在上次课的最后 At the end of last class,
我们开始简述一个 we started sketching an argument
来自笛卡尔的论证 that comes from Descartes,
或称为卡氏论证 the Cartesian argument,
这个论证说仅仅通过思考 that says merely by the process of thinking,
仅仅在思想的基础上 on the basis of thought alone,
它就能证明心灵 it tends to show that the mind--
我们都承认有心灵 We all agree that there are minds.
这个论证尝试证明的就是 What the argument attempts to show is
这个心灵肯定和我的身体是不同的 that this mind must be something separate from my body.
这个论证令人吃惊的就是 And what's amazing about the argument is
它完全只靠思想实验 that it works on the basis of a pure thought experiment.
回忆一下 那个思想实验 The thought experiment, you recall,
在其中我想象 was one in which I imagine,
我给自己讲了一个故事 I tell myself a story in which
在这个故事里 what I'm doing is
我只是想象我的心灵独立于我的身体存在 I'm imagining my mind existing without my body.
似乎这么做不是很难 It doesn't seem especially difficult to do that.
但是随后我们加上了一个哲学性的前提 But then, we add this extra philosophical premise.
如果我能想象一个东西独立于另一个存在 If I can imagine one thing without the other,
那么这两个东西肯定是不同的 then it must be that those are two things.
所以我的心灵肯定不是我的身体 So my mind must not be my body.
我的心灵肯定和我的身体不是一回事 My mind must not be the same thing
也不是我的身体的另一种说法 as my body or a way of talking about my body,
因为如果我的心灵只是 because of course if my mind just was--
谈论我的心灵只不过是 talking about my mind just was--
谈论我的身体的另一种说法 a way of talking about my body,
那么要想象心灵存在而身体不存在 then to try to imagine my mind without
就像是想象没有身体而身体存在 my body would be trying to imagine my body without my body.
而这肯定是不可能的 And that, obviously, can't happen.
设想在某个世界里面 Look. Suppose we try to imagine a world in
薛立存在而卡根不存在 which Shelly exists but Kagan doesn't.
你做不到 不是吗 You can't, right?
因为很明显 Because of course,
它们是一个东西 薛立·卡根 they're just a single thing, Shelly Kagan.
所以如果想象了薛立存在 And so if you've imagined Shelly existing
那么当然你也就想象了那一个东西 then of course you're imagining that single thing,
薛立·卡根存在 Shelly Kagan, existing.
如果你想像卡根不存在 And if you imagine Kagan not existing,
那么你也就是在想象那个唯一的东西 then you're imagining that single thing,
薛立·卡根不存在 Shelly Kagan, not existing.
所以你甚至无法想象在一个世界里 So you can't even imagine a world in
薛立存在而卡根不存在 which Shelly exists but Kagan doesn't.
千万不要被这个搞糊涂了 Now, it's important not to be confused about this.
我们可以容易地想象一个世界里 We can easily imagine a world in which
我不姓卡根或者 I don't have the last name Kagan or perhaps
反过来 to switch it around,
我不叫薛立 Shelly's not my name.
假设我父母姓布鲁斯 Suppose my parents had named me Bruce.
问题还是一样的 Nothing would be easier.
想象在一个世界里卡根存在 Imagine a world in which Kagan exists,
而薛立不存在 but Shelly doesn't exist,
因为这个世界里面没人叫薛立 because nobody in the world is named Shelly.
问题并不在于 The question is not,
你能否想象我有另外一个名字 "Can you imagine me with a different name?"
简单地说 我叫布鲁斯而不是薛立 Bruce instead of Shelly, easy enough.
而是在于 It's rather,
你能不能想象在一个世界里 "Can you imagine a world in which the very thing
你用薛立这个名字 that you really are picking out
指的那个人 when you refer to me by the name Shelly--
也就是这个东西 namely this thing--
你能不能想象在一个世界里某个东西存在 can you imagine a world in which that thing exists,
而你用卡根这个词 but the thing that you're picking up
所指的这个东西却不存在 when you use the word Kagan does not exist?"
你不可能做到 And that you can't do,
因为在现实世界里 because in the real world of course Shelly
薛立和卡根指的是 and Kagan pick out just
同一个东西的两个不同名字 two different names of this very same thing.
就在这里的这个东西 This thing right here.
所以想象在一个世界里薛立存在 So imagining a world in which Shelly exists
而卡根不存在或者卡根存在而薛立不存在 but Kagan doesn't or Kagan exists but Shelly doesn't,
这就像是要想象在一个世界里 that's trying to imagine a world in
我存在而我不存在 which I exist but I don't.
这当然是矛盾的 And that's, of course, incoherent.
所以另一方面 如果你做得到 So if you can--On the other hand, contrast.
我能不能想象在一个世界里我的左手存在 Can I imagine a world in which my left hand exists,
而我的右手不存在 but my right hand doesn't?
很容易 为什么那么容易 Easy. Why is it so easy?
因为它们是两个不同的东西 Because of course there's two different things.
当然 这并不意味着 Of course, that doesn't mean
在现实世界里面其中一个存在 that in the real world one of them does exist
而另一个不存在 and the other one doesn't.
但是这表明 But it does show
在现实世界里它们是不同的东西 that in the real world they are two different things.
因此我才能想象在 That's why I could imagine
一个世界里只有其一存在 a world with one but not the other.
试图想象一个世界里某人的微笑存在 Try to imagine a world in which somebody's smile exists
而身体不存在 but their body doesn't.
你根本做不到 You can't do it.
你不可能没有身体而有微笑 You can't have the smile without the body.
当然 没什么神秘的 And of course, no mystery about that.
因为微笑并不是什么 That's because the smile isn't
独立于身体的东西 really some separate thing from the body.
谈论微笑 Talking about smiles,
像我们之前提到的 as we've noted before,
那只不过是谈论身体 is just a way of talking about either
或者身体的一部分 what the body can do
能做什么的一种说法 or what a certain area of the body can do.
你可以尝试想象 You can try to imagine it.
在《爱丽丝漫游仙境》里面 In Alice in Wonderland,
笑脸猫消失不见了而剩下的 the Cheshire Cat disappears and all we have left,
最后一个东西 the last thing that disappears,
就是微笑 is the smile.
但是当然 But of course,
当你想象笑脸猫只剩下微笑的时候 when you imagine the Cheshire Cat only having the smile there,
你仍然想象着它的嘴唇 you're still imagining the cat's lips,
牙齿 或许还有舌头 teeth, maybe tongue,
不管是什么 whatever it is.
如果你要相信一个没有身体的微笑 If you try to imagine a smile with no body at all,
那是根本做不到的 为什么呢 it can't be done. Why?
因为微笑并不是独立于身体存在的东西 Because the smile isn't something separate from the body.
试着不通过身体 笛卡尔说道 "Try to imagine my mind," Says Descartes,
来想象我的心灵 "Without my body."
这很容易 Easy.
因为我的心灵和我的身体 From which it follows that my mind
不是同一个东西 and my body must not be one thing.
它们事实上是两个东西 They must, in fact, be two things.
这也就是为什么我们能 That's why it's possible to
不借助其一想象另一个的原因 imagine the one without the other.
所以这个卡氏论证似乎给我们表明了 So this Cartesian argument seems to show us
心灵是独立于身体 that the mind is something separate from,
不同于身体 distinct from,
不能称作身体 not reducible to,
不是"我身体"的另一种说法 not just a way of talking about, my body.
所以心灵肯定是超出身体的额外东西 So it's got to be something extra above and beyond my body.
是灵魂 It's a soul.
这就是笛卡尔要证明的 That's what Descartes argued.
我说过 迄今为止 And as I say, to this day,
哲学家们对于这个论证是否正确很有争议 philosophers disagree about whether this argument works or not.
我认为它不正确 I don't think it does work
我会马上给出一个反例 and in a second I'll give you a counter example.
在给了这个反例之后 And then, having given the counter example
也就是说 That is to say,
我要给一个 what I'm going to give is
与之相似的论证的例子 an example of an argument just like it,
或者至少看起来 or at least an argument
与之类似的一个论证 that seems to be just like it
我们能够很容易地看到 where we can pretty easily see
那个论证是不正确的 that that argument doesn't work.
因此笛卡尔的论证肯定也有同样的问题 And so something must go wrong with Descartes' argument as well.
这个反例是这样的 Well, here's the counter example.
你们有些人 我肯定你们大部分人 Some of you, I'm sure most of you,
或许全部 很熟悉昏星 maybe all of you, are familiar with the Evening Star.
粗略说来 昏星就是 The Evening Star is the, roughly speaking,
天黑时第一个能看见的天体 first heavenly body that's visible in the sky as it gets dark,
至少在一年的某个时间段是这样 at least at certain times of the year.
我肯定你们也对晨星很熟悉 And I'm sure you're also familiar then with the Morning Star.
晨星就是 The Morning Star is
这样一个天体 that heavenly body which
它是黎明来临 is the last heavenly body
天快亮时 还能看到的 that's still visible as dawn comes in
最后一颗星星 and it begins to get light.
在最初 So as a first pass,
昏星是能看到的 the Evening Star is the first star
第一颗星 而晨星 that's visible and the Morning Star
是最后一颗 is the last star
当然是在每年的特定时段 that's visible at the right times of the year.
我们所在的世界既有昏星 The world that we live in has both the Evening Star
也有晨星 and the Morning Star.
但是尝试想象在一个世界里昏星存在 But try to imagine a world in which the Evening Star exists,
而晨星不存在 but the Morning Star does not.
这看来是很容易的 不是吗 Seems fairly straightforward, right?
黎明快来时 我起床 I get up in the morning as dawn's approaching.
我四周张望 没有看到晨星 I look around and the Morning Star is not there.
一颗星也没有 There is no star
无论是晨星曾经出现的地方或 where the Morning Star had been or
是人们曾断言晨星会出现的地方 where people have claimed it would be or something.
但是昏星仍然存在 But the Evening Star still exists.
当夕阳西下夜幕降临时 我走出去 When I go out as sun sets and dusk falls,
昏星就在那里 there is the Evening Star.
我说过 So, as I say,
显而易见 想象在一个世界里 it's a trivial matter to imagine a world
昏星存在 in which the Evening Star exists
而晨星不存在 and the Morning Star does not.
所以我们得到一个 我们可以想象一个 And so we've got a--we could imagine then a--
笛卡尔式的论证 Descartes-like argument saying,
如果我能想象昏星存在而晨星不存在 "If I can imagine the Evening Star without the Morning Star,
这就证明了昏星 that shows the Evening Star
和晨星肯定是两个不同的天体 and the Morning Star must be two different heavenly bodies."
事实并非如此 But in fact, that's not so.
昏星和晨星 The Evening Star and the Morning Star
是同一个天体 are the very same heavenly body.
实际上它根本不是恒星 In fact, it's not a star at all.
它只是颗行星 金星 我没记错的话 It's a planet. It's Venus, if I recall correctly.
看啊 这里只有一个东西 So look, there's only one thing.
昏星就是金星 The Evening Star is Venus.
晨星也是金星 The Morning Star is Venus.
所以不可能有一个世界昏星存在 So there couldn't be a world in which the Evening Star exists,
而晨星不存在 but the Morning Star doesn't,
因为那意味着在那个世界里金星存在 because that would be a world in which Venus exists
而同时金星不存在 and Venus doesn't exist.
很明显 那是不可能的 Obviously, that's not possible.
你能想象的是 在某个世界里 Of course what you can imagine is a world
金星在早上是看不见的 in which Venus isn't visible in the morning.
但这并不是意味着 Still, that's not a world
晨星在这个世界不存在 in which the Morning Star doesn't exist,
如果给定了晨星的意思就是 given that what we mean by the Morning Star
一个这样的天体 is that heavenly object,
不管它到底是什么 whatever it is,
在这个世界上 that in this world
在早晨的那个时候我们仰望天空 we pick out at that time in the morning
就能看到的那个天体 looking up at the sky.
所以说 当我谈到晨星的时候 So when I refer to the Morning Star,
我就是在指金星 I'm talking about Venus,
不管怎么样 我认为那是金星 whether or not I realize it's Venus.
当我说到昏星的时候 When I talk about the Evening Star,
我指的也是金星 I'm referring to Venus,
不管怎么样 我认为 whether or not I realize
金星就是昏星 that Venus is the Evening Star.
所以 只要有金星 So as long as Venus is around,
就有昏星 well, there's the Evening Star,
哪里有晨星 哪里就有金星 there's the Morning Star, there's Venus.
不可能在某个世界里 You can't have a world
晨星不存在 in which the Morning Star doesn't exist
而昏星却存在 but the Evening Star does.
虽然 有可能在某个世界里 Although you could have a world
金星只是在白天没有出现 in which Venus doesn't show up in the morning.
事实上 我可以想象这样 Still, from the fact that I can imagine the world
我到处找晨星 in which I look around for the Morning Star--
但是却找不到 there it isn't.
我找昏星 I look around for the Evening Star--
却找到了 there it is.
由此你可能会想 You might have thought
这是不是就印证了笛卡尔向我们证明的 that showed--didn't Descartes prove to us that
昏星和晨星 that shows--the Evening Star
其实是两样不一样的东西 and the Morning Star are two different things?
错 当然不是了 Well no, obviously it didn't.
让我们来想一想这到底意味着什么 So let's think about what that means.
我们已经有了 So we've got this argument
笛卡尔给出的论证 that Descartes puts forward.
我可以想象我只有心灵而没有身体 I can imagine my mind without my body.
笛卡尔说这就证明了 And Descartes says that shows that,
我的心灵和我的身体是不同的东西 in fact, my mind is something separate from my body.
我可以想象只有晨星存在 Well, I can imagine the Evening Star
而昏星不存在 without the Morning Star,
于是笛卡尔的儿子 so Son of Descartes,
笛卡尔森 不得不说 "Descarteson," Has to say,
那就说明了晨星和昏星 "Oh, so that shows that the Morning Star
是两个不一样的东西 and the Evening Star are two different things."
但是 笛卡尔森说错了 But "Descarteson" Would be wrong when he says that.
晨星和昏星 The Morning Star and the Evening Star
不是不同的东西 aren't two different things.
它们就是一个东西 即金星 They're just one thing, namely Venus.
简而要之 In fact, the sentence,
它们是同一个东西 "They are one thing,"
这有点歧义对吧 is slightly misleading, right?
应该说 金星 它只是一个东西 It's just one thing, Venus.
如果这个论证 If that argument, if the argument--
如果把卡氏论证运用到天文学 If trying to run the Cartesian argument
是失败的 for astronomy fails,
看来我们也不得不承认 yet it seems to be an exactly analogous argument,
类似的那个证明心灵 we ought to conclude that the argument
和身体不同的那个论证 for the distinctness of the mind
必然也是失败的 and the body must fail as well.
在我看来 这样才对 Now, that seems to me to be right.
我认为笛卡尔论证的确是不成立 I think the Cartesian argument does fail.
而且我认为晨星 And I think the example of the Evening Star
和昏星的例子 and the Morning Star--
这不是我原创的 which is not at all original to me--
这个例子说明 that this example shows,
这个反例说明了 this counter example shows,
笛卡尔的原来的那个论证也行不通 that Descartes' original argument doesn't work either.
至少 在我看来行不通 At least, that's how it seems to me,
尽管像我说的 though as I say,
有些哲学家说过 there are philosophers that say,
不 不 那不对 "No, no. That's not right.
也许我们误解了这个论证到底怎么进行的 Maybe somehow we misunderstood how the argument goes
其实不是的 and it doesn't exactly--
虽然这两个理论看上去是类似的 although these two arguments seem parallel,
但其实它们并不是类似的 they're not, in fact, parallel.
它们之间有非常微妙的不同 There's some subtle differences
如果我们不仔细去看的话 that if we're not looking carefully,
我们就会忽略 we'll overlook."
然而就像我说的 争论依旧 But, as I say, the debate goes on.
并不能确定这个论证是否成立 One of the reasons for thinking
的其中一个原因就是 it's not clear whether the argument fails or not
我们很难确定 is because it's hard to pin down,
到底是哪里出了问题 where exactly did it go wrong?
拿行星的论证 Look, take the argument of the planets,
晨星和昏星的那个例子来说 the Morning Star and the Evening Star example.
我想大家都同意 I take it that we all agree
当我们试图把卡氏论证 that when we attempt to run the Cartesian argument
用到晨星和昏星的例子上来时 in terms of the Morning Star and the Evening Star,
它行不通了 但是很难说我们哪里错了 it fails. But it's harder to say what went wrong?
它怎么会出错的 为什么会出错 How did it go wrong? Why did it go wrong?
有哪些可能性 What are the possibilities?
第一个要求 第一个前提 Well, we said, look, first claim, first premise.
我可以想象一个昏星存在 I can imagine a world in which the Evening Star exists,
而晨星不存在的世界 but the Morning Star doesn't.
我想可能会有人回应说 Well, I suppose one possible response would be,
你知道 你其实并不能真的那样做 "You know, you couldn't really do that.
你觉得你在想象一个 You thought you were imagining a world
昏星存在 in which the Evening Star exists
但晨星不存在的世界 and the Morning Star doesn't,
但你并没有真正地想象出 but you weren't really imagining a world
一个昏星存在 in which the Evening Star exists
而晨星却不存在的世界 and the Morning Star doesn't.
你谎报了你所想象的东西 You misdescribed what it is you've imagined."
谈论这个天文学例子 That's not a silly thing
并不是什么傻事 to say about the astronomy case.
也许这才是正确的判断 Maybe that's the right diagnosis.
我们可不可以简单地说 Could we similarly say,
我并没有真正想象到一个 "I didn't really imagine a world
我的心灵存在 但身体不存在的世界 in which my mind exists but my body doesn't"?
我上次讲的那个小故事 That little story I told last time,
我认为我在描述一个 I thought I was describing a world
我的心灵存在 但身体不存在的世界 in which my mind exists and my body doesn't,
而不是真的想象出那样一个世界 but it wasn't really imagining a world like that.
在那里 这么说好像不是很有说服力 That doesn't seem so persuasive over there.
我确实想象出来了 It did seem as though I was imagining it.
天文学的例子里 还有哪里可能出错呢 What else could go wrong with the astronomy example?
或许我想象这一个 Well, maybe I did imagine a world
晨星存在 in which the Morning Star exists
但昏星不存在的世界 and the Evening Star doesn't exist,
但也许想象并不表示可能 but maybe imagining doesn't mean it's possible.
通常来说 我们认为 Normally, we think,
如果我们想象一些东西 if we imagine something,
就意味这它是有可能的 it means it's possible.
当然 我这里不是指在经验上可能 Here I don't mean, of course, empirically possible.
我可以想象一个有独角兽的世界 I could imagine a world with unicorns.
但并不代表我认为独角兽真的可能存在 It doesn't mean I think unicorns are physically possible.
我这里所指的 都是指逻辑上的可能性 All we mean here is logically possible.
我可以想象一个有独角兽的世界 I can imagine a world with unicorns.
可以推测 独角兽在逻辑上是可能的 It seems to follow that unicorns are logically possible.
想象似乎是可能性的向导 Imagination seems to be a guide to possibility;
但也许并非总是 but maybe not always.
也许有时 我们可以想象 Maybe sometimes we can imagine something
一些完全不可能的事 that's really impossible.
试着去想象 Try to imagine--
你可不可以这样 can you do that or can you not do that?--
试着去想象一个圆的方形 try to imagine a round square.
你能想象吗 Can you imagine it?
你不能想象吗 Can you not imagine it?
在某些情况下 In certain moods,
我感觉我能想象出圆的方形 I sort of feel I can just begin to imagine it.
当然 这并不意味着那有可能 Of course, it doesn't really mean it's possible.
似乎那是不可能的 It seems like it's impossible.
也许想象是可能性的一个有缺陷的向导 So maybe imagination is a flawed guide to possibility.
所以 也许 So maybe that's
身体和心灵那个例子 我们该这么说 what we should say about the mind-body case.
是的 我可以想象在一个世界里 "Yeah, I can imagine a world
我的心灵存在 而我身体不存在 in which my mind exists but my body doesn't.
但这并不表示那是真正可能的 But that doesn't show that it's really possible,
在逻辑上可能有一个世界 logically possible to have a world
其中我的心灵存在而身体不存在 in which my mind exists and my body doesn't."
也许那个论证就错在这里 Maybe that's where the argument goes wrong.
另一方面 On the other hand,
想象是通向逻辑可能性的最好的向导吗 isn't imagination our best guide to logical possibility?
我认为 Isn't the reason
独角兽在逻辑上不矛盾的原因 I think unicorns are logically coherent is
不正是因为我能够轻易的想象它们吗 because I can imagine them so easily?
还有另一种可能 Another possibility.
也许我们应该说 Maybe we should say,
A和B有可能不同 the mere fact that it's possible for A and B
比如 可能A存在 to be separate--for A to exist
而B不存在 without B for example,
这是它们明显的不同之处 that's clearly where they're separate--
它们有可能不同 the mere fact that it's possible for
并不意味着 them to be separate doesn't mean
在现实世界它们也是不同的 that in the actual world they are separate.
也许这个论证就错在 Maybe the argument goes wrong by assuming
假设了同一性 即当A等于B的时候 that identity--when A is equal to B,
它总是等于B it's always equal to B,
无论情况如何 no matter what.
也许同一性 就像哲学家喜欢说的 Maybe identity, as philosophers like to put it,
也许同一性是偶然的 maybe identity is contingent.
也许在这某个逻辑世界里 Maybe A could be the same thing
A会和B是同一个东西 as B in this logically possible world,
但我们可以想象 but we could imagine
一个完全不同的另一个逻辑世界里 a completely different logically coherent world
A和B不是同一个东西 in which A was not the same thing as B.
如果事实如此 If that's right,
那么结论该是 then maybe the conclusion should be
怎么说呢 "Well, you know, yeah,
笛卡尔的思想实验表明 the Cartesian thought experiment shows
可能存在某个世界 that there could be a world
其中存在着 in which there are minds
不同于身体的心灵 that are not identical to bodies.
但这并不意味着 But that doesn't mean
在现实世界中 我的心灵 that in this world the mind
和我的身体不一样 is not identical to my body.
也许在这个世界 Maybe in this world,
心灵和身体就是相同的 minds and bodies are identical,
即使在其他逻辑世界中 even though in other logically possible worlds
不存在这种同一性 the identity comes apart.
同一性不是必然的 Identity is not necessary,
而是偶然的 就像哲学家们常说的 but contingent, as the philosophers put it."
还不清楚这是不是对的 It's not clear that that's right either.
偶然同一性是很令人迷惑的 The notion of contingent identity is very puzzling.
毕竟 如果A真的是B After all, if A really is B,
它们怎么可能分离呢 how could they come apart?
那儿就只有一个东西 There's only one thing there.
没什么可分的 There's nothing to come apart.
就只有A等于B 那一个东西 There's just A equals B, that single thing.
何来的分离 What's to come apart?
那么究竟这个论证哪里出问题了呢 So where exactly does the argument break down?
难道这不是我的想象 Is it that I'm not really imagining?
还是只是我以为我在想象罢了 I'm just thinking I'm imagining?
或者说想象并不是通向可能性 Is it that imagination's not really
的一个好向导 a good guide to possibility?
这是时常发生 而不是一直发生的吗 I just--Often it is, but not always.
同一性是偶然的吗 Is it that identity is contingent?
笛卡尔论证的奇妙之处在于 The interesting thing about Descartes' argument is
我们能明显感觉到 that it's easy to see something has gone wrong
晨星和昏星的例子中 in the case of the Morning Star
有些东西不对劲 and the Evening Star,
但很难确定 but it's difficult to pin down
错误到底在出哪里 what exactly went wrong.
很多哲学家都认为 Different philosophers agree
在晨星和昏星的例子中 that something's gone wrong in the Morning Star
的确存在错误 and the Evening Star case,
但是错误出在哪里 but disagree about the best diagnosis of
哲学家们却各执一词 where the mistake went in.
当你找到了一种判断这个论证 Armed with your pet diagnosis of
是否错误的方法时 where the argument goes wrong there,
你肯定会问 you've got to ask,
在心灵与身体的问题上 "Does it also go wrong
是不是也出了同样的错误 in the mind and body case?"
我们可以在这个问题上花更多的时间 Well, we could spend more time,
但是我并不打算这么做 but I'm not going to.
我认为笛卡尔的论证不成立 I think Descartes' argument fails.
晨星和昏星的例子 I think the Morning Star,
向我们表明了 Evening Star case shows us
像这样的论证 that arguments like this,
一般来说 at the very least,
不能轻信 can't be taken at face value.
仅仅是因为我们似乎能够 Just because it looks as though we can imagine it and just
想象到一个事物独立于 because it seems as though from the fact
另一个事物存在这件事 that we can imagine one without the other,
并不能说明 it just won't necessarily follow
在现实世界里 有这样两个 that we really do have two things
相互独立 that are separate
而且不相同的事物 and not identical in the real world.
就笛卡尔的论证到底错在哪儿的问题 I'd be happy to discuss with you, outside class,
我很愿意在课外 at greater length my favorite theories as
和你们详细谈谈 to where the argument goes wrong
我最信服的理论 and why I think it goes wrong
以及我个人的看法 in Descartes' case as well.
总之我认为笛卡尔的论证是有错误的 But I suggest that the argument goes wrong.
它是不正确的 It's not right.
所以 笛卡尔试图 And so, Descartes' attempt to
用他的卡式思想实验来证明 establish the distinctness of the mind,
心灵的独立存在性 the immateriality of the mind,
和非物质性 on the basis of this Cartesian thought experiment,
我认为这种尝试是失败的 I think that's unsuccessful.
我们已经花了-- Well, we've spent--
让我们退一步 Let's step back
想想我们都讨论了些什么 and think of where we've been.
我们已经花了一周半 We've spent the last week and a half or so,
也许还多点 两周吧 maybe a bit more, two weeks,
来讨论证明灵魂存在的论证 talking about arguments for the existence of the soul.
我在课程还没正式开始的时候 And unsurprisingly-- since I announced this was going to
就已经说过了 be the result before the class had barely gotten started--
我认为这些论证都站不住脚 I don't think any of these arguments work.
我认为 无论是试图证明 I believe the attempts to
灵魂作为一种非物质的东西 establish the existence of a soul,
而存在 an immaterial object,
还是证明心灵 这个意识的处所 the house of consciousness separate
独立于肉体 and distinct from the body,
我认为这些论证都不成立 I think those arguments fail.
但我想有些人可能 But I recognize that this is something
会不同意我的看法 that reasonable people can disagree about.
所以 我希望 And so this is,
大家能在课后 as will be many times the case
继续思考这个问题 over the course of this semester,
本学期我可能 something that I invite you to continue
会经常这样要求大家 to reflect on for yourself.
如果你相信灵魂是存在的 If you believe in a soul,
你的论证是什么 what's the argument for it?
那么 下面我们开始讲 Well, what we're about to turn to
柏拉图在斐多篇中 is Plato's discussion of these issues
就这些问题进行的讨论 in the dialogue the Phaedo,
上个星期我已经提到过 which, as I told you last week,
斐多篇的主要内容是 purports to lay out the final day's
苏格拉底在被杀前最后一天的谈话-- discussion with Socrates before
他其实是自杀的 he is killed by--he kills himself--
他根据判决 by drinking the hemlock in accordance
喝下了毒芹汁而死 with the punishment that's been given to him.
在这段谈话中 Now, in the course of this discussion,
苏格拉底和他的学生们 Socrates and his disciples argue about
讨论的主要不是灵魂存在的问题 not so much the existence of the soul,
而是灵魂不朽的问题 but the question really is the immortality of the soul.
毕竟 就像我之前说过的 After all, even if you believe in a soul,
即使灵魂是存在的 as I have remarked previously,
那也不能说明 that doesn't give us yet any reason
灵魂在肉体死后 to believe the soul continues
仍然能继续存在下去 to exist after the death of your body.
我们在这门课里 The kind of dualist position
所讨论的二元论观点 that we are considering in this class
实际上是一种互动论的观点 is an interactionist position,
也就是认为灵魂可以控制肉体 where the soul commands the body.
是灵魂使我的手指动起来了 That's what makes my fingers move right now.
同时肉体又可以影响灵魂 And the body can affect the soul.
如果我戳自己的身体 If I poke my body,
我的心灵能感觉到 I feel it in my mind.
因此 心灵 即灵魂 So the mind, the soul,
和肉体明显是紧密联系的 and the body are obviously very tightly connected.
所以 很有可能 And so it could be--
尽管灵魂是独立于肉体的 even if the soul is something separate from the body--
但是 如果肉体死了 灵魂也就死了 that when the body dies, the soul dies as well.
正是这个问题引发了斐多篇中的谈话 That's the question that's driving the discussion in the Phaedo.
我们有什么理由去相信 Do we have any good reason to believe
灵魂在肉体死亡后仍能存活 the soul survives the death of the body?
确切地讲 And more particularly still,
我们有理由相信灵魂不朽吗 do we have good reason to believe it's immortal?
苏格拉底相信灵魂是不朽的 Socrates believes in the immortality of the soul.
所以 他试图捍卫他的观点 And so, he attempts to defend this position,
并试图说服 那些怀疑这一点的学生们 justify it to his disciples who are worried that it may not be true.
值得注意的是 当你们读这篇对话时 It's important to realize--as you read the dialogue,
会发现里面并没有 it becomes fairly apparent--
多少篇幅很明显地 that there isn't so much any
论证灵魂的存在 defense of the belief in the soul.
当然有一些是 There's some of it,
但那不是这些对话的主要目的 but it's not the primary goal.
就大部分篇幅而言 For the most part,
这篇对话里将灵魂的存在 the existence of the soul
看作是理所当然的 is just taken for granted in the dialogue.
作为一个二元论者 Plato, as a dualist,
柏拉图理所当然地 portrays Socrates as being a dualist
把苏格拉底塑造成一个二元论者 and that's just taken for granted.
对话篇中哲学讨论所围绕的问题 The question that the philosophical discussion
并不是 turns on is not,
灵魂是否存在 "Is there a soul?"
而是 灵魂是否会在肉体死亡后存活 but rather, "Does it survive the death of the body?
灵魂是否是不朽的 Is it immortal?"
我已经说过了 Now, as I said,
这是苏格拉底在人世的最后一天 this is Socrates' last day on earth
你们肯定以为他很难过 and you'd expect him to be pretty bummed.
以为他很伤心 You'd expect him to be sad.
但是 奇怪的是 And one of the just striking things is
苏格拉底当时非常开心 that Socrates is in a very happy,
甚至兴奋地和他的朋友们开玩笑 indeed jovial, mood, joking with his friends.
这是为什么 Why is that?
当然 这是因为他认为 Well, of course, it's because he thinks,
首先 灵魂是存在的 first of all, there's a soul
在肉体死后仍会继续存在 and it will survive
而且灵魂是不朽的 and it's immortal.
更重要的是 当然前面几点也很重要 But more importantly still--those are all crucial
但是还有更重要的一点 but there's an extra ingredient as well--
他觉得他有理由相信 he thinks he's got good reason to believe,
他死后他将去到一个 when he dies he's going to go, basically,
我们通常称为天堂的地方 to what we'd call heaven.
他认为有一个地方 住着众神 He thinks there's a realm populated by good gods
也许还住着和他志同道合的哲学家的灵魂 and maybe other philosophical kindred souls.
如果你打理好你在尘世中的一切 And if you got your stuff together here on life,
等你死了 你就能去到那儿了 you'll get to go to that when you die.
他当时很兴奋 很愉快 And so he's excited. He's pleased.
为什么他认为他死后将会去那儿呢 Why does he think he's going to go?
为了能够理解苏格拉底 Well, in thinking about Socrates' belief
关于灵魂存在的想法 in the existence of a soul,
我们应该去了解 it's important to understand,
去注意的是 it's important to notice,
他关于肉体所能做的 that his take on which stuff
事情的看法 gets assigned to the body,
也就是 哪些事是肉体负责的 what are the bodily things versus
哪些是灵魂负责的 what are the soul-like things,
苏格拉底的看法和 is rather different from the way,
我们今天的人的看法是不同的 I think, most of us nowadays would draw the line.
当我谈论证明灵魂 When I talked about arguments
存在的论证时 for the existence of a soul,
我说过 "这里有个可能的论证 I said, "Look, here's one possible argument.
我能看见颜色 I see colors.
没有哪种物质体能够 No physical object could,
没有哪种纯粹的物体能够看见颜色 no purely physical object could see colors.
我能尝到咖啡的味道 I can taste tastes
能闻到咖啡的气味 等等" and have the smell of coffee and so forth."
但苏格拉底认为所有这些肉体上的感觉 But Socrates thinks all those bodily sensations--
都是由肉体来负责的 that's all stuff that the body takes care of.
而现代的二元论者 So unlike those modern dualists
认为需要用非物质的东西 who think we need to appeal to something immaterial
来解释肉体上的感觉 in order to explain bodily sensations,
但苏格拉底不这么想 Socrates thinks no, no,
他认为肉体负责所有的肉体上的感觉 the body takes care of all the bodily sensations,
所有的欲望 需求 感情 all the desirings and the wantings and the emotions
感觉和渴望 and the feelings and the cravings.
那都是身体负责的事 That's all body stuff.
灵魂负责什么呢 What the soul does--
苏格拉底认为 灵魂负责思考 Socrates thinks--the soul thinks.
从本质上说 灵魂是理性的 The soul, in its essence, is rational.
灵魂负责与思考有关的事情 It takes care of the thinking side of things.
灵魂都思考些什么呢 What does the soul think about?
当然了 灵魂能思考 Well, the soul thinks about
所有的事情 all sorts of things, doubtless.
但是 在灵魂能做的所有事情中 But one of the things that it can do,
我们会发现 one of the things
有一件事可以说是 that sort of provides the underpinnings, as we'll see,
柏拉图论证灵魂不朽的基础 for Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul
这件事就是 is the soul can think about--;
灵魂能够思考 well, here I'll have to
在这里我要引入一个哲学术语 introduce a word of philosophical jargon.
有时候说 理念 Sometimes the idea,
有时候我们称为 理念 sometimes the term is called "Ideas."
有时候我们称为 型相 Sometimes the term is called "Forms."
他的基本想法就是 But the thought is that
灵魂能够思考纯粹的概念 the soul can think about certain pure concepts
或者说理念 比如正义本身 or ideas like justice itself,
或者美本身 or beauty itself,
或善本身 or goodness itself,
或健康本身 or health itself.
要解释这些 So to explain all this
我们现在得恶补一点柏拉图的形而上学 we need now a sort of crash course in Plato's metaphysics.
当然 这会是比较肤浅的介绍 Obviously, this will be rather superficial.
如果你们当中有谁想做更多的了解 Those of you who would like to know more about it,
我推荐去读柏拉图对话集 I recommend reading more Platonic dialogues
或者选修古代哲学课程 or taking a class in ancient philosophy.
下面我们介绍一下基本观点 But here's the basic idea.
在这个世界上存在各种美的事物 There's all sorts of beautiful objects in the world.
它们美的方式各不相同 Objects can vary in terms of how beautiful they are.
但是柏拉图认为 But Plato's got the idea
世界上不存在完美的事物 that there's nothing in this world that's perfectly beautiful.
尽管如此 And yet for all that,
我们都能够去思考美的本身 we can think about beauty itself.
换句话说 那就是 Well, we might put it this way.
我们可以说普通的 平凡的 日常的 We might say, ordinary, humdrum, everyday,
物理对象多少有点美 physical objects are somewhat beautiful.
它们只是片面的美 They're partially beautiful.
像柏拉图主义者有时说的那样 As, sometimes, Platonists put it,
它们"属于"美 they "Participate" In beauty.
它们美的程度不一样 They partake of beauty to varying degrees.
不能把其中任何一个与美本身混为一谈 But none of them should be confused with beauty itself.
或者以正义为例 Or, take justice.
存在各种不同的制度 社会制度 There are various arrangements, social arrangements,
它们在不同程度上是正义的或不正义的 that can be just or unjust to varying degrees.
但我们认为世界上无论哪里 But we don't think anywhere in the world
都不存在完全正义的社会 there's any society that's perfectly just.
虽然如此 Yet for all that,
但我们的心灵却可以思考完美的正义 the mind can think about perfect justice.
并且意识到普通的现实社会制度 And notice how ordinary empirical social arrangements
是多么的缺乏完美的正义 fall short of perfect justice.
所以无论完美的正义是什么 So whatever perfect justice is,
它不存在于经验世界中 it's not one more thing in the empirical world.
但它却是我们可以构想的东西 It's something we can think about.
它是以不同程度参与到 It's something that things in the empirical world
经验世界中的各种事物 can participate in or partake of to varying degrees.
但是我们不应该把可能正义的现实事物 But we shouldn't confuse the physical things which can be just,
比如 多少有些 the people who can be virtuous
德行的人 to one degree or another,
同完美的德性或完美的正义相混淆 with perfect virtue or perfect justice.
那仅仅是心灵可以设想的东西 That's something that only the mind can think about,
而在现实的经验世界中 that we don't actually have in the world,
却是不可能存在的 the empirical world itself.
或者以圆为例 Or take being round.
心灵可以构想出完美的圆形 The mind can think about perfect circularity.
然而任何物体都不是完美的圆形 But no physical object is perfectly circular.
只存在相对的圆的东西 There are only things that are circular to a greater or lesser degree.
所以 通过思考这个问题 So, by thinking about it,
通过思考以上那些问题 by thinking about these kinds of issues,
我们可以知道 we can see that the mind
心灵可以一定程度上理解完美 has some kind of handle on these perfect,
我需要一个词 well, we need a word.
我说过 柏拉图给出了一个词 理念 And as I say, Plato gives us a word, "Ideas."
有时候翻作理念或型相 Sometimes it's translated as "Ideas" Or "Forms."
我们构想出的这些东西是样板 These things that we can think about that are the template,
至少是标准 or at least the standard,
或最起码它是 or maybe at the very least it's that
普通的事物能以不同程度参与的东西 which the ordinary humdrum things can participate in to varying degrees:
如 完美的正义 perfect justice,
正义本身 justice itself,
美本身 beauty itself,
善本身 goodness itself,
圆本身 circularity itself,
健康本身 health itself.
以上这些 All of these things are,
被当今的哲学家称作柏拉图式的型相 as philosophers nowadays call them, Platonic forms.
现实世界的普通物体 Ordinary material objects of this world
能够分有各种各样的型相 can partake of the various Platonic forms,
但不能把它们同型相混为一谈 but they should not be confused with the Platonic forms.
尽管在这个世界上无法遇到型相 But we still-- even though we don't bump into the Platonic
但是我们仍能去设想 forms in this world-- we can think about them.
我们的心灵多少能掌握一些 Our mind has a kind of grasp of them.
但问题在于 Of course, the problem is,
在这个普通寻常的世界上 we're distracted by the comings and goings,
来往喧嚣吸引了我们的注意力 the hurly burly of the ordinary everyday world.
我们无法对柏拉图式的型相有深入了解 And so we don't have a very good grasp of the Platonic forms.
我们可以去设想它们 We're able to think about them,
却无法集中注意力 but we're distracted.
哲学家试图要做的是 What the philosopher tries to do--
至少苏格拉底认为 this is Socrates' thought,
或是柏拉图借苏格拉底之口表达这个观点 or Plato's thought that he puts in Socrates' mouth--
哲学家的目的就是 what the philosopher tries to
把自己从肉体的干扰中解放出来 do is free himself from the distractions
比如对食物的欲望 that the body poses--the desire for food,
对性的渴望 the craving for sex,
对痛苦的担忧 being concerned about pain.
所有这些 All this stuff,
还有对享乐的追求 hungering after pleasure,
所有这些都妨碍人们思考柏拉图式的型相 all this stuff gets in the way of thinking about the Platonic forms.
所以 哲学家们 What the philosopher tries to do,
为了全神贯注于这些理想事物 then, so as to better focus on these ideal things,
就要忽略肉体 撇开肉体 is to disregard the body, put it aside,
尽可能地分离精神和肉体 separate his mind as much as possible from it.
苏格拉底曾说他一直都在做这种努力 That's what Socrates says he's been trying to do.
正因为如此 And so because of that,
他更好地理解了这些理想型相 he's got a better handle on these ideal forms.
而且 他认为 And then, he believes,
当死亡来临 when death comes and the final separation
当精神和肉体最终分离时 occurs of the mind and the body,
他的精神可以飞升 his mind gets to go up,
他的灵魂可以升至天界 his soul gets to go up to this heavenly realm.
当今的哲学家称之为 柏拉图的天堂 Philosophers nowadays call it "Plato's heaven."
他可以飞升至柏拉图的天堂 He gets to go up to Plato's heaven
在那里他可以更直接地 where he can have more direct
接触到型相 contact with these things, with the forms.
我现在没有时间 Now, I don't have the time here
来做更多的阐述以说明 to say enough to try and make it clear
为什么这个柏拉图式的形而上学观点 why this Platonic metaphysical view
不仅值得认真对待 is a view that not only is worth taking seriously,
而且直至今日 许多哲学家都认为 but to this day, many, many philosophers think that,
它的基本构架一定是正确的 at least in it's basic strokes, must be right.
不管怎样 先给你们举个例子 But let me at least give you one example
或许能帮你们稍作了解 that may give you a feel for it.
以数学为例 Think of math.
举些简单的数学论断 Think of some simple mathematical claim
如2 + 2 = 4 like 2 + 2 = 4.
当我们说2+2=4或2+3=5时 When we say that 2 + 2 = 4 or 2 + 3 = 5,
我们是在讨论心灵可以掌握的数字 we're saying something about numbers that our mind is able to grasp.
但究竟什么是数字呢 But what are numbers anyway?
它们当然不是实际的物体 They're certainly not physical objects.
你不会在某一天 It's not as though someday
打开一本国家地理时 you're going to open up an issue of National Geographic
发现上面会印着这样的封面故事 where the cover story's going to be "At long last,
探险家们终于发现了数字2 explorers have discovered the number two."
数字2不是 It's not as though the number two is something
你能看到或听到或尝到或遇到的东西 that you see or hear or taste or could bump into.
不管数字2是什么 Whatever the number two is,
它是心灵可以掌握的东西 it's something that our mind can grasp
而在物质世界中却不存在 but isn't actually in the physical world.
这是柏拉图式对数学的理解 That's the Platonic take on mathematics.
心灵可以去设想数字 There are numbers. The mind can think about them.
事物可以分有它们 Things can partake of them.
如果我拿起两张纸 If I were to hold up two pieces of paper,
便有这样一层含义 即 there's a sense in which
这两张纸分有了 二性 they are participating in "Twohood."
但显然 数字2并不在这里 But of course, this is not the number two here.
要是我把这些纸撕碎 If I were to rip these pieces of paper,
数字2并没有被我给损毁了 I wouldn't be destroying the number two.
因而 数字2 数字3 So the number two, the numbers, three,
不管它们是什么 whatever it is, whatever they are,
至少它们都是不存在于时空中的 are these Platonic abstract entities
柏拉图式的抽象实体 that don't exist in space and time.
尽管如此 Yet, for all that,
心灵都可以去构想他们 the mind can think about them.
这就是这种观点 That's the idea.
它并不愚蠢 And it's not a silly idea.
似乎对于数学的解释 It seems like a very compelling account of
这是一种很有说服力的说法 what's going on in mathematics.
数学家所做的就是用他们的心灵 What mathematicians are doing is using their mind
来思考那些数学的柏拉图理念 to think about these Platonic ideas of mathematics.
柏拉图认为 Except Plato's thought was,
任何事物都是这样 everything is like that.
不仅数学如此 It's not just math,
正义本身也是如此 but justice itself is like that.
世上有正义或非正义的事物 There are just or unjust things in the world.
心灵可以去设想它们 The mind can think about them,
但是正义本身 but justice itself--this perfect,
即完美的正义这个理念 this idea of being perfectly just--
它是可以用心灵去把握的 that's something the mind can think about,
尽管在现实世界里不存在 but it's not here in the world.
它是另一种抽象的柏拉图式的型相 It's another abstract Platonic form.
这就是整个构想 So that's the picture.
柏拉图的观点是 Plato's idea is that
如果我们对形而上学有充分的研究 if we start doing enough metaphysics,
就必能看到柏拉图式的 we can see there must be this
理念或是型相组成的世界 realm of Platonic ideas, Platonic forms.
同时看到我们能够用心灵 And we can see that we are able to grasp them
去掌握它们 through the mind.
这是身体做不到的 This can't be a job the body does,
因为身体仅有其肉体性的功能 不是吗 because the body's only got its bodily capacities, right?
它只能执行五官的功能 It's able to do the five-senses thing.
是灵魂在思考柏拉图式的型相 It's the soul that thinks about the Platonic forms.
给出了心灵能做什么这一设想之后 And as Plato's then going to go on to try to argue,
柏拉图想要进一步证明 given this picture of what the mind can do,
他认为他可以说服我们相信心灵 灵魂 he thinks he can persuade us that the mind, the soul,
不仅能在肉体死亡时幸免于难 not only survives the death of your body,
而且恒久不灭 but will last forever.
它是完美的 It's perfect.
它是非物质的 不会被毁灭 It's immaterial and can't be destroyed.
它是不朽的 It's immortal.
因而他给出一系列论证 So he offers a series of arguments
来证明这个结论 for that conclusion,
证明这个立场 for that position,
下节课开始 and starting next time,
我们将讨论这些论证 we'll work our way through those arguments.