上一讲最后 我们留下了一个令人有些困惑的情况 PROFESSOR: So we left ourselves at the end of the
上一讲最后 我们留下了一个令人有些困惑的情况 last lecture in a somewhat perplexing situation.
我们考虑了朱迪斯•汤姆森在电车论文中给出的各种情景 We had thought through the particular scenarios that Judith
我们考虑了朱迪斯•汤姆森在电车论文中给出的各种情景 Thomson presents us with in her trolley paper.
我们发现了全班反应令人费解的如下特性 And we had discovered the following apparently perplexing feature about the class's responses.
在经典旁观者的情况中 In what's called the Classic Bystander case--
旁观者站在飞速驶向5个人的电车旁 the case where there's a bystander standing next to a
旁观者站在飞速驶向5个人的电车旁 trolley that's hurtling down a track about to hit five people,
旁观者可以选择改变电车轨道 and the bystander could if he chose turn the trolley onto a track
让电车只撞向1人 where the trolley will only hit one person--
你们的反应是这样的 your responses were as follows.
大约15%的人认为道德要求改变电车方向 Roughly 15% of you thought he was morally required to turn
让其不撞向5人 而撞向1人 the trolley from the five to the one.
70%的人认为这样做是道德上允许的 70% of you thought he was morally permitted to do so.
只有15%的人认为 让电车不撞向5人 而撞向1人 是道德上禁止的 And only 15% of you thought that it's a morally prohibited
只有15%的人认为 让电车不撞向5人 而撞向1人 是道德上禁止的 act for him to turn the trolley from the five to the one.
与之对照 我们课上最后以汤姆森著名的胖子情况作结 By contrast, we ended class with Thomson's famous Fat Man case.
旁观者同之前情况一样站在电车旁 This is a case where our bystander is standing next to the trolley as before,
电车呼啸而至 将会撞死5个人 the trolley is hurtling down the track about to kill the five,
旁观者可以选择一种让电车停止的方式 and the bystander has available to him a means for stopping the trolley.
这里不是让电车改道 In this case, rather than turning it onto a different track,
而是将一个胖子推下桥去 the means he has available to him is to push a fat man off a bridge,
从而阻止电车继续前进 thereby stopping the trolley in its tracks.
这种情况中 你们的反应同之前情况相差非常大 And your responses in this case exhibited a highly
这种情况中 你们的反应同之前情况相差非常大 different distribution than they did in the first case.
第一种情况下 只有15%的人认为 Whereas in the first case, 15% of you thought it
让电车撞死1人以挽救5人是道德上禁止的 was prohibited to stop the trolley from hitting the five by killing the one
让电车撞死1人以挽救5人是道德上禁止的 or by causing the trolley to kill the one,
而在胖子情况中 有78%的人 in the Fat Man case, 78% of you--
全班接近4/5的人 4/5 of the class--
认为把1个人推到轨道上阻碍电车前进 thought that the act of turning or of stopping the trolley by putting in its
是道德上禁止的 way another person was morally prohibited.
上节课末你们就知道 这导致了什么困惑 Now the puzzle that this raises, as you know from the end of last class,
看起来 两种情况中都… is that it seems that in both the Bystander case
抱歉 困惑是这样的 where one-- sorry. The puzzle is this.
旁观者情况中 大多数人看来很明显 杀1人是坏的 In the Bystander case, it seems clear to most people that killing one person is bad,
但让5人死更坏 but that letting five die is worse.
而在胖子情况中 事情似乎反过来了 Whereas in the Fat Man case, it seems to be just the inverse.
汤姆森考虑了所有这些情况后 在论文最后提出了问题 So what Thomson asks us at the end of that paper, having run through a number of cases,
其中有些情况我现在还没有讲到 including some that I didn't go over in this summary right now,
她问 如何解释人们对旁观者情况和胖子情况中的反应差异 is what could possibly explain the difference in our reactions
她问 如何解释人们对旁观者情况和胖子情况中的反应差异 to the Bystander case and the Fat Man case?
她认为 虽然避免5个人死亡的效用更大 And what she suggests is that whereas utility prohibits letting the five die--
也就是说挽救生命越多越好 that is, it would be better for the number of lives saved
救5人比救1人好 if we saved five than if we saved one--
但权利的概念禁止胖子情况中杀死1人 the notion of a right is what prohibits killing the one in the Fat Man case.
所以汤姆森在胖子情况中认为 So what has to happen, says Thomson in the Fat Man case,
胖子有权不让自己作为挽救他人这一目的的手段 is that you interfere with his right not to have his person used as
而你侵犯了他的这一权利 a means to the end of saving another.
而在旁观者的情况下 没有权利被侵犯 Whereas in the case of Bystander, there's no right that is infringed upon.
汤姆森认为 权利大于效用 And, suggests Thomson, rights trump utilities.
因此 权利是胖子情况中道德禁止的原因 So what the right prohibits is what is mandated in the Fat Man case.
这就是上一讲最后我们所讲到的地方 So that's where we were at the end of class last time.
汤姆森提出的解决方案 And the solution that Thomson proposed there is what we
是一种经典的电车类困境解决方案 might call a classic solution to trolley-type dilemmas.
这种解决方案假设 It's a solution that assumes
胖子情况和旁观者情况具有不同道德强制性 that Fat Man case and the Bystander case carry different moral mandates,
具有这种不同道德强制性的原因在于 and that the reason they carry those different mandates is because
这些情况中所包含的深刻道德差异 of a deep moral difference that those cases encode.
我们对胖子情况和旁观者情况的不同反应 So the difference between our response to Fat Man and our response to Bystander,
应该得到尊重 这是汤姆森在1985年论文中所说的 says Thomson in that 1985 article, is one that we should respect.
她认为 我们应该尊重这种差异的原因在于 And the reason we should respect that difference, she contends,
这种差异体现了两者之间一种非常大的道德差异 is that that difference is tracking a profound moral difference between them,
也就是在胖子情况 而不在旁观者情况中 namely that in the case of Fat Man but not in the case of Bystander,
个人的权利受到了侵犯 the rights of an individual are violated.
今天的课上 我将分析 What I want to do in class today is to go through with
电车情况的三种非经典反应 you three non-classic responses to the trolley case.
我会让你们在第一种和第三种中使用点击器 And I'll be giving you the chance to use your clickers in the first and third of these.
请拿出点击器 So if you get your clickers out,
我们马上就会用到它 we'll be prepared for what's going to happen in a few minutes.
三种经典反应是哪些 So what are the three classic responses?
经典反应认为 胖子情况和旁观者情况具有不同道德强制性 Remember, in a classic response, the claim is that
经典反应认为 胖子情况和旁观者情况具有不同道德强制性 Fat Man and Bystander carry different moral mandates, and
这种差异能够归结于两者之间的更深层次道德差异 that that difference can be traced to a deeper, morally relevant difference between them.
我们今天要考虑的两种反应 So two of the responses that we'll consider today are ones
认为胖子情况和旁观者情况不具有道德强制性差异 that suggest that Fat Man and Bystander in fact don't carry different moral mandates.
我将要讲到的第一个例子 So the first example that I'm going to run through with you
来自朱迪斯•汤姆森在2008年论文中对电车问题的重新考虑 is Judith Thomson's rethinking of trolley cases in a 2008 paper
她将旁观者情况和胖子情况进行了同化 in which she ends up assimilating the Bystander case to the Fat Man case.
认为两种情况中 杀1人救5人都是不允许的 And suggesting that in neither of the cases is it permissible to kill the one to save the five.
我们要考虑的第二种观点来自约什•格林 The second view that we'll consider is Josh Greene's view
他认为胖子情况中正确的做法 that the right thing to do in the Fat Man case is the same
同旁观者情况中正确的做法相同 thing as the right thing to do in the Bystander case,
两种情况中 都应该让电车撞死1人挽救5人 namely that in both cases, the right thing to do is to stop the
两种情况中 都应该让电车撞死1人挽救5人 trolley from hitting the five and cause it instead to kill the one.
最后 其实这样列有点牵强 And finally-- I'm shoe-horning this a bit,
实际上 比起汤姆森 桑斯坦更赞同格林 because in truth, Sunstein is a little closer to Greene than he is to Thomson.
我们可能将使用他的观点来保持立场 But we might use his thinking to maintain the position that
虽然我们对于两种情况的反应不同 though our responses to the cases differ,
但两种情况在某种更根本的意义上相同 the cases are in some more fundamental sense the same.
桑斯坦认为 需要推下那个胖子 And what Sunstein is going to suggest we need to do is to push the fat man.
这里我们有三种观点 So what we have are three views here.
汤姆森认为情况是一样的 Thomson's saying the cases come together, and they come
我们都不应该杀1人来救5人 together in telling us never to kill the one to save the five.
格林也认为情况一样 Greene's saying the cases come together, and they come
我们总应该杀1人来救5人 together in telling us always kill the one to save the five.
然后 桑斯坦认为或许这两种情况不一样 And then, perhaps, Sunstein's view telling us that the cases come apart.
这三种非经典反应 But these 3 non-classic responses
有趣不仅是因为其内容各异 are interesting not just for the difference in their content,
还因为对于这门课而言 I think they're interesting for the purposes of this class
每种反应都为我们呈现了不同的论证方法 because each of them makes use of a slightly different kind of argumentative methodology.
方法和答案并不一定要按照这里所呈现的方式对应起来 And there's no reason that the methodologies and the answers
方法和答案并不一定要按照这里所呈现的方式对应起来 needed to line up in the way that they did.
今天课上我希望你们思考 So one of the things that I want you to think about as we go through today's lecture is what
如何使用这些方法作出不同的论述 use might be made of each of these methodologies to make one of the alternative arguments.
汤姆森认为 在旁观者的情况中我们不应该改变电车轨道 So Thomson's contention that in the Bystander case we shouldn't turn the trolley
她的论证基础是邀请你们 is one that she makes on the basis of inviting you--
就像我等下要做的那样 as I will do in a moment--
考虑另一种假设情况 to consider additional hypothetical cases, and then asking you
要求你们按照一贯反应考虑道德方式上并非不同的情况 to be consistent about your responses to cases that fail to differ in moral ways.
汤姆森的方法同1985年论文中一样 So Thomson's methodology is the same as it was in her 1985 paper,
只是换了一种新的情况 there's just a new case that she's thought about.
桑斯坦的方法是考虑大量 Sunstein's methodology is to canvas a large array of
启发式和偏差方面的文献 literature in the heuristics and biases tradition,
认为道德推理同其它类型推理没有不同 and to suggest that moral reasoning is no different than any other sort of reasoning.
约什•格林的方法则是使用神经成像结果 And Josh Greene's method is of course to make use of neuroimaging results
在此基础上论证 and on that basis to argue in favor of his view
道德上强制我们的是一种特定类型的效用主义立场 that what is morally mandated of us is a certain kind of utilitarian stance.
下面需要使用到点击器 So let's start-- and here you'll need your clickers--
考虑另一种假设情况 with the additional hypothetical cases
这让朱迪斯•汤姆森信服 可能也能让你们信服 that convinced Judith Thomson, and may convince you,
旁观者改变电车轨道是不可以的 that it's not OK to turn the trolley in Bystander.
汤姆森所给出的这种情况 So the case that Thomson presents us with is a case
可以称为旁观者三选项情况 that we'll call Bystander's Three Options.
可怜的吉姆再次卷入进来 很抱歉课上老是用他打比方 So here's poor Jim, deeply regretting that he ever enrolled in this class,
同普通旁观者困境一样 他正看着电车 standing by the trolley in a usual Bystander dilemma where the trolley is about to hit
朝5个人方向开去 他能够让其改道只撞1个人 the five and Jim has the possibility of deflecting it to hit the one.
但因为吉姆生活在朱迪斯•汤姆森的思想实验中 But because Jim lives his life in Judith Thomson's thought experiment,
汤姆森让他处于一种很尴尬的境地 she has, in rather dastardly fashion,
她引入了第三条轨道 introduced a third track at the end of which,
很不幸 吉姆自己就处在这条轨道末端 rather unfortunately for Jim, Jim is standing.
这就是吉姆的三向困境 Now here's Jim's three-way dilemma.
选项一 让电车继续按原路前进 撞死5个人 One, allow the trolley to continue on its original path killing the five.
选项二 改变电车轨道 让另1个人被撞死 Option two, deflect the trolley so that it hits the other guy.
选项三 改变电车轨道 还是让电车撞死1人 Option three, deflect the trolley from the five to the one--
只不过这个人是吉姆自己 oh, except the one is Jim.
问题 Question.
在三向旁观者的情况中 假设吉姆打算让电车改道 In three-way Bystander, if Jim decides to turn the trolley--
忽略他让电车撞向5人那种情况 so we're ignoring the case where he lets it hit the five--
他决定让电车改道 问题如下 he's made the decision to turn the trolley, the question is the following.
道德是要求他 Is it morally required for him
让电车转向撞死另一个人而不是他自己的方向 to turn the trolley onto the track where it hits the other guy instead of himself?
还是允许但不强制他 Is it morally permitted, but not morally required, for him
让电车转向撞死另一个人而不是他自己的方向 to turn the trolley onto the track where it hits the other guy instead of himself?
还是禁止他 让电车转向撞死另一个人而不是他自己的方向 Or is it morally prohibited for him to turn the trolley onto the track instead of to himself?
我们假设吉姆决定让电车改道 不撞死5人 So we're assuming that Jim has made the decision to turn the trolley from the five.
记得吧 在普通旁观者情况中 After all, it's a straight Bystander case.
如果他不改变电车轨道 电车将撞死5人 If he doesn't turn the trolley, it's going to hit the five.
全班78%的人告诉我说 78% of you have previously told me that what one
此时道德至少允许他改变电车方向 ought to do, or at least what one is permitted to do in this case, is to turn the trolley.
为什么这里没有反应 同学们 How come there's no responses coming, guys?
幻灯卡住了 我的天 It's not working? Oh, my goodness.
为什么没有开启呢 All right. So why is it not open for you?
试试 现在好了吗 Let's try. Is it open now?
没有 STUDENT: No.
悲剧 PROFESSOR: Tragic.
这真是糟透了 它竟然无法工作 This is really, really, very, very horrible. That did not work.
今天的整节课都取决于投票系统的正确工作 OK, the whole lecture today depends upon these working.
我再试试 So let's try this again.
告诉我 现在好了吗 And tell me now whether this works.
行了吗 Is it working?
好 现在呢 OK. Is it working now?
还没有吗 No? Still no?
还没有吗 No?
好 All right.
哼 我们现在需要运行… Hm. We're going to have to run--
我想我是没辙了 I think there's nothing I can do.
我准备重启一下 看能否正常工作 I'm going to try resetting once more and see if that works.
我打算去除并恢复这个接收器 And I'm going to try removing and then returning this receiver.
然后 如果还不行 我们就只能采用老式举手投票了 And then-- if not-- we're going to do the old-fashioned show of hands
我的漂亮幻灯片竟然不能用 and all my beautifully constructed slides will turn out not to be useful,
没关系 but that's all right.
这还不算最糟糕的事 Worse things have happened in the world.
好 再试试 All right. Try it again.
耶 太棒了 Yay! Awesome.
我不知道我做了什么 I have no idea what I changed.
好的 开始回答问题 OK. So, answering this question.
哇 有64个人 Wow. There's 64 of you.
71个人 There's 71 of you.
我来倒计时 We'll do the countdown.
10 9 8 10, 9, 8--
看看结果会如何 so let's see how the numbers come out in--
4 3 2 1秒 4, 3, 2, 1 seconds.
哦 太让人兴奋了 Oh, and it's so exciting.
特别是刚开始不能奏效 现在苦尽甘来 好 Especially because we had to suffer first. The contrast. OK.
这里 6%的人认为道德要求 So in this case, 6% of you think it's morally required
吉姆让电车改道撞向别人 for Jim to turn the trolley onto the other man.
这6%的人可能一直是离群者 也可能是不同人 But you were the 6% who continue to be outliers, or perhaps you're different people.
看看这里是什么情况 But let's look at what's going on.
61%认为道德允许他让电车改道撞向别人 61% of you think it's morally permitted for him to turn the trolley onto the other man.
32%的人认为道德禁止他 And 32% of you think it's morally prohibited for him to
让电车改道撞向别人 turn the trolley onto the other man.
有趣的是 朱迪斯•汤姆森预计更多人会选择这个 Now interestingly, Judith Thomson expects that more of you will fall into this category.
这个有趣问题我们可以好好思考下 So it's an interesting question for us to think about as a class
为什么她认为你们这样投票会让她觉得惊奇 why it is that she is under the impression that it's rather
为什么她认为你们这样投票会让她觉得惊奇 surprising that this is the response that you gave.
这姑且不谈 再来考虑一下第二种对照情况 But in any case, let's move to a second contrast case and see how this goes.
假设这里只有两个方向可供选择 OK. Suppose now that we have only a two-way case.
在两向情况中 旁观者吉姆只有两种选项 In the two-way case, bystander Jim has only two options.
要么电车撞死5人 Either the trolley is going to hit the five
或者他让电车改道撞死他自己 or he can deflect the trolley in such a way that it hits him.
我先回头记录一下刚才得到的数字 I want to go back for a second and just get the numbers that I got on the last slide,
我刚才忘记记录这些数字了 because I forgot to record those for myself, thrown off as I was by our situation.
记录一下 6% 61% 32% So let me just record these. 6%, 61%, 32%.
下面看新的情况 OK. So moving on to the new case.
这是两向情况 问题是这样的 It's a two-way trolley, and the question is this.
旁观者的两个选项中 In Bystander's Two Options,
道德是要求他让电车撞死5人而不是他自己 is it morally required for him to let the trolley hit the five instead of himself,
还是允许但不要求他让电车撞死5人而不是他自己 is it morally permitted for him to let the trolley hit the five instead of himself,
还是禁止他让电车撞死5人而不是他自己 or is it morally prohibited for him to let the trolley hit the five instead of himself?
考虑一下这个情况 OK? So let's think through that case.
记住 这是两向的 So remember, it's a two-way case.
电车正撞向5人 The trolley's heading down towards the five.
问题是 让电车撞死5人而不是他自己 And the question is: is it required, permitted, or
道德上是要求的 允许的 还是禁止的 prohibited for him to turn the trolley from the five to hit himself?
好 看看结果会是怎样 OK. And let's see how the numbers come out here.
再过十秒钟的时间 We've got roughly 10 seconds to find out whether your
就能看到这和之前分布有何异同 distribution is going to be similar or different here.
这是结果 8% 70% 22% OK, so here's how the numbers come out: 8%, 70%, 22%.
我想拿来同这个进行对比的 是经典旁观者情况 Now, the case with which we want to contrast this is the classic Bystander case.
经典旁观者情况和这里的情况相比 In the classic Bystander case, more of you thought he was morally required
更多人认为道德要求他让电车改道 to turn the trolley than you think in this particular case.
经典旁观者的情况中 很有趣 In the classic Bystander case, interestingly,
你们关于道德上是否允许具有大致相同的观点 you had roughly the same view about whether it was morally permitted.
而更多人认为道德禁止他 And more of you think it's morally prohibited for him to
让电车撞死5人而不是他自己 let the trolley hit the five instead of himself.
有趣的差别在这里 So the interesting difference is this one here.
道德是否要求他让电车改道 You took a different attitude with respect to whether it's
你们对于改道后是撞死他本人还是撞死别人两种情况持不同态度 morally required for him to turn the trolley when the
你们对于改道后是撞死他本人还是撞死别人两种情况持不同态度 person it's going to hit is himself than when the person it's going to hit is another person.
回头看一下经典旁观者情况 So let's go back and do just a classic Bystander case and see
看考虑过这种新情况后 whether, as a result of having thought through this case,
你们的直觉有没有变化 if there's any change in your intuitions.
这是你们最开始看到的标准旁观者情况 So this is just the standard Bystander case that you've seen before.
在经典两向旁观者情况中 In the classic two-way Bystander case,
你们认为道德强制 允许 还是禁止吉姆改变电车轨道 do you think it's morally mandatory, morally permitted, or morally
你们认为道德强制 允许 还是禁止吉姆改变电车轨道 prohibited for Jim to turn the trolley?
3 2 1 So we're 3, 2, 1.
看看结果如何 And let's see how the numbers come out.
20% 65% 15% 20%, 65%, 15%.
考虑了第一人称对比情况之后 So as a result of having thought about the first-person analogue,
虽然远没有我想的那么多人 但还是有人改变了观点 some-- though many fewer than I would have thought-- some of you changed your view.
最初 只有15%的人认为 道德强制改变电车轨道 Whereas originally, 15% of you thought it was morally mandatory to turn the trolley--
哦 你们改变观点的方向正好和我预计的相反 oh, you've changed your view exactly the direction against the one I would have predicted.
这有些神秘 So here's a mystery.
这是课堂上进行的小小的实验哲学 Here's a little bit of experimental philosophy done in our classroom.
朱迪斯•汤姆森预测… What Judith Thomson was predicting--
我们可以在讨论课讨论下为什么会这样 and we can talk in sections about why this didn't happen--
朱迪斯•汤姆森预测你们会像如下方式反应 what Judith Thomson was predicting is that you would react as follows.
如果道德不强制我改变电车轨道 让它撞死我 If it's not morally mandatory for me to turn the trolley onto myself,
那么道德也不强制 甚至不允许我 then it's not morally mandatory, indeed not morally permitted,
改变电车轨道 撞死另一个人 for me to turn the trolley onto another person.
如果我自己不愿意被撞死 If I'm not willing to take a hit myself in that case, I
我也不应该替他人决定撞死他人 shouldn't be deciding on behalf of another person that he take that hit.
我想让你们考虑一下 So I want you to think about
什么让汤姆森在考虑这种情况时 觉得很显然 what it is in Thomson's thinking about this case that made it feel to her so obvious
考虑到第一人称情况后 that as the result of considering the first-person case,
人们会倾向于重新考虑第三人称情况 people would be inclined to rethink the third-person case.
老实说 我本人在阅读了2008年汤姆森的论文后 And I have to say, I myself in reading Thomson's 2008 paper
很容易就被引入了她所描述的心理状态 am very easily brought into the mindset she describes there.
这里看到你们的反应完全相反 让我觉得很惊奇 很有趣 So I find it surprising and extremely interesting to see
这里看到你们的反应完全相反 让我觉得很惊奇 很有趣 that that isn't what happened in this context.
不过 至少有一部分人认为 Let's assume, however, that at least for some of you, the
在考虑新情况后的直觉 intuition that you came to have as the result of considering this case
同汤姆森的直觉类似 was something like Thomson's intuition.
老的旁观者情况中 So that whereas on the old view in Bystander case, you
你们认为正确做法是杀1人 而不是让5人死 thought the right thing was to kill the one rather than to let the five die--
这是标准的旁观者情况 大多数人都是这么想的 that is, in the standard switch case, and this is in fact what most of you think--
标准旁观者情况中 大多数人都认为正确的做法 in the standard Bystander case, most of you think that the right thing to do
是杀1人 而不是让5人死 is to kill the one rather than to let the five die.
汤姆森说 考虑过第一人称情况后 What Thomson says is that in thinking through the first-person case,
你应该会意识到 旁观者情况比最开始你认为的更类似于胖子情况 you ought to realize that Bystander is a lot more like Fat Man than you initially thought.
你们的投票结果否决了汤姆森的直觉 To the extent that you reject that intuition of Thomson's,
你们不赞同她的观点 you're in a position to disagree with her.
下面 我们看一下你们大多数人赞同的观点 So let's move to the view with which I take it most of you are going to end up agreeing,
这同汤姆森观点相反 since this is exactly the opposite of Thomson's,
也就是格林的论断 认为同化是反向的 namely Greene's argument that the assimilation ought to go the other way.
回顾一下我们处在什么情况 So just to remind you where we are in the picture,
最开始的困惑在于 人们对旁观者情况和胖子情况的反应不同 the puzzle with which we began is that people were giving a different
最开始的困惑在于 人们对旁观者情况和胖子情况的反应不同 response in Bystander than in Fat Man,
而汤姆森试图通过同化两种情况来清除这种困惑 and Thomson tried to get rid of the problem
而汤姆森试图通过同化两种情况来清除这种困惑 by causing you to assimilate Bystander to Fat Man.
我无法让你们按照汤姆森说的那样改变直觉 I was unable through Thomson's cases to get you to shift your intuitions in that case.
你们的反应中 仍然存在残留的差异 So we're stuck with a residual difference between your responses.
大多数人认为 旁观者改变电车轨道是可行的 Most of you think it's OK to turn the trolley in Bystander
而不管你愿不愿意对自己这样做 regardless of whether you wouldn't do it on yourself,
但将胖子推下桥则是不可以的 but that it's not OK to push the man on the bridge in Fat Man.
格林为我们提供了第二种思考 So Greene's going to give us a second way of thinking about
如何让这两种反应一致的方式 how it is that we might bring those responses together.
他的论述如下 And his argument runs as follows.
总体而言 我们无法很好地确定 In general, we're not in a very good position to determine
我们的推理之下到底是什么 what really underlies our reasoning.
我在课程早期讲过 社会心理学中有一整个领域 There's an entire tradition in social psychology that I talked about in one of the early lectures
目标就是证明人们在做决定时所做的 that aims to show that a lot of what people engage in when they make decisions
是直觉反应之后的事后理性化 is post-facto rationalization of intuitive responses that they had
这其实说明不了情况中同道德相关的实际特性 which weren't in fact tracking what they would say are the relevant features of the situation.
著名地 人们更容易选择 So famously, people are more likely to choose an object
视觉序列左手边放置的物体 that lies on the left-hand side of a visual array than an
而不是视觉序列右手边的物体 object that lies on the right-hand side of that visual array.
在进行选择后 他们不认为这是物体位置使然 But in making the choice, they don't provide as their reason the location of the object,
而是将此归因于物体呈现出某种特殊性质 they provide as their reason some other feature of the object.
我们在第二讲时考虑了"虚构"的结果 And when we looked at, in the second lecture, the confabulation results,
当时我们讨论了胼胝体被切开的裂脑人 whereby subjects who had undergone commissurotomy--
当时我们讨论了胼胝体被切开的裂脑人 that is, whose corpus callosum had been severed--
这些人的左右脑无法相互通信 so that the right and left hemispheres of their brains weren't in communication,
我们发现 we discovered that when they
当他们根据右脑刺激进行行为后 performed an act that was based on stimulation of the right brain,
负责语言的左脑 the left brain, which is the linguistic part,
"虚构"他们这样进行选择的解释 came up with an explanation for what they were doing that
这明显不是实际行为的真正原因 was obviously not the real source of their behavior.
格林指出 很多情况下 So there are many cases, Greene points out,
我们的动机对我们很模糊 where our motivations are opaque to us.
我们认为自己是对某物进行反应 Where we think we're responding to one thing, but
实际上 我们是对其它事物进行的反应 in fact we're responding to something else.
格林认为 我们对 One of those cases, says Greene,
胖子情况和旁观者情况的反应差异 也属于这类 is the difference in our response to the Fat Man case and to the Bystander case.
在旁观者的情况中 So what happens in the Bystander case--
我们试图确定是否让电车改道不撞死5人 而撞死1人 where we're trying to decide whether to shift the trolley from the five to the one--
这时 我们的理性处理系统处于活跃状态 is that our rational processing system gets activated.
然而格林假设说 一会我会给出证据 Whereas what happens, hypothesizes Greene-- and we'll give some evidence in a minute--
胖子情况中 我们的情感处理系统处于活跃状态 what happens in the Fat Man case is that our emotional processing system gets activated.
然后格林说 And says Greene,
对于理性系统和情感系统之间的选择 given the choice between our rational system and our emotional system,
理性系统输出结果才是我们应该信任的 the rational system is the one whose outputs we ought to trust.
因此 格林说 道德正确的做法是推下胖子 So says Greene, the morally right thing to do in this case is to push the fat man.
注意 这是一个多步论证 Notice that this is a multi-step argument,
其中有些前提比其它争议要大得多 some of whose premises are a good deal more controversial than others.
我们的动机对我们模糊这一前提 So the premise that our motivations are often opaque to us is
几乎没有人提出异议 completely undisputed by everyone.
毫无疑问 There's no question that often
我们很多时候都没意识到 是什么让我们产生特定反应 we aren't aware of what's causing us to respond in a particular way.
我可能由于脚是湿的而非常易怒 I may be particularly irritable because my feet are wet,
但我可能没意识到我对你们的暴躁反应 and unaware of the fact that the reason that I'm responding to you in a short-tempered way
不是因为你们很恼人 而是因为我自己的脚不舒服 is not because you are particularly irritating, but because my feet are uncomfortable.
这个现象是不可否认的 This phenomenon is undeniable.
这两种情况中的不同反应作何解释 The question of whether what actually explains our different responses in these two cases
是一个有趣的实证问题 is an interesting empirical question.
过去十年左右的时间里我们所收集的 And there has been collected over the last decade or so
一些很有趣的神经成像数据显示 some pretty interesting neuroimaging data suggesting
两种情况下具有系统性的脑活动差异 that there are systematic activation differences in what
人们对情景给出效用主义反应时 goes on when people give utilitarian responses to cases
和人们给出义务论反应 比如包含权利概念时 and what goes on when people give responses to cases that
和人们给出义务论反应 比如包含权利概念时 seem to involve the sorts of notions to which deontologists appeal.
脑活动差异很大 Notions like rights.
然后还有来自其它研究的一定量证据显示出 And there is a certain amount of additional evidence coming from other research
两种情况下脑活动存在差异 that the areas that are differentially activated in those two cases
一种对应理性处理的脑区域 correspond on the one hand with what is often thought of as a rational processing
一种对应理性处理的脑区域 system-- a calculative processing system--
另一种则对应情感处理的脑区域 whereas in the other, they correspond with areas of the brain
另一种则对应情感处理的脑区域 that have been in independent cases implicated in emotional processing.
第一个前提没有争议 So the first premise is uncontroversial.
第二个前提也得到了良好的支撑 The second premise is reasonably well-supported.
关于数据存在争议 There's controversy about the data,
但存在很好的科学证据证明 but there is scientific evidence for which there's a good argument to be made that
情况如我们这里所写 what it shows is roughly what's written here.
争议性问题在于 就算前两个前提是正确的 The controversial question is whether even if the first two premises are true,
第三个规范性前提是否正确 the third normative premise is true.
如果我们对胖子情况的反应是由情感引起 Is it the case that if our responses to Fat Man are triggered by emotion,
而对旁观者情况的反应由理性系统引起 whereas our responses to Bystander are triggered by the rational system,
我们是否应该服从理性系统 is it the case that we ought to go with the rational system?
这是规范性论断 而不是实证性前提 That is a normative claim, not an empirical one.
就算如我等下将论证的那样 And even if the arguments that we're going to consider in a minute
第二条前提是正确的 successfully establish the truth of the second premise,
我们仍然没有关于第三条论断正确的有力依据 we don't yet have the truth of the third premise thereby established.
下面讨论格林所发现的支持第二条前提的证据 So let's talk about evidence that Greene has found in favor of the premise
即胖子情况下是情感反应 that what goes on in cases like Fat Man is an emotional response,
而经典旁观者情况下是理性反应 whereas what goes on in cases like classic Bystander is a rational response.
格林在过去十年左右时间 So Greene has for the last decade or so
让人们到fMRI仪器中扫描 跟踪他们的脑内血流状况 put people into fMRI machines--
让人们到fMRI仪器中扫描 跟踪他们的脑内血流状况 into scanners which track where blood is flowing in the brain--
这些人在扫描仪中 被问及三种困境 and presented them in the scanners with three kinds of dilemmas.
第一类困境 他称为"道德/亲身"困境 The first kind of dilemma are dilemmas that he calls moral/personal dilemmas.
比如胖子情况的那种困境 These are dilemmas like Fat Man where you're being asked
是否将胖子推下桥 whether you want to push the fat man off the bridge.
再比如我讲的医生情况 Dilemmas like the doctor case, which I presented, where we're
是否肢解1个健康人救其他人性命 considering whether to cut up a healthy patient to save the lives of others.
再比如救生艇情况 Dilemmas like a lifeboat case
救生艇上没有足够的食物和水 where there's not enough food and water to go around on the lifeboat and you're
考虑是否将一个人扔到水里 considering whether to throw off one of the people on the lifeboat
让剩下的人有足够的食物和水 so as to leave enough food and water to go around for the remaining subjects.
这是他让研究对象在扫描仪中考虑的第一类情况 So that's the first class of cases that he has subjects consider in the scanner.
他让研究对象在扫描仪中考虑的第二类情况 The second class of cases that he has people consider in the scanner
他称为"道德/非亲身"情况 are what he calls moral and impersonal cases.
比如改道装置旁的旁观者所面对的道德困境 So these are cases like Bystander at the switch where you're facing a moral dilemma,
旁观者没有近距离亲身的涉入 but not one where you are imagining, in an up-close and personal way,
不会对邻近的特定个人造成特定伤害 causing particular harm to a particular individual who's in your proximity.
这类情况还包括 捡了钱包是否应该归还 Cases like ones where you've found a lost wallet and you need to decide whether to return it.
某政策对他人具有影响但对你影响不大 而你参与政策的投票 Cases where you're voting on a policy that will have certain kinds of effects on people,
某政策对他人具有影响但对你影响不大 而你参与政策的投票 but where those effects are relatively remote from you.
最后 他让研究对象考虑"非道德"困境 And finally, he presents people with what he calls non-moral dilemmas.
比如 如果我要从克利夫兰到芝加哥 Questions like, if I'm trying to get from Cleveland to Chicago,
我是应该选择巴士 火车还是飞机 should I take the bus or the train or a plane?
或者 我应该使用哪种网络赠券来节省运费 Or if I'm trying to decide which coupon to use on the internet to save on shipping,
或者 我应该使用哪种网络赠券来节省运费 should I do this or that?
这些情况具有相同类型的物体 对吧 Cases that involve the same kinds of objects, right?
胖子情况包括火车 巴士或火车也包含火车 Fat Man involves trains. Bus versus train involves trains.
赠券使用情况中 你可以用赠券购买船 We might have a coupon-use case where you're using the coupon to buy a boat.
救生艇情况也包含船 Lifeboat involves a boat.
他让研究对象到扫描仪中 向他们问及这些情况 So he has the subjects in the scanner and they're presented with these sorts of cases.
注意 这里我给出了颜色图例 黑 灰 白 And you'll notice that I've put a little color-coded box here of black, grey, and white.
这是格林在2001年论文中所发现的 What Greene discovered in the 2001 paper--
这里有些数据之后又被重新分析过 and let me say some of these data have since been re-analyzed,
某些细节可能不再成立 但大多数都成立 so some of the details haven't held up, but many of them have--
他发现 如果相信主流的脑区域理论… 脑区域列出在这里 what he discovered is that if one believes, as many do, that the brain areas listed here--
脑区域如额内侧回 brain areas like medial frontal gyrus,
角回 后扣带回 and angular gyrus, and posterior cingulate gyrus--
如果相信这些区域同情感相关 if one believes that those are areas associated with emotion,
那么我们有很好的证据相信 道德/亲身情况中 then we have good evidence that in the moral/personal cases,
情感相关的脑区域处于活跃状态 the areas of the brain associated with emotion are activated.
而在道德/非亲身情况和非道德情况中 并非如此 Whereas in the moral/impersonal and non-moral cases that doesn't occur.
相反 By contrast,
活跃的是传统理论认为同理性相关的区域 it looks like a bunch of areas that are traditionally associated with working memory--
顶叶 额中回 parietal lobe, middle frontal gyrus--
这些在非亲身情况和非道德情况时 比亲身情况时更活跃 are more active in the impersonal case and the non-moral case
这些在非亲身情况和非道德情况时 比亲身情况时更活跃 than they are in the personal case.
这是格林2001年论文中著名的图像 后来被不断引用 And here's the famous image from Greene's 2001 paper reproduced in many papers since
图中显示 脑的各区域显示出不同反应 that shows the brain areas that exhibit differential response in the
道德/亲身情况同其它情况非常不同 moral/personal cases as contrasted with the other cases.
看起来似乎存在一些决定性的证据 So it looks like there is some, perhaps decisive, evidence
支撑格林的第二条前提 in favor of Greene's second premise.
即道德/亲身情况时处于活跃的是情感相关的脑部分 In favor of the premise that what goes on in moral/personal cases
即道德/亲身情况时处于活跃的是情感相关的脑部分 is an activation of the part of the brain associated with emotion,
而在旁观者这样的情况中 whereas what goes on in cases like Bystander
处于活跃的是理性及其它控制性更强过程相关的脑部分 is an activation of the part of the brain associated with reasoning
处于活跃的是理性及其它控制性更强过程相关的脑部分 and other sorts of more-controlled processes.
而且 格林说 还有很多很多行为学证据 Moreover says Greene, there's lots and lots of behavioral evidence
支撑这一假设 that supports the hypothesis
即当我们对假设性道德困境作出反应时 that one of the things that goes on when we respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas
我们所跟踪的并不是情况中同道德相关的特性 is that we track features of the case that are not morally relevant.
比如 这是2000年代早期的一份研究 So for example, there's a study from the early 2000s by
由行为经济学者斯莫尔和勒文施泰因完成 behavioral economists Small and Loewenstein
他们发现了一个非常显著的现象 that points out that in a very profound sense,
即可辨认受害者 identifiable victims
比不可辨认受害者 会对我们情感反应产生更强烈的影响 produce in us more powerful emotional responses than non-identifiable victims.
这不同于你的乐施会捐款所给到的小孩的照片 And this isn't just the difference between a picture of the child to whom your Oxfam
同你的乐施会捐款所给到的小孩的简述之间的区别 donations will go versus a description of the child to whom your Oxfam donations will go.
如下两种条件下人们的意愿存在非常大的差异 There is in fact a strikingly large difference between people's willingness
研究对象将自己在游戏中赢得的奖励更多地给"4号" to give some of their rewards in a game in a laboratory to person number four--
他们先从帽子里抽取一个名字知道这个人是"4号" right, so they draw a name from a hat and it says person number four--
而先决定给多少钱 然后再抽出号码 决定钱给到哪个人 than in cases where they're told, decide how much money you want to give to the person
研究对象给的钱明显更少 whose number you're about to draw from the hat.
两种条件下 研究对象都不知道"4号"是谁 In neither of these instances do they know who person number four is going to be.
但第一种条件下 研究对象先从帽子中抓阄 But the fact that in the first case, the person they draw from the hat
得知"4号"是谁 然后他们想 哦 and it says person number four, and they think, oh,
我要给这么多钱给这个人 I'll give this amount of my proceeds to the person.
而第二种条件下 他们先决定给多少钱 Whereas in the second case, they decide what amount of proceeds they want to give
然后再抓阄 知道把钱给谁 to the person whose number they are about to draw.
这在研究对象中得到了持续显著的反应差异 The fact that that produces in subjects consistently different responses
这让格林 或许也让你们很多人认为 suggests to Greene, and perhaps to others of you,
也许通过我们对这类情况的直观反应来构建道德理论 that perhaps using our intuitions about these sorts of cases to build our moral theories
并不是最好的方法 may not be the best way to proceed,
毕竟很少有人会认为 since presumably there are few of you who think that there is a relevant moral difference
先知道"4号"是谁然后再决定给多少钱 between whether you know the number of the person to whom you're going to be giving the gift
同先决定给多少钱再知道给谁 两者之间存在本质差别 or whether you're about to find out the number
同先决定给多少钱再知道给谁 两者之间存在本质差别 of the person to whom you're going to be giving the gift.
这是影响我们对不同情况道德反应的又一事物 Here's something else that appears to affect our moral responses to cases.
如果你要决定给某人多少惩罚… If you're deciding how much punishment you want to give somebody--
这是乔纳森•海特的研究 this is work done by Jon Haidt,
《幸福假设》的作者之一 author of The Happiness Hypothesis, with various collaborators.
如果你要决定给某人多少惩罚 If you're deciding how much punishment to give somebody--
如果你要决定某行为有多错误… if you're deciding how wrong an act was--
如果你感到反感 if you have been induced to feel disgust,
可能是因为坐在脏桌子前 either by sitting at a dirty table
可能是在催眠暗示中同特定反感的字眼关联在一起 or by having been trained to associate certain terms with disgust through a hypnotic suggestion,
你会对做错事的人进行更严厉的惩罚 you will be harsher in punishing people for their misdeeds.
你们大多数人肯定会认为 仅仅因为坐在脏桌子前 Now, I take it that most of you don't think people deserve harsher punishment
仅仅因为你感到反感 他人不应该受到更严的惩罚 when you are feeling disgust because the table in front of you is dirty.
一般人都会认为 别人行为的好坏 I take it you think that how bad an act is that somebody else has done
同你个人感觉的好坏是没有关系的 is independent of your feelings of disgust.
但问罪的时候 这个感觉似乎影响很大 But it looks like one of the things that condemnation tracks is that feeling.
等下 我就会讲到 这个概念 And in a minute, I'll talk about how that connects to
如何同桑斯坦关于启发式的一般讨论联系起来 Sunstein's more general discussion of heuristics.
最后 耶鲁博士大卫•皮萨罗的研究显示 Finally, some work by David Pizarro, a Yale PhD, suggest
在特定电车情况中 that in specific trolley cases,
比如在胖子情况中 我们可以让人们的直觉产生变化 we can get people's intuitions to move around in cases like Fat Man just by
只需要调节某些一般被认为同道德无关的情况特性就能实现 varying what most people would say are morally irrelevant features of the situation.
特别地 皮萨罗让人们考虑2种不同版本的胖子情况 In particular, Pizarro presents subjects with 2 different versions of the Fat Man case.
第一种情况 你被问及 道德是否允许 要求 或禁止 In the first, you're asked whether it is morally permitted, required, or prohibited,
将一个叫泰隆•佩顿的胖子推下桥 to push a man named Tyrone Peyton off the bridge
来救100位纽约爱乐交响乐团成员 in order to save 100 members of the New York Philharmonic.
第二种情况中 你被问及 道德是否能接受 And in the second, you're asked whether it's morally acceptable
将一个叫奇普•埃尔斯沃斯三世的胖子推下桥 to push a man named Chip Ellsworth III off the bridge
来救100位黑人爵士乐团成员 to save 100 members of the Harlem Jazz Orchestra.
问题也就是 So the question is
将白人推下桥 救100个非洲裔黑人 whether pushing a white man off the bridge to save 100 people of African descent
或将黑人推下桥 救100个欧洲裔白人 or pushing a black man off the bridge to save 100 people of European descent
是否会导致不同反应 should produce different responses.
很有趣 And interestingly--
也许是由于一些自我校正因素 perhaps as the result of a certain kind of self-correction--
自由主义者认为 将泰隆•佩顿推下桥道德上更难以接受 liberals say it is less morally acceptable to push Tyrone Peyton off the bridge
比起将奇普•埃尔斯沃斯推下桥 than to produce Chip Ellsworth.
不管结果朝哪个方向偏斜 Regardless of which direction the numbers come out,
关键在于结果偏斜了 what's interesting is the numbers come out differently, tracking
体现出大多数人不会认为具有道德关联的特性 a feature which most of us would think isn't a morally relevant feature.
这似乎强化了格林的第二条前提 So it looks like strengthening Greene's second premise--
这个论点他在论文中讲得更细 and this is an argument that he makes in more detail in a paper,
假期后 我们会读到相关选段 from which we'll read excerpts after the break,
论文叫《康德灵魂的神秘玩笑》 called "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul"--
似乎有很好的理由相信 it looks like there's pretty good reason to think
至少我们对这些情况的某些反应 at least some of our responses to these cases
体现了我们理性上不会认可的特性 are tracking features which we wouldn't reflectively endorse.
格林认为 特别地 在胖子情况中 And Greene thinks in particular in Fat Man,
我们不情愿将胖子推下桥 our reluctance to push the fat man off the bridge
就体现了某个道德无关特性 is tracking one of those morally irrelevant features.
格林认为 义务论判断 Deontological judgments, says Greene--
对采取效用主义行动的不情愿 those where we're unwilling to make the utilitarian move--
是由情感反应所驱动的 deontological judgments, says Greene, are driven by emotional responses.
结果主义判断由认知反应所驱动 Consequentialist judgments are driven by cognitive ones.
他认为 义务论反应缺乏道德意义 And the deontological responses, he says, lack moral significance.
实际上 义务论本身是一种道德虚构 In fact, deontology itself is a kind of moral confabulation.
我会让康德在这一讲中最后发一次言 I'm going to give Kant the last word in this lecture.
崇敬这位哥尼斯堡贤哲的人有福了 So those of you who are crying for the sage of Konigsberg,
今天我还会给他最后一次发言机会 realize that he will get the very last word in today's
还会给他一个漂亮的面部特写 lecture complete with a beautiful image of his face.
但这之前 这一讲最后10分钟我打算用来 But before I do that I want to spend the final 10 substantive minutes of the lecture
讲今天我们要考虑的第三篇论文 talking you through the third article which we are considering for today,
也就是凯斯•桑斯坦的论文 namely Cass Sunstein's article.
桑斯坦 在某些方面类似于格林 So Sunstein, in somewhat similar vein to Greene,
只是采用了稍微不同的文献 though drawing on a slightly different literature,
他认为我们道德推理的大部分 argues that a good portion of our moral reasoning
同我们常规推理的运行方式完全相同 operates in exactly the same way that our regular reasoning does,
也就是使用启发式 namely by making use of heuristics,
1月20日讲双重处理时我讲过 which we know about from the lecture on January 20 on dual processing.
启发式是一种快速简单的工具 Heuristics are fast and frugal tools for dealing with the
用以在处理复杂世界中时间敏感 决策制定的任务 complexity of the world when we're faced with time-sensitive, decision-making tasks.
启发式的工作方式非常巧妙 And the way that heuristics work is really smart.
这种工作方式通过"属性替代"来实现 They work by means of something called attribute substitution.
我们对某目标属性感兴趣 We're interested in a target attribute--
这在现实世界中较难弄清 something that's relatively hard to find out about the world.
于是我们将注意力集中于替代的启发式属性 And we focus our attention instead on a heuristic attribute--
这在现实世界中较容易弄清 something that's relatively easy to find out about the world.
比如 你们在辨别自己电话和其他人电话时 会用到这个 So some of you may make use of this when you're trying to
比如 你们在辨别自己电话和其他人电话时 会用到这个 distinguish your telephone from other people's telephones.
你所感兴趣的目标属性是 这是不是我的电话 The target attribute-- the thing you're really interested in is-- is this my phone?
要确定真实情况 Something which you're only going to be able to determine
你需要打开电话 by turning on the phone and looking to see whether the
翻看里面的号码是不是你的 numbers in it are the numbers that you've placed into it, let's say.
但为了让生活更简单 你会在电话上安一个壳子 But you might make your life easy by putting a cover on your phone
或者贴一个标签 或弄一些其它表面特性 or a sticker on your phone or some surface feature on your phone
从而让你自己能够快速确认哪个是你的电话 that will let you find your phone quickly and well. Right?
你会利用一个易于找到的属性 So you're going to make use of an easy to find attribute
而不是一个难于确定的属性 rather than a difficult to determine attribute.
一般而言 这是应对世界的非常好的方式 In general, this is an extraordinarily good way to navigate the world.
目标和启发式属性一般能够吻合 Target and heuristic attributes generally coincide.
启发式就是这样 被用作目标的标签 That's how the heuristic attributes came to be the ones
启发式就是这样 被用作目标的标签 which you're using as the markers of the target.
处理世界的表面特性更容易实现 And it takes much less effort to process surface features of the world
你不用逐个仔细分析 每个你想弄清的事物的细节 than to spend your time working through the details
你不用逐个仔细分析 每个你想弄清的事物的细节 of each of the things that you want to make sense of.
我发现 我早上就利用了一种目标属性来学校 So I observed myself this morning making use of a target attribute on my way into school.
我停在红绿灯前 I was stopped at a stoplight,
我用眼睛余光看到旁边的车开始发动 and I noticed out of the corner of my eye that the car next to me had started to move.
显然 我所感兴趣的属性是 Now obviously, the attribute in which I was interested in
红灯有没有变成绿灯 was whether the light had turned green.
但因为我的位置看不清红绿灯 But because I couldn't quite see the green light from where I was sitting,
我只能使用旁边车辆的移动 I was able to use instead the motion of the car next to me
作为我所关心事物的指示物 as an indicator of the thing that I was concerned with.
当然 这里启发式有可能出错 Now of course, the heuristic could have misfired in this case.
仍然是红灯时 旁边的车仍然有可能移动 It could have been that that car was moving even though the light was still red.
移动的可能是左车道的车 It could have been that that car was moving in the left lane
有一个特殊灯指示其移动 and had a special light that I didn't.
但多数情况下 我们一直利用启发式 这帮助很大 But for the most part, we make use of heuristics all the time and they help us.
桑斯坦认为在非道德情况下 人们通常使用启发式 Now Sunstein's argument is that in non-moral cases, people often use heuristics.
启发式虽然有用 但也可能导致错误 That though these are useful, they may also lead to errors.
道德情况下 人们通常也使用启发式 And that in moral cases, people often use heuristics as well.
不过同非道德情况下可能导致错误一样 But just as they may lead to errors in the non-moral cases,
道德情况下也可能导致错误 so too may they lead to errors in the moral cases.
特别地 他举出了一些例子进行讨论 And in particular, he thinks they do in a number of cases that he goes on to discuss.
我意识到 这堂课快结束了 And I realize, I think we're going to close--
我说康德还有最后发言机会的 看来只能留到周四了 I said Kant would get the last word, but Kant's going to get the last word on Thursday.
我们先来分析桑斯坦的论断和例子 然后再讲康德 We're going to go through Sunstein and one of the examples, and then we'll get to Kant.
比如 桑斯坦指出 So Sunstein points out, for example,
存在一种启发式叫可得性启发式 that there's a heuristic called the availability heuristic.
这种启发式说 看 我正要弄清某事物发生的可能性 That's a heuristic that says, look, I'm trying to figure out how likely something is to happen,
这是确定某事物发生可能性的好办法 and here's a good way to determine how likely something is to happen.
我考虑这种事物确实发生的情况有多少 这很容易 I think about how easy it is for me to think of cases where that did happen.
比如担心小孩被绑架这一事件时 我可以这样想 So whenever I'm worried that my children are going to be kidnapped, I think for myself,
我有多少朋友的小孩被绑架过 how many friends do I know whose children were kidnapped?
我有多少认识的人 小孩被绑架过 How many people do I know whose children were kidnapped?
当我发现答案是没有 我就放松了 And when I discover that the answer is none, I relax.
这种启发式通常是正确的 但也可能让人误入歧途 This kind of heuristic is often correct, but it can lead us astray.
比如 假设你被问及 Suppose, for example, you're asked whether it's
英语中单词以ing结尾的单词更多 more likely whether there are more words in the English language that end in I-N-G
还是倒数第二个字母是n的单词更多 or more words in the English language whose second-to-last letter is N.
以ing结尾还是倒数第二个字母是n的单词更多 More words that end in I-N-G or more words whose second-to-last letter is N?
很容易认为答案是ing结尾的词 It's much easier to think of words that end with I-N-G,
人们倾向于说 and so people tend to say that
以ing结尾的单词比倒数第二个字母是n的单词多 there are more words ending in I-N-G than words whose second-to-last letter is N.
但是 每个ing结尾的单词 倒数第二个字母都是n But of course, every word that ends with I-N-G is a word whose second-to-last letter is N.
人会被可得性启发式所愚弄 You've been bamboozled by the availability heuristic.
假设你使用一种所谓的"代表性启发式" Or suppose you make use of what's sometimes called the representative heuristic.
某事物发生的概率体现了它的典型性程度 That the probability of something occurring tracks its degree of typicality.
这通常也是正确的 This too is often correct.
典型实例是发生更加频繁的实例 What it is to be a typical instance is to be one of the instances that occurs more frequently.
但你们知道银行柜员琳达的情况 But as you know from the Linda the bank teller case
或有拖拉机的农民的情况 or the farmer with a tractor case,
如果我问你们 爱荷华的随便一个居民 if I ask you of our random resident of Iowa
此人更可能是农民 还是有拖拉机的农民 whether it's more likely that that resident is a farmer or a farmer with a tractor,
代表性启发式会让你倾向于说 the representative heuristic is going to draw you towards saying that it's
更可能是有拖拉机的农民 more likely that the person is a farmer with a tractor.
但显然 每个有拖拉机的农民都是农民 But obviously, every farmer with a tractor is also a farmer.
记住 桑斯坦对两种情况的论述很容易作出 Now remember that Sunstein's arguments for one and two are easy to make
因为我们有独立方式确定 because we have an independent way of determining
某人是否在情况中犯了错误 whether somebody has made an error in those cases.
我们能够看出 可得性启发式和代表性启发式中出了什么错 We can see what went wrong in the availability heuristic and in the representative heuristic,
因为我们能了解到 because we can see that
倒数第二个字母是n的单词确实 it is in fact more likely that the second-to-last letter of a word is N
比最后三个字母是ing的单词多 than it is that the last three letters of the word are I-N-G.
我们能了解到 是农民的可能性 We can see that it's more likely that somebody's a farmer
比是有拖拉机的农民的可能性要高 than it is that somebody's a farmer with a tractor.
因为两种情况中 后者都是前者的特例 Because in both of those cases, one of them is a special instance of the other.
桑斯坦对道德启发式的论述则有更多步 Sunstein's argument for moral heuristics is going to take more steps.
因为这还不足以证明我们所要建立的事物 Because it's not enough for him to show what we'll establish--
道德情况下 人们通常使用启发式 that in moral cases, people often use heuristics--
他还需要证明用启发式时 人们会犯错 he's also going to need to show that in so doing, they're making mistakes.
而问题在于 我们要如何独立分析 Where the question of how we get an independent handle on
如何算是犯错 这是非常复杂的 what it is to make a mistake is a rather complicated one.
首先来考虑下 他对人们经常在道德情况中使用启发式的论述 But let's first think about what his argument in favor
首先来考虑下 他对人们经常在道德情况中使用启发式的论述 of the claim that in moral cases people often use heuristics is.
我将以他的两个例子为今天这一讲作结 And I'm going to close today's lecture with two examples that he gives.
然后周四 我会继续讲解一些特定情况 And then we'll begin on Thursday by running through
并要求你们对这些情况进行反应 some particular cases where I'll ask you to respond.
他举出的一个例子仍然来自乔纳森•海特的作品 So one of the examples that he provides is again some work by Jonathan Haidt
关于一种叫道德失声的现象 on a phenomenon known as moral dumbfounding.
根据你们所读的桑斯坦论文 As you know from reading Sunstein's paper,
对于如下问题 "道德是否能够接受" people often respond to the question: "Is it morally acceptable
"兄妹之间进行双方自愿 没有伤害的乱伦行为" for a brother and sister to engage in consensual, harm-free sibling incestuous relations?"
人们的反应通常是不能接受 by saying that it is morally unacceptable.
但被要求提供理由时 人们却无言以对 But when asked to provide reasons for that, subjects find it difficult to do so.
类似地 很多人都倾向于认为 用国旗拖地板存在道德问题 Likewise, many people are inclined to think there's something morally problematic
类似地 很多人都倾向于认为 用国旗拖地板存在道德问题 about wiping the floor of your bathroom with a flag,
自家的狗被撞死后 吃掉它 存在道德问题 or about eating your dog if he's been hit by a car,
但对于这些反应 他们却无法找到合适的理由 but they find it difficult to articulate what their reasons are for those responses.
桑斯坦认为 这是因为启发式的外延过度 Sunstein suggests the reason is an overextension of heuristics.
类似地 他指出 道德情况中 我们下一讲会谈到 Likewise, he points out in moral framing cases-- and we'll start with this next lecture--
像1月20日我所讲的亚洲疾病道德困境 cases like the Asian disease case that I presented you with in our lecture on January 20,
问题中 给一部分人说有多少条生命被挽救 whether you present a moral dilemma as involving lives saved,
给另一部分人说多少人丧命 or by contrast lives lost--
这其实只是对相同结果的互补描述方式 even when those are just complementary descriptions of the same outcome--
结果人们的反应非常不同 people are likely to have different responses.
桑斯坦基于此总结认为 And Sunstein concludes on that basis
人们使用启发式进行道德推理 that people make use of heuristics in moral reasoning
就像非道德推理时一样 just as they do in non-moral reasoning.
周四的课 我将以桑斯坦对这些情况的讨论开始 And we'll begin on Thursday with Sunstein's discussion of those cases,
然后让康德和密尔在电车困境辩论中最后发言 and then we'll let Kant and Mill get the last words in the trolley debate.
周四再见 I'll see you then.