetic* intuition as well. The whole programme is influenced by the Cartesian method of doubt and is intended to provide an absolutely certain grounds for knowledge.

"On grounds of method this operation will split up into different steps of 'disconnexion' or 'bracketing', and thus our method will assume the character of a graded reduction. For this reason we propose to speak, and even preponderatingly, of phenomenological reductions (though, in respect of their unity as a whole, we would speak in unitary form of the phenomenological reduction)." —Husserl, *Ideas* (tr. Kersten), 1982, sect. 33.

### Phenomenology

[from Greek *phainomenon*: to appear + *logos*: theory, literally, a theory of appearance] The idea of phenomenology can be traced to Aristotle's "saving the *phainomena*", but the

### 现象学的悬置

见“现象学还原”条。

### 现象学的还原

胡塞尔现象学特有的方法论步骤。现象学的还原是一个探测体验的意向结构或本质结构的方式。通过撇开我自己的体验流中的感官内容,我就能专注于这体验中本质性的、基本的和不可还原的东西了。这还原从经验的层次移向先验的层次,使得我们可以达到体验的意向结构或意向对象的内容;而这结构或内容乃是我们关于这个世界的知识的源头。这种还原与现象主义或逻辑实证主义中那种将所有知识还原为某些基本的或记录式的感觉经验或陈述的做法正相反对。

现象学还原的基本方式是现象学的悬置(*epoche*,这个词为希腊文,意味着“抑制”,衍变为“判断的中止”)。在我们与世界的认知关系中,我们的自然态度预设了外部时空世界的实存,并预设了作为心理及肉身个体的我们自身的实存。胡塞尔的现象学悬置将这种自然态度“放进括弧之中”或让它失去作用。这种放进括弧的悬置并不否认事实世界的实存,只是抑制住关于这个世界和我们在其中的身体存在的判断。这样,在胡塞尔看来,我们就能以不同的方式来看待我们的体验,进入被先验地纯粹化了的体验领域。我们于是能将意识严格地视为意向机能,也叫做“先验的意识”、“纯意识”或“绝对意识”。我们就这样处在了一个让本质直观面对体验的意向结构的地位上。

现象学的悬置也叫做“先验的还原”。这就是“现象学的还原”一般所意味的,但有时胡塞尔扩大了它的指称范围,将本质直观也包括了进来。这整个学说受到笛卡尔的怀疑方法的影响,意在为知识提供一个绝对确实的基础。

“作为方法,这种操作〔即悬置〕将分为‘分离’或‘加括弧’的不同步骤;因此,我们的方法将具有分级还原的特点。出于这个理由,我们要谈论、甚至是强调复数形式的现象学还原(尽管就其整体的统一性而言,我们将以合一的方式谈论现象学的还原)。”——胡塞尔:《观念》(克尔斯滕英译),1982年,第33节。

### 现象学

[源自希腊文 *phainomenon* (显现) 和 *logos* (理论); 字面意思是“关于显现的理论”] 关于现象学的观念可追溯到亚里士多德的“〔从赫拉

word was first used by J. H. Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff, in his *Neues Organon* (1764), meaning the study of the forms of appearances and illusions. Kant took over this word, claiming that phenomenology determined the principles of sensibility and understanding which can be applied only to the world of appearance and not to things-in-themselves. Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* brought this word into prominence. However, for Hegel, phenomena are not illusions or appearances. They are stages in the development of knowledge, in the manifestations of which Spirit itself appears, and are the expressions of a self-developing Absolute idea. Phenomenology is therefore the study of the evolutionary process of consciousness from its simplest to its most sophisticated forms. The American pragmatist C. S. Peirce developed in his early work a kind of phenomenology, also called "phaneroscopy", as a system of categories to classify the main types of phenomena that make up the world.

Phenomenology in its most popular sense refers to an influential philosophical movement, founded by Edmund Husserl and developed in Germany by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger and in France by Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It has gradually fused with Existentialism and Hermeneutics. In this sense, Phenomenology is a philosophy of consciousness concerned with the truth or rationale of immediate experience. Originally, Husserl conceived phenomenology as a philosophical method to reveal and elucidate the internal structures and essential features of various types of experience. Through analysis of this sort, one could discover the ultimate sources of our knowledge, especially the fundamental logical and epistemological categories. In his later stage, Husserl considered phenomenology to be first philosophy, which could describe the region of pure experience in which all sciences are rooted and provide a unified theory of science and knowledge. Husserl's phenomenology was deeply influenced by Descartes' demand that knowledge be clear and distinct and opposed relying on any *a priori* assumption that has to be justified elsewhere. Phenomenology in this sense differs from studies that seek to explain things, for example, from their causal relations or evolutionary origins. Its slogan is "to the things (phenomena) themselves". Husserl emphasised the function of intuition in achieving insights into the essential structures of experience. Phenomenology characteristically emphasises the intentionality of consciousness. Its philosophical novelty is the demonstration that intentional objects of every sort, existing and non-existing, can and should be described in their own right. Phenomenology can be contrasted with analytical philosophy, which is concerned with the analysis of propositions, although J. L. Austin sometimes called his work linguistic phenomenology.

Heidegger analysed the two components of the word "phenomenology". On his analysis, *phenomenon* means that

克利特的“流变”中拯救现象”之说，但这个词首先是由 J. H. 朗姆贝特（他是沃尔夫的一个追随者）在其《新工具论》（1764 年）中使用的，意味着对显露和假象诸形式的研究。康德采用了这个词，认为现象学的任务是确定感觉和知性的原则；这些原则只适用于显现的世界，不可用于物自身。黑格尔的《精神现象学》使这个词获得了突出的地位。然而，对黑格尔来说，现象不是假象或显露，它们是在知识的发展中、在精神显示自身的展现中的各个阶段，并且是自身发展着的绝对理念的表达。现象学因此就是对意识的进化过程，即从最简单到最复杂形式的过程的研究。美国实用主义者 C. S. 皮尔士在他的早期著作中提出了一种现象学，也被他称作“phaneroscopy”（显象学）；将它当做对于那构成了这世界的主要现象类型进行分类的范畴系统。

现象学在它最广为人知的意义上指的是一个影响深远的哲学运动，由 E. 胡塞尔建立，在德国由 M. 舍勒、N. 哈特曼和 M. 海德格尔发展，在法国为 G. 马塞尔、J.-P. 萨特和 M. 梅洛-庞蒂所阐发。它逐渐地与生存主义和解释学融合。在这个意义上，现象学是一种关于意识的哲学，涉及直接体验的真理和原则。一开始，胡塞尔将现象学设想为一种揭示和说明不同的体验类型的内在结构和本质特点的哲学方法。通过这种分析，我们能够发现知识的最终源头，特别是基本的逻辑和认识论的范畴。在他的后期阶段，胡塞尔将现象学看做第一哲学，它可描述所有的科学都植根于其中的纯粹体验的领域，并为科学和知识提供一个统一理论。胡塞尔的现象学受到笛卡尔这样一个要求的深刻影响，即知识必须是清楚明白的，不可依赖于任何还要在其他地方被证实的先天假设。在这个意义上，现象学不同于那些去解释事物的研究，比如那些从因果关系或进化来源方面对事物的解释研究。它的口号是：“到事情（现象）本身中去。”胡塞尔强调直觉在获得对体验的本质结构的洞察方面的功能。现象学特别强调意识的意向性。它的哲学新颖性在于表明每一种意向对象，不管是实存的还是非实存的，都能够并且应该以其自身的方式被描述。现象学与关心命题分析的分析哲学极为不同，尽管 J. L. 奥斯汀有时也称他的工作为语言现象学。

海德格尔分析了“现象学”这个词中的两个成分。在他的分析中，“现象”（*phenomenon*）意味着“那在自身中显示自身者”；“学”或“逻各斯”（*logos*）从 *legomenon*、即“那被显示者”这个词来。他的结论是现象学意味着“让那在自身中显示自身者被从其自身看到”。因此，现象学仅仅是一种方法，它告诉人们一个研究应该如何去进行，而不是什么东西应该被研究。这个方

which shows itself in itself and *logos* is derived from *legomenon*, that which is exhibited. He concludes that phenomenology means "to let that which shows itself in itself be seen from itself". Accordingly, phenomenology is merely a method, which prescribes how a study should be conducted rather than what should be studied. The method indicates that any subject-matter must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. Heidegger called his own approach to *Dasein* and Being "hermeneutic phenomenology". Here "hermeneutic" does not refer to a method for uncovering the meaning embodied in an expression, but to the constitution of *Dasein*. The whole expression refers to a method by which Being can be approached or brought to self-showing.

"Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experience in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them." —Husserl, *Logical Investigations II* (tr. by Findlay), 1970, p. 862.

## Phenomenon

[From Greek; *phainomenon*, what appears by itself, hence appearance] Perceptual appearance in general, that is what may be observed and how things look. For Aristotle, all the widely accepted beliefs, things commonly held as well as the beliefs of the wise about a certain matter, are also phenomena. In this latter sense, phenomenon means the same as *legomenon* (what is said) and *endoxa* (common belief). Phenomena of this kind were taken by Aristotle to be the starting-point of dialectical argument. He claimed that a good theory should start from the phenomena and insofar as possible should be consistent with the phenomena and explain the phenomena. This is what he called saving the phenomena. A scientific theory should enable us to understand the empirical phenomena, and a philosophical theory should enable us to understand the phenomena in the sense of common beliefs.

"This view [that there is no weakness of will] plainly contradicts the phenomena." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145b27.

## Philanthropy

[from Greek *philos*, love + *anthropos*, man, loving one's fellow men] A synonym for love, benevolence, altruism and charity. Philanthropy is regarded as a virtue, especially in Christian ethics. In modern times, the term is used for large-scale actions to help those who are poor and in need. Sometimes, governmental agencies offering social support, such as the social welfare or health systems are regarded as socially philanthropic institutions. Some occupations in the areas of health, education, welfare or social work are associated with a philanthropic vocation.

法指出, 必须直接展示和直接表明任何被讨论的主题。海德格尔称他自己对缘在 (*Dasein*) 和存在的探讨为“解释学的现象学”。这里, “解释学”并不意味着那种揭示隐含在某种表达中的意义的方法, 而是指缘在的构成。这整个表达式 [解释学的现象学] 指一种能够进入存在或让存在自身显现的方法。

“因此, 现象学是关于普遍意义上的体验的理论, 包括所有在体验中被给予的并可在体验中被明白发现的东西, 不管它是实在的还是意向的。”——胡塞尔:《逻辑研究》第二卷 (芬德雷英译), 1970年, 第862页。

## 现象

[源自希腊文 *phainomenon*, “显现自身的东西”, 等于“表象”] 它一般意为感知表象, 即可以感觉到的东西和事物所看起来的样子。对亚里士多德来说, 一切广泛接受的信仰, 共同认可的东西, 以及聪明人对某些事物的看法, 也都是现象。在这后一种意义上, 现象就等同于 *legomenon* (所说的东西) 和 *endoxa* (共同信仰)。这类现象被亚里士多德看做是辩证论证的出发点。他认为, 一个好的理论应当从现象出发, 尽可能地与现象相一致, 并解释现象。这便是他所谓的“拯救现象”。一个科学理论应使我们明白经验现象, 而一个哲学理论应使我们明白共同信仰意义上的现象。

“[说意志薄弱不存在] 这样一种观点显然与现象相矛盾。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1145b27。

## 慈善

[源自希腊文 *philos* (爱) 和 *anthropos* (人), 即爱同胞] 爱、仁慈、利他主义和博爱的同义词。慈善被认为是一种美德, 特别是在基督教伦理学中。在当代, 这一术语用来指大范围地帮助那些贫穷的、有困难的人的行为。有时政府机构提供的社会帮助, 如社会福利制度或国家医疗保险制度被认为是社会慈善机构。一些卫生、教育、福利或社会工作领域的职业是与慈善行业相联系的。

“如果社会工作想要存在下去, 那么就必须

“If social work is to exist at all, there have to be either private philanthropists or a system of imposing philanthropy on the general public by means of taxes.” —Downie and Telfer, *Caring and Curing*, 1980, p. 12.

### Philia

[Greek; friendship, derived from *philein*, love, but without sexual implications. Empedocles uses a slightly different term *philotes* (also love or friendship) which, in opposition to *neikos* (strife), is the unifying principle of elements.] *Philia* is an affectionate personal relationship, requiring some degree of mutual goodwill, mutual recognition and shared activities. *Philia*, which is much broader than our current notion of friendship, includes the love of members of families for each other, the favourable attitudes of business partners and of fellow citizens for each other, and the mutual admiration between virtuous men for virtuous character. *Philia* is a major topic in Greek ethics, for it is taken as a kind of virtue and as a necessary condition for happiness. Aristotle chiefly distinguishes three types of friendship; for pleasure, for usefulness and for goodness. While the first two kinds are incidental, the last kind is complete and perfect, especially between virtuous men. Each virtuous person wishes the other to be good for the good of the other party itself. The root of the perfect friendship is to take the friend as another self, with friendship being a kind of self-love of a good man. Aristotle's discussion of friendship seems to offer an approach for breaking the antithesis between egoism and altruism and therefore attracts much current attention. Friendship is also a major topic in contextualist and feminist approaches to moral philosophy.

“The defining features of *philia* (friendship) that are found in friendship to one's neighbours would seem to be derived from features of friendship towards oneself.” —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a1-2.

### Philosophe

[French; philosopher] The eighteenth century French thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Montesquieu, Helvetius, Condillac, D'Holbach, and other Encyclopedists. These philosophers are generally materialists, atheists and liberals. They believed in the strength of reason and scientific knowledge and intended to judge everything in accordance with the measure of reason.

“The French philosophes of the eighteenth century were the examples we sought to imitate, and we hope to accomplish no less results.” —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, I, p. 111.

**Philosopher-king**, see guardians

有私人慈善家，或有通过税收手段强加于一般大众的慈善制度。”——道尼和特尔弗：《关怀和治疗》，1980年，第12页。

### 友情

[希腊语，指友谊，源自 *philein* 一词，意思是没有性爱的爱或爱情。恩培多克勒使用了一个稍有差异的词 *philote*，意思是指友爱或友谊。这种友爱与冲突 (*neikos*) 相对立，是统一诸要素的原理] 友情表示一种友爱的人际关系，需要某种程度的相互友善、相互承认和协同活动。友情的内涵要比现行的友谊观念更为广泛，包括家庭成员之间的爱护，商务伙伴与同胞之间的友好态度以及有德之士对道德品格的相互仰慕等等。在希腊伦理学中，友情是一个主要话题，因为它是一种美德，是幸福的必要条件。亚里士多德主要区分了三种友情：为了愉快的友情，为了有用的友情和为了善的友情。前两种友情是偶然发生的，后一种友情才是完美的，尤其是在有德之士之间。每位有德之士都期望他人善待对方。完美友情的根源在于把朋友当做另一个自我，将友情视为善者的一种自爱。亚里士多德在论述友情时提出了一种打破自我主义与利他主义彼此对立的方法，因此十分引人注目。在研究道德哲学的语境主义和女性主义方法中，友情也是主要的话题。

“友情的决定性特征存在于对邻居的友情之中，这一点源自对待自己的友情特征。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1166a1—2。

### 启蒙哲学家

[法语，哲学家] 18世纪法国启蒙运动思想家，诸如伏尔泰、卢梭、狄德罗、孟德斯鸠、爱尔维修、孔迪亚克、霍尔巴赫，以及其他百科全书派人物。这些哲学家一般都是唯物主义者、无神论者和自由主义者。他们相信理性和科学知识的力量，并试图依据理性的尺度评判一切。

“18世纪法国哲学家是我们追求效仿的榜样，我们希望取得他们那样多的成就。”——《J.S. 密尔著作集》，第一卷，第111页。

### 哲学王

见“护卫者”条。

### Philosophia perennis

[Latin: perennial philosophy] A metaphysical thesis that there is a single Divine reality as an impersonal Absolute is common to all great Western and Eastern religions. The soul is the divine spark of light in our body, and by means of its contemplative practice we can have mystical access to this divine reality. The term and the basic idea can be traced to Leibniz, but the thesis was fully explicated by Aldous Huxley in *The Perennial Philosophy* (1946). According to Huxley, perennial philosophy unifies all religions with the consequence that there is only one sort of mysticism or fundamental metaphysics. Opponents argue that the thesis wrongly amalgamates different strands of mysticism.

“Philosophia perennis—the phrase was coined by Leibniz, but the thing—the metaphysic that recognises a divine reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or even identical with, divine reality; the ethic that places man’s final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent ground of all being—the thing is immemorial and universal.” —Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, 1945, vii.

### Philosophical anthropology

[from Greek: *anthropos*, man] The comprehensive study of human nature, which considers each human being as a biological, psychological, cultural, social and religious complex, in contrast to the simplicity of God and to the traditional rationalist view of man as an exclusively rational being. All discussions about man as such belong to philosophical anthropology, and in this broad sense it is as old as philosophy itself. Kant considered anthropology to be a pragmatic branch of philosophy concerning “what man as a freely acting entity makes of himself or can and should make of himself”. Feuerbach took anthropology as a synonym for philosophy. Based on the German philosophical tradition, Max Scheler introduced philosophical anthropology in *Man’s Place in Nature* (1928) as a special discipline. This discipline was a synthesis of Dilthey’s life philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, but also embraced most of the social sciences. Scheler attempted to discover the basic structure of human nature and accordingly to explain human existence, experiences, potentialities and various other aspects of human activities. He also sought to establish philosophical anthropology as the foundation of other social sciences in virtue of its central aim of achieving human self-understanding. Consistent with this aim, Scheler used philosophical anthropology to criticise his contemporary bourgeois society in terms of the theory of alienation of Hegel and Marx. Other major figures of philosophical anthropology include Plessner, Gehlen, Cassirer and Sartre. As an interdisciplinary study, philosophical anthropology has practitioners in many areas and has developed various approaches to the study of man.

### 永恒哲学

[拉丁语,永恒哲学]一个形而上学论题,其主张是:存在着一个单一的神圣实在,作为非人格的绝对,它对西方和东方的一切大的宗教都是共同的。灵魂是我们体内的神圣火花,依靠它的沉思实践,我们能够神秘地达到这个神圣的实在。这个术语及其基本观念可以追溯到莱布尼茨,但是,该论题的充分阐释,却是由A.赫胥黎在其《永恒哲学》(1946)一书中完成的。按照赫胥黎的观点,永恒哲学统一所有的宗教,因此,只存在着一种神秘主义或根本形而上学。但是,反对者们认为这个论题错误地混淆了神秘主义的不同标准。

“Philosophia perennis 是由莱布尼茨生造的一个短语,但是那个东西——形而上学认作是作为事物、生命和精神世界实体的神圣实在;心理学发现它是灵魂中的某个相似于、甚或同一于神圣实在的东西;伦理学将其视作人的终极目的置于一切存在内在的、超验的根据的知识中——那个东西是恒古的、普遍的。”——赫胥黎:《永恒哲学》,1946年, vii.

### 哲学人类学

[源自希腊文 *anthropos*, 人]对人的本质的综合研究,它把每个人视为生物的、心理的、文化的、社会的和宗教的复合体,这与上帝缩影的观点和把人视为惟一理性存在物的传统理性主义观点形成对照。所有关于这样的人的讨论都属于哲学人类学,从广义上讲,它和哲学本身一样久远。康德把人类学看做是哲学的一个实用分支,它关心的是“作为自由行动存在物的人塑造自身,或能够和应当塑造自身”。费尔巴哈把人类学作为哲学的同义词。在德国哲学传统的基础上, M. 舍勒在他的《人在宇宙中的地位》(1928)一书中提出了作为一门特殊学科的哲学人类学。这一学科是狄尔泰的生命哲学和胡塞尔的现象学的综合,但也包含绝大部分社会科学。舍勒试图发现人的本质的基本结构,从而解释人的存在、经验、潜能和人的活动的其他各方面。他还试图把哲学人类学确立为其他社会科学的基础,其根据是哲学人类学的中心目的是达到人的自我理解。与这一目的相一致,舍勒还根据黑格尔和马克思的异化理论,将哲学人类学用于对当代资本主义社会的批判。哲学人类学的其他主要代表人物包括普莱斯特、盖伦、卡西尔和萨特。作为一门交叉学科,哲学人类学在很多领域都有实践者并发展出各种不同的研究人的方法。

“理论家们对人们具有的(他们的‘哲学人类学’,就像人们称呼的那样)愿望和要求存在争执,而且常常是强烈的争执,但没有一方怀疑,只要人们的要求和信念能够一致,他们的行

“The theorists disagree, often very strongly, over the wants and desires that people have (their ‘philosophical anthropology’, as it is often termed), but neither side doubts that if only people’s wants and beliefs could be identified their action would be intelligible.” —Yearley, *Science and Sociological Practice*, 1984, p. 88.

**Philosophical behaviourism**, see behaviourism

**Philosophical hermeneutics**, see hermeneutics

### Philosophical logic

Russell’s term for the study of philosophical problems arising from applying formal logic to natural language. It does not contain formal logical systems themselves, and it is not confined to arguments which formal logic has codified. In British philosophy, philosophical logic is considered to be a basic philosophical discipline, concerned with the analysis of key notions indispensable to rational thinking such as analyticity, necessity, definition, description, entailment, existence, identity, reference, predication, proposition, quantification, truth, meaning, negation and existential statements. Many problems in philosophical logic are intertwined with other branches of philosophy, especially with epistemology and ontology.

Some scholars suggest that philosophical logic can also be called “philosophy of logic”. But others try to distinguish them on the grounds that philosophical logic is a philosophy interested in language, thought and the world structure, while philosophy of logic is the study of the scope and nature of logic systems, especially philosophical issues arising from non-standard logic.

“The contrast between philosophical logic and philosophy of logic can accordingly be put like this: when one does philosophy of logic, one is philosophising about logic; but when one does philosophical logic, one is philosophising.” —Grayling, *An Introduction to Philosophical Logic*, 1982, p. 15.

**Philosophical psychology**, see philosophy of psychology

### Philosophical radicals

A group of political and economic liberals deeply influenced by Jeremy Bentham and active in London in the first half of the nineteenth century, including the philosopher James Mill and later his son John Stuart Mill, legal philosopher John Austin, economist David Ricardo, lawyer E. Chadwick and classical historian George Grote. They criticised the evils existing in the government and social policies

为就是可以理解的。”——耶利:《科学和社会学实践》, 1984年, 第88页。

### 哲学行为主义

见“行为主义”条。

### 哲学解释学

见“解释学”条。

### 哲学逻辑

罗素的术语, 指把形式逻辑应用于自然语言而产生的哲学问题的研究。它并不包含形式逻辑体系本身, 也不限于形式逻辑已经整理过的证明。在英国哲学中, 哲学逻辑被视为基本的哲学学科, 它涉及对理性思维不可缺少的关键概念的分析, 如分析性, 必然性, 定义, 描述, 衍推, 存在, 同一性, 指称, 谓词, 命题, 量词限定, 真, 意义, 否定, 存在陈述等概念。哲学逻辑中的许多问题与哲学的其他部门相互联结, 特别与认识论和本体论密切相关。

某些学者提出, 哲学逻辑也可称为“逻辑哲学”。但是其他学者对它们作出区分, 根据是, 哲学逻辑是研究语言、思想和世界结构的哲学, 而逻辑哲学是对逻辑系统的本性和范围, 特别是从非规范逻辑中产生的哲学问题的研究。

“哲学逻辑和逻辑哲学因此能这样对比: 当某人做逻辑哲学时, 那么他就是在做关于逻辑的哲学研究; 但是当某人做哲学逻辑时, 那么他就是在做哲学研究。”——格雷林:《哲学逻辑导论》, 1982年, 第15页。

### 哲学心理学

见“心理学哲学”条。

### 哲学激进主义者

一群深受J. 边沁影响, 于19世纪上半叶活跃于伦敦的哲学和经济学的自由主义者, 包括哲学家詹姆斯·密尔和他的儿子约翰·斯图亚特·密尔, 法哲学家J. 奥斯汀, 经济学家D. 李嘉图, 律师E. 查德威克和古典历史学家G. 格罗特。他们批判当时存在于不列颠政府和政策中的弊病, 认为所有这些弊病在于政府、

of Britain at that time and believed that the source of all evils lay in the aristocratic principle adopted by the government, economic monopolies and the established church. The group embraced Bentham's utilitarianism, Adam Smith's economics, Austin's rational jurisprudence and J. S. Mill's rationale for democracy. They tried to provide a justification for radically transforming the traditional aristocratic regime into a modern, secular, democratic market society. This group exerted great influence upon British philosophy and political life.

"Those whom... we call philosophic radicals are those who in politics observe the common practice of philosophers—that is, who, when they are discussing means, begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of cause." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VI, p. 353.

### Philosophical theology

A contemporary discipline largely derived from the methods and subject-matter of natural theology. It employs standard techniques of reasoning and makes use of every possible consideration to justify theistic belief and to examine the coherence and implications of various traditional theistic doctrines. It aims to clarify the content of the central concepts, presuppositions and tenets of theological commitment. Its main questions include the concept of God, the nature of divine attributes, the source of our ideas of God, proofs of the existence of God, the nature of divine knowledge, the essence of divine creation, God's relation to time, and God's relation to human beings. It differs from the philosophy of religion in that it is not a neutral discussion about theism, but presupposes the existence of God. It is essentially a way of using philosophy to do theology rather than an independent philosophical enterprise.

"Philosophical theology is a species contained within the theological genus. Insofar as its specific difference is that it makes use of philosophical methods and techniques to explicate the meaning or to discover the implications of theological doctrines, it continues to stand within [the] 'theological circle'." —Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 10.

### Philosophy (Kant)

Kant held that philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists concretely, but which we can endeavour to approximate by many different routes. What we learn is not philosophy itself, but how to philosophise by exercising our talent to reason on certain actually existing philosophical attempts. Since human reason is always active, it is impossible to offer an ultimate and dogmatic answer to the question of what philosophy is and who possesses it. That would mean the end of philosophising and hence the

经济垄断组织和国教奉行的贵族统治原则。这些人信奉边沁的功利主义、A. 斯密的经济学、奥斯汀的理性法学和 J. S. 密尔对民主的理论说明。他们力图为将传统的贵族统治的社会转变为现代的、世俗的和民主的市场社会而进行的激进的变革提供论证。这些人对英国的哲学和政治生活产生了重大的影响。

"那些我们称之为哲学激进主义者的人,是在政治上奉行哲学家的通常习惯的人——就是说,当他们讨论手段时,是从考虑目的入手,当他们期望产生结果时,思考的是原因。" ——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,第六卷,第 353 页。

### 哲学神学

一门当代的学科,很大程度上以自然神学的方法和主题为基础。它使用标准的推理技巧,应用每种可能的材料,为有神论的信条提供证明,并考察各种传统的有神论学说的统一性和复杂含义。它的目的,是要弄清神学信奉的主要概念、假设和教义的内容。它的主要问题包括上帝的概念、神性的本性、我们的上帝观念的来源、上帝存在的证据、神圣知识的本性、神圣创造的本质、上帝与时间的关系、上帝与人类的关系等等。它与宗教哲学的区别在于,它不是中立地讨论有神论,而是以上帝存在为前提条件。它本质上是以哲学的方式来建构神学,而不是一种独立的哲学事业。

"哲学神学是包含在神学这个属内的一个种。虽然它的种差是运用哲学的方法和技巧来阐释神学学说的意义或发现神学学说的蕴意,但它依旧处在'神学圈'内。" ——费勒:《现代宗教哲学基础》,1968年,第10页。

### 哲学(康德)

康德认为,哲学只是一可能科学的观念,它并非具体地存在于任何地方,但我们可以通过不同的途径来努力接近它。我们所学的不是哲学本身,而是如何进行哲学思考,即在某些已存在的哲学尝试中去锻炼我们的推理能力。因为人类理性总是主动的,对"什么是哲学"和"谁拥有哲学"的问题作出最终的和独断性的回答是不可能的。那只意味着哲学思考的终结,因而是哲学的死亡。

death of philosophy.

Accordingly, for Kant philosophy is an activity of reason rather than a static body of knowledge. He thought that the scholastic tradition took philosophy to be the logical perfection of knowledge, but another conception which forms the real basis of philosophy takes it as a science for relating all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason. The so-called philosopher is the lawgiver of human reason. Philosophical knowledge can arise either out of pure reason or empirical inquiry. Kant's own philosophy is systematic, attempting to answer all the questions of philosophy in a single scheme, and critical, determining the limits as well as the extent of our knowledge through an examination of reason by itself.

Kant divided the philosophy of pure reason into a propaedeutic, which deals with the *a priori* knowledge of the faculty of reason, and metaphysics as the system of pure reason. The latter is divided into the metaphysics of nature, which is concerned with what is, and the metaphysics of morals, which is concerned with what ought to be. They are respectively the theoretical and practical employment of pure reason.

"The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, ... the philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals that which ought to be."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A840/B868.

### Philosophy (Logical Positivism)

On the basis of a strong conviction that science serves as a paradigm for all knowledge, Logical Positivism requires philosophy to have scientific standards of precision and objectivity. There are only two kinds of statements that meet the strict standards of science, that is *a priori* statements of logic and pure mathematics, and empirical statements. Thus, most of the statements in traditional metaphysics and moral philosophy cannot constitute knowledge and should be eliminated. The positive role of philosophy is concerned with the logical analysis of the rules and frameworks of scientific theory and language and is a department of logic. Philosophy must employ scientific method to provide knowledge, and epistemology is nothing more than the philosophy of science.

"Once philosophy is purified of all scientific elements, only the logic of science remains."—Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 279.

### Philosophy (Ryle)

To clarify the nature of philosophy was one of Ryle's major concerns. Logical Positivism had dethroned philosophy from its position of priority regarding the sciences, and Ryle tried to show what is left for philosophy to do. He held that Philosophy does not have its own domain and is not concerned with the problem of entities. It is a meta-occupation

因此对于康德来说,哲学是一种理性的活动,而不是一静态的知识系统。他认为,经院哲学的传统把哲学作为知识的逻辑圆满,但构成哲学真正基础的另一概念是把它看做连接一切知识与人类理性本质目的的科学。所谓的哲学家乃是人类理性的立法者。哲学知识既可产生于纯粹理性,也可产生于经验研究。康德自己的哲学是体系性的,企图以单一的模式回答所有的哲学问题;其哲学又是批判的,它通过对理性自身的考察来规定我们知识的界限和范围。

康德把纯粹理性哲学划分为涉及理性官能的先天知识的预备性学科,和作为纯粹理性体系的形而上学。后者又依次划分为论及“什么是”的自然形而上学和涉及“什么应当是”的道德形而上学。它们分别是纯粹理性的理论应用和实践应用。

“人类理性之立法(哲学)有两大目标,即自然和自由……自然哲学论究一切存在〔是〕,道德哲学论究什么应该存在。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A840/B868。

### 哲学(逻辑实证主义)

逻辑实证主义相信,科学可以作为一切知识的范例。根据这种坚定的信念,它要求哲学也应该具有精确性和客观性这样的科学标准。而只有两种陈述满足这样严格的科学标准,即先天的逻辑和纯数学陈述以及经验陈述。因而,传统形而上学和道德哲学中的大多数陈述都不能构成知识,应该被清除掉。哲学的积极作用是关于对科学理论和语言的结构与规则的逻辑分析,是逻辑的一部分。哲学必须用科学的方法提供知识,而认识论则只是科学哲学。

“一旦哲学清除了一切科学成分,那么剩下的就只能是关于科学的逻辑。”——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第279页。

### 哲学(赖尔)

澄清哲学的本质是赖尔所关心的主要问题。逻辑实证主义已经否认了哲学对科学的优先性,而赖尔则试图表明哲学还可以做什么。他认为哲学没有它自己的领域,而且也不关心存在问题。它是一个超职业,它所要做的就是揭示支持我们的日常或科学语言的表面语法的逻辑

and an activity with the role of laying bare the logical categories which underlie the surface grammar of our ordinary or scientific language. This is necessary because these logical structure are often hidden or distorted by surface grammar. Philosophy has the function of mapping and comparing the logical geography of concepts and clarifying the connections between concepts. In brief, the task of philosophy is not to discover truth about the world but to re-arrange and analyse language in order to reveal its correct logical form or real meaning. It is not an empirical science, but is closely associated with a logic of diverse categories or forms. Ryle's work was a major example of the linguistic turn taken by English-speaking philosophy in this century.

"Science talks about the world, while philosophy talks about talk about the world." —Ryle, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, p. 247.

### Philosophy (Wittgenstein)

Philosophy does not present any picture of reality, and it can neither explain nor deduce anything. In trying to do so, philosophy becomes traditional metaphysics, which can give no meaning to its expressions. Proper philosophy should stop this misleading way of working. Philosophy is different from the natural sciences and shares no method with them. It can neither confirm nor refute scientific investigations. Since the whole of natural science is constituted by the totality of true propositions, philosophical propositions are not truths.

Philosophy is an activity rather than a theory and aims to cure us of the misuse of ordinary language by means of clarifying propositions. Most traditional philosophical questions are generated through the misuse of language, and hence we should not seek to answer them (the solutions for them do not exist). We should rather treat the questions as we treat illness. We should make the questions disappear by showing how they violate logical syntax. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein proposes that the way to clarify language is to reveal its hidden structure, but in *Philosophical Investigations* he turns to the study of language-games to clarify language.

"All philosophy is a 'critique of language'." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.0031.

**Philosophy of art**, see aesthetics

### Philosophy of biology

A relatively independent area of the philosophy of science dealing with philosophical issues arising from biological studies. Because of certain characteristics of biological inquiry, philosophy of biology is more than the mere application of general principles of scientific explanation. Biology explains a trait of an organism in terms of its function to pro-

范畴。这是必要的,因为这些逻辑结构常为表面语法所掩盖或歪曲。哲学具有描绘、比较概念的逻辑地形和澄清概念间联系的功能。一句话,哲学的任务不是发现关于世界的真,而是重新布置和分析语言,以揭示其正确的逻辑形式或真正意义。它不是一门经验科学,而是与具有不同范畴或形式的逻辑密切相关。赖尔的工作是本世纪英语世界的哲学发生语言转向的重要一例。

"科学谈论世界,而哲学则谈论关于世界的谈论。"——赖尔:《文集》,第一卷,第247页。

### 哲学(维特根斯坦)

哲学并不呈现实在的图像,它既不能说明,也不能演绎任何东西。如果哲学企图这么做,它就成了传统的形而上学,对于其表达的东西不能赋予意义。合适的哲学应停止这种误入歧途的研究方式。哲学不同于各门自然科学,与它们没有共同的方法。它既不能肯定,也不能否定科学研究。因为整个自然科学是由真命题的总体构成的,因此哲学命题并非真理。

哲学与其是一种理论,倒不如说是一种活动,其目的是借助于澄清命题而医治我们对于日常语言的误用。大多数传统的哲学问题是由于误用语言而产生的,因此我们不应追求对它们的回答(不存在对这些问题的解决)。我们倒应该像对待疾病那样对待这些问题。我们应指明它们是如何违反逻辑句法的,以此来使之消失。维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中提出,澄清语言的方法就是揭示其隐蔽的逻辑结构,但在《哲学研究》中,他转而研究语言游戏以澄清语言。

"全部哲学就是'语言的批判'。"——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,4.0031。

### 艺术哲学

见“美学”条。

### 生物学哲学

一个相对独立的科学哲学领域,论述生物学研究中出现的哲学问题。由于生物学探究的某些独特性,生物学哲学并非仅仅是一般科学说明原理的应用。生物学依据一个有机体促进其自身、其基因或其物种的福利、发展或生存的功能来说明其特性。这种功能说明从其效果来

mote the well being, development or survival of that organism, its genes or its species. This functional explanation seems to explain a cause by its effect and hence to differ from a standard causal explanation which explains an effect by its cause and it also differs from the covering law model of explanation. The nature of functional or teleological explanation and its rationality therefore become major topics in the field. Many philosophers argue that we should understand biological traits in terms of the past evolutionary history of the organism rather than in terms of their future consequences. On this view, functional explanation can be assimilated to a causal account. Other philosophers of biology argue for an autonomous level of functional explanation which cannot be reduced to ordinary causality. Darwin's theory of evolution led to the formulation of various philosophical problems concerning for example the logic of natural selection and the implications of the concepts of adaptation and fitness. In a sense, philosophy of biology is the discussion of the philosophical problems raised by the theory of evolution. The biological classification of species had been a paradigm of philosophical classification of reality. Darwin suggested that species themselves evolve. The features of a species are not eternal, and the distinctions between species are not fixed. This evolutionary perspective has seriously transformed our understanding of the structure of the world. From the theory of evolution, philosophers have developed evolutionary epistemology, which attempts to explain cognitive faculties, knowledge acquisition and the progress of knowledge in terms of the process of natural selection. Philosophers have also proposed an evolutionary ethics, which claims that what we ought to do should be determined on an evolutionary basis according to the principle of the survival of the fittest. Evolutionary ethics can also have a less controversial role in explaining the pattern of our ethical thinking in terms of our being members of a particular naturally evolved species. Some philosophers also attempt to explain social, cultural and psychological phenomena in terms of biological structure in a reductionist approach called socio-biology.

"Evolutionary biology is the centre of gravity for both the science of biology and for the philosophy of the science. The philosophy of biology does not end with evolutionary issues, but that is where I think it begins." —Sober, *Philosophy of Biology*, 1993, xix.

### Philosophy of education

A branch of applied philosophy dealing with philosophical issues in education. Although philosophy of education can be traced to Plato's *Republic*, it did not become a specific branch of philosophy until the beginning of the twentieth century. Interacting with political philosophy, the philosophy of education attempts to work out a conception of education which is suitable for contemporary liberal society. In

说明原因,因而不同于通常的从其原因来说明效果的标准因果说明,也不同于说明的覆盖律模型。这种功能的或目的论的说明的本性及其合理性问题,因而成为这一领域的一个主要论题。许多哲学家论证说,我们应当按照有机体过去的进化史,而不是按它未来的结果来理解生物学特性。按这种观点,功能说明能同化为一种因果说明。而另一些生物学哲学家则主张一种不能归结为一般因果性的自主性层次的功能说明。达尔文进化论导致了种种哲学问题的提出,例如自然选择的逻辑、适应和合目的性概念的涵义等。在某种意义上,生物学哲学就是有关进化论提出的哲学问题的讨论。生物学的物种分类是哲学中实在分类的一个范式。达尔文提出物种自身也在进化,种的特征并非永恒的,种之间的区别并非固定的。这种进化的视域极大地转变了我们对于世界结构的理解。哲学家们由进化理论发展出“进化认识论”,它试图按照自然选择过程来说明认知才能、知识获取和知识进展;哲学家们也发展出“进化伦理学”,它相信我们的道德规范应基于按“适者生存”原则的进化来决定。进化伦理学也可以有不那么引起争议的功用,因它能根据我们是一种独特的自然进化物种的一员来说明我们伦理思维的模式。有些哲学家还试图依据生物学结构来说明社会、文化和心理学现象,这种还原论方法被称作“社会生物学”。

“进化论生物学对于生物学科学和科学哲学二者都处于问题的中心。生物学哲学并非终止于进化论问题,但我认为它正是由此开始的。”——索伯:《生物学哲学》,1993年,第xix页。

### 教育哲学

应用哲学的一个分支,它涉及的是教育中的哲学问题。虽然教育哲学可以追溯到柏拉图的《国家篇》,但直到20世纪初它才成为哲学的一个专门分支。与政治哲学相互影响,教育哲学试图创立一个适合当代自由社会的教育概念。柏拉图和卢梭认为,教育的目标是一个具有牢固的共同价值的正义社会;与此相反,当代自由

contrast to both Plato and Rousseau, who believed that education aims at a just society with strongly shared values, contemporary liberal education theorists, such as John Dewey, Michael Oakeshott, Paul Hirst and R. S. Peters, hold that education is individualistic, existing simply for the sake of developing one's rational mind, exploring with our natural inquisitiveness, acquiring knowledge for the sake of knowledge or cultivating personal autonomy. The philosophy of education is concerned with a series of problems arising from this picture of education, such as the relation between education and moral development, education and censorship, education and the role of art, the education of personal emotion and feeling and the equality of educational opportunity. It also provides a critical evaluation of educational theory. Different theories of human nature result in different theories of education. In the twentieth century, the development of psychology, such as Freud's psychoanalysis and Piaget's theory of the stages of psychological development in the child, have deeply affected the discussion of education, although in Freud's case not always to its benefit. In radically incompatible ways, Chomsky's linguistics and Skinner's behaviourism altered notions of learning. Philosophy of education is less developed than other branches of the philosophy of the social sciences.

"Philosophy of education focuses on the language of educational theory and practice." —Moore, *Philosophy of Education*, 1982, p. 6.

### Philosophy of history

History is the actual human past, but it is also a branch of knowledge about the human past. Correspondingly, there are two major types of philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy of history is concerned with actual history and seeks to provide a philosophical history of the world. Analytic philosophy of history, in contrast, is concerned with historical thinking and knowledge and with other philosophical issues arising out of the practice of historians. The distinction between these two kinds of philosophy of history is widely characterised as also being a distinction between substantive and critical philosophy of history and between material and formal philosophy of history.

Speculative philosophy of history can be traced to its origin in Augustine's *City of God*. It assumes that history is not a sequential aggregate of random past events and argues that an underlying factor or structure renders the whole historical process rational and intelligible. The claim that temporal succession itself has logical implications was first derived from a theology and teleological world view which viewed human history as controlled by some divine force. In the Enlightenment, some philosophers, such as the eighteenth century French Encyclopedists, were inspired by the development of physics to explore the uniformity of history on the

主义的教育理论家如 J. 杜威、M. 奥克肖特、P. 赫斯特和 R. S. 彼得斯主张，教育是个人主义的，它的存在只是为了发展人的理性心智，探究我们天生的好奇心，是为了知识而学知识，或为了培养个人的自主。与此相关，教育哲学关注这样一系列由这一教育图式引起的问题，如教育和道德发展的关系、教育和检查制度、教育和艺术的作用、个人的情感教育和教育机会的平等。它还对教育理论提出批判性的评价。不同的人性理论导致了不同的教育理论。在 20 世纪，心理学的发展，如弗洛伊德的精神分析和皮亚杰的儿童心理发展阶段理论，对教育的研讨产生了深刻的影响，尽管后者并不总是从弗洛伊德那里受益。乔姆斯基的语言学和施金纳的行为主义以极不相同的方式改变了学习的观念。与社会科学的其他哲学分支相比，教育哲学的发展极其缓慢。

"教育哲学关注的是教育理论与实践的语言。"——摩尔：《教育哲学》，1982 年，第 6 页。

### 历史哲学

历史是现实人类的过去，它也是关于人类过去的一个学科。与此相应，历史哲学有两种主要的类型。思辨的历史哲学涉及的是实际的历史，并试图提供一部哲学的世界历史。相比之下，分析的历史哲学涉及的是历史思考和历史知识，以及产生于历史学家实践的其他的哲学问题。这两类历史哲学的区别也被广泛地说成是实在的历史哲学和批判的历史哲学的区别，以及实质的历史哲学和形式的历史哲学的区别。

思辨的历史哲学可以溯源至奥古斯丁的《上帝之城》。它假定历史不是偶然的过去事件的前后堆积，并论证说一个基本的因素或结构使得整个历史过程成为合理的和可以理解的。时间的连续性本身就有逻辑意义这一主张，最初来自神学和把人类历史视为由某种神的力量控制的目的论的世界观。在启蒙运动时期，一些哲学家，如 18 世纪法国百科全书派，受物理学的发展所鼓舞，根据人性的一致性这一假定探讨了历史的一致性。另一些哲学家，如 G. 维柯和 J. G. 赫尔德，则赞同更为经验的方法，即将历史的意义同它的文化背景联系起来的方法。黑格尔主张，历史有一个秘密计划，历史的发展

basis of the assumption of the uniformity of human nature. Others, such as Giambattista Vico and J. G. Herder, endorsed a more empirical approach in connecting the meaning of history with its cultural milieu. Hegel claimed that history has a plot and that the development of history is a dialectical movement governed by the absolute spirit. Marx substituted an economic foundation for Hegel's absolute spirit as the engine for historical development. In the twentieth century, authors such as Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler continued to believe in the overall meaning of human history, but substantive philosophy of history is in general out of favour.

Analytic philosophy of history emerged in the twentieth century. Rather than dealing with the underlying structure of actual history, its subject-matter is the underlying structure of historic explanation and the nature of historical understanding. It is concerned with the conceptual framework of historical thinking and the nature of historical objectivity. Analytic philosophy of history has two general tendencies. The first, represented by Hempel, attempts to assimilate historical explanation to scientific explanation and to offer a model of universal laws for historical knowledge. The second, influenced by the works of Rickert, Dilthey, Croce and Collingwood, is the mainstream of analytic philosophy of history. It distinguishes historical study from the natural science and argues for the autonomy of history. It does not take a historical event as an instance of a covering law, but attempts to understand the reasons behind each action. In the work of Lyotard, Foucault and others, it is concerned with the epistemological status of narrative, which is the characteristic form of presenting historical knowledge.

“Unlike their speculative predecessors, most present-day contributors to the philosophy of history take it to be a second order form of inquiry with the aim, not of trying to seek and assess the human past itself, but rather of seeking to elucidate and assess the ways in which historians typically describe or comprehend that past.” —Gardiner (ed), *The Philosophy of History*, 1974, p. 3.

### Philosophy of language

Contemporary philosophy of language resulted from the linguistic turn in philosophy and is based on the assumption that all philosophical analysis can be reduced to the analysis of language. In a broad sense, philosophy of language is nearly synonymous with analytic philosophy. Hence, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and the early and later Wittgenstein all exemplified different philosophical approaches to language in dealing with philosophical problems.

In a narrow sense, philosophy of language is related to linguistics or the science of language and is concerned with the underlying reality of language and its philosophical import. Traditionally semiotics is divided into syntax, seman-

是一个由绝对精神统治的辩证运动。马克思用经济基础取代了黑格尔的绝对精神作为历史发展的动力。在20世纪,一些学者,如A. 汤因比和O. 斯宾格勒,仍然相信人类历史的总体意义,但实质的历史哲学一般说来已不受欢迎。

分析的历史哲学出现于20世纪。它的论题涉及的不是实际历史的基本结构,而是历史说明的基本结构和历史理解的本质。它关注的是历史思维的概念结构和历史客观性的本质。分析的历史哲学有两种大体的趋势。第一种趋势以亨佩尔为代表,它试图将历史说明与自然科学说明同化,并试图为历史知识提出一个普遍规律的模式。第二种趋势受到李凯尔特、狄尔泰、克罗齐和柯林伍德的著作的影响,是分析的历史哲学的主流。它把历史研究与自然科学区别开来,并为历史的自律性做辩护。它不把历史事件看做覆盖律的例证,而是试图理解每一行为背后的原因。在利奥塔、福柯和其他人的著作中,它涉及的是叙述的认识论地位,而叙述乃是展现历史知识的特有形式。

“与他们思辨的前辈不同,绝大多数现今致力于历史哲学的研究者都把它看做第二等级的研究形式,其目的不是试图探索和评价人类过去本身,而是试图阐明和评价历史学家有代表性的描述或领会那种过去的方式。”——加德纳(编辑):《历史哲学》,1974年,第3页。

### 语言哲学

当代语言哲学产生于哲学中的“语言的转向”,它基于这样的一种假定,即认为一切哲学分析都可以还原为对语言的分析。在广义上,语言哲学几乎是“分析哲学”的同义语。因而,逻辑实证主义、牛津日常语言哲学和前后期的维特根斯坦,都是用不同的语言哲学方法讨论哲学问题的。

在狭义上,语言哲学与语言学或语言学科有关,它关心的是内在的语言实在及其哲学意义。符号学在传统上被分为句法学、语义学和语用学。语言哲学讨论的是句法学与语义学之间的区分问题,以及诸如言语行为理论和格莱斯

tics and pragmatics. The philosophy of language deals with the problem of the distinction between syntax and semantics, and some pragmatic problems, for example in the theory of speech acts and Grice's theory of conversational implicature. There are different conceptions of what the philosophy of language should be, but its central concern is with semantic questions such as meaning, truth, reference, predication, quantification and the nature of the propositions. Other major issues in this field of philosophy are the universal features of language and the relationships between language and world and between language and thought. Because of the inseparable relations between logic and language and among intentionality, understanding, thinking and language, the philosophy of language shares many common topics with philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. It is sometimes regarded as a part of the philosophy of mind and sometimes even as a part of the philosophy of action. An influential type of philosophy of language developed out of Chomsky's generative grammar, which tries to uncover the structure of conceptual knowledge by revealing the linguistic structure underlying surface irregularities and variations.

"Though the philosophy of language might be reasonably be thought of as comprising anything that philosophers do when they think, qua philosophers, about knowledge... I have presented the philosophy of language in one of its guises, as an attempt to get clear about the basic concepts we use in thinking about language." —Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, xi.

### Philosophy of law

Also called legal philosophy, a branch of philosophy that deals with philosophical problems or issues concerning the law and legal systems and that applies philosophical method to legal problems. The major topics of this field are: the nature and the definition of law, properties and identity conditions of legal systems, the ends to be attained by law, legal responsibility, legal reasoning, the nature and justification of punishment, the nature and justification of the state's coercive power and the relationships between moral right and legal right, between moral obligation and legal obligation, and between law and justice.

Philosophy of law is often used as a synonym for jurisprudence (from Latin: *juris prudentia*, knowledge of or skill in law). Jurisprudence, however, has a wider reference. Some of its divisions, such as analytical jurisprudence (the logical analysis of law and of legal concepts) and normative or critical jurisprudence (the evaluation of law and legal obligations) fall into the domain of philosophy of law. Other divisions such as historical jurisprudence (dealing with the origin and development of law), sociological jurisprudence (dealing with the relationship between legal rules and legal behaviour) and functional jurisprudence (dealing with legal

的交谈意义理论这样一些语用学问题。对语言哲学应当是什么还存在着不同的看法,但它的核心问题无疑是诸如意义、真理、指称、谓词、量化和命题的性质等这样的语义学问题。在这个哲学领域中的其他主要问题是,语言的一般特征和语言与世界以及语言与思想之间的关系。由于逻辑与语言和意向性、理解、思维与语言之间不可分的关系,语言哲学就与哲学逻辑和心的哲学有着许多共同关心的问题。有时,它也被看做心的哲学的一部分,有时,甚至被看做行为哲学的一部分。一种较有影响的语言哲学出自乔姆斯基的生成语法,它试图通过揭示隐藏在各种不规则和变化背后的语言结构,揭示概念知识的结构。

"虽然有理由把语言哲学看做是哲学家们在思考知识问题时所做的一切,……但我始终按照语言哲学的字义,把它看做是企图澄清我们在思考语言时所使用的基本概念。"——阿尔斯通:《语言哲学》,1964年,第xi页。

### 法哲学

也称为 legal philosophy, 哲学的一个分支,涉及的是与法律和法律制度相关的哲学问题或争论,以及哲学方法在法律问题中的应用。这一领域的主要论题有:法律的本质和定义,法律体系的特性和同一性的条件,法律所要达到的目的,法律责任,法律推理,惩罚的本质及其正当性,国家的强制权力的本质及其正当性以及道德权利和法律权利、道德责任和法律责任以及法和正义之间的关系。

法哲学也常常被用来作为“法理学”(源自拉丁语 *juris prudentia*, 关于法律的知识 and 技巧)的同义语。不过,法理学涉及的面更宽。它的某些分支,如分析的法理学(涉及的是法律和法律概念的逻辑分析)和规范的或批判的法理学(它涉及的是法律评价和法律责任)属于法哲学的领域。其他分支,如历史法理学(涉及的是法的起源和发展),社会学法理学(涉及的是法律规范和法律行为的关系)和功能法理学(涉及的是法律规范和社会需要),则同法哲学无关。

法哲学可以追溯到柏拉图的《法篇》,以及亚里士多德对分配正义和平均正义的区分。对法律的主要的哲学探讨包括:以 T. 阿奎那为

norms and social needs), are not the concerns of philosophy of law.

Philosophy of law can be traced to Plato's *Laws*, and Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice. Major philosophical approaches to law include natural law theory, represented by Thomas Aquinas, which holds that law is essentially connected with moral right and good; legal positivism, represented by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H. L. A. Hart, which argues for the moral neutrality of law and separates law from morality; and legal realism, represented by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Alf Ross, which claims that the law should be understood in terms of how it operates in courts.

"The philosophy of law studies philosophical problems raised by the existence and practice of law." —Dworkin (ed.), *The Philosophy of Law*, 1977, introduction, p. 1.

**Philosophy of logic**, see philosophical logic

### Philosophy of mathematics

Starting with Plato, mathematics has been viewed by philosophers as the model of necessary truth and *a priori* knowledge. Hence, the ontological status of mathematical objects, the foundation of mathematics, the nature of mathematical knowledge and truth, and the structure and function of mathematical theories have been of central interest for many philosophers. Modern philosophy of mathematics started with Frege's logicism and the establishment of set theory in mathematics. In opposition to the traditional claim that there is a kind of mathematical intuition which guarantees the necessity of mathematical truth, logicism argues that mathematics can be reduced to logic, and this idea was classically presented in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. The approach inspired logical positivism, but was attacked by Quine with his criticism of the notion of analyticity. The paradox Russell discovered in set theory led to a foundational crisis of mathematics. To cope with the crisis, philosophers of mathematics have adopted different approaches. Some philosophers, following Plato, believe that mathematical objects are abstract entities independent of our minds, and this realistic position is called mathematical Platonism. Others, like Quine and Putnam, suggest that mathematics does not have objects proper to itself. Hilbert's formalist programme saw the meaning of mathematical expressions in terms of the formal mathematical system to which they belong rather than in terms of objects. Hilbert's attempt to prove the consistency and completeness of formal systems expressing arithmetic was undermined by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. In the Kantian tradition, others claim that mathematical objects are mental constructions or creations, a view best represented by constructivism.

代表的自然法理论,这一理论认为法律在本质上是与道德权利和善相联系的;以J. 边沁、J. 奥斯汀和 H. L. A. 哈特等人为代表的法学实证主义,这一理论坚持法律的道德中立思想,把法律与道德分离开来;以及以 O. W. 小霍尔姆斯和 A. 罗斯为代表的法学现实主义,这一理论认为应当根据法律如何在法庭中起作用去理解它。

"法哲学研究的是由于法律的存在和实践而出现的哲学问题。"——德沃金编:《法哲学》,1977年,导言,第1页。

### 逻辑哲学

见“哲学逻辑”条。

### 数学哲学

自柏拉图始,数学就被哲学家看做是必然真和先验知识的模型。由此,数学对象的本体论地位,数学基础,数学知识和数学真的本性,数学理论的结构和功能等成为许多哲学家的主要兴趣之所在。现代数学哲学始于弗雷格的逻辑主义和集合论在数学中的确立。传统观点认为,有一种数学直觉保证了数学真的必然性,与此观点相对立,逻辑主义相信数学可以还原为逻辑,这种观念在罗素和怀特海的《数学原理》中得到经典体现。这鼓舞了逻辑实证主义,但却受到了奎因通过对分析性概念的批评所进行的攻击。罗素在集合论中所发现的悖论导致了数学基础的危机,而为了克服这一危机,数学哲学家采取了不同的方式。有些哲学家追随柏拉图,相信数学对象是独立于我们意识的抽象实体,这种实在论立场被称为“数学柏拉图主义”;还有些哲学家如奎因和普特南则提出数学并没有自己特有的对象。希尔伯特的形式主义纲领根据数学表达式所属的形式系统而不是对象来解释表达式的意义。希尔伯特试图证明表达算术的形式系统的一致性和完全性,但这一努力为哥德尔不完全性定理所摧毁。康德传统中的其他哲学家认为数学对象是心的构造或创造,这种立场的最好表述为“构造主义”;布劳维尔的直觉主义试图通过证明的构造去解释数学推理,这导致否认处于经典数学核心的排中律。数学哲学与当代本体论、认识论和当前的实在论与反实在论之争中的许多问题密切相关。

"数学哲学的中心问题是数学真的定义。"——卡里:《形式主义数学哲学纲要》,1951年,第3页。

Brouwer's intuitionism, which attempted to explain mathematical reasoning in terms of the construction of proofs, led to the denial of the law of excluded middle which is at the heart of classical mathematics. Philosophy of mathematics is closely connected with contemporary issues in ontology and epistemology and with current debates between realism and anti-realism.

"The central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is the definition of mathematical truth." —Curry, *Outline of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics*, 1951, p. 3.

### Philosophy of mind

The philosophical examination of the nature of the mind and its relationship with body. Plato and Aristotle provided theories of mind, and so have many modern philosophers, in particular Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant. But only with the emergence of psychology as a distinct discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, did the philosophy of mind become an independent sub-discipline within philosophy. Since then, theories of mind have aimed at deepening our understanding of the mind itself, rather than at placing an account of the mind within a traditional metaphysical or epistemological framework. Franz Brentano and his successors played a major role in this process.

Contemporary philosophy of mind established a new focus with the publication of Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Ryle tried to understand our mental states by analysing the logical structures and relations of our mental concepts. This work is distinguished from psychology, which studies the actual operations of mind through experimental methods and from philosophy of psychology which investigates the philosophical implications of the results and methods of psychology. Major topics in the philosophy of mind include the mind-body problem; the nature of the mind; consciousness; mental causation; intentionality, propositional attitudes and mental contents; knowledge and belief; representation; perception; feelings; sensations; thought and language; will; and the emotions. Various approaches to the mind have been explored, such as dualism, phenomenism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, parallelism, materialism, functionalism and eliminativism. The philosophy of mind has been an extremely active discipline in recent decades. In the most recent years, some philosophers have sought to soften the distinction between philosophical and empirical studies of the mind and have linked philosophy of mind with such fields as computational modelling and cognitive psychology.

"The aim of the philosophy of mind is to conduct an a priori investigation into the essential nature of mental phenomena, by elucidating the latent content of mental concepts." —McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 14.

### 心的哲学

对心的本质及其与身的关系的哲学考察。柏拉图和亚里士多德曾提出过关于心的理论,许多近代哲学家也是如此,特别是笛卡尔、洛克、休谟和康德。但只是当心理学在19世纪末成为一个独立的学科时,心的哲学才成为哲学的独立分支。因为从那以后,心的理论旨在加深我们对心本身的理解,而不是在一个传统的形而上的或认识论的框架中置入一个关于心的说明。F. 布伦塔诺及其继承者在这一过程中起到了重要作用。

当代心的哲学随着赖尔《心的概念》(1949)一书的出版而确立了新的问题。赖尔试图通过分析我们的心的概念的逻辑结构和关系来理解我们的心的状态,这与通过实验方法来研究心的实际操作的心理学的本身不同,也不同于研究心理学成果与方法的哲学意义的心理学哲学。心的哲学的主要论题包括心身问题、心的本质、意识、心的因果性、意向性、命题态度和心的内容、知识和信念、表征、知觉、情感、感觉、思维和语言、意愿以及情绪等等。心的哲学对心提供了多种多样的研究方法,如二元论,现象论,附随现象论,行为主义,平行论,唯物论,功能主义及取消论。近年来心的哲学成为哲学中最为活跃的部分。最近,有的哲学家试图弱化关于心的哲学与经验研究之间的区分,并将心的哲学与像计算机模拟和认知心理学这样的领域相联系。

"心的哲学的目标就是通过阐明心的概念的潜在内容来进行对心的现象的必要本质的先验研究。"——麦金:《心的特性》,1982年,第14页。

## Philosophy of nature

In one sense, the analysis and clarification of the concepts used by natural scientists, particularly those concepts that cut across the frontiers of the various scientific disciplines. In a traditional sense, philosophy of nature employs the philosophical contemplation of nature to work out general principles to explain the constituent stuff, basic structure and movement of the natural world. This study was the main preoccupation the Pre-Socratic philosophers who originated western philosophy. Philosophy of nature is also called "physics" [from Greek: *phusis*, nature], and one of Aristotle's major philosophical works is entitled *Physics*. Philosophy of nature has been a standard part of Western metaphysical systems, although it has been increasingly superseded by the empirical study of nature. Kant, however, held that philosophy of nature should seek to determine the basic concepts and principles on which scientists could build the whole structure of their knowledge of the world by establishing the *a priori* presuppositions of natural science. For Hegel, philosophy of nature stood above the empirical natural sciences by providing its own insights into the structure of facts and by going beyond scientific investigation. Philosophy of nature is also called "natural philosophy", but it should not be confused with the nature-philosophy (*Naturphilosophie*) of the German romantic movement.

"The philosophy of nature takes up the material which physics has prepared for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warranted base." —Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, Introduction 10.

## Philosophy of organism

A term used by Alfred North Whitehead for his own metaphysical outlook, although his metaphysics, which is also called process philosophy. Influenced by field theory in physics, he believed that the ultimate basis of the natural world is force rather than matter. Nature is analysed into units called actual occasions. An actual occasion is a process of becoming with its own orientation and is like the Leibnizian monad, although it is not windowless. Each actual occasion actively interrelates with other actual occasions in its immediate past. This process is called *concretere* (Latin: to grow together) and generates an actual entity. Whitehead claimed that this picture explains the organic structure of the world. Physics studies smaller units, while biology studies larger units. Each unit has its own inner structure and is an organism. Larger units are systems of smaller units.

"In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity'." —

## 自然哲学

在一种意义上,是指为自然科学家所使用的概念,尤其是对那些横跨各门学科的概念加以分析和澄清的一个哲学分支。在传统意义上,自然哲学运用对自然的哲学沉思而制造出一般原理以解释自然界的构成材料、基本结构和运动。这个研究是前苏格拉底哲学家关注的主题,他们开创了西方哲学。自然哲学也称为“物理学”[源自希腊词: *phusis*, 自然],亚里士多德的一本重要哲学著作就题为《物理学》。自然哲学一直是西方形而上学体系的标准部分,虽然它已逐渐被对自然的经验研究所代替。然而,康德认为,自然哲学应该努力规定基本概念和原理,在这些概念和原理的基础上,自然科学家才能通过建立自然科学的先天前提而建构他们对世界的整个知识结构。对于黑格尔来说,自然哲学凌驾于经验自然科学之上,因为前者提供它自己对事实结构的洞察,并超越科学的研究。自然哲学不应与德国浪漫主义运动的“自然的哲学”相混。

“自然哲学在物理学使它达到的立脚点上接受物理学从经验中为它准备的材料,并把这种材料加以重构,以至于不再把经验作为最终有根据的基础。”——黑格尔:《自然哲学》,导言10。

## 有机体哲学

英国哲学家 A. N. 怀特海用于他自己的形而上学观点的名称,尽管他的形而上学一般也称作“过程哲学”。为物理学中的场论所影响,他相信自然界的终极基础是力而不是物质。自然被分析为称作“现实事态”的单位。一个现实事态就是一个带有其自身方向性的生成过程。它就像莱布尼茨的单子,但不是无窗的。每个现实事态都与刚刚过去的其他现实事态能动地互相关联。这个过程叫做 *concretere* (源自拉丁文,意思是“共同生长”),并且产生出“现实实有”。怀特海宣称这一图景说明了世界的有机结构。物理学研究较小的单位,而生物学研究较大的单位。每一单位都有其内在结构,都是一个有机体。较大的单位是较小单位的系统。

“在所有哲学理论中都有一个基本原理,它借助于其偶然性而现实化。只有通过它偶然的体现,它才能特征化;离开了这些偶然性也就丧失了现实性。在有机体哲学中,这个基本原理用‘创造性’这一术语表示。”——怀特海:《过程与实在》,1929年,第10页。

Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 1929, p. 10.

### Philosophy of physics

A discipline of philosophy of science dealing with the philosophical impact of the development of modern physics, in particular philosophical issues arising in theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, modern thermodynamics and contemporary cosmology. The major topics of philosophy of physics include space, time, motion, probability, causation and objectivity in the quantum world. The discipline also investigates the foundations of physical theory, the aim of a physical theory, the inter-relation of physical theories and scientific methodology in physics and the logical systems suitable for modern physics. By exploring ideas and methods developed in physics, philosophy of physics contributes to our understanding of physics as a science. It tests the implications of new metaphysical claims arising within physics and shapes our insight into both human knowledge and the nature of things.

“The philosophy of physics performs at least four useful functions, which may be called philosophical assimilation, research planning, quality control, and home cleaning.” — Bunge, *Philosophy of Physics*, 1973, p. 13.

### Philosophy of psychology

The study of psychological concepts and theories, philosophical presuppositions of approaches to psychology and implications of psychological discoveries. It is part of a general development in the philosophy of science towards the integration of empirical and philosophical aspects of study, but in some respects philosophy of psychology overlaps with philosophy of mind. For many contemporary philosophers, philosophy of psychology has replaced philosophical psychology, which sought to analyse psychological concepts without attending to major developments in scientific psychology.

Philosophy of psychology is concerned with empirical or experimental psychology. Empirical psychology as an independent discipline began with the establishment of the first psychology laboratory at University of Leipzig in 1879 by the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, although empirical psychology was also based initially on the associationist theory developed by Hume and J. S. Mill. Philosophy of psychology explores complex relations among different theories of mind, empirical data and experiment in seeking a general account of the nature of mind. Psychological theories contributing to philosophical discussions about the mind have included Gestalt Theory, Freudian theory and behaviourism, but the source of much recent influence is cognitive science, in which the boundary between philosophy and psychology remains undetermined. This boundary is also challenged within philosophy, with Quine's naturalised epistemology tending to reduce epistemology to psychology.

### 物理学哲学

科学哲学的一门学科，它研究现代物理学发展的哲学影响，特别是在相对论、量子力学、现代热力学和当代宇宙学中产生的哲学问题。物理学哲学的主要论题包括空间、时间、运动、可能性、因果性和量子世界的客观性。这个学科也研究物理学理论的基础和目的、物理学理论和其科学方法、适合于现代物理学的逻辑体系的相互关系。通过探索物理学中所提出的观念和方法，物理学哲学对作为科学的物理学作出了我们的理解。它考察了在物理学中产生的新的形而上学主张的内涵，并形成我们对人类知识和事物本性的见识。

“物理学哲学至少执行四种有用的功能，它们可称为哲学同化、研究规划、质量控制和家园清洁。”——邦格：《物理学哲学》，1973年，第13页。

### 心理学哲学

对于心理学概念和理论、心理学方法的哲学前提和心理学发现的含义的研究。它是科学哲学中总体发展的一部分；这种发展的倾向是要整合研究中经验的和哲学的这两个方面。但在某些方面，心理学哲学与心的哲学相重叠。对于许多当代哲学家来说，心理学哲学已经取代了哲学心理学；后者试图在不关注科学心理学主要进展的情况下分析心理学概念。

心理学哲学涉及到经验心理学或实验心理学。经验心理学作为一门独立学科始于1879年莱比锡大学的第一座心理学实验室的建立，它出自德国心理学家W. 冯特之手；尽管在这之前，休谟和J. S. 密尔提出的联想主义理论已为经验心理学提供了一个初步的基础。心理学哲学探讨那些关于心灵、经验材料和实验的不同理论之间的关系，以寻求对于心灵本质的普遍性说明。已经影响到关于心的哲学讨论的心理学理论有格式塔理论、弗洛伊德理论和行为主义；但相当多的近期影响的来源是认知科学，其中哲学与心理学界限是未定的。在哲学里，由于奎因的自然化的认识论要将认识论还原为心理学，这样一种界限也受到挑战。

“心理学哲学就是对于科学心理学的结果和方法的本质及意义的哲学研究。”——麦金：《心的特性》，1982年，第4页。

“[P]hilosophy of psychology, that is, the philosophical study of the nature and significance of the results and methods of scientific psychology.” —McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 4.

**Philosophy of pure reason**, see metaphysics (Kant)

### Philosophy of religion

A branch of philosophy dealing with the meaning, nature and philosophical implications of religious beliefs and claims and of religious practices. Theoretically, all religions constitute its subject-matter, but since the philosophy of religion as a speciality developed in Western countries, it naturally focuses on the claims of Western religions, especially the doctrines of Christianity but also including doctrines of Judaism and Islam. Its main topics include: the conception of God; the conceptual analysis of divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, eternity, and the paradoxes resulting from these attributes; the logical characteristics of religious language; the examination of the logical structure of arguments for and against the existence of God, in particular of the most influential arguments such as the ontological argument, the argument from design, the cosmological argument and the problem of evil; the relation between faith and reason; the relations between religion and morality, art and science; the philosophical comparison of different forms of religion; the phenomenology of religious experience and its role, if any, in justifying religious belief; the methods of religious argument; the afterlife or immortality; the discussions of particular Christian doctrines such as the Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement. Many of these themes are also included in metaphysics and were the central topics in medieval philosophy.

“What are the distinctive features of religious ideas? Do they here and there contain contradictions? On what possible basis can they be considered true or false? How do they mesh in, if at all, with the other concepts which we use? Such are the questions which typically fall within the ambit of the philosophy of religion.” —Ninian Smart, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1970, v.

### Philosophy of science

The study of logical, epistemological and metaphysical problems arising from reflections on the sciences and scientific activities. It is a philosophical critique of science. This area is new as a specific discipline and has emerged in conjunction with the intellectual achievements of modern science, but in a wider sense has been a part of epistemology and metaphysics in the philosophical tradition. The exact bound of its research domain is hard to define, for science itself comprises a wide range of activities, modes of thoughts

### 纯粹理性哲学

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

### 宗教哲学

哲学的一个分支,研究宗教信条和主张以及宗教实践活动的意义、本性和哲学蕴意。从理论上讲,一切宗教都建构有自己的主题,但是,既然宗教哲学作为一个专业是在西方国家中发展起来的,那么,它自然要聚焦在西方宗教的主张,尤其是基督教学说上,但也包括犹太教和伊斯兰教的学说。它的主要论题包括:上帝的概念;对全能、全知、善、永恒等神性以及导源于这些神性的悖论的概念分析;宗教语言的逻辑特征;对关于上帝存在的论证和反驳的逻辑结构考察,特别是对那些最有影响的论证的考察,譬如本体论论证、设计论证、宇宙论论证和邪恶难题;信仰和理性之间的关系;宗教和道德、艺术、科学的关系;不同形式宗教的哲学比较;宗教体验及其在证明宗教信仰中的作用(如果有某种作用的话)的现象学;宗教论证的方法;来世或不朽;对“三位一体说”、“道成肉身说”、“赎罪说”等特殊的基督教学说的讨论等等。其中的许多题目也包括在形而上学中,而且是中世纪哲学的核心论题。

“宗教观念的不同特征是什么?它们包含有这样那样的矛盾吗?在什么可能的基础上,它们能被认作真的或假的?如果真有必要的话,它们怎样与我们使用的其他概念相吻合?诸如此类的问题,是典型地属于宗教哲学范围的问题。”——斯马特:《宗教哲学》,1970年,v。

### 科学哲学

对于由反思科学和科学活动而产生的逻辑、认识论和本体论问题的研究。它是对科学的哲学批判。这一领域作为一个新的特殊学科,其产生是与近代科学在思想上的成就相关联的,但在更广泛的意义上,它是哲学传统中认识论和形而上学的一部分。其研究领域的精确边界很难确定,因为科学本身是由范围广泛的活动、思想方式和话语构成的。一般而言,它所研究的最重要的问题有:科学的目的;科学概念之间和

and discourses. In general, the most important issues it investigates include the aims of science, the relations between scientific concepts and between scientific propositions; the principles assumed in science; the nature and structure of scientific rationality and methodology; scientific knowledge and its confirmation; rationality and scientific progress; explanation; scientific laws; natural necessity; probability; the unity or diversity of science; reduction and relations among the sciences; objectivity in science; certainty and fallibility in science; theory, observation, experiment in science; models in science; the ontological implications of science and the nature of theoretical entities; scientific creativity, invention and discovery; science and other knowledge; science and religion, the social effects of scientific ideas; the relation of philosophy of science to history and sociology of science; the ethics of science. Major figures in this field include the logical positivists (logical analysis of the structure of science, verificationism), Hempel (scientific explanation), Popper (falsificationism), Lakatos (progressive and degenerating research programmes) and Kuhn (paradigm shift and scientific revolutions). Before the Second World War, philosophy of science mainly focused on the logic of science. Since then, philosophers have been more interested in the developmental paradigms of sciences and the epistemology of science.

Aside from general issues regarding the enterprise of science, there are specific problems arising in particular fields of science leading to discipline-specific studies, such as philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology and philosophy of psychology.

“In any event, much is gained in the way of clarifying the aims of philosophical analysis by limiting the philosophy of science to a group of related questions that arise in attempting to understand the intellectual products of scientific inquiry as embodied in explicitly formulated statements.” — Ernest Nagel, in Danto and Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science*, 1960, p. 13.

### Philosophy of social science

In the eighteenth century enlightenment, social sciences aimed to achieve the ideal of scientific objectivity and universality. But are natural sciences and social sciences similar? Philosophers who emphasise the meaning of human action or the role of ideology in social scientific inquiry believe that social sciences explain the social world in a distinct way. The tension between scientific explanation and interpretative understanding led to the emergence of the philosophy of social sciences. This discipline is concerned with the methodology and knowledge claims of the social sciences, especially with the logic of theory construction in the social sciences, with the nature, validity and adequacy of social theory, and with causation or laws among social phenomena. It is also concerned with explanation without universal laws and the role

科学命题之间的关系;科学中设定的原理;科学合理性和方法论的本性和结构;科学知识及其确证;合理性与科学进步;说明;科学法则;自然必然性;或然性;科学的统一性与多样性;科学之间的还原和关系;科学中的客观性;科学中的确定性和可错性;理论,观察,科学实验;科学模型;科学的本体论意义与理论实体之本性;科学的创造性、发明与发现;科学与其他知识;科学与宗教,科学观念的社会影响;科学哲学与科学史和科学社会学的关系;科学伦理学等。这一领域的主要代表人物包括逻辑实证主义者(科学结构的逻辑分析,证实主义),亨佩尔(科学说明),波普(证伪主义),拉卡托斯(进步与退化的研究纲领)和库恩(范式转换与科学革命)。在第二次世界大战前,科学哲学主要集中于科学的逻辑。自那以后,哲学家逐渐对科学的发展范式和科学认识论更感兴趣。

除了关于科学事业的一般问题外,还有出现于科学的特定领域中的专门问题。对于它们的研究形成了科学哲学中的几个专门学科,例如数学哲学、物理学哲学、生物学哲学、心理学哲学,等等。

“无论如何,澄清哲学分析目的的方式都会大有收获,而这种澄清借助于把科学哲学限于一组相关的问题,这些问题产生于试图去理解体现在清晰表述的陈述中的科学探究的精神产物。”——内格尔,见丹托和莫根贝瑟(编):《科学哲学》,1960年,第13页。

### 社会科学哲学

在18世纪的启蒙运动中,社会科学的目的 是寻求实现科学的客观性和普遍性的理想。但自然科学和社会科学相同吗?强调社会科学探究中人的行为的意义或意识形态的作用的哲学家,相信社会科学是以独特的方式解释人类社会的。科学说明与阐释性理解之间的矛盾导致了社会科学哲学的出现。这一学科关注的是社会科学的方法论和有关知识的主张,特别是社会科学中理论框架的逻辑,社会理论的本质、有效性和适应性,以及社会现象中的因果联系或规律。它还关注无需普遍规律的说明,以及社会科学中的意义和解释的作用。它的目的是阐明应用于社会科学中的推理形式和说明框架。它所涉及的一个中心问题是在说明的优先性上社

of meaning and interpretation in the social sciences. It aims to elucidate the forms of reasoning and explanatory frameworks practised in social sciences. A central question concerns the relation between social institutions and individuals with regard to explanatory priority, leading to a long-standing debate concerning methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. Major approaches in the philosophy of social science include those initiated by Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber. The hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamer have challenged the unity of science model of the social sciences proposed by the logical positivists. The later work of Wittgenstein influenced Peter Winch's attack on an account of the social sciences on the model of the natural sciences. Martin Hollis, who emphasises the importance of rationality in understanding society, has argued for a possible accommodation between the rival traditions in the philosophy of social sciences. On this view, we must take care to determine the sort of questions we are asking and the sort of answers which would be appropriate. The philosophy of social sciences should be distinguished from social philosophy, for while social philosophy is the philosophical discussion of the substance of human society, the philosophy of social science deals with philosophical, in particular epistemological and methodological, issues arising out of the practice of social scientists. Nevertheless, the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is a recent example of how these two philosophical enterprises can influence one another and in some instances merge.

"To what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature? Without exaggerating, I think one could call this question the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences." —Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*, 1979, p. 1.

## Philosophy of thought

A new philosophical approach to thought represented by Christopher Peacocke and the late Gareth Evans. Its roots can be traced to Frege's criticism of psychologism and his assertion that thought is the third realm (the others being the physical and the psychological). In contrast to the central tenet of traditional analytical philosophy that an analysis of thought must depend on the analysis of language and that language is prior to thought, advocates of the philosophy of thought believe that the order of priority of this analysis should be reversed. Language can only be explained in terms of antecedently given notions which are thought-laden. Hence, the central consideration of philosophy is no longer language, but thought. It is thought that determines language, and not *vice versa*. Thought can be explained independent of language. Of course, traditional Cartesian epistemology also focuses on the question of the nature of thought,

会制度和个人之间的关系,这导致了关于方法论的集体主义和方法论的个人主义的长时期争论。社会科学哲学中的主要方法包括那些由杜克海姆、卡尔·马克思和M. 韦伯开创的方法。狄尔泰与伽达默尔的解释学对逻辑实证主义提出的社会科学的科学模式的统一性提出了挑战。维特根斯坦的后期著作影响了P. 温奇对以自然科学为模型的社会科学论述的非难。M. 霍利斯强调合理性在理解社会中的重要性,并对社会科学哲学中的对立传统之间可能的和解做了论证。据此,我们必须小心确定我们所问的问题及适合它的答案。社会科学哲学应与社会学哲学相互分开,因为社会哲学是对人类社会本体的哲学探讨,而社会科学哲学涉及的则是产生于社会科学家实践的哲学问题,特别是认识论和方法论的问题。不过,麦金泰尔最近的工作表明了这两个哲学事业如何能够相互影响并在一定情况下结合。

“在何种程度上社会能以研究自然的同样方法进行研究?毫不夸张地说,我想人们可以把这个问题叫做社会科学哲学的首要问题。”——巴斯卡:《自然主义的可能性》,1979年,第1页。

## 思想哲学

对思想的一种新的哲学探讨,以C. 皮考克和已故的G. 埃文斯为代表。它的根源可以追溯到弗雷格对心理主义的批判和对思想是“第三领域”(其他两个领域是物理领域和心理领域)这一观点的肯定。传统分析哲学的核心原则是,思想的分析必定依赖于语言的分析,语言先于思想。与此相对,思想哲学的拥护者认为,分析的这一先后顺序应当倒过来。语言只能根据先已给出的、充满着思想的概念来说明。因此,哲学主要考虑的不再是语言,而是思想。决定语言的正是思想,而不是相反。思想可以不需语言而得到说明。当然,传统的笛卡尔的认识论也关注思想的性质的问题,不过,思想哲学把思想认作命题的内容,研究如下之类的问题:如何成为一个思想,我们如何把握一个思想,思想有怎样的结构,思想是如何关于某物的,我们如何

but the philosophy of thought considers thought as the content of propositions and deals with questions such as what it is to be a thought, how a thought can be grasped, how a thought is structured, how a thought can be about something, how we can judge a thought to be true and how concepts that we grasp are related to thoughts. This type of philosophy is distinct from the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, although it is related to them.

“The philosophy of thought concerns itself with the question what it is to be a thought, and with the structure of thoughts and their components; what it is for a thought to be about an object of one or another kind, what it is to grasp a concept and how a concept can be a component of a thought.” —Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, 1993, p. 129.

### Phonologism

Derrida's term for the feature of traditional metaphysics which establishes an opposition between speech and writing and then prefers speech or voice to writing. Voice [Greek: *phono*] is traditionally considered to be the locus of truth, the real sign of essence and truth and the presence of consciousness to itself. One 'hears' the voice of 'reason' when one seeks the truth. Writing is considered to be a parasitic, supplementary, inferior and derivative form of communication. Such a philosophical tradition is fully presented in Plato's *Phaedrus*, and even Lévi-Strauss accepts this view. Derrida's notion of phonologism is closely associated with, or even used interchangeably with his notions of logocentrism and metaphysics of presence. The speech/writing opposition is one of the main objects of Derrida's deconstruction.

“This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also phonocentrism; absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning.” — Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Spivak), 1974, pp. 11-2.

### Phrase-marker

Chomsky's term for the components of the structural skeleton of a sentence. It is generated by starting with a rule for rewriting the sentence and further expanding its components using phrase-structure rules, eventually reaching a categorial structure. This structure will mark items such as noun phrases, prepositional phrases and clauses. Phrase-markers are the elementary units from which deep structures are constituted. When we insert words into phrase markers and tidy them up, for example to ensure that the words have the right endings, we will have an actual sentence.

“The base of the syntactic component is a system of rules that generate a highly restricted (perhaps finite) set of basic strings, each with an associated structural description called a base phrase-marker.” —Chomsky, *Aspects of the*

能判断一个思想是正确的，我们所把握的概念是如何与思想联系着的。此类哲学与语言哲学和心的哲学有关系，但又与它们不同。

“思想哲学关心的问题是成为一个思想，以及思想的结构和成分问题：一个思想如何成为关于这种或那种对象的思想，如何掌握一个概念以及一个概念如何成为一个思想的组成部分。”——达米特：《分析哲学的起源》，1993年，第129页。

### 语音主义〔或译“语音中心主义”〕

德里达用来表示传统形而上学特点的词，形而上学将说话与书写对立起来，并看重说话或语音〔voice, 声音〕，贬低书写。语音〔古希腊文为 *phono*〕在传统中被认为是真理所在地、本质和真理的真实符号以及意识对自身的显现。当一个人追求真理时，他/她“听到了”“理性的”声音。书写则被认为是寄生的、附加的、低级的和衍生出的交流形式。这样一个哲学传统充分表现在柏拉图的《费得罗篇》中，甚至列维·斯特劳斯也接受这种观点。德里达关于语音主义的观念与他关于逻各斯中心主义和在场的形而上学这两个观念有密切联系，甚至可以相互使用。这种语音与书写的对立是德里达要解构的主要对象之一。

“所以，这个观念就保持在逻各斯中心主义、也叫做语音中心主义的遗产之中：语音与存在、语音与存在的意义、语音与意义的理念性的绝对亲近。”——德里达：《论书写学》（斯庇瓦克英译），1974年，第11—12页。

### 短语记号

乔姆斯基的术语，指一个句子构架的组成部分。它首先产生于重写这个句子的规则，然后用短语结构的规则扩展其组成部分，最后达到一种范畴结构。这种结构就标记为名词短语、介词短语、从句等等。短语记号是构成深层结构的基本单位。当我们把语词插入短语记号并把它们整理一番（譬如当我们确信这些语词有恰当的头尾），我们就会得到一个实际的句子。

“句法成分的基础是一套规则体系，它们产生了一套严格限制的（或许是有限的）基本线索，而其中具有相关结构描述的每个线索称作基本的短语记号。”——乔姆斯基：《句法理论的若干方面》，1965年，第17页。

*Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 17.

### Phrase-structure grammar

One of the three models Chomsky uses in order to characterise our understanding of language and grammar (the other models are finite-state grammar and transformational grammar). It is a form of grammar associated with the theory of linguistic structure based upon immediate constituent analysis or parsing (from Latin: *pars*, part). This analysis parses a sentence into various components and then assigns these components to categories such as Noun, Verb, Adverb, and so on. A language which can be thus derived is called a phrase-structure language. This analysis is characterised by the use of diagrams and the introduction of rewriting rules for turning symbols into other symbols. For example, we can rewrite "Sentence" as "Noun Phrase + Verb Phrase" and then rewrite "Noun Phrase" as "Article + Noun", and so on. The different aspects of an utterance are successively disclosed in such an analysis. However, it can only be applied when we know what sentence we want to derive, and it fails to exhibit the intuited inter-relationships that hold between different sentences. For instance, this grammar cannot incorporate "to be" into the class of verbs. Hence, Chomsky takes this grammar to be inadequate for linguistic description, and holds that it should be replaced by transformational grammar.

"A phrase-structure grammar consists of an unordered set of rewriting rules, and assigns a structural description that can be represented as a tree-diagram with nodes labelled by symbols of the vocabulary." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 88.

**Phrase-structure language**, see phrase-structure grammar

**Phrastic**, see neustic / phrastic

**Phronesis**, Greek term for practical wisdom

### Physical determinism

The belief that everything in the world, including human action, is governed by universal laws of nature. This position was presented in ancient atomism, and was fully articulated by Hobbes. The development of modern science, especially physics, led many to think that physical determinism must be true. Science claims that its aim is to discover these objective laws. If we can provide a complete physical explanation at this time for one thing, we will be able to predict its future on the grounds of natural laws. Human freedom should be understood as the lack of constraints, rather

### 短语结构语法

乔姆斯基用于阐明理解语言和语法的三种模式之一(另外两个是“有限状态语法”和“转换语法”)。它是与一种语言结构理论相关的语法形式,而这种理论是基于直接的结构分析或分解(源自拉丁语 *pars*, 即“部分”)。这种分析是把句子分解为各种组成部分,然后赋予这些部分这样一些范畴,诸如名词、动词、副词等等。由此产生的语言就被称作短语结构语言。这种分析被明显地刻画为使用图表和引入把某些符号转换为其他符号的重写规则,譬如,把“句子”重写成“名词短语+动词短语”,又把“名词短语”重写成“冠词+名词”,等等。话语的不同部分在这种分析中不断地得到揭示。但这只能用在当我们知道我们想要推出什么样的句子的时候,它并没有展现不同句子之间直观到的内在关系。譬如,这种语法不能把“to be”归为一种动词。因而,乔姆斯基认为这种语法不适合语言描述,并认为应该把它替换为转换生成语法。

“短语结构语法是由一些不规则的重写规则构成的,它确定了一种结构描述,这种描述可以表示为一种以词汇符号做标记的三维图表。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第88页。

### 短语结构语言

见“短语结构语法”条。

### 内含

见“语调/内含”条。

### 实践智慧

“实践智慧 (practical wisdom)”的希腊词。

### 物理决定论

相信世界中的一切事物,包括人的活动,都是由自然的普遍规律支配的。这一见解出现于古代的原子论中,并被霍布斯明确表述。现代科学的发展,特别是物理学的发展,使得很多人认为物理决定论肯定是对的。科学宣称其目的是发现这些客观规律。如果我们能在此时为一事物提供完整的物理解释,我们将能根据自然规律预测它的未来。人的自由应被理解为不受强制,而不是脱离这种因果关系。如果我们所做的一切都可以用物理规律解释,灵魂不朽就必须

than as freedom from such causation. If all that we do is explicable in terms of physical laws, the immortality of soul must be denied.

“Physical determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, many of which have actually been discovered, and of whose truth we can reasonably hope to be quite certain, together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors.” —Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970, p. 65.

**Physical objects**, another term for material objects

**Physical phenomenon**, see mental phenomenon

### Physicalism

A refinement of materialism introduced because not all physical phenomena are material. Physicalism assumes that the physical sciences can encompass everything in the world, and that ultimately everything in the world can be explained through physics. It is possible to reduce any scientific predicate to a physical predicate. The word was introduced by the Logical Positivists for the claim that all scientific statements could be translated into statements about physical or observable objects. In this sense, physicalism is close to scientism, which claims that any language which cannot be reduced to scientific language is defective. Carnap took physicalism as a synonym for behaviourism. However, the Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart contrasted physicalism with behaviourism, taking the former to be a scientific approach and the latter a linguistic approach. Smart's physicalism is also called the identity theory of mind or central-state materialism, because its main thesis is that mental events are identical to brain events. On this view, propositions about mental states turn out to be propositions about brain states that belong to the science of neuro-physiology. Neuro-physiology, in turn, is reducible to physics. However, the physicalist view that the identity between mental states and brain states is contingent identity has been challenged by Kripke's claim that all identity is necessary identity. The issues raised by this criticism include the nature of reference, description, meaning, identity, modality and theory.

“The thesis of physicalism maintains that the physical language is a universal language of science—that is to say, that every language of any sub-domain of science can be equipollently translated into the physical language.” —Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 320.

### Physico-theological argument

Kant's term for his version of the argument from design. The physico-theological argument is one of the three

予以否认。

“物理决定论是以自然中物理规律的存在为基础的,这些规律有许多实际上已被发现,对这些规律的真实性,连同那种认为世界的所有其他特性都取决于物理要素的观点,我们都能有理由希望是确定无疑的。”——鲁卡斯:《意志的自由》1970年,第65页。

### 物理对象

“物质对象”的另一说法。

### 物理现象

见“心的现象”条。

### 物理主义

一种改良的唯物论,其引入是因为并非一切物理现象都是物质的。物理主义认为物理科学可涵包世界上的一切,并且宇宙中的万事万物都可以最终借助于物理学而得到彻底的解释。有可能将任何科学谓项都还原为物理谓项。逻辑实证主义者创造这一词汇来指这样一种观点:所有的科学陈述都可以被转译为关于物理的或可观察的对象的陈述。在这个意义上,物理主义近乎“科学主义”,后者认为任何不能还原为科学语言的言语都是有缺陷的。卡尔纳普视物理主义为行为主义的同义语,然而,澳大利亚哲学家 J. J. C. 斯马特则将物理主义与行为主义相对立,将前者视为一个科学方法,而将后者视为语言方法。斯马特的物理主义又被称为“心的同一论”或“中心状态唯物论”,因为其主要论点是,心的事件同一于大脑事件。根据这一观点,关于心的状态的命题就是关于属于神经生理科学的大脑状态的命题,而神经生理科学则转而可以还原为物理学。不过,物理主义关于心的状态与大脑状态的同一是偶然同一的观点受到了克里普克的挑战。他认为,一切同一都是必然同一。由这一批评所引发的问题包括指称的性质,摹状,意义,同一,模态及理论等。

“物理主义的观点认为,物理语言是科学的普遍语言——也就是说,任何科学分支的每一语言都可以等同地转译为物理语言。”——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第320页。

### 自然神论证明

康德的术语,是他关于设计论证的一种形式。自然神论证明是三个主要的上帝存在的神

main theistic proofs for the existence of God, the other two being the ontological argument and the cosmological argument. It argues from observations that the world is purposive and teleologically arranged to the conclusion that there must be an intelligent designer who created it. For Kant, this argument is not sufficient to prove the existence of God because it relies upon the presupposition that there is a supreme being and is thus ultimately based on the ontological argument. Kant argued in detail for the impossibility of the ontological argument and held that its rejection showed that both the cosmological and physico-theological arguments are impossible as well.

“Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological.” —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A630/B658.

### Pictorial form

Wittgenstein claims that a proposition is a logical picture of reality. The elements in a picture are connected with one another in a certain way, and this is the structure of a picture. But how is such a structure possible? The possibility of the structure is called its pictorial form, which is the common element shared by a picture and the reality it represents. Pictorial form is the way a picture represents how objects are related to one another, allowing a picture to depict any reality whose form it has. The conception of pictorial form generalises the notion of picture beyond its primitive base. The distinction between form and structure enables Wittgenstein to solve the ancient puzzle of the possibility of false judgement.

“Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.” —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.151.

### Picture theory

Wittgenstein's theory of the proposition in the *Tractatus*, according to which a proposition is a picture of reality. To understand a proposition is to know the situation that it represents. The term “picture” (German: *Bild*) is derived both from a drawn picture and from the mathematical sense of an abstract model. All propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Each elementary proposition is composed of unanalysable names which designate simple “objects”. The sense of a proposition is the state of affairs it depicts. The way that elements are related in a proposition represents the same way in which objects are related to each other. Hence, a proposition has a pictorial nature. However, it is a logical picture which shares a “pictorial form” with what it depicts, rather than resembling what it depicts spatially. Although all propositions are pictures, not all pictures are propositions. It is a matter of dispute whether the picture

学证明之一（另外两个是本体论证明和宇宙论证明）。它根据所观察到的这一事实，即世界是按意图和合目的地安排的，从而推断出这样的结论，即存在着一个创造世界的理智的设计者。对于康德来说，这个论证本身不足以证明上帝存在，因为它依赖于存在着最高的存在者这个前提。这个论证从根本上说是以本体论证明为基础的。康德具体地揭露了本体论证明的不可能性，并通过这个揭露来表明：宇宙论证明和自然神论证明也同样是不可能的。

“因此对本源的或最高存在者之存在的自然神论的证明是依据宇宙论证明，而宇宙论又依据于本体论的证明。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A630/B658。

### 图像的形式

维特根斯坦认为，命题是实在的逻辑图像。图像中的元素以某种方式相互联系，这就是图像的结构。但这一结构何以可能呢？结构的可能性称为图像的形式，这是图像及其代表的实在共有的元素。图像的形式是图像表示对象如何相互联系的方式，它使得图像描绘任何实在，它具有实在的形式。关于图像形式的看法使得图像的概念扩展得超出了它原来的基础。形式和结构的区分使维特根斯坦能够解决假判断的可能性这个古老的困惑。

“图像的形式是事物以与图像元素相同的方式相互联系的可能性。”——维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》，2.151。

### 图像论

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中提出的关于命题的理论，主张命题是实在的图像。要理解一个命题就是要知道它所表现的情况。“图像”一词（德文为 *Bild*）来自画成的图画，也来自一抽象模型的数学涵义。全部命题都是基本命题的真值函项。每个基本命题由命名简单“对象”的不可分析的名称构成。命题的涵义是它所描绘的事态。元素在命题中联系的方式代表了对象以同样的方式相互联系。因此，命题有图像的性质。然而，这是逻辑的图像，它和它所描绘的东西具有共同的“图像形式”，而不是把它描绘的东西在空间上集合在一起。虽然所有的命题都是图像，但并非一切图像都是命题。一个引起争论的问题是，命题图像论是否随着维特根斯坦抛弃《逻辑哲学论》中的“逻辑原子论”的形而上学而破产。

theory of propositions collapses with Wittgenstein's rejection of the metaphysics of logical atomism of the *Tractatus*.

"It is commonly said that Wittgenstein after the *Tractatus* abandoned the picture theory of proposition." —Kenny, *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*, 1984, p. 21.

### Piecemeal engineering

Popper's proposal for an approach to social change. Piecemeal social engineering contrasts with the utopian engineering of rapid, large-scale reform or revolution. Instead of setting up a positive blueprint for society and then seeking the means to realise it, piecemeal engineering confronts the ills of society through a succession of limited reforms. Social life is so complicated that we cannot tell in advance the unintended consequences of any policy, and these consequences might be harmful. If reform is too complex, rapid or wide-ranging, we cannot trace harmful consequences to their source and correct them. Popper argued that reforming society by piecemeal social engineering would improve institutions and maintain social stability more effectively than utopian strategies. Some critics argue that a policy of piecemeal social engineering would succeed only if there is social agreement, but on such matters there are often deep divisions.

"The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good." —Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies* 1945, p. 158.

### Pietism

A devotional religious movement within Protestantism, springing from Lutheranism and flourishing in Germany in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was founded by the German Lutheran pastor Philipp Jakob Spener. The name of the movement was derived from the twice-weekly Bible study meetings for devout lay-people (called *collegia pietatis*) under Spener's organisation. The movement aimed at being free from the influence of Church and tradition. It stressed autonomous subjectivity and claimed that the real purpose of redemption is to bring the religious subjectivity of man into lively play. The real interest of theology should be to promote the exercise of godliness. The individual should determine the shape of his own religious life by confronting the Bible. The movement emphasised individual experience and practicality rather than evidence and reason. It was concerned with particular problems and situations rather than with the establishment of universal principles. Pietism was the religion of Kant, and the movement also produced figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Gotfried Arnold.

"Pietism represented a turning towards a more inward, emotional, and enthusiastic form of Christianity." —Pinson,

"人们通常说, 维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》之后放弃了命题的图像论。" ——肯尼:《维特根斯坦的遗产》, 1984年, 第21页。

### 渐进工程

波普提出的一种社会变革的方式。渐进式社会工程是相对于激烈的、大规模的改革或革命的乌托邦式工程而言的。渐进工程不是先提出一个明确的社会蓝图然后再寻找方法来实现它, 而是通过一系列有限的改革来对抗社会的弊病。社会生活是如此复杂以至我们不可能预先知道任何政策所带来的意料之外的后果, 而且这些后果也许是有害的。如果改革太复杂、太快或规模过大, 我们就不能找出有害后果的根源并纠正它们。波普论证说, 以渐进的社会工程改革社会将会改善社会制度并维持社会的稳定, 这样做比乌托邦的策略更有效。一些批评家争辩说, 渐进的社会工程的政策只有在社会一致同意的情况下才能成功, 但对这样的问题常常存在很深的分歧。

"因此, 渐进的工程将采取寻找社会最严重、最迫切解决的社会弊端并与之斗争的方法, 而不是采取寻找社会最伟大的终极幸福并为之奋斗的方法。" ——波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》, 1945年, 第158页。

### 虔敬主义

新教内的一个虔诚的宗教运动, 发源于路德教, 盛行于17世纪到18世纪早期的德国。由德国的路德教牧师P. J. 斯庇勒创立。该运动的名称源出于在斯庇勒组织下为虔诚的俗界人士举办的每星期两次的圣经研讨会议(被称为 *collegia pietatis*)。该运动的目标是为了摆脱教会和传统的影响。它强调自治的主体性, 主张救赎的实在目的是把人的宗教主体性鲜活地发挥出来。神学的实际效用应该是促进敬神的实行。个体应该通过对照圣经, 决定他自己的宗教生活形式。该运动强调的是个体体验和实践性, 而不是证据和理由。它关注的是特殊问题和境遇, 而不是普遍原则的建立。虔敬主义是康德的宗教, 该运动也产生出了F. 施莱尔马赫和G. 阿诺德这样的人物。

"虔敬主义代表了基督教转向到较为内向的、激情的和热情的形式。" ——宾森:《虔敬主义在日耳曼民族主义中的作用》, 1968年, 第14页。

*Pietism as a Factor in the Role of German Nationalism*, 1968, p. 14.

### Pineal gland

Descartes held that mind and body are two entities which are completely different in nature. How, then, can the soul have a unified relationship with the entire body? How can mind and body mutually affect one another? Descartes' answer is that the soul does not exercise its functions directly on the body, but affects the body through the pineal gland. The pineal gland is an organ which is situated in the middle of the brain, and which is unique to humans. For Descartes, the pineal gland is the seat of the soul. He claimed that the mind generates movements in the pineal gland, which in turn generates movements in the nerves and hence the body. Giving a location to mind-body interaction is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of psycho-physical causation. The rejection of this appeal to the pineal gland led to the parallelism of Spinoza, the occasionalism of Malebranche and the pre-established harmony of Leibniz.

"There is no other place in the body where they can be thus united unless they are so in this gland." —Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 1. 32.

**Plagiarism**, see forgery

### Platonism

Philosophy derived from the spirit of the philosophy of Plato, in particular from his Theory of Forms, which contrasts reality with phenomena; soul with body; knowledge with opinion; reason with sensation; and rationality with emotion. It then claims that the first member of each contrasting pair is superior or more real than the second member. Such contrasts form an essential ingredient of Western philosophy and has inspired many philosophers since Plato. In this sense, Whitehead reasonably claimed that all subsequent philosophies are footnotes to Plato. Those who claim explicitly to be the heirs of Plato include the Academy tradition (the Old, Middle, and New Academy), Neo-platonism, the Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino and the Cambridge Platonism of the seventeenth century. In contemporary philosophy, all positions which suggest the independent existence of abstract objects are called Platonism. According to these accounts, abstracta can be grasped by the mind, but cannot be created by it. Platonism in this sense is virtually synonymous with realism and is opposed to nominalism.

"Empiricism may properly be contrasted with platonism. For the platonist believes ... that the propositions of logic and mathematics concern an abstract (non-physical and changeless) but genuinely mind-independent realm of objects, including universals such as beauty and wisdom, as

### 松果腺

笛卡尔认为,心灵和肉体是性质上完全不同的两个东西。那么,灵魂怎么能同整个身体有一种统一的关系呢?它们怎样互相影响的呢?笛卡尔的回答是:灵魂并不将其功能直接作用于身体,而是通过松果腺来做到的。松果腺是位于脑中部的一个器官,它是人类独有的。笛卡尔认为,松果腺是灵魂的所在地。心灵在松果腺中产生各种运动,这些运动转而又在神经中,而后在身体上产生运动。给身心的相互作用指定一个地点不是解决心—物因果关系问题的满意办法。放弃求助松果腺,就引出了斯宾诺莎的平行论、马勒伯朗士的偶因论和莱布尼茨的前定和谐论。

“除了在这个腺体内它们〔灵魂和肉体〕可以那样结合以外,它们在身体的任何其他地方都不能那样结合。”——笛卡尔:《灵魂的激情》,第一部分,第32节。

### 抄袭

见“赝品”条。

### 柏拉图主义

源于柏拉图哲学精神的哲学,尤其以他的“理念论”为基础。“理念论”把实在和现象、灵魂和肉体、知识和意见、理性和感觉、理智和激情对应起来,随后断言,这每组对应关系中的前者要优于后者,或比后者更实在。这样的对应,形成了西方哲学的一种本质要素,启发着从柏拉图以来的许多哲学家。在这种意义上,怀特海断言一切后随的哲学都是对柏拉图脚注是有道理的。明确承认是柏拉图后继者的人,包括柏拉图学园传统(老学园、中期学园和新学园)、新柏拉图主义、M. 费其诺为代表的文艺复兴时期的柏拉图主义和17世纪的剑桥柏拉图学派。在当代哲学中,凡认为抽象对象独立存在的一切主张都被称作“柏拉图主义”。根据这些说明,抽象物能被心智把握,但不能被它创造。在这种意义上,柏拉图主义实际上是“唯实论”的同义语,而与“唯名论”相对。

“经验主义可以恰当地和柏拉图主义相对应。因为柏拉图主义者相信……逻辑和数学命题关注的是抽象的(非物理的、无变化的),但又完全独立于心智的对象领域,包括美、智慧等共相,也包括自然数等数学实体。”——卡拉塞斯:《人类知识与人类本性》,1992年,第10页。

well as mathematical entities such as the natural numbers.” —Carruthers, *Human Knowledge and Human Nature*, 1992, p. 10.

### Plato's beard

Quine's term for a classical puzzle, which can be traced to Plato's *Sophist* and concerns the existence of nonbeing. We can formulate the true sentence, "The Queen of China does not exist", but it seems plausible to claim that the non-existent Queen must in some sense be for us to make sense of denying her existence. Yet it seems self-contradictory to say that we can infer the being of something from its nonbeing. This puzzle has led philosophers to examine both the nature of reference and the logical form of existential propositions.

"This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, pp. 1-2.

### Plausibility

A claim is plausible if it subjectively seems worthy of belief even if we have not necessarily studied its objective ground. Plausibility is thus acceptable credibility, and its degree of credibility can depend in part on the authority that advocates it. A plausible claim can turn out to be false, and an implausible claim can turn out to be true. People can disagree on what they find to be plausible. Plausibility is distinct from probability, which is related to alternatives. A belief is probable if its degree of likelihood is greater than that of its alternatives. Probability is more objective than plausibility.

"All holding-to-be-true based on grounds concerning which we do not investigate whether they contain a large or a small degree of truth is plausibility." —Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 113.

### Pleasure

[Greek; *hedone*, from which hedonism is derived] Pleasure is taken to be contrary to pain but related to enjoyment and liking. Plato in the *Philebus* argues that pleasure is an indeterminate state and cannot be measured, a position challenged by social choice and other theories which depend on some way of measuring pleasure. Aristotle holds that pleasure, in contrast to movement, is an activity having its own end and is the natural accompaniment of successful activity, whether of the mind or the senses. Pleasure is not identical to happiness, but is an important part of it. This position opposes traditional hedonism, which claims that pleasure is the only or the highest good. According to Utilitarianism an action is justified to the extent that it tends to produce pleasure and to reduce pain. Pleasure is generally viewed as an agreeable feeling, but there is much debate regarding its nature,

### 柏拉图的胡子

奎因的术语，指一个可溯至柏拉图《智者篇》的经典性难题，关注“不是”的存在。我们可以构建一真实的句子，“中国的皇后不存在”。但我们有理由断定，不存在的皇后必定自某种意义上“是”〔存在〕，因而使得我们可否定其存在。可是说我们可从一个事物的“不是”〔不存在〕中推出其“是”〔存在〕，这是自相矛盾的。这一难题吸引了许多哲学家去考察指称的性质和存在命题的逻辑形式。

“这是古老的柏拉图的关于‘不是’的谜。‘不是’必定在某种意义上‘是’；不然，‘不是’又是什么？这一棘手的学说可取绰号为柏拉图的胡子。”——奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》，1956年，第1—2页。

### 似真性

一个信念是似真的，如果它主观上值得相信，尽管我们尚未必要地研究其客观基础的。这样，似真性就是可接受的可信性，其可信度部分地依赖于提倡它的权威。一个似真观点可证明为是假的，而一个不似真观点可证明为是真的。人们对他们认为是似真的东西会有不同观点。似真性区别于与选择相关的或然性，一个信念是或然的，如果其真实性程度大于其他选择。或然性比似真性更客观。

“所有那些我们主张其为真，但其基础又并非我们对其真实度的研究，就是似真性。”——康德：《逻辑学讲义》（杨编辑），1992年，第113页。

### 快感

[希腊词是 *hedone*，“享乐主义”（hedonism）源自该词] 快感与痛苦相对，与享受和喜欢相关。在《费利布篇》中，柏拉图争辩说，快感是一种不确定的状态，是无法衡量的，这一立场受到有赖于某种快感衡量方式的社会选择与其他学说的挑战。亚里士多德认为快感与运动截然相反，它是一种有其自身目的的活动，是成功活动的自然伴随物，无论这种活动是心灵的还是感官的。快感与幸福不同，但却是幸福的重要组成部分。这一立场反对传统的享乐主义，因为后者把快感当做惟一的或至高的善。按照功利主义的观点，举凡产生快感并且消减痛苦的行动就是合理的。快感通常被视为一种欣快的感受，但在其本质、分类及其同欲望的关系等问题上争论颇多，这其中的部分原因在于

classification and relation to desire, in part because of its central role in the discussion of human motivation and value.

“Appetite’s concern is pleasure and pain.” —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1111b17.

### Pluralism

[From Latin *pluris*, more than one] A doctrine, opposed to monism and dualism, holding that reality consists of many things and that none of its constituents is more fundamental than any of the others. It is therefore impossible to reduce everything in reality to one or two ultimate principles. For pluralism there are many worlds which we are able to construct through the use of different systems of concepts and different standards of measurement. Leibniz’s theory of monads, Russell’s logical atomism and later Wittgenstein’s theory of language games are different forms of pluralism. Sometimes pluralism means that reality has no basic unity or continuity, but is essentially fragmented or indeterminate. In ethics, pluralism means that there are various competing ethical interests or values which cannot be reduced to one single overriding interest or value.

“The extreme form of pluralism is the assumption that all relations are external, with the consequence that the existence of any one object is logically independent of the existence of any other.” —Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 10.

### Pneuma

[Greek: breath] A key term in Stoic philosophy of nature. *Pneuma* was held to be a compound of fire and air, although not a simple chemical compound, and was also called artistic or intelligent *pneuma*. Through having two components, *pneuma* was held to have a peculiar tensional movement making it continuously active. It was described as a material substance with fine and tenuous structure, but also as a cohesive force or energy which pervades the universe to account for its change and persistence. As Nature, God or the universal *logos*, it acted on matter, that is the elements of earth and water, to hold them together. *Pneuma* worked in the macrocosm and also in every individual body. The concept of *pneuma* was influenced by the Pre-Socratics and in turn influenced the postulation of *aether* in the science of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. It is also comparable to a field of force in contemporary physics.

“This pneuma possesses two parts, elements or conditions, which are blended with one another through and through, the cold and hot, or if one wished to describe them by different names taken from their substances: air and fire.” —Chrysippus, in Gelen, *On Hippocrates and Plato’s Doctrines*, 5, 3, 8.

Pneumatology, another expression for rational psychology

快感在讨论人类动机和价值过程中的重要作用。

“欲望所关心的是快感与痛苦。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1111b17。

### 多元论

[源自拉丁文 *pluris*, “多于一”] 与一元论和二元论相反, 这种学说认为实在由许多事物组成, 其组成元素中没有哪一种比任何其他种更为基本。因此不可能把实在中的任何东西都还原为一种或两种最终的基质。对多元论而言, 有多个世界, 我们可以通过使用不同的概念系统和不同的测量标准而把它们构造出来。莱布尼茨的单子论、罗素的逻辑原子论以及后期维特根斯坦的语言游戏论都是不同形式的多元论。有时, 多元论指的是实在没有基本统一性或连续性, 它本质上是支离破碎和不确定的。在伦理学中, 多元论指有各种对立的伦理兴趣和价值, 不能把它们还原成单一的、压倒一切的兴趣和价值。

“多元论的极端形式是这种假设: 所有的关系都是外在的, 因此任何对象的存在在逻辑上都独立于任何其他对象的存在。”——艾耶尔: 《20世纪的哲学》, 1982年, 第10页。

### 普纽玛

[希腊文, 气息] 斯多亚自然哲学的中心概念。它被认为是火与气的复合物, 虽然不是一种简单的化学复合物。他们也称之为“技艺性的”或“理智的”普纽玛。因为普纽玛有两个成分, 它便有一种独特的张力运动, 使其不断地活动。它是一种结构稀薄精致的物质本体, 但也像一种凝聚力或能量般贯穿整个宇宙, 说明后者的变化和持续。它作为自然, 作为神, 作为普遍的逻各斯, 而作用于质料, 即土和水的元素, 将它们相结合。普纽玛既在宏观宇宙, 也在每个个别物体中起作用。这一观念深受前苏格拉底哲学影响, 并转而影响了17至19世纪科学中关于以太的设定。它也可与当代物理学的“力场”观念相对照。

“这一普纽玛拥有两个部分, 两种元素或两种条件; 它们一直在互相混合, 既冷又热; 如果人们要用取自它们本体的不同名称来描绘它们, 即是气与火。”——克吕西波, 见盖伦: 《论希波克拉底和柏拉图的学说》, 5, 3, 8。

圣灵论

## Poiesis

[Greek: from *poiein*, to act, to do or to make] For Aristotle, *poiesis* is restricted to making or producing which has as its aim something beyond itself, for example ship-building, which has the aim of producing a vessel. It is distinguished from *praxis* (action, conduct), which has aims and value in itself. *Poiesis* belongs to *techne* (craft), while *praxis* belongs to *phronesis* (practical reason). In another sense, *poiesis* is used specifically for poetry and its composition.

"The state involving reason and concerned with action is different from the state involving reason and concerned with *poiesis*." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a3-4.

## Polar-related concept pair

A pair of concepts which are opposite in meaning, where each of them can be understood or identified only in terms of its contrast with the other. The notion is also called conceptual polarity. Neither member of the pair has an autonomous existence as a concept apart from the other, and neither member can logically be reduced to the other. In many cases, one concept of the polar pair is formed in association with the other from which it is distinguished. Examples of polar pairs include up and down, unity and plurality, physical and mental and error and truth. The application of each entails the possibility of applying the other. In the history of Western philosophy, various polarities have been established, and usually one member is thought to be superior to the other. Derrida's deconstructionism is intended to reject dichotomous conceptual structures and their relations of unequal power and value, but it is difficult to determine whether we can do without such concept pairs or whether objectionable implications of value can be detached from them.

"A particularly important type of discrimination is that where one concept which, so to speak, includes by exclusion. Concepts related in this way and such constitute the most important concepts of our thinking, we denoted as 'polar-related concept pairs'." —Reiss, *The Basis of Scientific Thinking*, 1961, p. 5.

## Polish notation

The notation employed in contemporary logic is generally Russellian symbolism. Yet there is an important kind of notation which was originates by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz and which was widely employed by Polish logicians between two world wars. It was also preferred by the logician Arthur Prior. The chief characteristic of Polish notation is that it places all its operators immediately before their arguments, and thus gets rid of parentheses. This helps avoid ambiguity and better serves automatic processing. The

"理性心理学"的另一表述。

## 创制

[希腊词,源自 *poiein*, 行动、做或制作]对亚里士多德而言,创制限于那目的不在自身内的制作或生产,例如,造船业的目的是制造船。它与实践(举动,行为)相区分,后者具有目的和价值于自身。创制属于技艺(*techne*),而实践属于实践理性(*phronesis*)。在另一意义上,创制专门用来指诗及其创作。

"理性地关涉行为的状态不同于理性地关涉创制的状态。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1140a3—4。

## 极性相关的概念对

一对意义相反、但每一个只能在与另一个的对比中才能理解或鉴别的概念。这一概念也被称作“概念的两极性”。这种概念中的任何一个都既不能作为离开另一方的孤立概念而自主存在,也不能在逻辑上还原为另一方。在许多情形中,这种极性对中的一个概念都在与自己相区别的另一概念的相关中形成。这种概念对的例子有“上一下”,“统一性—多元性”,“物理的—心理的”,“错误—真理”等。每一概念的应用都蕴涵着另一方应用的可能性。西方哲学史中确立起种种概念对,并且通常认为有一方高于另一方。德里达的解构主义力图拒斥两极概念结构以及它们间在力量与价值上不相等的关系,不过很难决定我们可否取消这些概念对,或者价值的客观化含义是否可与它们相分离。

“一种特别重要的辨别类型,是一个概念由排斥而得以包容。以这种方式相关、并由此构成我们思维中最重要的概念,我们名之为‘极性相关的概念对’。”——里斯:《科学思维基础》,1961年,第5页。

## 波兰记法

在当代逻辑中所使用的记法一般是罗素的符号体系。不过,还有一类重要的记法,它起源于波兰逻辑学家卢卡西维茨,并且被波兰逻辑学家在两次世界大战之间所广泛使用,亦为逻辑学家普赖尔所偏爱。波兰记法的主要特点在于,它把所有的算子直接置于其主目之前,这就省掉了括号。这有助于避免歧义并更适用于自动编程。下面是这组记号的表列,括号内是其中文解释:

following is the list of this set of notation, with an English explanation in bracket:

Np (not p)

Apq (either p or q)

Kpq (both p and q)

Cpq (if p then q)

Epq (p if and only if q)

Mp (possibly p)

Lp (necessarily p)

Ixy (x is the same as y)

$\Sigma x\phi x$  (for some x,  $\phi x$ )

$\Pi x\phi x$  (for every x,  $\phi x$ )

“Polish notation shows which expressions are arguments and which expressions are functions by always writing all arguments to the right of their functions.”—Williams, *What is Existence*, 1981, p. 50.

### Political liberty

According to liberalism, the basic rights or liberties that citizens of a just society holds equally. It is the liberty held in virtue of citizenship. Political liberty includes negative liberties, such as freedom from the arbitrary arrest and the freedom to pursue one's own interests and plans without obstruction, and positive liberties, such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to possess property. Political liberties provide the main content of human rights.

“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”—Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, p. 122.

### Political obligation

The duty to obey the laws and rules of the state. A fundamental problem for political philosophy concerns the grounds for accepting the authority of the state, given that state jurisdiction has the character of universality and compulsion. Under what conditions is obedience required or disobedience justified? These issues are closely associated with attempts to determine the basis of the authority of the state, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate governments, and the problem of civil disobedience. Political obligation cannot be understood merely in terms of prudence and the fear of coercive power. Various theories of political obligation have been put forward over the centuries, such as those focusing on divine right, the social contract, consent, the general will, justice and rationality.

“[H]aving a political obligation ordinarily presupposes the existence of a rule (whether a legal rule or some other type) which forbids or requires a specified form of conduct.”—Flathman, *Political Obligation*, 1972, xxiv.

Np (非 p)

Apq (或者 p 或者 q)

Kpq (既 p 又 q)

Cpq (如果 p 则 q)

Epq (p 当且仅当 q)

Mp (可能 p)

Lp (必然 p)

Ixy (x 与 y 同一)

$\Sigma x\phi x$  (对某些 x,  $\phi x$ )

$\Pi x\phi x$  (对每一个 x,  $\phi x$ )

“波兰记法凭借把所有主目总是写在其函项的右边,从而表明了哪些表达式是主目,哪些表达式是它们的函项。”——威廉姆斯:《什么是存在》,1981年,第50页。

### 政治自由

根据自由主义,政治自由是一个公正社会的公民平等拥有的那些基本权利或自由。它是凭借公民身份而拥有的自由。政治自由包括消极的自由和积极的自由,前者如不受随意逮捕的自由,不受妨碍地追求自己的利益和计划的自由,后者如思想的自由、言论的自由、集会的自由和拥有财产的权利。政治自由为人权提供了主要的内容。

“正常说来,我在没有人或团体干预我的活动这种程度上是自由的。政治自由在这种意义上仅仅是一个范围,在这一范围内,一个人可以不受他人的妨碍去行动。”——柏林:《自由四论》,1969年,第122页。

### 政治义务

遵守国家的法律和法规的责任。对政治哲学而言,假定国家司法权具有普遍和强制的特性,那所涉及的一个基本问题就是,接受国家权威性的根据是什么?在什么样的条件下所需的服从或不服从才是正当的?这些问题与确定国家权威基础的努力、区分合法政府和非法政府及公民的不服从问题密切相关。政治义务仅从谨慎和对强权的恐惧是不能被理解的。有关政治义务的各种理论被提出已有许多世纪了,如那些关注神权、社会契约、同意、共同意志、正义和合理性的理论。

“政治义务通常以存在一个规定(不管是合法的规定还是其他类型的规定)为先决条件,这一规定禁止或要求一种特定的行为方式。”——弗拉茨曼:《政治义务》,1972年,第xxiv页。

## Political philosophy

Political philosophy is distinguished from political science on the grounds that political science is empirical and descriptive, explaining how government in fact works, while political philosophy is normative, establishing the norms or ideal standards which prescribe how governments ought to work. In fact, the boundary between the two fields is not clear. Political theory includes both empirical and normative investigations. Contemporary political philosophers bring analytic skill and ethical commitment to their work. They seek theoretical insight into basic political concepts, such as justice, equality, liberty, democracy, nationalism, the state, power, authority, citizenship, rights and obligations and look for rational grounds to accept or reject particular political institutions. Political philosophers assess existing political institutions and ideologies and in some cases seek to justify alternative political and social systems if existing arrangements are unacceptable. Plato's *Republic* remains the major classic. Other prominent political philosophers include Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Burke, Hegel, Mill and Marx. Much recent discussion in political philosophy has responded to the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

A rigid demarcation between political and social philosophy is impossible, and social philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, have influenced recent political philosophy. Social philosophy also deals with philosophical issues relating to institutions such as the family, religion and education. Critiques of culture and modernity derived from Nietzsche and his successors have also influenced political philosophy.

"Politics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise. Political philosophy is therefore, strictly speaking, the philosophy of the state." — Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, 1970, p. 3.

## Political theory

An academic discipline aiming to provide a systematic understanding of the nature and purpose of government and to provide certain views about how political institutions ought to be improved. It is distinct from political philosophy, which seeks to explicate and give theoretical insight into normative political concepts, such as justice, liberty, equality, the state, democracy, authority, citizenship and rights, and from political science, which seeks to provide explanatory theories and classifications in relation to the empirical data of politics. Nevertheless, political theory is closely related to these other disciplines and is often regarded as the theoretical aspect of political science. Traditionally, its main preoccupation has been to analyse the work of the classical political thinkers from Plato to Marx and to apply their insights to current political affairs. Recently, political theorists have be-

## 政治哲学

政治哲学不同于政治科学,其原因在于政治科学是经验性的和描述性的,它解释一个政府实际上是如何运作的,而政治哲学则是规范性的,它确立那些规定政府应如何运作的准则或理想的标准。事实上这两个领域的界线是不清楚的。政治理论既包括经验方面的调查研究,也包括规范方面的调查研究。当代政治哲学家把分析的技巧和伦理学的承诺带进了他们的研究。他们试图从理论上洞察诸如正义、公平、自由、民主、民族主义、国家、权力、权威、公民身份、权利和义务等基本政治概念,寻求接受或拒绝特定政治制度的合理根据。政治哲学家评价现存的政治制度和意识形态,如果现存的安排不能被接受,他们有时还试图论证可以替换的政治和社会制度。柏拉图的《国家篇》现在仍是政治哲学的主要经典著作。其他著名的政治哲学家包括亚里士多德、马基雅维利、霍布斯、洛克、休谟、卢梭、康德、博克、黑格尔、密尔和马克思。近来政治哲学的许多讨论已转向 J. 罗尔斯和 R. 诺齐克的著作。

政治哲学和社会哲学之间不可能存在一条严格的界线,一些社会哲学家,如 J. 哈贝马斯,已对近来的政治哲学产生了影响。社会哲学也探讨与诸如家庭、宗教和教育这些与制度相关的哲学问题。起源于尼采和他的后继者的对文化和现代性的批判也对政治哲学产生了影响。

"政治是国家权力的运作或影响这些运作的尝试。因此,从严格意义上讲,政治哲学是关于国家的哲学。"——沃尔夫:《为无政府主义辩护》,1970年,第3页。

## 政治理论

一门旨在提供对政府的性质和效用的系统理解,并提供某些有关政治制度应如何改进的意见的学科。它与政治哲学不同,后者试图解释并从理论上洞察规范的政治概念,如正义、自由、平等、国家、民主、权威、公民身份和权利;它与政治科学也不同,后者试图提供有关政治经验材料的解释性理论和分类法。不过,政治理论同这两个不同学科联系密切,并常常被视为政治科学的理论方面。从传统上看,它的主要着眼点一直是分析从柏拉图到马克思这些经典政治思想家的著作,并把他们的思想运用于当前的政治事务。近些年来,政治理论家关注的是建构政治进程的形式模型。由于当代对分析—综合,事实—价值区分的质疑,政治哲学、政治理论与政治科学已变得越发接近。

come interested in constructing formal models of political processes. With the contemporary questioning of the analytic-synthetic and fact-value distinctions, political philosophy, political theory and political science have drawn more closely together.

“Political theory is ... an essentially mixed mode of thought. It not only embraces deductive argument and empirical theory, but combines these with normative concerns ... so acquiring a practical, action-guiding character.” —Miller and Siedentop (eds), *The Nature of Political Theory*, 1983, p. 1.

**Polyadic**, see dyadic

### Polysyllogism

An inference composed of a series of syllogisms in which the conclusion of an earlier syllogism become a premise of a later syllogism in the series. The earlier syllogism is called a prosyllogism, and the later syllogism is called an episyllogism. For example, take (1) all *rs* are *ps*; (2) all *ps* are *qs*, (3) all *rs* are *qs*; (4) all *qs* are *ds*, (5) all *rs* are *ds*. Not only is (3) a conclusion derived from (1) and (2), but it is also a premise of the syllogism composed of (3), (4) and (5). A syllogism with more than two premises is generally analysed as two or more syllogisms.

“A series of syllogisms, one providing a premise of another, is called a polysyllogism.” —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 354.

### Polytheism

[from Greek: *poly*, many + *theos*, god] A belief that there are many gods, instead of one. Religions that accept and worship many gods are called polytheistic religions. This view is opposed to monotheism (from Greek: *mono*, one, single + *theos*, god), the belief that there is only one God. The religion of the ancient Greeks was polytheistic, and Judaism, Christianity and Islam are monotheistic. It is often held that polytheism is inconsistent with true religious belief, because its gods, who are pictured as quarrelling, lying and cheating, are far from moral perfection. Based on the observation that polytheism characterises the religions of early societies, monotheists argue that polytheism is a stage of human religious development which culminates in monotheism.

“Polytheism: more than one god exists.” —Sorensen, *Thought Experiment*, 1992, p. 205.

### Pons asinorum

[Latin: the bridge of asses, because asses were traditionally thought to have difficulty in crossing bridges] This term has several usage. It refers to proofs from Euclid's *Elements* of two theorems: first, if two sides of a triangle are

“政治理论是……一种实质上混合的思想模式。它不仅包含演绎性的证明和经验性的理论,而且还把它们与规范的事物结合起来,……从而获得了一种实践的、指导行动的特征。”——米勒、西登托普(编辑):《政治理论的性质》,1983年,第1页。

### 多元的

见“二元的”条。

### 复合三段论

由一系列三段论所构成的推理,该系列中较前的三段论的结论变成了较后的三段论的前提。较前的三段论叫做前三段论(prosyllogism),较后的三段论叫做后三段论(episyllogism)。例如,(1)所有 *r* 都是 *p*; (2)所有 *p* 都是 *q*; (3)所有 *r* 都是 *q*; (4)所有 *q* 都是 *d*; (5)所有 *r* 都是 *d*。(3)不仅是从(1)和(2)推出的结论,而且也是由(3),(4)和(5)构成的三段论的一个前提。有多于两个前提的三段论通常被分析为两个或多个三段论。

“一系列三段论,一个为另一个提供了前提,叫做复合三段论。”——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第354页。

### 多神论

[源自希腊语 *poly* (众多的) 和 *theos* (神)] 一种信仰,相信存在着多个神,而不是一个。接受并崇拜许多神祇的宗教被称作多神论宗教。这种观点与“一神论”(monotheism,源自希腊语 *mono* (一,单) 和 *theos* (神)) 相对立,因为一神论相信只有一位神存在。古代希腊的宗教是多神论,犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教是一神论。一般认为,多神论与真正的宗教信仰是不一致的,因为它的那些被描述为争吵、撒谎和欺诈的神祇,离道德完美相去甚远。基于发现多神论表现了早期社会的宗教特征,一神论者认为,多神论是人类宗教发展过程中的一个阶段,而这个过程的顶点是一神论。

“多神论:有多个神存在。”——索仑森:《思想实验》,1992年,第205页。

### 驴桥

[拉丁语,“驴桥”。因为在传统上,它被认为是驴子难以通过的桥]这个术语有几种用法。首先,它指源于欧几里德《几何学原理》两个定理的证明。这两个定理是:第一,“如果一个三

equal, then the angles opposite those sides are also equal; and secondly, the Pythagorean theorem, the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Those who fail to follow these proofs are considered to be as stupid as asses. In another sense, a *pons asinorum* is a bridge-like diagram proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. It was used as a study aid to show how to proceed from premises to a given conclusion.

"In the later Middle Ages this diagram (with accompanying mnemonic verses to distinguish good connexions from bad) was used extensively for the teaching of syllogism and came to be known as the *pons asinorum*." —W. Kneale and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, pp. 186-7.

### Popular art

Art is often distinguished into serious, higher or esoteric art and popular art. Popular art has dominated modern mass-media culture and has great social influence. Critics of popular art claim that it is inferior to the higher forms of art and fear that it corrupts higher culture. They allege that popular art lacks creativity in both form and content and does no more than please its audience. They see it as intellectually shallow and emotionally disruptive and argue that its appreciation requires neither effort nor training, but only passive response. Popular art is alleged to produce spurious gratification rather than real aesthetic satisfaction. In all, these critics see popular art as intrinsically worthless in aesthetic terms. Cultural elitists claim that popular art is a lower taste that reduces the quality of our culture. Perhaps led by aesthetic attention to film, many recent critics and cultural theorists have adopted a more favourable attitude towards popular arts. They have challenged much of the hostile assessment given above and have argued that fastidious higher arts have benefited greatly from the exuberant strength of popular arts. We should at least distinguish among different forms of popular art. Intelligent appreciation might improve them without destroying their character or their legitimate function.

"The distinction between esoteric and popular arts almost coincides in our civilisation with that between art and entertainment, but need not do so; the former distinction, unlike the latter, does not impute insincerity and the will to manipulate." —F. E. Sparshott, *The Structure of Aesthetics*, 1963, pp. 138-9.

### Pornography

A genre of fiction, initially associated with brothels, focusing on the representation of obscene—often perverse—sexual activities, with the intention of sexually arousing its readers, mainly men. The term now extends to cover any work in any medium with the same content and intention.

角形的两边相等,那么,与那些边对应的角亦相等";第二,毕达哥拉斯定理,即“一个直角三角形斜边的平方等于另两个边平方之和”。没有领会这些证明的人被认为蠢笨如驴。在另一种意义上,它指一个像桥的图表,由阿弗罗迪西的亚历山大在其对亚里士多德《前分析》的评注中提出。它用作研究的一种帮助,表示怎样从前提推论到给定的结论。

“在中世纪后期,这个图表(带有区分正确的联结和错误的联结的记忆韵文)曾被广泛地用于教授三段论,逐渐被通称为驴桥。”——W. 涅尔和M. 涅尔:《逻辑学的发展》,第186—187页。

### 通俗艺术

艺术经常被分为严肃艺术、高雅艺术或难懂的艺术以及通俗艺术。通俗艺术主导着现代大众传媒文化,具有重大的社会影响力。通俗艺术的批评者认为通俗艺术劣于高雅的艺术形式,同时还担心通俗艺术对高雅文化的腐蚀作用。他们认为通俗艺术在形式与内容方面缺乏创造性,只是一味地迎合和取悦观众。批评家们认为通俗艺术在思想上肤浅,在情感上腐朽,认为欣赏通俗艺术轻而易举、无需训练,只是被动地反应而已。据说,通俗艺术给人以虚假的满足而非真正的审美满足。总之,这些批评家认为通俗艺术从审美角度看没有什么内在价值。文化精英论者宣称,通俗艺术低级趣味,有损文化的品质。或许由于对电影的审美注意,近来许多批评家和文化理论家对通俗艺术采取了一种比较积极的态度。他们向敌视通俗艺术的上述评价提出挑战,认为过分讲究的高雅艺术在很大程度上得益于通俗艺术的勃勃生机。人们至少应当区别对待不同的通俗艺术形式。理智的欣赏或许会在不破坏其特征或合理职能的情况下改善通俗艺术。

“在人类文明中,难懂的艺术与通俗艺术之间的区别几乎等同于艺术与娱乐的区别,但是不必这样划分;这两种区别不同,前者并不把虚伪和意志归咎于操纵。”——斯帕肖特:《美学的结构》,1963年,第138—139页。

### 色情艺术


一种小说样式,最初与妓院有关,侧重于表现淫秽——经常是堕落的——色情活动,旨在唤起读者(主要是男人)的性欲。现在,色情艺术包括所有具有相同内容与意向并以各种媒体制作的作品。虽然边界难以划分,但是,赤裸裸

Although the boundaries are difficult to draw, hard-core pornography, which depicts cruelty, violence and explicit arousal can be distinguished from soft-core, which does not. Pornography, as distinct from erotic art, is generally considered to have little redeeming aesthetic interest, for its dominant aim is the gratification of sexual fantasy. Because pornography is thought to be morally harmful and degrading to individuals and society, many consider that any material found to be pornographic should be restricted or prohibited. Others argue that pornography should be eliminated because it supports in fantasy real and objectionable patterns of patriarchal domination in society. Opponents argue that pornography has a positive function of dealing with sexual desire without involving unwelcome sexual advances. The issue of censoring pornography is debated in terms of the freedom of thought and the press, on the one hand, and the need to avoid degrading creators and users of pornography, women and society, on the other.

“If we assume that the majority is correct, and that people who publish and consume pornography do the wrong thing, or at least display the wrong sort of character, should they nevertheless have the legal right to do so?” —R. Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 336.

### Porphyrian tree

The Greek Neo-platonist Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus' *Enneads*, wrote an introduction (Greek: *Isagoge*) to Aristotle's *Categories*. It was translated into Latin by Boethius and became the standard philosophical textbook in the Middle Ages. In his introduction, Porphyry presented the basis of Aristotle's thought as a tree-like scheme of dichotomous divisions which indicates that a species (subgenera) is defined by *genus et differentia* and that the process continues until the lowest species (*infirma species*) is reached. In the category of substance, the tree is:



Mortal Immortal

Thus, to define a human being (for example, Socrates), we shall say that he is a mortal, rational, sensitive, animate, corporeal substance. The tree is the standard device by which medieval metaphysics classified natural kinds.


“A Porphyrian Tree begins with an Aristotelian category ... and moves via a series of dichotomies from the most gen-

的性描写以及描写残忍与暴力的色情艺术，有别于委婉描写此类事情的色情艺术。与难懂的高雅艺术截然相反的是，人们一般认为色情艺术没有什么值得注意的审美兴趣，因为其主导目的是为了满足不同性幻想。由于人们认为色情艺术对个体和社会来讲有伤风化，所以许多人认为应当限制或禁止任何描写色情的东西。有些人争辩说，色情艺术理应取缔，因为它引人思淫或想入非非。而反对者则认为色情艺术具有对付性欲的积极功能，同时又不掺杂讨厌的性挑逗。查封色情艺术的问题向来争论不休，一方面是因为思想与新闻自由所致，另一方面是因为有必要避免贬低作者和色情艺术使用者的身份，避免降低妇女的身份和败坏社会的风气。

“我们如果假定大多数人是正确的，假定出版和消费色情艺术的人们是错误的，或者假定人们表现出一种错误的品格，那么他们到底有没有合法权利这样做呢？”——德沃金：《原则问题》，1986年，第336页。

### 波菲利之树

古代希腊的新柏拉图主义者、普罗提诺《九章集》的编纂者波菲利撰写了一篇亚里士多德《范畴》的导言（希腊语为 *Isagoge*）。它由波埃修斯译成拉丁文，成为中世纪的标准哲学教科书。在这篇导言中，波菲利把亚里士多德的思想基础表述为一张两叉划分的树状图。这张图表明，一个种（子属）是靠 *genus et differentia*（属加种差）而被定义的，这个过程要一直持续达到最低一级的种（不稳固的种）。以实体范畴为例，这棵树是：



有死的 不死的

可见，要定义一个人（例如，苏格拉底），我们就要说，他是一个有死的、有理性的、有感觉的、有生命的、有形体的实体。这棵树是中世纪的形而上学区分自然种类所依据的标准设计。

“波菲利之树从亚里士多德的一个范畴开始，……从最一般的属出发，经过一系列的两叉

eral genus through at least some of its species.” —Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, 1997, p. 136.

### Port-Royal Logic

In 1662, French theologians and philosophers Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole published *La Logique; Ou, l'Art de Penser (Logic; Or the Art of Thinking)*. Both of them were teachers at Port Royal, a monastery in the south-west of Paris and the intellectual centre of Jansenism. Hence the book is generally called the *Port-Royal Logic*. The book defines logic as the art of managing one's reason in the knowledge of things for the instruction of others and oneself. It claims that the mind has four principal operations: conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering, and the book is divided into four corresponding parts. The *Port-Royal Logic* is established on the basis of Cartesian epistemology and rejects the subtleties of medieval logic. It introduced into logic modern scientific methods and contributed to propositional logic. The book became the standard logic textbook until the nineteenth century and had a wide impact on the development of modern logic. It is also regarded as the precursor of modern linguistic analysis.

“Port royal logic ... both contains an argument against probabilism and is the first occasion on which ‘probability’ is actually used in what is identifiably our modern sense, susceptible of numerical measurement.” —Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability*, 1975, p. 25.

### Posit

The assumption or hypothesis which is given as the starting-point of a theory or an explanation. The question of its truth is often left to a later stage of dealing with the theory or explanation or is not dealt with separately at all. For Quine, all the entities we use to explain and organise sense experience are posits. Hence, they are everything that we claim to exist aside from sense experience, including abstract objects as well as physical objects.

“Everything to which we conclude existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built.” —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 2.

**Positive fact**, see negative fact

**Positive freedom**, an alternative expression for positive liberty; see negative freedom

式划分,最后到达它的某个最低的种。”——克里兹曼:《有神论的形而上学》,1997年,第136页。

### 波尔—罗亚尔逻辑

1662年,法国神学家和哲学家A.阿尔诺和P.尼柯尔发表了他们的著作《逻辑学;或思维术》。两人都是波尔—罗亚尔的教师。波尔—罗亚尔是巴黎西南部的一所修道院,是“詹森主义”的思想中心,因此这本书一般被称作《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑学》。该书把逻辑定义为一个人在认识事物时运用理性的艺术,用于指导自己和其他人。该书断言心灵有四项主要活动:构想、判断、推理和整理,该书也相应地分为四个对应的部分。《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑》建立在笛卡尔认识论的基础上,它反对中世纪逻辑的琐细。它将近代科学方法引入逻辑,对命题逻辑做出了贡献。该书成为直至19世纪为止的标准逻辑学教科书,并对近代逻辑的发展有广泛的影响。它还被认为是现代语言分析的先驱。

“波尔—罗亚尔逻辑……既包含反对概率论的证明,也是‘概率’一词实际用于与近代相同的、可用数值来测量的意义上的第一次。”——哈金:《概率的出现》,1975年,第25页。

### 假定

它是指被用做一种理论或说明出发点的那种假设或假说。要确定它为真常常是在讨论理论或说明的最后阶段,或者不能完全单独地确定它为真。在奎因看来,我们用于解释和构造感觉经验的一切实体就是假定。因而,它们就是我们认为在感觉经验之外存在的东西,包括抽象对象以及物理对象。

“我们关于存在的每个推论,从描述构造理论之过程的出发点来看,都是一个假定,同时,从这种正在构造的理论出发点来看,它们也是真实的。”——奎因:《词与物》,1960年,第2页。

### 肯定事实

见“否定事实”条。

### 积极自由

“积极的自由”的另一表述;见“消极自由”条。

## Positive law

[from Latin: *jus*, law + *positivum*, to lay down, hence laws established by human society and institutions] In contrast to natural law, which holds that laws were authored by God or are based on human nature, positive law relies on the will of legislators and applies only to the members of the community for which the legislators legislate. In the philosophy of law, natural law theory claims that the authority of positive law is derived from its compliance with natural law, while legal positivism argues that there is no necessary connection between positive law and morality. In Austin's command theory of law, the conception of positive law is narrowed to the laws laid down by the sovereign of a political society or its subordinates.

"As contradistinguished to natural law, or to the law of nature (meaning, by these expressions, the law of God), the aggregate of the rules, established by political superiors, is frequently styled positive law, or law existing by position." —Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, 1911, p. 87.

## Positive liberty

Positive liberty or positive freedom is concerned with enabling one to be the self-determining master of one's own life and action. With positive liberty, one is autonomous and can freely exercise one's own will. On this view, one's life and decisions do not depend on external forces, but are limited solely by one's capabilities, resources and opportunities. According to Isaiah Berlin, positive liberty contrasts with negative liberty, which is freedom from external interference. Unlike negative liberty, positive liberty has a specific content, so that a person is not deemed to be free unless living according to that content. Berlin argued that such a notion of positive liberty carried with it the danger of despotism and preferred the more open political systems incorporating negative liberty.

"The positive sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master." —Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, p. 122.

## Positivism

A philosophical tradition founded by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, although its ancestry may be traced to Francis Bacon. The general spirit of positivism is that philosophy should only be concerned with what is positively given (this is also the meaning of the word "positive") and should avoid any speculative thinking which goes beyond given experience. Accordingly, positivism takes the study of scientific methodology as its major task and presents itself as a kind of philosophy of science. Comte's positivism has a famous Law of the Three Stages which claims that the human mind has developed historically through stages. An initial theological

## 实在法

[源自拉丁文 *jus* (法) 和 *positivum* (制定), 因此, 是指那些由人类社会和机构制定的法] 与认为法律是神创造的或以人性为基础的自然法不同, 实在法依靠的是立法者的意志并且只应用于立法者为其立法的共同体的成员。在法哲学中, 自然法理论认为实在法的权威来自对自然法的依从, 而法律实证主义则提出实在法和道德之间没有必然联系。在奥斯汀的法的命令理论中, 实在法这一概念被限于由一个政治社会的统治者或他的下属制定的法。

"通过与自然法或自然的法(后一种表达方式意指神的法律)的对比区别, 由政治长官制定的法规的集合体常常被称为实在法, 或通过地位而存在的法。" —— 奥斯汀: 《法理学讲义》, 1911年, 第87页。

## 积极的自由

积极的自由关注的是使一个人能够成为自己决定自己的生活和行动的主人。有了积极的自由, 一个人就是自主的, 可以自由地实行自己的意愿。根据这一观点, 一个人的生活和决定不取决于外在的力量, 而只受他自己的能力、资源和机会的限制。柏林认为, 积极的自由与消极的自由形成对照, 它没有外在的干涉。与消极的自由不同, 积极的自由有特定的内容, 其结果是除非生活与这种内容相一致, 否则不能认为一个人是自由的。柏林论证说, 这种积极的自由概念使其带有专制主义的危险, 因而, 他更喜欢与消极的自由相结合的更为开放的政治制度。

"'自由'这个词的积极意义来自个人要成为他自己的主人的那种希望。" —— 柏林: 《自由四论》, 1969年, 第122页。

## 实证主义

由法国哲学家 A. 孔德奠基的哲学传统, 虽然其开山祖师可以追溯到 F. 培根。实证主义的一般精神是, 哲学只应当关心实证地给予的东西(这也是"实证的"一词的含义), 应当避免任何在所予经验之外的沉思冥想。因此, 实证主义把科学方法论的研究作为其主要任务, 并使自己呈现为一种科学哲学。孔德的实证主义有一个著名的三阶段定律, 它声称人类精神是通过这些阶段在历史上发展的。最开始的神学阶段特点是力图用超自然的存在物说明事物的内在本性。在其后的形而上学阶段, 早先的神

stage was characterised by attempts to explain the inner nature of things in terms of supernatural beings. In a subsequent metaphysical stage, earlier deities were depersonalised and became explanatory abstractions such as essence or force. Finally, in the positivist stage, the human mind realises that all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and can only be advanced by means of observation and experience and therefore understands that metaphysics should be abandoned. Comte also initiated a positive sociology, which studied human societies in terms of positive methods, and a positive religion, which sought to replace the worship of God with the worship of Humanity. Herbert Spencer linked positivism with the theory of evolution to make the study of the all-embracing evolutionary process the major task of philosophy. The descendants of positivism include the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius, which held that science describes sense-experience and has no need to postulate any hidden entities such as the atom; the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, which developed the principle of verification, incorporated the new logical developments of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, and held an extremely hostile attitude to metaphysics; and legal positivism, which emphasises that law should be as it is (positive law) rather than as we might believe it should be (natural law).

“Apart from Kantianism, there is no contemporary philosophical movement so closely associated with exact science as positivism.”—Schlick, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 178.

**Possibilism**, see actualism

### Possible world

Although philosophers had been talking about what is possible long before, the origin of the discussion of possible world is generally credited to Leibniz, who claimed that although our world contains much that is evil, it is nonetheless the best of all possible worlds. In contemporary philosophy, discourse of possible worlds developed into a semantic interpretation for modal logic and a proposal to solve the truth-value problem of counterfactual conditionals. The idea is to construe a counterfactual as stating some possible states of affairs in which things are other than the way they actually are. There are two views about how to understand possible worlds. One is the extreme possibilism held by David Lewis, which claims that the actual world we inhabit is only one of many real worlds, each of which exemplifies ways that things could have been besides the ways that they are. Such an objective interpretation gives rise to the problem of transworld identity, which in turn motivated Lewis to develop his counterpart theory. The other account of possible worlds, represented by Kripke, is in terms of one or more intensional

被非人格化了,成了诸如本质或力量这种说明性的抽象物。最后,在实证阶段,人类精神认识到,一切真正的知识都基于感觉经验,它们只能根据观察和经验而得到推进,从而理解到形而上学应当抛弃。孔德还首创了实证社会学和实证宗教,前者用实证方法研究人类社会,后者寻求用对于人道的崇拜来取代对于上帝的崇拜。H. 斯宾塞把实证主义和进化论联系起来,使对于无所不包的进化进程的研究成为哲学的主要任务。实证主义的后裔包括马赫和阿芬那留斯的经验批判主义,它主张科学描述感觉经验,没有必要假设像原子这样的隐蔽实体;以及维也纳小组的逻辑实证主义,它提出了证实原则,结合了弗雷格、罗素和维特根斯坦的逻辑的新发展,对形而上学持极端敌视态度;还有法学实证主义,它强调法律应当是其是(即实证法),而不应该是我们可能会认为的当其所是(自然法)。

“除了康德主义,当代没有哪种哲学运动像实证主义那样与精确科学密切相关。”——石里克:《哲学论文集》,第一卷,第178页。

### 可能主义

见“现实主义”条。

### 可能世界

尽管很久以前哲学家们就已经在谈论什么是可能的,但对可能世界的讨论的起源通常归功于莱布尼茨。他宣称,虽然我们的世界包含许多恶的东西,但它仍然是所有可能世界中最好的一个。在当代哲学中,可能世界话语已经演变成模态逻辑的一种语义解释,以及解决反事实条件句真值问题的一种方案。其基本思路是把反事实条件句看做是陈述了某种可能的事态,其中的事物以不同于它们实际所是的方式存在着。在如何理解可能世界的问题上存在两种观点。其一是D. 刘易斯所主张的极端可能主义,它断言我们所居住的现实世界只是众多实在世界中的一个,这些世界中每一个都体现着事物的除实际存在方式外的可能存在方式。这样一种客观的解释引起了跨世界的同一性问题,后者反过来又促使刘易斯发展了他的对应体理论。克里普克所代表的关于可能世界的另一种说明,所依据的是一个或多个内涵性术语如属性、命题或事态,以及某些模态概念如可例

items such as properties, propositions or states of affairs and of some modal notions such as instantiability or possible truth. On this view, a possible world is a world whose properties are not actually instantiated or a world which has obtainable but not actually obtaining states of affairs. According to this latter interpretation, a possible world is not another world, but is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. In order to distinguish this account from Lewis' account, Kripke sometimes suggests that we use terms such as a possible state or history of the world or a counterfactual situation to replace the notion of a possible world. There is much debate about the theory of possible worlds, regarding problems such as essentialism, possible but nonactual entities, transworld identity, reference and meaning. Currently, modal concepts are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. "Necessarily p" is equivalent to "p is true in every possible world", and "Possibly p" is equivalent to "p is true in some possible world".

"Possible worlds are total 'ways of the world might have been', or states or histories of the entire world." — Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 1980, p. 18.

**Post hoc ergo propter hoc**, see fallacy of false cause

**Post res universals**, see *universalia, ante rem*

**Post-historical art**, see death of art

## Postmodernism

A fashionable but elusive term used originally among New York artists and critics in the 1960s to reject any dominant framework dictating artistic style. Postmodernism in art was a reaction to modernism, which has provided such a framework throughout this century. Modernism emphasises experimentation, an inner truth behind surface appearances, and the presence of paradoxical ambiguities and uncertainties in our life experience. In art and literature, postmodernism seeks to cancel the boundary between art and daily life and the distinction between elite and popular taste. It emphasises surface instead of depth and stylistic form rather than content.

In the 1970s, postmodernism was taken up by some influential continental philosophers. Modernity is normally taken to have begun with the work of Descartes in the seventeenth century and has shaped the issues, problems and standards of relevance which have occupied Western philosophers since then. If Descartes is seen as the father of modernism, then postmodernism comprises a variety of cultural positions which reject major features of Cartesian (or allegedly Carte-

证性或可能真理。按照这种观点,可能世界是其属性未被实际例证化的世界,或者是可以得到但未实际得到的事态。根据这后一种解释,可能世界并不是另外一个世界,而是由我们使之关联的描述条件给定的。为了使这种说法与刘易斯的解释区别开来,克里普克有时建议我们用“这个世界的可能状态或历史”或“反事实的情景”之类的术语去代替“可能世界”概念。关于可能世界理论存在很多争论,涉及本质主义,可能但非现实的实体,跨世界的同一性,指称,意义等问题。流行的做法是,经常用可能世界去解释模态概念。“必然p”等于说“p在每个可能世界中真”,“可能p”等于说“p在某个可能世界中真”。

“可能世界是‘这个世界全部可能的存在方式’,或者是这整个世界的状态或历史。”——克里普克:《命名与必然性》,1980年,第18页。

## 以先后为因果

见“错为因果的谬误”条。

## 出于事物的共相

见“在物之先的共相”条。

## 后历史艺术

见“艺术的消亡”条。

## 后现代主义

一个流行的但意思含混的词,原本由纽约的艺术家和(文学、艺术的)批评家们在20世纪60年代所使用,表示对任何规范艺术风格的主导构架的拒绝。在艺术中,后现代主义是对于本世纪里提供了这样一个主导构架的现代主义的反动;现代主义强调实验法,强调在表面现象之后的内在真理,并强调对于我们生活经验中的悖谬含糊和不确定性的展现。在艺术与文学中,后现代主义尽力取消艺术与日常生活的界限和精英与世俗趣味的区别。它强调的是表面而非深度,是风格形式而非内容。

20世纪70年代中,“后现代主义”被一些有影响力的欧陆哲学家采用。现代性一般被认为始于17世纪笛卡尔的工作,自那时以来,它就规范了西方哲学家们认为是重要的论点、问题和标准。如果笛卡尔被看做现代主义之父,那么后现代主义就由各种这样的文化立场组成,它们都拒绝笛卡尔的(或被说成是笛卡尔的)现代思想的主要特性。笛卡尔的现代主义的一个主要特点就是坚持纯理性的至上地位。对于知

sian) modern thought. A major characteristic of Cartesian modernism is to insist on the supremacy of pure rationality. The pursuit of knowledge should be independent of practical concerns, traditional beliefs and any social, political, and economic interests of those seeking knowledge. Views which stress the priority of the social to the individual; which reject the universalising tendencies of philosophy; which prize irony over knowledge; and which give the irrational and the rational equal claims to roles in our procedures for acquiring knowledge all fall under the postmodernist umbrella. Postmodernism tries to replace logic with narrative because it disputes the claim that meaning can be determined by logical and semantic analysis. It denies univocality and linearity and rejects any theoretical grounds for culture.

The major exponents of postmodernism include Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze. Postmodernism has also greatly influenced the contemporary feminist movement, represented by Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. Postmodernist criticism of modernist concerns with meaning, truth, objectivity, rationality and universality has not led a constructive alternative, but not having a constructive alternative is perhaps part of the point of postmodernism.

“Postmodernism is of great interest to a wide range of people because it directs our attention to changes, the major transformations, taking place in contemporary society and culture.” —Sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Post-modernism*, 1993, p. 2.

### Post-structuralism

The Saussurian model of linguistics is the basis of structuralism. Post-structuralism originated with the rejection of that model. While Saussure emphasised that each signifier acquires its semantic value only by virtue of its differential position within the structure of language, post-structuralists augmented their account of the relations among signifiers through, for example, Nietzschean concerns with power and Freudian concerns with unconscious origin. They reject the existence of the unity of the stable sign and question the possibility of any descriptive and analytical language. They do not believe that authors are the authority for the meaning and truth of what they write, but claim instead that reading is an active performance creating interpretations rather than a passive consumption of a product. Post-structuralism rejects a static notion of meaning and is hostile to any system or attempt at system-construction. A truth-claim for what we say or write is not a matter of course, and meaning is not tightly bound up with truth. Thought is constituted through and through by the codes, conventions, languages-games and discourses that make up a given cultural order. In a sense,

识的追寻应该独立于对实践的关怀, 独立于传统的信仰和任何有关的社会、政治和经济的利益。与之相对, 后现代主义的观点强调社会先于个人、拒绝哲学的普遍化倾向、赞赏反讽甚于赞赏知识、在我们以后现代主义的大旗下获取知识的过程中给予非理性以同理性相平等的地位。后现代主义试图用叙述代替逻辑, 因为它不认为意义可以被逻辑的和语义的分析所决定。它否认单义性和线性, 拒绝任何为文化提供理论基础的做法。

后现代主义的主要阐发者包括 J. 德里达、R. 罗蒂、J.-F. 利奥塔、E. 莱维纳斯、M. 福柯、J. 鲍德里拉德和 G. 德勒兹。后现代主义已极大地影响了以 J. 克里斯特娃和 L. 伊莉格莱为代表的当代女性主义运动。后现代主义对于现代主义关于意义、真理、客观性、理性和普遍性等观点的批判还没能导致一种建设性的替代者; 但是不提供建设性的替代者可能就是后现代主义观点的一部分。

“后现代主义引起了许多领域中的人们的极大兴趣, 因为它将我们的注意力导向那些发生在当代社会和文化中的转化或重大变形。”——萨罗波:《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》, 1993年, 第2页。

### 后结构主义

索绪尔的语言学模式是结构主义的基础。后结构主义始于对这样一个模式的拒绝。索绪尔强调每个能指只有通过它在语言结构中的不同位置才获得其语义值; 但后结构主义者却是通过(例如)尼采式的对强力的关注和弗洛伊德式的对无意识起源的关注来论证他们关于能指之间关系的说明。他们否认那种不变的符号统一体的存在, 怀疑任何描述性的和分析性的语言的可能性。他们不相信作者对自己所写东西的真实意义具有最终的解释权, 而是认为阅读是一个创造解释的积极活动, 并非是对某个产品的被动消费。后结构主义拒绝关于意义的静态观念, 敌视任何系统或任何去做系统构造的企图。认为我们所说和所写的东西中定有真理并非是天经地义的看法, 而意义也并非完全受制于真理性。思想彻头彻尾地由造成某个特定文化状况的习俗、常规、语言游戏和言谈所构成。在某个意义上, 后结构主义力图颠覆对于语言结构的传统理解。这个运动受到尼采的影响, 它的主要代表人物包括 G. 德勒兹、F. 郭塔瑞、

post-structuralism seeks to subvert the traditional understanding of the structures of language. The movement is influenced by Nietzsche, and its major representatives include Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Post-structuralism shares many common features with postmodernism.

"While structuralism sees truth as being 'behind' or 'within' a text, post-structuralism stresses the interaction of reader and text as a productivity." —sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-modernism*, 1993, p. 2.

### Postulates of empirical knowledge

For each of his four groups of categories, Kant introduced principles to show the objective validity of the employment of categories of that kind. For the categories of quantity, quality and relation, the principles are respectively the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception and analogies of experience. For the categories of modality, the principles are the postulates of empirical knowledge. While the other principles determine the ways in which appearances are related to each other, the postulates determine the modes in which the subject of experience is related to its experiences. The postulates include the principle of the possible, which requires that the concepts of things should agree with the formal conditions of experience; the principle of the actual, which requires that the concept is connected to the material conditions of experience; and the principle of the necessary, which requires that the actual experience conforms to both the formal and material conditions of experience. These principles are called postulates, not in the mathematical sense of being immediately certain without justification, but in the sense that they are procedural specifications of relations between the understanding and the synthesis of appearances.

"The same can be asserted of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which concern the synthesis of mere intuition (that is, of the form of appearance), of perception (that is, of the matter of perception), and of experience (that is, of the relation of these perceptions)." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A180/B223.

### Potentiality

[Greek, *dunamis*, the power or capacity of one subject to effect change in another subject or the power or capacity of one subject to be affected by another thing] We can distinguish non-rational capacities (the capacity of eyes to see) from rational capacities (the capacity of a person to build). The realisation of these capacities is their exercise. For Aristotle, however, this sense is not important philosophically. Potentiality was important for him through connection with substantial change, in which potentiality is associated with

J.-F. 利奥塔、M. 福柯和 J. 德里达。后结构主义与后现代主义有许多共同点。

"结构主义认为真理存在于一个文本的'后边'或'里边',但后结构主义则强调作为一种产生状态的读者与文本之间的相互作用。"——萨罗波:《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》,1993年,第2页。

### 经验知识之公准

康德四组范畴的每一组都有一组原理以表明那类范畴应用的客观有效性。对于量、质和关系这三组范畴,它们的原理分别是"直观之公理"、"知觉之预测"和"经验之类推"。至于样式范畴,这一组的原理称为"经验知识之公准"。然而,所有前三组原理规定现象相互联系的方式,公准的原理则规定经验主体与他的经验相联系的方式。公准包括要求事物的概念应当符合经验的形式条件的可能性原理;要求概念与经验的质料条件相联系的现实性原理;要求实际经验要与经验的形式和质料的条件相一致的必然性原理。这些原理被称为"公准",不是在数学的意义上,即是无需论证,直接确定的,而是在这个意义上,即它们是知性和现象综合之间关系的程序上的说明。

"同样可以断定经验思想一般之公准,它关涉单纯直观之综合(即现象形式的综合)、知觉之综合(即知觉事务之综合)及经验之综合(即这些知觉的关系之综合)。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A180/B223。

### 潜能

[源自希腊词 *dunamis*, 一主体引起另一主体变化的力量或能力,或一主体受另一事物影响的力量或能力]我们可以区分非理性能力(眼睛有看的能力)与理性能力(一个人建造的能力)。这种能力的实现即是它们的实施。但对于亚里士多德而言,这一意义在哲学上并不重要。潜能对他的重要性是通过它与本体变化的关系,在本体变化中,潜能与质料相结合。在这种意义上,潜能乃是一物可能的但尚未实现的状态。

matter. In this sense, potentiality was the possible but unrealised state of a thing. (See the entry on potentiality / actuality.)

“For in the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to potentiality, that we not only ascribe potentiality to that whose nature is to move something else, or to be moved by anything else ... but also use the word in another sense.” —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048a27-9.

### Potentiality / actuality

When Aristotle moved from a static discussion of the structure of reality to a dynamic discussion, he introduced a distinction between potentiality and actuality in association with a distinction between matter and form. He even used these two distinctions interchangeably. Aristotle divided relationships between actuality and potentiality into two major kinds. The first kind likened the relationship to that between motion and power. It conformed to the etymological senses of potentiality and actuality and concerned relations such as that between the capacity to build and the exercise of that capacity. The second kind likened the relationship to that between generated substance and matter. With regard to Aristotle's discussion of substance, it can also be divided into two types. In the first type, matter (potentiality) develops into some form (actuality) to generate a thing, with potentiality and actuality thus belonging to two different stages. In the second type, form (actuality) and proximate matter (potentiality) in a sense exist together as two aspects of the same thing. In various ways, Aristotle held that actuality is prior to potentiality. In Aristotle's theology, God, having an eternal nature, is pure actuality, without involving any potentiality.

“To all such potentialities, then actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not.” —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1049b11-3.

*Pour-soi / en-soi*, see being-for-itself

### Power

The ability or capacity to compel others to act according to one's aims so that they will do what they would not otherwise have done. Power can also affect how such actions are performed. Political power is the ability to get people to obey explicit or tacit commands in virtue of what they anticipate to be the consequences of obeying or disobeying them. The consequences can range from crude threats and promises to subtle patterns of social control. Political power is not only power to do something, but is also power over others through coercion, domination or hegemony. Understanding the relationship between political power and political authority is

态。(参见“潜能—现实”条。)

“在我们分析的过程中将会看到,就潜能而言,我们不仅把潜能归于那些其本性是推动他物或受他物推动的事物,……而且也在另一意义上使用该词。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1048a27—29。

### 潜能/现实

当亚里士多德从对现实结构的静态讨论进展到一种动态讨论时,他引入了潜能与现实的区分,与质料与形式的区分相联系,并且不加区分地使用这两者。亚里士多德把潜能与现实关系划分成两类:一类比作运动与能力间的关系,它符合潜能与现实这两词的字根意义,指诸如建筑的能力与该能力的实施这样的关系。另一类比作已生成的本体与质料的关系。它与亚里士多德对本体的讨论相联系,可以进一步划分成两类。在第一类中,质料(潜能)发展到某种形式(现实),产生一个事物。潜能和现实因此属于不同的阶段。在第二类中,形式(现实)与近似质料(潜能)在一种意义上是同一事物的两个方面。亚里士多德认为现实在多种意义上先于潜能。在他的神学中,永恒的神是纯现实的,不涉及到任何潜能。

“对所有这些潜能,现实都既在定义上又在本体性上在先;在时间上,它在一种意义上在先,在另一种意义上则不。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1049b11—13。

为自身的/在自身中的(或译“自为的/自在的”)见“为自身的存在”条。

### 权力

迫使他人按照自己的目的去行动的能力,以使他们做他们可能还没有做的事。权力还可影响这种行动如何履行。政治权力是使人们服从明确的或不言而喻的命令的能力,因为他们预先知道服从或不服从命令的后果是什么。这些后果可能包括从粗暴的威胁到对宽松的社会控制方式的许诺。政治权力不仅是做事的权力,而且也是通过强迫、统治或霸权压制他人的权力。理解政治权力和政治权威的关系是理解政治科学和政治哲学关系的核心。权力与权威不同,它不包括权利,但它与责任和暴力都有关。

central to understanding the relationship between political science and political philosophy. Unlike authority, power does not involve rights, but it is related both to responsibility and force. Relations of political power may be shaped by culture, history or tradition as well as by brute force.

“Power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”—Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, 1947, p. 152.

### P-predicate

Strawson's term for any predicate ascribed to persons and only persons. To apply a P-predicate to something at least implies the possession of consciousness. Examples of this kind of predicate include “is smiling”, “is in pain”, “believes that you will meet on Tuesday”. Philosophical problems arise concerning the possibility of delimiting the class of P-predicates and concerning the closely related possibility of formulating the concept of a person. The logical criteria for the ascription of P-predicates to others closely involves the question of personal identity. P-predicates are contrasted to M-predicates, which can be ascribed to material bodies without consciousness as well as to persons.

“The second kind consists of all the other predicates we apply to persons. These I shall call P-predicates.”—Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 104.

**Practical ethics**, see applied ethics

**Practical law**, see maxim

### Practical reason (Kant)

The practical application of reason, which concerns what one ought to do, in contrast to the theoretical application of reason (theoretical or speculative reason), which concerns what is. Although Kant held that theoretical and practical reason are fundamentally the same, he recognised their different functions and claimed that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason in line with the primacy of our being rational agents over our being rational knowers. While theoretical reason is limited by the bounds of experience, practical reason is inseparable from freedom. Kant identified practical reason with the will, which initiates action. Like theoretical reason, practical reason determines and applies its own principles, but in the case of practical reason the application of its principles commands action. Its supreme principle is the categorical imperative. Hence it is the home of the moral law and is the fundamental basis of our autonomy. In Kant's critical philosophy, three works, *The Groundwork*

政治权力关系可以受到文化、历史或传统以及蛮横的暴力的影响。

“权力是这样一种可能性,即一个处于一种社会关系中的行为者能够执行他自己的意愿而不管他人的反对,并且无视这一可能性依据的基础。”——韦伯:《社会和经济组织的理论》,1947年,第152页。

### 人—谓词

斯特劳森的术语,指任何归属于人,而且只归属于人的谓词。把一个人—谓词应用于某物至少意为被归属者具有意识。举例说,这类谓词包括“在微笑”,“感觉痛苦”,“相信你们会在星期二见面”。这类谓词所引起的哲学问题包括,界定人—谓词的类的可能性,以及与此紧密相联的阐明人的概念的可能性。把人—谓词归属于他人的逻辑标准涉及到个人认同问题。与人—谓词相对照的是物—谓词。物—谓词既可以归属于无意识的物体也可以归属于人。

“第二类包括其他一切我们应用于人的谓词。我把这些叫做人—谓词。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第104页。

### 实践伦理学

见“应用伦理学”条。

### 实践的法则

见“准则”条。

### 实践理性(康德)

理性的实践应用,关涉人们应该做什么,相对于理性的理论应用(理论的或思辨的理性),它关涉“是什么”。虽然康德认为理论理性和实践理性在根本上是同一个理性,但他认识到它们的不同功能,并主张:既然我们更多地作为理性主动者而不是只作为理性的认知者,因而实践理性对于理论理性具有优先性。理论理性受经验界限所限制,而实践理性则与自由不可分离。康德把实践理性与引发行为的意志相等同。像理论理性一样,实践理性规定和应用它自己的原理。不同的是,实践理性对它的原理的使用诉诸行动。它的最高原理是绝对命令。因此它是道德法则的发源地,是我们自主性的根本基础。在康德的批判哲学中,《道德形而上学基础》、《实践理性批判》和《道德形而上学》这三部著作考察了实践理性的运作过程。

“纯粹实践理性一般而言是为目的的能

for the *Metaphysics of Morals*, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals* examine the operation of practical reason.

“Pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally.” —Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, II, ix.

### Practical reasoning

A kind of argumentation that is directed towards a certain goal and is based on knowledge of an agent's situation and knowledge that a certain sort of action is a means to reach that goal. Its conclusion is an imperative to pursue a course of action for a particular agent. Its sequence of inference is called practical inference because it aims at a practical conclusion. Practical reasoning gives reasons for actions or desires and it is essentially pragmatic. In contrast, theoretical reasoning aims to derive truth from premises and concentrates on the formal validity of arguments. Practical reasoning was first discussed in Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom, where the action itself was seen as the conclusion. In this century, practical reasoning became a special field of philosophical inquiry, partly due to the works of Anscombe and von Wright. It is characterised as a form of argument appropriate to the humanities, rather than as merely a vehicle of means-end deliberation. Although there is much debate about the elements, scope and procedure of practical reasoning, it is widely agreed that it is significant for explaining human action, establishing ranking and priority in one's life plan, understanding personal responsibility for action and evaluating the actions of others. Some theorists have employed a wider notion of practical reasoning to extend rational choice theory in seeking to understand institutions as well as individual behaviour. Moral reasoning is one of the main forms of practical reasoning.

“What then, is practical reasoning? It is the transition (not necessarily conscious) from belief in the premises to acceptance of the putative conclusions of a practical inference.” —Raz (ed.), *Practical Reason*, 1978, p. 5.

### Practical syllogism

Aristotle's concept, although he instead used the term *sullogismos ton prakton* (syllogism about action). An inference of practical reason starting from a universal ethical premise and concluding with an action. It has a major premise, such as “since the end is such and such”, and a minor premise, such as “this is such and such”, and a conclusion. In contrast to modern thinking, Aristotle insisted that the conclusion is not an imperative to do something, but the action itself. According to him, if a man gets an order but does not proceed to act, it is not practical reason. Of the two premises, one provides the good end, and the other gives a possible way to achieve the end. Aristotle offers many examples in his writings, but he does not formalise this reasoning.

力。”——康德：《道德形而上学》，I，ix。

### 实践推论

• 一种直接针对某一目标的推论，它基于对当事者情况的了解，以及知道某种行动是达到这一目标的途径。它的结论就是命令特定当事者实现行动进程。它推断的结果被称为实际的推断，因为它的目标是一种实际的结论。实践推论为行动或要求提供理由，它在本质上是务实的。相比之下，理论推论的目的是从前提出得出正确认识并将注意力集中于论证的形式的有效性。实践推论在亚里士多德的实践智慧理论中首次被探讨，在那里，行为本身被视为结论。在本世纪，实践推论成为哲学研究的一个专门领域，这部分是由于安斯康及冯·赖特的著作。它被描绘为一种适合于人文学科的论证形式，而不仅仅是一种手段—目的式思考的工具。虽然对实践推论的要素、范围和程序存在很多争议，这种推论对于解释人的活动、确立人们生活计划中的顺序和重点、理解人们对活动的责任，以及评价他人的行为，都有重要意义，这一点已得到广泛的认可。一些理论家业已使用一种更为宽泛的实践推论的概念去扩展理性选择理论，以求理解制度和个人行为。道德推论是实践推论的一种主要形式。

“那么什么是实践推论？它是从对前提的相信到接受由实践推断得出的假设结论的（未必是有意识的）过渡。”——拉兹（编）：《实践推理》，1978年，第5页。

### 实践三段论

亚里士多德的概念，尽管他自己所使用的术语是 *sullogismos ton prakton*（关于行为的三段论）。一种始于普遍伦理前提而止于行动的关于实践理性的推论。它有一个大前提，诸如“由于目的是如此如此”，一个小前提，诸如“这是如此如此”和一个结论。与现代思维相反，亚里士多德坚持说，结论不是一个做什么的命令，而是行为自身。他认为，如果一个人得到一个命令可又不进一步去做它，这就不是实践理性。在两个前提中，一个提供了好的目的，另一个则给了一种达到那个目的的可能途径。亚里士多德在他的著作中提供了大量例证，却未能将该推理形式化。人们一直在争论这种形式化是否可

There is much controversy whether such a formalisation is possible.

“For the syllogism about actions have an origin, viz. ‘since the end, i. e. what is best, is of such and such a nature’, whatever it may be.” —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1144a31-4.

### Practical wisdom

[Greek: *phronesis*, thought or understanding, also translated as intelligence, practical reason or prudence] Aristotle’s technical term for the reasoning which leads to practical activity. In contrast, contemplation or theoretical wisdom is concerned with invariable things, although both theoretical and practical wisdom are intellectual virtues. Like theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom operates at a general level, concerned with the truth of practical judgement and formulating general rules of action. But practical wisdom also works at a particular level, applying general rules to concrete situations of life and finding the right actions to do. It contains a practical intuition, which grasps the features of the particular action, and a practical syllogism, which infers ways and means of achieving the end. Practical wisdom is inseparable from the virtues of character, for the latter decides the right end. Without a right end, a man can only be said to have cleverness rather than practical wisdom. A person of practical wisdom is a *phronimos*.

Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom is ambiguous and unsystematic. It was criticised by Hume, who claimed that emotion rather than reason determines action. It has nevertheless attracted much attention in contemporary moral theory, especially in virtue ethics. If there really is a kind of reason peculiar to moral actions, it may give a new foundation to ethics and solve many traditional difficulties, such as the tension between objectivity and the practical application of moral judgement.

“[P]ractical wisdom is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for human beings.” —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140b4-6.

**Practicalism**, another expression for experimentalism

**Pragmatic maxim**, see pragmatism

### Pragmatic theory of truth

A theory of truth held in different forms by the American pragmatists Peirce, James and Dewey. Their common ground was the claim that truth should be approached by enquiring about the difference made by a belief being true, namely to examine the idea of truth at work in its context of

能。

“关于行为的三段论有一个起源,即‘由于目的,即最好的事物,是这样这样的一种性质’,不论这一目的本身是什么。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1144a31-34。

### 实践智慧

[源自希腊词 *phronesis* (思想或理解),也译作“明智”、“实践理性”或“慎思”]亚里士多德的一个专门术语,意为导向实践活动的推理。相反,思辨或理论智慧关注永恒事物,虽然,实践智慧与理论智慧两者都是理智德性。如同理论智慧一样,实践智慧在一般性层面上运作,关注于实践判断的真实性,及构建行为的一般规则。但实践智慧也在具体的层面运作,将一般规则应用于具体的生活领域,确定应当做的正确行为。它包括一种把握具体行为特征的实践直观,和一种推论如何达到那一目的的途径和手段的实践三段论。实践智慧与品格德性是不可分的,因为后者决定了正确的目的。没有正确的目的,一个人只能说是精明的,而不能说具有实践智慧。一个具有实践智慧的人在希腊文中是 *phronimos*。

亚里士多德关于实践智慧的理论是含混的、不系统的。休谟对它做了批判,并认为决定行为的是情感而不是理性。尽管如此,它在当代道德理论,尤其在德性伦理学中受到广泛注意。如果确实有一类与道德行为相关的独特理性,它就会为伦理学提供一个新的基础,并可解决诸如道德判断的客观性与实践应用性之间的矛盾等许多传统的问题。

“实践智慧是这样一种状态,它把握真理,体现理性,关注于对人类有善恶意义的行为。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1140b4-6。

### 实践主义

“实验主义”的另一种表述。

### 实用主义公式

见“实效主义”条。

### 真理实用论

由美国实用主义者皮尔士、詹姆斯和杜威以不同方式主张的一种真理论。他们的共同之处在于主张,应该通过探寻由一信念为真所造成的差别去探究真理,也就是说在其使用环境中考察起作用的真观念。但他们的观点是有些

use. But their views are somewhat different. Peirce held that truth is the eventual consensus of those who use the scientific method and go on long enough in their exploration. James believed that true beliefs are those which are confirmed or verified by experience in the long run. For Dewey, truth is a property attaching to ideas which we are warranted in asserting. He preferred the term warranted assertability to truth.

In addition to his attempt to connect utility with verifiability, according to which truth is useful belief in the sense that it is belief which is secure in the long run, James held that truth is that which is good, useful or expedient to believe. Truth is the expedient in our way of thinking just as the right is the expedient in our way of behaving. This account of truth connects truth with utility and was bitterly criticised by Moore, Russell and Carnap on the grounds that false ideas can have utility and still be false and that we should seek truth for itself rather than for its consequences. This later version of James' theory is generally taken to be the standard pragmatic theory of truth, although the accounts of Peirce and Dewey might prove more fruitful.

"It is the cardinal feature of pragmatic theories of truth that true propositions are characterised as those that we accept." —Ayer, *The Concept of a Person*, 1964, p. 180.

### Pragmatism

Although Peirce introduced the word pragmatism, he later invented the term pragmatism for his own version of pragmatism, in order to distance himself from other versions, in particular from the anti-intellectualism he saw in James' more popular pragmatism. Pragmatism was originally a method of logic based on Peirce's pragmatic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object". This is a criterion of the clarity of meaning which connects the meaning of general terms with expectations of consequences. To attain a clear meaning of an abstract formula, we need only consider what conceivable practical effects it may involve. The conception of these effects is for us the whole positive significance of that formula. Peirce then tried to use this criterion to clarify traditional problems of philosophy and to dismiss traditional metaphysical problems, although he developed his own robust metaphysical doctrines. Peirce emphasised that pragmatism is a theory of logic rather than a speculative philosophy.

"So then, the writer, finding his bantling 'pragmatism' so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word 'pragmatism', which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." —Peirce, *Collected Works*, V, p. 415.

差别的。皮尔士认为,真理是那些在其探究中运用科学方法的人们持续工作相当长时间之后所达到的最终一致。詹姆斯相信,真信念就是那些最终被经验所确证或证实的信念。对杜威来说,真理是附属于我们有根据断定的观念的一种特性。他偏爱“有根据的可断定性”(warranted assertability) 胜过“真理”。

詹姆斯除了试图把效用与可证实性相联系之外(根据这种观点,真理是在下述意义上有用的信念:它是长期使用起来安全可靠的信念),他还认为真理就是那些好的、有用的和方便得到的信念。真理在我们的思维方式中是便利的,就像正确在我们的行动方式中是便利的一样。对真理的这种解释把真与效用连在一起,这受到了摩尔、罗素、卡尔纳普等人的严厉批评,其理由是:假的观念也能有效用,却仍然是假的,而且我们应该为真理本身而不是为它所造成的后果去追求真理。詹姆斯理论的这后一种形式通常被当做是标准的实用主义真理论,尽管皮尔士和杜威的说明可能证明是更富有成效的。

“实用主义真理论的基本特征就是,真命题被刻画为我们所接受的命题。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念》,1964年,第180页。

### 实效主义

虽然“实用主义”一词是由皮尔士本人引入的,但他后来又发明了“实效主义”一词来标示自己的实用主义观点,以使自己与其他形式的实用主义保持距离,尤其是与他认为是反理智的詹姆斯的更为通俗的实用主义保持距离。实效主义起初是一种逻辑方法,建立于皮尔士的实用主义公式基础之上。这一公式表述如下:“考虑我们的概念对象可能有什么样的可想像的具有实际意义的效果,这样我们关于这些效果的概念,就是我们关于这个对象的概念的全部。”这是一个意义澄清的标准,它把一般术语的意义与对结果的预期结合起来。为获得一抽象表达式的清晰含义,我们仅需考虑它涉及什么样的可想像的效果。这些效果的概念对我们来说就是这一表达式总体上的确定意义。皮尔士由此试图用这一标准去澄清传统的哲学问题,去消解传统的形而上学问题,尽管他自己也提出了一种强硬的形而上学主张。他强调实效主义是一种逻辑理论,而不是一种思辨哲学。

“如此,作者发现他的孩子‘实用主义’被如此滥用,觉得已是与其吻别,放手让它寻求好运之时。而正是为了表述此学说原初定义的目的,请允许他宣布‘实效主义’一词的诞生,它的丑陋足可保证其免受绑架。”——皮尔士:《文集》,第五卷,第415页。

## Pragmatics

[from Greek: *pragma*, action] The analysis of the relations between signs or languages and their users. It is a branch of semiotics, the other two branches being syntactics or syntax, which deals with grammar, and semantics, which deals with reference and truth. General pragmatics is concerned with the general principles of utterance, and applied pragmatics is concerned with special kinds of linguistic interaction. Pragmatics focuses on the context of the actual use of language by speakers such as its purposes, effects, implications and the relations between speakers and listeners. Many philosophers are concerned with its relations to semantics. Pragmatics classifies a wide variety of interesting types of speech acts, and studies the use and implications of indexical expressions, such as I, you, this, here and now. Pragmatics is an important aspect of contemporary philosophy of language.

“Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed.” —Stalnaker, “Pragmatics”, in Davidson and Harman (eds.) *Semantics of Natural Language*, 1972, p. 383.

## Pragmatism

[from Greek *pragma*: things done, action] When Peirce introduced this term in his article “How to make our ideas clear” (1878), he called it his pragmatic maxim, a criterion of meaning according to which the meaning of a theory is equivalent to the practical effects of adopting it. The term was borrowed by William James, who extended it from a criterion of meaning to a theory of truth, such that an idea is respectable or true if the results of accepting it are good or satisfactory. This theory was further developed by John Dewey and F. C. S. Schiller. Russell and Moore accused James of confusing the theory of truth with the theory of utility. Pragmatism claims that knowledge must relate to practical human purposes and to our adaptation to our environment. Intellectual beliefs should be justified in terms of their social, moral and biological utilities. Truth and theory are tools or instruments, and they are not for solving abstract enigmas. Any idea which proves to have a value for concrete life is true. Pragmatism rejects abstraction and absolute principles and turns towards concreteness, facts and action. This philosophy tries to assimilate modern science, especially the theory of evolution and new statistical modes of reasoning, within philosophy and criticises traditional metaphysical speculations. This theory also became an attitude toward life and a movement emphasising actions and practices. But Peirce himself disliked the anti-intellectual tone of this later development and introduced the word pragmaticism for his own version of pragmatism. Pragmatism has been regarded as a typically American approach to philosophy and has exerted

## 语用学

[源自希腊文 *pragma*, 意味着“行动”] 语用学是对记号或语言与其使用者之间关系的分析。它是“符号学”的一个分支, 另外两个分支是句法学或句法(讨论语法)和语义学(讨论指称和真理)。它又进一步分为讨论话语一般原则的普通语用学和讨论具体语言相互作用的应用语用学。语用学关注说者实际使用语言的语境, 诸如目的、效果、意味、说者与听者的关系等等。许多哲学家都关注它与语义学的联系。它区分了各种有意义的言语行为, 并研究索引词表达式的用法与意义, 比如“我”、“你”、“这个”、“这里”、“现在”。语用学是当代语言哲学的重要方面。

“语用学研究的是语言行为以及完成这些行为的语境。”——斯托奈克:《语用学》, 载戴维森和哈曼(编):《自然语言的语义学》, 1972年, 第383页。

## 实用主义

[源自希腊词 *pragma*, 意为“所做的事”或“行动”] 当皮尔士在1878年的一篇题为《如何使我们的观念清楚》的文章中首次引入这一术语时, 他指的是他的“实用主义公式”, 一个认为理论意义等价于采用它的实际效果的意义标准。“实用主义”一词为W. 詹姆斯所借用, 从一种意义标准拓展到一种真理理论, 即认为, 如果接受一个观念的结果是好的或令人满意的, 这个观念就是值得重视的或真的。这个理论为J. 杜威和F. C. S. 席勒所进一步发展, 但罗素和摩尔指责詹姆斯混淆了真理理论与效用理论。实用主义主张知识必须与实际的人类目的、与我们对环境的适应相关。思想信念必须依据它们的社会、伦理和生物学效用来辩护。真理和理论都是工具或手段, 它们不是用来解决抽象难题的。任何被证明为具有具体生活价值的观念都是真的。实用主义反对抽象和绝对原理, 转向具体、事实和行动。这种哲学试图把近代科学、尤其是进化论和新的统计推理模式吸收到哲学中来, 批判传统的形而上学思辨。这一理论也成为一种对于生活的态度和一场强调行动和实践的运动。但是皮尔士本人不喜欢这种后来发展中的反理智情调, 因而引入“实效主义”一词以指他自己的实用主义形式。实用主义被看做是典型的美国式哲学, 对当代的美国哲学家如奎因、普特南和罗蒂等有着重大影响。

“实用主义代表一种在哲学上非常熟悉的态度, 即经验主义的态度, 在我看来它所代表的

great influence upon contemporary American philosophers such as Quine, Putnam and Rorty.

“Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed.” —James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 45.

**Praxis**, Greek term for action

### Preconceived opinions

[Latin: *praejudicia*, prejudices] Descartes adopted this term for the beliefs which everyone forms in childhood. These beliefs are derived from a reliance on tradition and authority and are also generated from the mere use of senses without consulting the light of reason. These opinions are always so deeply rooted in one's mind that they are generally regarded as implanted by nature and are accepted as utterly true and evident. According to Descartes, these preconceived opinions are the chief source of error and when we begin to philosophise seriously, the first step should be to doubt the certainty of these preconceived opinions and replace them with ideas which are consistent with the standards of reason.

“We must first of all lay aside all our preconceived opinions, or at least we must take the greatest care not to put our trust in any of the opinions accepted by us in the past until we have first scrutinised them afresh and confirmed their truth.” —Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, I.

### Preconception

[Greek: *prolepsis*, also translated as anticipation] A term in the epistemology of Epicurus and Stoicism, a general concept or mental picture generated by repeated similar impressions and experience. Preconceptions record and classify our experience of the world and are foundations of judgments. For example, when we hear “table”, we anticipate the kind of thing to which this term refers. Preconceptions are also viewed as the criteria of true perceptual statements. They can be combined together as a basis for inference, and can be used to form the new concepts of things not encountered in experience.

“Preconception, they say, is as it were a perception, or correct opinion or conception, or universal ‘stored notion’ (i. e. memory) of that which has frequently become evident externally.” —Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, X, pp. 32-3.

### Preconscious

Freud's term for the latent elements of mind waiting to be discovered. These elements, though not being in consciousness, can be brought to consciousness by ordinary in-

经验主义的态度，不但比素来所采取的形式更彻底，而且也更少可以反对的地方。”——詹姆斯：《实用主义》，1955年，第45页。

### 实践

“行为”的希腊词。

### 先入之见

[拉丁文 *praejudicia*, 意思是“偏见”] 笛卡尔用这个概念指每个人在童年时形成的信念。这些信念来自对传统和权威的信赖，也是由于只使用感觉而不请教理性之光而产生的。这些意见永远深深扎根于一个人的心中，以致一般认为它们是被自然植入的，并被当做完全真实明白的意见接受下来。根据笛卡尔的观点，这些先入之见是错误的主要来源，当我们开始认真研究哲学的时候，第一步就应当怀疑这些先入之见的确实性，并且用与理性标准相一致的观念来代替它们。

“我们应当首先把我们的一切先入之见抛到一边，或至少应极其小心地、在首先对我们过去接受的意见作了重新检查，进一步确证了它们的真实性之前，不要信赖我们过去接受的任何意见。”——笛卡尔：《哲学原理》，第一部分。

### 预先概念

[希腊词 *prolepsis*, 也译作“预想”] 伊壁鸠鲁及斯多亚学派认识论中的一个术语，它是指一种从不断重复相似的影像和经验中得出的一般概念或心的图像。预先概念记录和分类了我们的世界经验，是判断的基础。例如，当我们听见“桌子”一词时，我们便预想有一类这个词所指的事物。预想概念也被看做是真实的知觉陈述的标准。它们可互相连结，作为推理的基础，可用来构成关于并非在经验中遭遇的事物的新概念。

“预想概念，他们说，就如同知觉，或正确的意见或观念，或普遍的‘储存概念’（即，记忆），是关于那经常外在地变得显然的事物的。”——第欧根尼·拉尔修：《名哲言行录》，X，第32—33页。

### 前意识的

弗洛伊德使用的一个词，指心中等待被发现的那些潜在因素。这些因素尽管不在意识之中，但可以通过一般的内省方法被唤入意识。弗

rospective methods. Freud distinguishes explicitly between the unconsciousness and the preconscious. The unconscious is repressed and cannot become conscious in an ordinary way. Furthermore, the unconscious is dynamic in that it is active in the determination of behaviour. The preconscious does not have this function.

“The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call ‘preconscious’.”—Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 9, p. 47.

## Predestination

[from Latin *praedestinare*, a synonym of predetermination] A theological doctrine which means that all events in someone's life, no matter whether they have happened, are happening, or will happen, have been determined to happen in advance by God. Whether a person's soul will go to heaven or hell has also been decreed by the sovereign will of God when that person was born, no matter how the person behaves in life. According to the doctrine of predestination, God not only has foreknowledge of all that will happen, but also has foreordained that it will happen. This claim arises from the view that God is the cause of everything and is also associated with the view that human beings can be saved only by God's grace. The position had scriptural support in Romans 8 and 9 and Ephesians 1 and was held by Augustine and Calvin, among others. The notion of predestination or pre-termination provides the basis for fatalism.

Problems arise for the notion of predestination. If God plans everything and we do not have free will, then God seems to be responsible for our evil deeds. But this cannot be true if God is perfectly good. It is difficult to understand the relation between God's foreknowing and God's foreordaining. In this domain, His omniscience and omnipotence seem hard to distinguish.

In logic, the law of excluded middle has been thought by Lukaziewicz and others to force us into logical predestination when applied to statements about the future. On this view, the truth or falsity of such statements has always been fixed independent of any questions concerning divine knowledge or power. This thought provided a major motive for giving up the law of excluded middle and for developing many-valued logic in contemporary non-classical logic, but others — including many who admire the achievements of many-valued logic — attempt to overcome logical predestination within classical logic.

“If it is held that everything that happens... is planned in every detail, then I do not see how it can be denied that if the responsibility for what we do can be assigned to anyone at all, it must ultimately fall upon the planner rather than ourselves... For someone who takes this view, the doctrine of predestination does seem irresistible.” —Ayer, *The Con-*

洛伊德清楚地地区别了无意识和前意识。无意识受到压抑,不能以一般方式进入意识。而且,无意识是动态的,在决定人的行为中起着作用。前意识则没有这种功能。

“这种仅在描述的而非动态的意义上是无意识的潜在者,我们称之为‘前意识的’。”——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第九卷,第47页。

## 宿命论

[源自拉丁文 *praedestinare*,“先定论”的同义词]一种神学学说,指的是人的一生中的所有事件,不管它们是已经发生、正在发生或将要发生,都是预先由上帝决定好要发生的。一个人的灵魂是进天堂还是入地狱也是在此人出生时就由上帝至高无上的意志所判定的,不管他在一生中表现如何。根据宿命论学说,上帝不仅对将要发生的一切有先知,还对将要发生的事情有先定。这种主张出自上帝是万物的原因这一看法,也与人类只能靠上帝的恩典而得救这个看法有联系。这种立场得到圣经中《罗马书》第8章和第9章以及《以弗所书》第1章的支持,除了其他人之外,奥古斯丁和加尔文也持这种立场。宿命论或先定论的概念为天命论提供了基础。

宿命论的概念产生了不少问题。如果上帝规划了一切,而我们没有自由意志,那么上帝似乎要为我们的罪恶行为负责。但这不应该是真的,如果上帝为至善的话。要理解上帝的先知和上帝的先定之间的关系很困难。在这个领域,他的全知和全能似乎难于区分。

在逻辑上,卢卡西维茨和其他人认为排中律在运用于关于未来的陈述时,会强使我们相信逻辑宿命论。根据这种看法,这种陈述的真假总是一定独立于关于神的知识和力量的问题。这种想法提供了在当代非经典逻辑中放弃排中律和提出多值逻辑的主要动力,但其他人——包括很多钦佩多值逻辑成就的人——力图在经典逻辑之内克服逻辑宿命论。

“如果认为发生的每一事情……都是巨细无遗地计划好的,那么我看不出怎么才能否认,如果对于我们所做事情的责任毕竟可以归之于某个人的话,这最终必定要归之于计划者而不是我们……对于持这种观点的人,宿命论的主张似乎是不可抗拒的。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念及其他论文》,1963年,第253—254页。

*cept of a Person and Other Essays*, 1963, pp. 253-4.

**Predetermination**, another term for predestination

### Predicables

The different relations in which a predicate might stand to a subject in a proposition. In the *Topics*, Aristotle distinguished various predicables: (1) *definition*, in which the predicate states the essence of the subject; (2) *property*, in which the predicate expresses something which is not a constitutive part of the essence, but is inseparably bound up with the subject, for example capable of learning to man; (3) *genus*, in which the predicate defines the subject together with a *differentia*; (4) *accident*, in which the predicate expresses a feature which is neither a constitutive part of the essence nor inseparably bound up with the subject. In the first two of these predicables, the subject and predicate are convertible (we can argue from "X is Y" to "Y is X"), but the latter two are not convertible. According to Aristotle, all problems can be brought under one or other of the predicables, so these predicables are the framework for his whole treatment of the *topoi* (commonplaces). The medieval logician Porphyry added *species* as a fifth kind of predicable. Because species is a subject rather than a predicate for Aristotle, Porphyry's classification produced much confusion.

In addition to this historical sense of predicable, there is an additional sense introduced by the contemporary British philosopher Peter Geach. He noticed that in modern logic the term predicate might refer both to a role that a particular word or phrase is playing in a particular proposition, and to a syntactical category to which expressions belong in virtue of their ability to play this role. To avoid this ambiguity, he uses predicable for membership of the syntactical category and reserves predicate for the actual performance of the predicative role.

"I use 'predicables' as a term for the verbal expressions called 'predicates' by other logicians; I reserve the term 'predicate' for a predicable actually being used as the main function in a given proposition." —Geach, *Logic Matters*, 1972, p. 239.

**Predicament**, the medieval scholastic equivalent of an Aristotelian category

### Predicate

[from Latin: *pare*, in front + *dicere*, to say, literally that which is said in front of] A basic sentence expresses a proposition that some object has a certain attribute ("The dog is running" or "This flower is red") or that there is certain relation between two or more objects ("The horse is

### 先定论

“宿命论”的另一说法。

### 述语

在一个命题中，谓词可能保持的与主词的不同关系。在《正位篇》中，亚里士多德区分出不同的述语：(1)“定义”，谓词在其中说明主词的本质；(2)“特性”，谓词所表达的某种东西，虽不是本质的构成部分，但却与主词不可分地连在一起，例如，“学习能力”之于“人”；(3)“属”，谓词与种差一起界定主词；(4)“偶性”，谓词表达的特征既不是本质的构成部分，也不与主词不可分地连在一起。在这些述语中，前两个的主词和谓词可以互换（我们能从“X是Y”论证“Y是X”），但后两个却不可互换。按照亚里士多德的观点，一切问题都能被置于一个或另一个述语之下，所以，这些述语是他对日常用语(*topoi*)进行整体处理的框架。中世纪逻辑学家波菲利又添上“种”，作为第五类述语。由于“种”在亚里士多德那里更多地是主词而不是谓词，因而波菲利的分类产生了很大混乱。

除了上述历史上的“述语”含义外，在当代英国哲学家吉奇还引入了另外的含义。他注意到，在现代逻辑中，“谓词”这个词既可指一个特殊的语词或短语在一个特殊的命题中扮演的角色，也可指表达靠自己扮演这种角色的能力所属的句法范畴。为了避免这种歧义，他使用“述语”来表示句法范畴的成员身份，保留“谓词”实际扮演的陈述作用。

“我用‘述语’指其他逻辑学家称为‘谓词’的表述，而保留‘谓词’指实际上作为给定命题中的主要功能来使用的述语。”——吉奇：《逻辑问题》，1972年，第239页。

### 范畴

中世纪经院哲学对亚里士多德的“范畴”的对应词。

### 谓词

[源自拉丁文 *pare* (在……面前) 和 *dicere* (叙说)，其字面意思是：“在……前面被叙说的”] 基本语句表达了这种命题，即某个对象有某种属性（“那条狗在跑”或“这朵花是红的”），或在两个或多个对象之间存在某种关系（“马比

larger than the sheep”); The expressions standing for an object (for example “the dog”, “this flower”, or “the horse” and “the sheep”) are called subjects, and the expressions standing for an attribute (for example “is running”, “is red”) or relation (for example “is larger than”) are predicates. A predicate is what is said of a subject in a sentence. A predicate can be a verb, adjective phrase or noun phrase. Predicates are also called predicate expressions or predicate terms. If a given sentence has one subject, its predicate is a one place predicate; if there are two subjects, its predicate is a two place predicate, and so on. One place predicates are connected with intransitive verbs, and two place predicates are connected with transitive verbs or relations. There is also a distinction between logical (first-order) and grammatical (second-order) predicates. A logical or first-order predicate applies to some object, and a grammatical or second-order predicate is predicated of a first-order predicate. According to this distinction, words such as exist are grammatical predicates rather than a logical predicates.

“The subject is that term about which affirmation or denial is made. The predicate is that term which is affirmed or denied of the subject.” —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 92.

**Predicate logic**, another name for predicative calculus

### Predicate nominalism

A term introduced by the Australian philosopher David Armstrong for the theory that what universals there are is simply a matter of what predicates there are. In other words, universals are parasitic upon predicate expressions. Although a predicate like “tree” can apply in principle to more than one object, we need not posit some common property by which a common predicate or general term applies to objects. On the contrary, the applicability of a common predicate needs no further explanation and determines the existence of a universal. Strawson’s characterisation of universals in *Individuals* is sometimes said to express this theory. Predicate nominalism is one attempt to solve the fundamental difficulty of nominalism, namely, if only particulars exists, how can we bring numerically different particulars under the same general terms? The difficulty for predicate nominalism is that it does not explain how predicates can determine properties or universals.

“According to Predicate Nominalism, an object’s possession of (say) the property, being white, is completely determined by the fact that the predicate ‘white’ applies to this object.” —Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism*, 1978, p. 17.

**Predicate term**, another name for predicate

羊大”)。其中代表对象的表达式(例如,上面例子中的“这朵花”,“马”,“那条狗”)叫做主词,表示性质(例如“在跑”,“是红的”)或关系(例如“比……大”)的表达式是谓词。谓词就是在句子中述说主词的东西。谓词可以是动词、形容词短语或名词短语。谓词也叫做“谓词表达式”或“谓词词项”。在一给定语句内,如果有一个主词,则它的谓词是一位谓词;如果有两个主词,则它的谓词是二位谓词,如此等等。一位谓词与不及物动词相关联,二位谓词与及物动词或关系相关联。还存在逻辑(一阶)谓词和语法(二阶)谓词的区分。逻辑或一阶谓词应用于某个对象,而语法或二阶谓词则谓述一阶谓词。根据这一区别,像“存在”这样的词语是语法谓词而不是逻辑谓词。

“主词是对之作出肯定或否定的词项。谓词则是用来肯定或否定主词的词项。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第92页。

### 谓词逻辑

“谓词演算”的另一个名称。

### 谓词唯名论

澳大利亚哲学家D. 阿姆斯特朗引入的术语,指一种认为共相存在即是谓词存在的理论。换言之,共相是寄生于谓词表述的。虽然像“树”这样的谓词在原则上可应用于多个对象,但我们不必设定一个共同谓词或类名,只有通过它才可应用于对象的某种共同属性。相反,共同谓词的可应用性不需要进一步的解释,它决定了共相的存在。斯特劳森在《个别物》中对共相的描绘有时被认为是表达了这一理论。传统的唯名论面临一个根本性的困难,即如果只有殊相存在,我们如何能把数目上不同的殊相归到同一个类名之下?谓词唯名论是力图解决这一困难的一种尝试。但它也有自己的弱点,因它未能解释谓词如何决定属性或共相。

“根据谓词唯名论,一个对象拥有(比如说)白这一属性,完全是由谓词‘白’应用于这个对象这一事实所决定的。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯名论和唯实论》,1978年,第17页。

**谓词词项**

## Predication

The attribution of a predicate to a subject, or the combination between them. Predication expresses the relation between a thing and its attributes, which is the basic combination in logical thinking. Much of logic depends on understanding the different logical roles of subject and predicate. Predication can be symbolised as  $Fa$  ( $a$  is  $F$ ) or  $Rab$  ( $a$  has relation  $R$  with  $b$ ). Frege held that predicates are unsaturated, that is they contain logical holes which can be filled by subject terms or can be held open by variables. If a predication contains a one-place predicate, it is a one-place predication. If it contains a two-place predicate, it is a two-place predication, and so on. Frege suggested that we distinguish predication from assertion for assertion involves an assent to the truth or falsity of the sentence. While every assertion must be expressed by a predication, not every predication is necessarily an assertion.

“Predication: in logic, the joining of a predicate to a subject of a proposition so as to increase the logical breadth without dismissing the logical depth.” — Peirce, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 359.

## Predication, metaphysical

A kind of predication related to Aristotle's theory of matter and form, particularly his view that form is predicated of matter, also called form predication. Metaphysical or form predication differs from linguistic predication, which picks out a logical subject and states what that subject is or has. In metaphysical predication, such as “these bones and flesh are Socrates”, matter as subject is not a logical subject, but indicates the kind of material stuff (bones and flesh) from which the predicate (Socrates) is constituted or generated by substantial change.

“Let's say that a predicate (a linguistic term) is linguistically predicated of its subject, but that a predicable (a metaphysical term) is metaphysically predicated of its subject.” — Lewis, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, 1992, p. 4.

**Predicative adjective**, see attributive adjective

## Predicative calculus

Also called the logic of terms, predicate logic or the calculus of predicates. A logic that analyses subject-predicate sentences, including sentences involving “not” and the quantifiers “all” and “some”. It deals with the inner structure of propositions, and the arguments whose validity depend on the arrangement of the terms within the premises and conclusion. Predicative calculus is thus distinguished from proposi-

“谓词”的另一个名称。

## 主谓关系

把一谓词归属于一主词，或这两者之间的某种结合。它表达了事物与其属性之间的关系，是逻辑思考中基本的组合。逻辑的大部分内容取决于如何理解主词和谓词的不同逻辑作用。主谓关系可以被符号化为“ $Fa$ ” ( $a$  是  $F$ ) 或“ $Rab$ ” ( $a$  与  $b$  有关系  $R$ )。弗雷格认为，谓词是非饱和的，即是说它们包含逻辑空隙，这些空隙能够用主词填充，或者用变元填充且仍保持开放状态。如果一主谓关系包含一个一位谓词，则它是一位主谓关系。如果它含有一个二位谓词，则它是一二位主谓关系，如此等等。弗雷格建议把主谓关系与断定区别开来，因为断定涉及到对该语句的真或假的某种肯定。尽管每个断定必须由主谓关系来表达，但并非每个主谓关系必然地是一个断定。

“主谓关系：在逻辑中，把命题的谓词与其主词组合起来，以至增加了其逻辑宽度而没有消除其逻辑深度。”——皮尔士：《文集》，第二卷，第 359 页。

## 形而上学的主谓关系

一类与亚里士多德的形式质料说，尤其是他的形式述说质料的观点相关的主谓关系，也叫形式的主谓关系。形而上学的或形式的主谓关系不同于语言的主谓关系。语言的主谓关系标出一个逻辑主词，并陈述这一主词是什么或有什么。在形而上学的主谓关系中，如“这些骨头和肉是苏格拉底”，作为主词的质料不是逻辑主词，而是表示谓词（“苏格拉底”）通过本体变化所构成或产生的物质材料（“骨与肉”）。

“让我们认定，一个谓词（一个语义项）在语义上上述一个主词，而一个可作谓词的项（一个形而上学的项）是在形而上学上述说其主词。”——刘易斯：《亚里士多德哲学中的本体与主谓关系》，1992 年，第 4 页。

## 谓词形容词

见“归属形容词”条。

## 谓词演算

亦称“词项逻辑”，“谓词逻辑”或“谓词演算”。它分析主谓式语句，包括那些含有“并非”和量词“所有”、“有些”的句子。它处理命题的内部结构，以及其有效性依赖于前提和结论内词项排列的论证。谓词演算因此区别于命题演算，后者与命题结构有关，并且以命题作为它的单位。谓词演算有时被刻画为词项逻辑，而

tional calculus, which is concerned with propositional structures and has propositions as its units. Predicative calculus is sometimes characterised as the logic of terms, while propositional logic is the logic of propositions. Predicative logic introduces “x, y, z” as variables ranging over individual objects and “F, G, H” as signs for predicates. At its core is quantification theory, which was developed by Frege to analyse the logical properties of quantifiers. First-order predicate logic, which is elementary logic and a modern replacement of Aristotelian syllogism, deals only with individual variables and their quantifications, while second-order or other higher-order predicate logic is also concerned with relational predicates and other predicate variables.

“The laws of the predicative calculus are of two kinds; 1. those that are peculiar to itself (that is to the logic of terms) and 2. those that are analogous or specifications of the laws of the propositional calculus. The propositional calculus and the predicative calculus belong to one system.” — Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 94.

### Prediction

To forecast that something will happen in advance of its actual happening. This capacity is essential for the human species to survive and is also a central feature of human intelligence. Predicting and controlling the future is a major reason that we pursue knowledge. The problem of how to predict rationally has been of central interest in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Predictability is the main measure by which we may test the efficiency of a scientific theory. The notion of prediction has been associated with the discussion of topics such as free will and determinism, chaos and chance and induction. Problems concerning the truth-value of predictions led to the development of three-valued logic.

“The chain of reasoning which leads from given observational findings to the ‘prediction’ of new ones actually involves, besides deductive inferences, certain quasi-inductive steps each of which consists in the acceptance of an intermediate statement on the basis of confirming, but usually not logically conclusive, evidence.” — Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, 1965, p. 29.

**Prediction paradox**, another term for surprise examination paradox

### Pre-established harmony

Leibniz’s proposed solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem. The world, including minds and bodies, is ultimately composed of independent substances or monads. Each monad is isolated and self-enclosed, and develops in accordance with its own internal nature. There is no interaction between finite minds and bodies. No state of a substance has

命题逻辑则被刻画为命题的逻辑。谓词逻辑引入 “x, y, z” 作变元, 以个别的对象为值, 引入 “F, G, H” 作为谓词的记号, 量化理论是其核心部分, 它是由弗雷格提出来分析量词的逻辑特性的。一阶谓词逻辑, 作为初等逻辑和亚里士多德三段论的现代替代物, 只处理个体变元及其量化, 而二阶或高阶谓词逻辑则还关注关系谓词和其他谓词变元。

“谓词演算的规律包括两类: 其一是为它本身 (即词项逻辑) 所特有的规律, 其二是命题演算规律的类似物或限定。命题演算和谓词演算属于一个系统。”——米切尔:《逻辑导论》, 1962年, 第94页。

### 预测

在某事实际发生之前预言某事将发生。对于人这个物种来说, 为了生存下去而具有这种能力是至关重要的, 并且这种能力还决定了人是理智的生物。我们追求知识的主要理由正是为着预测和控制未来。如何进行合理的预测始终是认识论和科学哲学中重点关注的问题。可预测性是我们可以用来检验科学理论的效用的主要手段。预测概念是与关于自由意志和决定论、混沌和机遇、归纳等等的讨论密切相关的。判定预测的真值的努力导致了三值逻辑的发展。

“从给定的观察发现到对新现象的预测的推理链条, 除演绎推理外, 实际上包含着某些准归纳的步骤, 其中每一步都在于根据肯定证据接受某个居间陈述, 但后者在逻辑上通常是非结论性的。”——亨佩尔:《科学说明的诸方面》, 1965年, 第29页。

### 预告悖论

“意外考试悖论”的另一名称。

### 前定和谐

莱布尼茨对笛卡尔的心—身问题的解决办法。包括心灵和身体在内的世界最终是由独立的实体或单子构成的。每一个单子都是孤立的、自身封闭的, 根据它自己的内在性质而发展。在有限的心灵和身体之间没有任何相互作用。一个实体的任何状态都不会像一个真正原因那样

as a real cause some state of another substance, for a substance which is properly so-called, must have a kind of self-sufficiency which is incompatible with causal dependence. Yet God, in creating the universe, has pre-established a perfect noncausal harmony of activity among all possible monads. Each monad is like a mirror which reflects the whole universe. A change in one will correspond to a change in other. This harmony is analogous to the non-causal harmony of activity existing between two clocks whose ticking is synchronised perfectly. The doctrine of pre-established harmony is at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. It is, in a sense, an incorporation of occasionalism and the view that each substance has its own internal activity.

"There remains only my hypothesis, that is the way of pre-established harmony, through a prior divine artifice, which has formed each of these substances from the beginning in such a way that by following only its own laws, laws which it received with its being, it nevertheless agrees with the other, as if there were a mutual influence, or as if God always meddled with it, over and above his general course." —Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 148.

### Preface paradox

An author, based on the experience that all her previous works contain some mistakes, reasonably acknowledges in the preface of her new book that it also contains mistakes, in spite of her best efforts. This acknowledgement creates a contradiction. On the one hand, she holds that propositions  $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots, P_n$  (which are the views she argues for in this book) are true; on the other hand, she also believes that at least one of them is false. This amounts to saying that at one and the same time she believes that all these propositions are true and believes that some of them are false. This reveals an imperfection in what we take ourselves to know.

"We occupy the posture of the so-called 'preface paradox' —standing in the shoes of the author who apologises in his preface for those errors that have doubtless made their way into his work, and yet blithely remains committed to all those assertions in the body of the work itself." —Rescher, *Empirical Inquiry*, 1982, p. 206.

### Prejudice

Prejudice is a target of Cartesian doubt and other rationally based philosophy because it is thought to obstruct reason and philosophy in the pursuit of truth. Prejudice is rehabilitated in Gadamer's hermeneutics, where it is viewed as an essential element in our understanding on the basis of Heidegger's notion of a fore-structure of understanding. All understanding involves the projection of meanings arising out of one's own situation and obtained from a certain perspective. Because this fore-structure of understanding is preju-

含有另一实体的某个状态, 因为严格而言的实体应当有一种与因果依赖不相容的自足性。然而上帝在创造宇宙时已经在一切可能的单子之间预先建立了非因果的、完美的活动和谐。每一单子都像一面镜子反映着整个宇宙。一个之中的变化都将对应于另一个之中的变化。这种和谐类似于两个完全同步运行的钟表之间存在的非因果的动作和谐。前定和谐说是莱布尼茨的形而上学的核心。在某种意义上, 它是偶因论和关于实体有自己的内在能动性观点的混合物。

"只有我的假设仍然保留着, 那就是先前由神的技巧而造成的前定和谐方法, 神的技巧将这些实体的每一个在一开始就按那样一种方式来形成, 使得它只遵循自己的规律——那些它存在时就得到的规律——行事, 却依然与其他的实体相适合, 就好像它们真的互相影响一样, 或好像上帝在他的基本的活动主流之外, 还总在摆弄那个实体一样。"——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989年, 第148页。

### 序言悖论

作者根据他先前所有著作都包含有错误这个经验, 在他的新著序言中有理由承认, 它也可能包含错误, 尽管他尽了最大的努力。这个承认产生了一个矛盾。一方面, 他认为命题  $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots, P_n$  (他在这本书中论证的观点) 是真的; 但另一方面, 他又相信其中至少有一个是假的。这就等于是说, 他在既相信所有这些命题为真的同时, 又相信其中的一些是假的。这揭示了我们确认知道的东西是不完美的。

"我们处于所谓的'序言悖论'的状态——即处于这样一个作者的位置, 他在序言中为那些无疑曾经出现在他的著作中的错误而表示歉意, 但又轻松地承认就这本书里的所有断言也有错误。"——雷谢尔:《经验探究》, 1982年, 第206页。

### 偏见

偏见是笛卡尔的怀疑和其他基于理性的哲学所反对的东西, 因为它被视为妨碍了追求真理的理性和哲学。偏见在伽达默尔的解释学中恢复了名誉, 它在那里被视为我们理解中的一个必要因素, 这种看法基于海德格尔关于理解或领会的前结构的观点。所有的理解都涉及意义的投射或筹划, 这投射则出自一个人自己所处的形势, 由某个视域中获得。由于这种理解的前结构就是偏见, 理解或领会不可避免地植根

dice, understanding is inevitably rooted in prejudice. There is no neutral point of view from which we may get the “real” meaning of a text. According to Gadamer, this does not mean that understanding and interpretation are purely subjective. Prejudice is not a matter of subjective opinion, nor is it personal property. Instead, he holds that it is part of tradition and is developed within the historical tradition to which we belong. Prejudice is the historically and culturally determined horizon and the effectivity of history. Furthermore, Gadamer claims that prejudice is not an obstacle or limit to understanding, but by serving as our orientation to meaning, it is the basis for the possibility of understanding.

“What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being.” —Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen-Doepel), 1975, p. 246.

### Pre-reflective cogito

Sartre’s term for a crucial kind of human consciousness. Our consciousness is always directed upon some object of which we are aware. This is the Cartesian or reflective cogito. But this consciousness is itself accompanied by a consciousness that we are aware. Sartre called this second order awareness, which is consciousness directed upon consciousness, pre-reflective cogito. This consciousness, which always passes without being reflected upon, makes reflection possible. The pre-reflective cogito is the condition of the reflective cogito. On Sartre’s view of intentionality, therefore, consciousness operates on two levels at once. Sartre account of consciousness led to his rejection of Freud’s notion of the unconscious. A major task of Sartre’s philosophy was to give a descriptive account of the pre-reflective cogito.

“I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito. This cogito, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective cogito since it appears as the first necessity for non-reflective consciousness to be seen by itself.” —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 74.

### Prescriptivism

A moral theory developed by Hare in *The Languages of Morals* (1952) and *Freedom and Reason* (1963). According to this theory, the main concern of moral philosophy is to clarify the nature of moral terms and statements. Distinct from fact-stating statements which tell us what is the case, ethical statements tell us to do something and are used to guide choices. Such statements must have irreducibly prescriptive elements. To express agreement to a prescription or to accept it is to express one’s resolve or decision to carry it out. Prescriptivism emphasises the typically prescriptive use

于偏见。并没有能让我们得到一个文本的“真实”意义的中立视角。按照伽达默尔的看法，这也并不意味着理解和解释是纯主观的。偏见并不就是主观意见，也不是个人癖好；相反，伽达默尔认为它是传统的一部分，在我们所属于的历史传统中发展。偏见是被历史和文化决定的视域，是历史的效果。而且，伽达默尔认为偏见不是理解的障碍或局限，相反，它引导着我们朝向意义的方向，因而是使理解成为可能的基础。

“所需要的是从根本上为偏见概念恢复名誉，并认识到这样一个事实，即存在着合法的偏见，如果我们不加偏见地看待人类存在的有限的和历史的样式的话。”——伽达默尔：《真理与方法》（格兰-多培尔英译），1975年，第246页。

### 前反思的思想

萨特用来表达一种极重要的人类意识的词。我们的意识总是指向某个我们意识到的对象。这是笛卡尔的或反思的思想。但这种意识本身又被我们知道的〔另〕一个意识所伴随。萨特称之为第二层的意识，也就是指向意识的意识或前反思的思想。这种意识总是不被反思地进行着，但正是它使得反思成为可能。这前反思的思想乃是反思思想的条件。因此，按照萨特关于意向性的观点，意识同时运作在两个层次上。萨特对于意识的解释使得他拒绝弗洛伊德关于无意识的观念。萨特哲学的一个主要任务就是去描述性地说明前反思的思想。

“我相信我已表明所有反思的首要条件是一种前反思的思想。当然，这种思想并不设置对象，它保持在意识之中。尽管如此，它与反思的思想是同源的，因为它是让非反思的意识被自身看到的必要前提。”——萨特：《存在与虚无》（巴奈斯英译），1957年，第74页。

### 规定主义

为黑尔在他的《道德语言》（1952年）和《自由与理性》（1963年）所发展的一种道德理论。根据这个理论，道德哲学的主要任务是阐明道德词汇和陈述的性质。不同于告诉我们事实是什么的表述事实的描述，伦理陈述告诉我们做什么以及被用来指导我们的选择。这样的陈述必定有不可化简的规定成分。表达对一个规定的同意或者接受，就是表达一个人的决定或者是执行它的决心。规定主义强调对于道德判断的典型的规定性使用。它也主张道德规定是

of moral judgements. It also claims that moral prescription is universal, and is directed to everyone at all times. This principle of universalizability is the reason that Hare calls his theory “universal prescriptivism”. Both prescriptivism and emotivism are types of noncognitivism, but they have significant differences. While emotivism emphasises the emotional impact of a moral judgement, and its influence on the hearer’s attitude, prescriptivism thinks that this result is not necessary for the success of prescription. Emotivism, in distinguishing between factual statements and ethical statements, claims that only factual statements are the objects of reasoning. Prescriptivism, on the other hand, claims that one can also reason about moral questions. It thus avoids the charge of irrationality.

“For the sake of a name, let me refer to the type of doctrine which I put forward in *The Language of Morals*, and still hold, as ‘universal prescriptivism’—a combination, that is to say, of universalism (the view that moral judgements are universalizable) and prescriptivism (the view that they are, at any rate typically, prescriptive).” —Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 1963, p. 16.

## Presence

According to Derrida, Western metaphysics from Parmenides to Husserl held the prejudice that the locus of truth is in the pure presence of things themselves to consciousness. Hence he calls traditional Western metaphysics the metaphysics of presence. Because presence gives priority to the spoken over the written, he also considers Western metaphysics to be a tradition of phonocentrism. “To return to the things themselves” has been a central philosophical slogan of the tradition. For Plato, truth lay in the idea or *eidos* (form) which is present to reason, the soul’s sight. Plato thus united the notions of presence and evidence with those of objectivity, ideality, and the Good. He established the dichotomy of sensibility and rationality as an ultimate pair of opposing concepts. Plato authorised philosophy as the philosophy of presence or philosophy of *logos*. Derrida calls reason-centred philosophy logocentrism. Aristotle set up a notion of temporal presence through a continuity of time and history. He developed a position of taking the presence of a thing to be its substance, essence and existence. Descartes claimed that the condition of the possibility of knowledge and truth is the clarity and distinctness of ideas immediately present to consciousness. Hegel systematically demonstrated the self-presence of the subject. For most people, presence is the province of certainty. By denying presence, Derrida seems to deny the importance of actual experience. The complex displacement of presence, speech and reason requires careful assessment.

“We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as presence, with all the subdeterminations

普遍的,是在任何时候都对每个人起作用的。这是它的普遍性原则,也是黑尔宁可把他的理论称作为“普遍规定主义”的理由。规定主义和情感主义是非认知主义的两种类型,但它们的意义是不同的。情感主义强调一个道德判断对情感的效果,对听者态度的影响;而规定主义认为这个结果对于规定的成功来说不是必要的。情感主义在区分事实陈述与伦理陈述时,相信惟有事实陈述是推理的对象;而规定主义则主张,人们能够对道德问题进行推理。因此它避免了被指责为是非理性的。

“就名称而言,让我把我在《道德语言》中提出的那类并仍然坚持的学说,称作是‘普遍规定主义’——即普遍主义(把道德判断看成是普遍的观点)和规定主义(即道德判断至少主要地是规定性的)的结合。”——黑尔:《自由与理性》,1963年,第16页。

## 在场

在德里达看来,从巴门尼德到胡塞尔的西方形而上学都坚持这样一个偏见,即真理的所在地乃是事物本身对意识而言的纯在场。因此他称传统西方形而上学为“在场的形而上学”。由于在场首要关注的是说出的东西而非写出的东西,他也将西方形而上学视为一种语音中心主义的传统。“回到事情本身中”一直是这个传统的最重要的哲学口号。对于柏拉图,真理位于形相或理念之中,而这形相或理念对理性、也就是灵魂之眼而言是在场的。柏拉图因此而将在场和明证的观念与客观性、理念性(相性)和善的观念统一起来。他建立起感性与理性的二元分立,作为所有对立概念的终极模式。柏拉图将在场的哲学或逻各斯的哲学树立为正宗哲学。德里达称以理性为中心的哲学为“逻各斯中心主义”。亚里士多德通过时间和历史的连续性建立起了时间在场的观念。他提出了这样一种立场,即将事物的在场当做这事物的实体、本质和存在。笛卡尔认为,知识和真理可能性的条件是观念的明白和清楚,而这些观念对意识而言都是直接在场的。黑格尔系统地证明主体的自身在场。对绝大多数人而言,在场是确定性的领地。通过否定在场,德里达似乎否定了实际经验的重要性。对这种要逐出在场、说话和理性的复杂观点需要仔细的估价。

“我们已经有了这样一个预知,即语音中心主义的出现伴随着一个历史性的决定:将普遍存在的意义确定为在场;同时伴随着各种依附于这个普遍决定形式的次级决定。在这普遍的

which depend on this general form and which organise within it their system and their historical sequence.” —Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Spivak), 1974, p. 12.

**Presence-at-hand**, see ready-to-hand

### Pre-Socratics

A term invented by historians of philosophy to group together the Greek thinkers living between approximately the first half of the sixth century B C and Socrates' lifetime. These include mainly the Milesian school (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), the Pythagoreans, the Eleatic school (Parmenides, Zeno and Milissus), Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). The name is sometimes misleading because some philosophers in this period were actually contemporaries of Socrates. The unity consists rather in the fact that none of them were influenced by Socrates and Plato. They were also called natural philosophers, for many of them concentrated on finding principles to explain the world of nature, although this is not true of Parmenides' way of truth or of Zeno.

The Pre-Socratics took part in the first period of the history of Western philosophy, which began the tradition of free and rational inquiry. None of these philosophers left us a single complete work, so the study of them relies on the scanty and disconnected fragments preserved in the quotations and discussions of the later philosophers, in particular in Aristotle's works and those of his commentators. There was no separation of science and philosophy in this period, but the road leading to this separation was prepared by them. Many contemporary philosophers admire the intellectual freedom and speculative brilliance of the Pre-Socratics and are inspired by their views of man and universe.

“In saying that the Pre-Socratics were rational men I mean no more than this: that the broad and bold theories which they advanced were presented not as ex cathedra pronouncements for the faithful to believe, and the godless to ignore, but as the conclusions of arguments, as reasoned propositions for reasonable men to contemplate and debate.” —Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1979, p. 5.

### Presumption

A statement which has some grounds to be considered a candidate for truth, but whose truth is not yet established. It is provisionally acceptable, but falls short of being conclusively acceptable. A presumption possesses a positive but low-level cognitive status and is the raw material for the production of knowledge. A presumption has some similarity to Epicurus' notion of *prolepsis*, the anticipation of the application of a term.

形式中这些次级决定组织起了它们的系统和历史序列。”——德里达:《论书写学》(斯庇瓦克英译), 1974年, 第12页。

### 现在在手状态

见“用得称手”条。

### 前苏格拉底

哲学史家们创造了这一术语, 把生活在大约公元前6世纪前半期至苏格拉底时期的希腊思想家归在一起。这些思想家包括米利都学派(泰勒斯, 阿那克西曼德, 阿那克西美尼), 毕达哥拉斯学派, 埃利亚学派(巴门尼德, 芝诺, 梅利索), 恩培多克勒, 阿那克萨戈拉, 原子论者(留基波和德谟克利特)。这一名称有时有些含混, 因为这一时期的有些哲学家实际上是苏格拉底的同时代人。这些思想家们的共同之处在于, 他们都没有受过苏格拉底和柏拉图的影响。他们也被叫做自然哲学家, 因为他们绝大多数都致力于找到可解释自然界的原理, 虽然巴门尼德的真理之路与芝诺哲学除外。

前苏格拉底哲学发生于西方哲学史的第一阶段, 它开始了自由和理性研究的传统。这些哲学家都没有留给我们一部完整的著作, 故对他们的研究是依赖于数量不多且互不相连的残篇。这些残篇被保存在后代哲学家, 尤其是亚里士多德及其注释者的引语和讨论中。这一阶段科学与哲学尚未分家, 可通往分离之路已经由他们奠定了。许多当代哲学家都敬慕前苏格拉底哲学家的理智自由和思辨才能, 并从他们对人和宇宙的观点中吸取灵感。

“说前苏格拉底哲人是理性的人, 我的意思只是说: 他们提出的大范围的和大胆的理论不是作为教会的宣导, 使虔诚的人相信, 而被无神论者所忽视; 相反, 他们的理论是论证的结论, 是推论而得的命题, 使理性的人去思考和争论。”——巴奈斯:《前苏格拉底哲学家》, 1979年, 第5页。

### 假定

一个基于某些论据被考虑为待选的真理性, 但是其真理性尚未确立的陈述。它是暂时可接受的, 但是尚缺乏最后的可接受性。假定拥有确定的然而却是低水准的认知地位, 是知识生产的原材料。假定类似于伊壁鸠鲁的 *prolepsis*, 即对使用一个词项的预期。

“假定是这样一个问题, 它被公开承认为未知(即未知其为真)的, 但是有些人宣称(不管